


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**Inclusion – psychosocial aspects
– Part I**

*Iwona Niewiadomska,
Weronika Augustynowicz*

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e-mail: sekretariat@ipip.info.pl

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sekretariat@natanaelum.pl

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STUDIES



**Iwona Niewiadomska
Weronika Augustynowicz**

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– psychosocial aspects

Editors:

Iwona Niewiadomska,
Weronika Augustynowicz
e-mail: sekretariat@ipip.info.pl
www.ipip.info.pl

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CHAPTER 1

The inclusion of the disabled from the vantage point of Christian social ethics

Markus Vogt

ABSTRACT

The paper deals with the term inclusion, and strives to portray it from various ethical vantage points. Firstly, it focuses on inclusion and its ethical implications: society as interaction between inclusion and exclusion; the acceptance of being different as a moral principle; inclusion as a counterpoint to societal dimension of disability. Secondly, it scrutinizes human rights as the basis for inclusion: inclusion as a criterion for testing the universality of human rights; assisted autonomy; respect for different forms of diversity, as well as the risks of putting it in jeopardy. Thirdly, it tests various interpretations of inclusion from the anthropological and social justice perspectives: the potential of inclusion inscribed in the Christian image of human being; people with disabilities as a matter of special concern in the classic theories of justice; attempts to synthesize anthropological aspects of inclusion with those articulated in the social justice discourse.

Keywords: inclusion, integration, human rights, anthropology, justice, pluralism, ethics

Towards the definition of inclusion and its ethical implications

Society as interaction between inclusion and exclusion

The term “inclusion” derives from the Latin verb *includere* (to contain, to close, to lock up, to surround). As a term it is ethically neutral: whether inclusion is desirable or not depends on the value attached to a given group or the circumstances something is being assigned to. So, as a rule, normally nobody wants to be imprisoned and in most cases people want to belong to the community of citizens in the land they inhabit.

Inclusion is primarily a multi-theoretical concept: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz describes inclusion as a relation of being contained *Enthaltensein (in esse)* (Menne, 1976, p. 383f). One category of elements is included in another, when all of its elements are included in the other one. It can be understood either spatially (extensional inclusion) or with reference to particular qualities (intentional inclusion) – as Aristotle explains in the context of his analysis of logic. The larger the extent of inclusion, the lower the number or range of the qualities determinable by content, which can be testified as being common in the respective quantity. According to this linguistic analytical logic, there is a reverse proportional correlation between extent and content: a term which includes everything neither differentiates nor defines anything and therefore is empty in terms of content. Applied to the logic of order formation this means: structures and orders are always selective, i.e. they include particular elements in a given category of elements and thereby exclude others.

In the theory of systems, inclusion has been established as the principal category by Talcott Parsons. Sociologically, it implies the inclusion of the previously excluded actors in the subsystems. It is the opposite of exclusion. Following this, Niklas Luhmann interprets inclusion as participation in the achievements of particular functional systems. However, this only becomes possible through exclusion from other functional systems (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 237–241; Farzin, 2006). According to that, a complete inclusion into society and all of its component systems is not possible – society would always be a dynamic and multi-dimensional interaction consisting of various inclusions and exclusions. Against this background it becomes clear that inclusion as an ethical ideal only makes sense in reference to overcoming particular instances of exclusion. Therefore, an entirely inclusive society is hard to imagine.

In response to the observation of social, economic and political tendencies to exclusion, various scientists have developed normative concepts of social inclusion, which differ considerably from the ways the term was used by Parsons and Luhmann. From the normative vantage point, inclusion implies societal participation, and is used in opposition to exclusion. Exclusion from participation and affiliation is regarded as a cause of social inequality and social need, as well as the aftermath thereof. Therefore, inclusion is perceived as a claim and central goal of solidarity (Kronauer, 2010, pp. 24–30; Stichweh, 2005). Pierre Bourdieus' social theory receives its ethical conciseness by combining empirical analyses and social inequality with a theory of justice, thus putting forward specific demands for overcoming inequality and exclusion.

Acceptance of otherness as a moral principle

In the ethical debate, the term inclusion has partially superseded the term integration. Integration (from the Latin *integrare*: to heal, to live intact, to restore, to complete) derives from an existing society, which an individual or group has to be incorporated into. Compared to that, inclusion required for social conditions, which cause exclusion to be overcome in advance, and so aimed at direct affiliation (Kronauer, 2010, p. 5f). Therefore, inclusion and integration are two concepts that clearly differ from one another in their ethical content, even though they are used interchangeably in everyday language.

In contemporary sociopolitical debates, inclusion refers to involving people with disabilities, whereas integration strives to reach out to foreigners or to those on the periphery

of social life. The preliminary ethical decision of using different concepts and objectives by dealing on the one hand with the phenomenon of disability and on the other hand with people who are considered strangers is not indispensable. One could also think of including strangers and integrating people with disabilities. Due to its multi-theoretical origin, the term “inclusion” appears to be a compound of static elements, whereas “integration” is defined as a developing process of systemic wholeness, which corresponds to a dynamic process (see, for instance, Herbert Spencer, who was one of the first to attach primary importance to the term in his “organic” evolutionary social philosophy, Vogt, 1997, pp. 143–191). Therefore, instead of being perceived as mutually exclusive alternatives, these two terms should be considered complementary. Nonetheless, along with the shift in focus from integration to inclusion, there are also vital ethical learning processes and differentiations to be highlighted.

The supporters of inclusion consider heterogeneity as a “normal” condition. They consciously and programmatically exempt the principle from homogeneity. Homogeneity would be a fiction since every human being is unique and this uniqueness is the source of individual dignity, identity, and purpose in life. Therefore, inclusion cannot be reduced to integration in a sense that separated persons are later reunited. This concept of inclusion is pluralistic and eschews exclusion from the very beginning, as it would endanger the element of humanity in society. Inclusion does not adapt people to existing systems and standardized catalogues of achievement, but strengthens them in their capacities to love, to work and to live as autonomous and authentic beings. Inclusion is an attitude that emerges from the actions of incorporation and from creating a sense of community (Herz, 2013). The claim associated with it goes back to the very roots of our visions of the person. Therefore, inclusion is often perceived as a basic existential need, and accordingly, is understood as an entitlement and human right (Flieger & Schönwiese, 2011; Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 2011; Beilefeld, 2011, pp. 65–68). This has some far-reaching implications; for instance, the measures that make inclusion possible, such as public facilities accessible to handicapped people, should be independent from financial restrictions.

Inclusion as a counterpoint to the social dimension of disability

People are considered “disabled” if they have considerable and relatively long-lasting physical, mental and/or spiritual impairments (Speck, 1995, p. 619; Biewer, 2010). In this context, the English-language distinction between *impairment* (damage, physical or psychological deviation from the norm), *disability* (functional impairment) and *handicap* (disadvantages suffered by people afflicted with impairment) can be helpful. This distinction helps differentiate between the functional, physical, and spiritual dimensions of disability from its social dimension. The socio-ethical debate on the differences between, and also on the complementary character of, the two aforementioned dimensions, can be understood by means of analogy to the feminist debate on *sex* and *gender* (particularly with regard to the awareness of physical differences not to be rashly combined with evaluations and role patterns, the learning experience of the debates on feminism can be of considerable help for the discourse on disability, Bendl, Hanappi-Egger & Hofmann, 2004). As a rule, different aspects superimpose one another. In so far as impairment is perceived and considered as

a deviation from what is socially expected from the ability to communicate and act, these expectations are not entirely, but still to some degree, a phenomenon of social assignment.

In social terms, disabilities result from functional limitations and arise through the process of interaction, in which the individual perceives himself or herself as having certain physical-functional impairments in relation to the applicable norms. "What in the complex sense is understood as a disability, arises from interaction between the impaired person and their environment" (Speck, 1995, p. 621). The experience of functional impairment often proves to be of secondary importance for the well-being of a disabled person – the primary factors are humanitarian commitment, recognition and acceptance as well as those concerning exclusion from social participation and social relations.

"Only the reduction in these subjective needs, caused by rejection, disregard and exclusion from social relations, constitutes the entire extent of one's impairment in the context of everyday life. For the disabled person, the most critical problem is not his or her physical impairment, but the limited social contacts resulting from it, discrimination, and the fact that their identity is challenged" (Speck, 1995, p. 622).

Inclusion aims at preventing exclusion and stigmatization by the qualifying system of "disability", which is always accompanied by a certain vision of social and medical norms (Kronauer, 2002; Dorrance & Dannebeck, 2013).

Inclusion does not refer only to the way one deals with the "disabled", but also to the existential aspects of response produced by the lack of experience, which are important for every human being. Indeed, every human being has to cope with inadequacies and specific limitations in relation to their competences that change over the course of their lives. The decisive factor for the achievement of individual satisfaction and a stable identity is not the level of capacities and limits, but rather a constructive and honest approach to one's own deficiencies, and the deficiencies of other people, too. This kind of approach depends essentially on one's awareness of being treated as a respected member of a community. As it has been noted, particularly in studies on resilience research (Endreß & Maurer, 2015), those who feel recognized on their own terms and accepted as human beings can also cope with massive constraints. The appreciative approach to people with disabilities shows whether respect for human dignity is unconditional and altruistic or not. In this case, the Christian image of mankind presents perhaps the most important religious and cultural principle. Without it, "modern faith in human dignity" (Große, 2014; Küppers, 2013) is hardly understandable.

Principles of inclusion from the perspective of human rights

Inclusion as a test of the universality of human rights

In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) there is no reference to the difficult situation of people with disabilities. Attempts to make up for this were belated, when the United Nations at its 2006 Annual General Meeting adopted the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). In 2009, Germany committed itself to submit an action plan to implement the Convention in the areas of education, work, health, mobility and communication, as well as the right to personal protection, the right

to freedom and the right to self-determination (Baum, 2013, pp. 1–21; Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 2011).

In the CRPD, inclusion is not considered as a special right for a specific group, but as a necessary vehicle for expressing the universality of human rights. This is only manifested when the various living conditions of people are comprehensively considered (Bielefeldt, 2011, p. 65f). The CRPD continues to develop a full spectrum of human rights with regard to the living conditions of people with disabilities. It is about “nothing less than the core of human rights universalism, which can never be understood as simply being given, but is to be articulated ever anew in response to publicly articulated experiences of injustice” (Bielefeldt, 2011, p. 67). Inclusion is a program term for the universality of human rights, that encompasses all social groups and life conditions. This form of intentional universality is equally significant as its spatial and intercultural extension (for more information on the distinction between intentional and extensional universality, see Menne, 1976 and Farzin, 2006).

Assisted autonomy

Inclusion is based on the notion of human dignity. However, human dignity is not only an axiom that illustrates the idea of human rights, but it is also a tangible claim, in terms of the sense of dignity (Bielefeldt, 2011, p. 69). Exactly this shift from the abstract proclamation of human dignity towards reflection on the conditions of its possible experience is the decisive innovation introduced by the Pastoral Constitution of the Catholic Church, *Gaudium et spes* (1965), which links the principle of the person with that of suable human rights, thus redefining the foundations of social ethics (Hünemann, 2013, pp. 36–50). The social conditions that help disabled people experience their dignity are to be considered from the vantage point of human rights as structures that guarantee their recognition. On recognition as a keyword of normative theory of society (Honneth, 2003, particularly p. 54–105), and also on the claim to basic (status negativus) human rights, which are to be made socially tangible *via* “objectification” (cf. Honneth, 2015).

By looking at social contexts, in which the individual is aware of their own dignity and also of developing their own identity, the principle of freedom receives a new aspect: Sigrid Graumann describes it as “assisted autonomy” (Graumann, 2011; Pauer-Studer, 2000, pp. 9–65). This kind of autonomy “does not aim at the ‘autarky’ of a self-sufficient and entirely self-contained individual as portrayed in the heroic ideal of the Stoics, but aims at a self-determining lifestyle, which can never succeed without promoting and supporting social structures. This does not only concern people with disabilities, but basically every human being” (Bielefeldt, 2011, p. 72). The concept of assisted autonomy is not explicitly referred to in the CRPD. Nevertheless, Graumann plausibly points out that assisted autonomy is reflected in the mere intention of finding it, and that it stimulates the transformation of the policy on the disabled, understood as charity, to the inclusion-oriented policy on human rights. At the same time, the concept is essential for the ability to link the discourse on human rights to the Christian vision of the human being. Indeed, the dignity and freedom of the person in Christian anthropology is not considered as autarky but as an act of relationship – it requires gratitude and humility towards God, who has bestowed it on those who are created in God’s image, and God expects willingness on their part to pass on this

gift of recognition to others (Vogt, 2016). Therefore, the need for help and “grace” does not contradict dignity, but is understood as essential to human existence.

One look at the social conditionality of recognition leads to the transformation of the idea of equality: it is operationalised by making an issue of social barriers under the aegis of overcoming structural discrimination. These discriminating barriers include “collective habits, unreflected assumptions, stereotypical linguistic phrases, established selection structures in the education system, the functioning of the public transport system, the structures of the labour market, and the design of buildings” (Bielefeldt, 2011, p. 73). Therefore, equality is not interpreted in terms of the general reconciliation of differences, but is derived from the normative postulate to eliminate discrimination, and becomes concrete in reference to that (for more information on the normative sense of equality apart from the reconciliation of differences: cf. Vogt, 2012b, p. 131f, and also fundamentally by means of the term respect: Margalit, 2012).

From a human rights perspective, it is not only the understanding of freedom and equality but also brotherhood that is qualitatively redefined in the CRPD.

“Through the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities the triad of freedom, equality and brotherhood gains a new interpretation, which from now on serves as the guiding principle for the theory and practice of human rights. The claim for assisted autonomy is derived from freedom, equality becomes concrete in terms of the absence of barriers, and the principle of brotherhood is replaced by the principle of social inclusion” (Bielefeldt, 2011, p. 70f).

Brotherhood or sisterhood are, therefore, not primarily interpreted as a caring solidarity, but, above all, as inclusion in the social community, and thus as something that enables social participation.

Appreciation of and threat to diversity

The implementation of comprehensive inclusion presupposes the acceptance of otherness as a moral principle. What is significant here is attitude to diversity, which positively recognizes disability as a manifestation of social diversity (diversity or *Diversität* is a normative concept that has its roots in the American civic movements and is used worldwide as a concept against discrimination based on race, colour, descent, sex, religion, age or impairment; it has been in use in the European Union as pattern since 1990). So, the state has been obliged in the CRPD “to recognize and promote the linguistic identity of deaf people” (Bielefeldt, 2011, p. 77), and to perceive their language no longer as an emergency aid to compensate for deficits in communication, but as an expression of linguistic diversity and cultural achievement, analogous to cultural minority rights. Disability or the forms of expression and communication that arise from disability tend to be viewed as part of normal cultural diversity. The fact that the term “disabled people” is now being replaced by “people with disabilities” is a semantic attempt to take this into account: the focus is now on their humanity and not on their limitations. What is paradigmatic in this shift in focus is the renaming of the “Action for a Child in Need” into “Human Action” (the social lottery founded in 1964, supports up to 1000 projects for inclusion every month; it is present in the public realm with commercials that increase the visibility of disabled people and humorously

portray the awkwardness of what is commonly considered “normal”, using interactions between people with and without disabilities).

From an ethical point of view the diversity approach should be distinguished from a belittling approach – that is one that tends to suppress the painful experience of functional deficiency of those personally affected and their relatives – and turn it into something positive. The transformation of an experience of deficiency into an experience of overcoming and success is an individual and social achievement, that that can by no means be generally assumed. Of greater importance is a much more problem-oriented focus, that takes into account the eclipsing of functional and social aspects, and that emphasizes real experiences of the exclusion of those affected by disability. This attitude to diversity aims at reducing the social construction of disability, but it should not be used to underestimate the aspects of functional deficiency.

Due to the possibility of prenatal diagnosis of disabilities, the overcoming of the viewpoint that focuses on deficiencies gains a new eminent practical importance: “due to the growing biotechnological possibility of ‘optimizing’ the human genome, there is a risk that disabled people will be stigmatized in a new way – as products of allegedly wrong parental planning” (Bielefeldt, 2011, p. 76). The practice of “liberal eugenics” (Habermas, 2001) established in clinical practice in a border area between prenatal diagnosis, selection and therapy shows that CRPD efforts to make existential human rights universal must not be limited only to a special discourse on any socially marginalised group, but should also address a more fundamental dimension of the understanding and practical application of human rights in our late modern society. Here one should remember the debate launched by Peter Singer, on the question whether human dignity should be defined as the possession of consciousness, which would partially exclude people with disabilities (Singer, 2011, p. 196f).

Anthropological and theoretical justice interpretations of inclusion

Inclusion potential of the Christian image of the person

The biblical vision of the Kingdom of God is essentially described in Jesus’ “first speech”, (Luke 4) as inclusive of people with disabilities (Kliesch, 2011, p. 102f). The therapeutic activity of Jesus through his devotion to people with disabilities is manifested accurately in the Gospel of Mark. It is given a central place in the texts of the New Testament, where there is a record of no less than fourteen cases of the healing of infirm people and six cases of casting out of demons.

A key element in the composition of the biblical text is by no means the one that puts emphasis on at a later date as a “supernatural” medical miracle, but the unconditional attention to people in need. This signals recognition and inclusion. Healing stories are “narrative responses to the question of inclusion” (Kliesch, 2011, p. 112). They are understood as an order to be followed, and thus as a calling addressed to everyone.

The stories in which Jesus heals people are demonstrations of protest against the prejudices and exclusions that social normality has associated at times with illness, disability and suffering. These are “stories that break into a world, where the boundaries of unbearable normality are overcome for the benefit of people who are ill or handicapped. These

are stories of hope full of longing for this world not to remain as it is now” (Kliesch, 2011, p. 101). This way, they do not aim at normalization in terms of integrating disabled people into the world of those who consider themselves healthy, but aim at a fundamental renewal of relationships and value patterns.

The “prophecy” of disabled people lies in the fact, that through interaction, the healthy are compelled to accept the reality of the dynamism of dependency and certain limitations as part of human existence. The confrontation with them is an opposite pole to the suppression of one’s own limitation and weaknesses in the meritocracy. It “can point to things that we as humans actually live on: it does not primarily focus on our efficiency and efficacy, but on the trust and the humanity we share with others. A man with visible deficiencies cannot [...] as easily as the seemingly perfect people [...] delude himself and go beyond his capacities” (Mieth, 2011, p. 128). When faced with disability, healthy people are forced to reconsider the fundamental values and fragility of the inner constitution of the person.

Remaining open-minded about our perception of the person is a central concern of the idea of inclusion (Dederich, 2013, p. 36). It has to restate itself continually against the hostility to disabled people – this hostility is deeply anchored in history, in European, as well as non-European, cultures (Dederich, 2013, p. 114f). Such defence and exclusion mechanisms are psychologically explained as the fear of disability, and, as such, they require an active counter-control and communication through encounter.

The inclusive power of the Christian vision of mankind stems from the fact that it pays special attention to the injured and handicapped people, and by doing so perceives dignity as a gift bestowed by God on every human being. This dignity is to be sought and respected particularly in those who suffer. All Christians are called upon to do so. In this context, the humanitarian and socio-political calling in the face of the phenomenon of disability is to avoid social exclusion, limit dependency as much as possible, promote inclusion through the process of communication, and, if possible, support work in a way that facilitates maximum personal integration and autonomy (Speck, 1995, p. 622).

According to the principle of subsidiarity, assistance should be provided in a way that does not weaken self-responsibility and self-help, but enables and strengthens it (from the vantage point of theory of justice it can also be characterized as Empowerment-postulate, Vogt, 2009, pp. 55–63). Instead of disheartening them, help is meant to enable a person to live their life on their own terms. This can also involve efforts to relieve or alleviate pressure to be “normal”, and being “normal” means meeting the requirements associated with what is socially considered usual and ordinary [when Otto Speck calls for “normalization” as an ethical-pedagogical guiding maxim (Speck, 1995, p. 623), it appears to me problematic or at least misleading from today’s point of view; the concept of inclusion routinely dispenses with strivings for normalization in the sense of adapting to the prevailing societal standards; one can also interpret normalization in the sense of the increase in societal tolerance for deviation, and, consequently, equate it with the concept of inclusion].

The disabled as a blind spot in classical theories of justice

This rather formally undefined character of “inclusion” is compensated in the ethical debate by placing a claim on equality of opportunity. With regard to social policy, which deals with people with disabilities, this is possible only to a limited degree: the full equality

of opportunity will never be attainable, and it should not be promised, as a basic normative claim. When disability is the outcome of an error of judgement on the part of an individual or a group (for example, a road accident or a medical error), such an occurrence is a justified reason for a claim for compensation, and it is addressed to the perpetrator. However, the compensation will rarely be fully satisfactory. In addition, the theory of equality should not be used for compensation, but rather is to be used for the binding goal, namely, to minimize social exclusion caused by disability (for more information on the differentiation from the vantage point of theory of justice with regard to goal compensation, see Kersting 2005, p. 75). From the vantage point of the theory of justice, the postulate for the state to have a general obligation to compensate for handicaps associated with disability would lead to the demand for “improvement of the work of the Creator” (Kersting, 2005, pp. 67–78; Vogt, 2012b, pp. 132–134). The normative focus of the CRPD is not equality of care, but an increase in opportunities for participation in social life, as likewise the justice of participation.

In his theory of justice, which has been a dominant theme for decades, John Rawls explicitly excludes the disabled. Since his theory is based on the social contract of cooperation for reciprocal advantage and conceptualizes the maximin principle, which gives priority to the needs of the most vulnerable, merely as a modification in the given framework, the handicapped person does not generally fit into his ethical model. This blind spot in his theory of justice is often overlooked. Therefore, the ethic of inclusion cannot refer to John Rawls. His question whether the exclusion of the disabled is a fundamental weakness of his theoretical model, or whether it can perhaps be thought of as a supplementary marginality, is open to discussion (for more information on this topic, see: Ostheimer, 2016).

Martha Nussbaum, who in her book “Frontiers of Justice” deals extensively with the problem of justice raised by disability, criticizes Rawls’ theory of justice, and in her model of the social contract assumes symmetrical relations between equal individuals (Nussbaum, 2010, pp. 138–309). However, crucial problems of justice in the 21st century are marked essentially by asymmetrical relationships that cannot be modelled properly by a social contract for reciprocal benefit. She points to neediness as a central anthropological starting point in the theory of justice. Since in contemporary contract theories people with severe disabilities are excluded from establishing fundamental political principles, their status as citizens is structurally endangered. In accordance with Amartya Sen, she offers a model of capability justice that emphasizes prerequisites for the development of abilities, and proposes it as an ethical criterion for the inclusion of people with disabilities (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 2010, pp. 218–309, particularly 218f and 229–241; on education pp. 276–294).

The idea of justice cannot be adequately derived from a contract of a fictitious “equal-one”, but it must come from the responsibility for a concrete “other-one” (Levinas, 1989; Vogt, 2016). In this case, the “other-one” appears in a real singularity, and not merely as a particular case of a generality. This is the starting point for situations of responsibility. The radical otherness of the “other-one” is shifted by the presence of a third person to a different perspective, which forces one to generalize, to compare and balance the claims. Therefore, (1) the perspective of inclusion that tends to satisfy the other in his singularity without making comparisons, and (2) the perspective of justice which balances generalized claims and needs, are two perspectives that cannot be traced back to one another.

If inclusion is primarily understood as a legal principle, the “other-one” comes only into view as a generalized other. Admittedly, such legalization of the idea of inclusion is indispensable for the shaping of social order, but it also entails the danger of ignoring the as-

pect of individual responsibility. “The implementation of inclusion through legalization will fail, if inclusion is not at the same time a value that is embodied and lived by a sufficient number of people” (Dederich, 2013, p. 9). With reference to Levinas, Dederich asserts that, from an ethical point of view, the non-compromised and unconditional responsibility for the other one is an indispensable constitutive element. Policy, on the other hand, focuses on the sphere of conditional and regulated relations (for more information on the relations of responsibility and freedom for the foundations of ethics, cf. Vogt, 2016).

Attempts to synthesize anthropological and theoretical justice aspects of inclusion

Justice is a process, not a status quo that can be maintained. The biblical call to strive for “greater justice” (Mt 5: 20) should not only be interpreted by means of theological reinforcement, but also with a certain distance to the term itself. The passage from Matthew 5 can also be translated as “more than justice”. This signals an awareness that not all problems can be solved by means of the normative, general and legal categories of justice, and that ethics need to be supplemented by impulses of mercy and love, which are case-specific and cannot be generalized (Epikie). In the Reclam edition, Franz Drilmeier translates ἐπιείκεια as a „goodness in justice” (cf. Aristoteles, 1985, 1137).

However, in the biblical-prophetic tradition, the concept of justice also entails a political claim to the formation and transformation of social order. This is an original biblical impulse that has contributed considerably to the further development of the concept originally associated with actions motivated by virtue. This is indispensable today, since the phenomena of the constantly growing, massive inequality on a global scale, social exclusion and ecological destruction have been caused by major systemic inadequacies. Therefore, dealing with them requires a legislative approach.

From a socio-ethical perspective, the indissoluble tension between equality and difference is to be regarded as the core of the problem of justice (for more information on this widely divergent philosophical debate, see Vogt, 2012a). The decisive factor here is not the levelling of differences in wealth, but the provision of fair interaction, as well as the avoidance of humiliation and exclusion. The references to equality in German basic law are prescriptions for treating everyone the same way, despite their existing differences. The treatment-related limitation of the commandment to treat everyone equally in every single reference point (situation), opens up a perspective for equality that is not to be understood as the levelling of differences, but as the enabling of interaction („On the one hand, the normative sense of equality is the equivalence of the members and the unity of a community, and on the other hand it is the autonomy and spontaneity of the members. [...] The sense of equality cannot be identified with evening out, but first of all with the safeguarding and increase of the interaction opportunities”). It is about looking at, picking up and constructing a particular aspect a comparison is to be made or should be made of (*tertium comparationis*).

The authoritative *tertium comparationis* for the equality of men is to be found in the Constitution, Art. 1.1: Human Dignity. Constitution describes people not as a species, but as individuals in their uniqueness, originality and otherness.

I suggest that the different types, or three categories, of equality be systematically distinguished as indispensable and complementary dimensions of justice, and that they be

combined with the classic theories of justice developed by Aristotle – legal, distributive and commutative justice:

- equality of people as subjects of law; which is followed by the formal equality of rights, such as legal security or “fairness” (legal justice);
- equality of people in their basic needs; which is followed by the right that implies provision of basic care, according to respective cultural standards (distributive justice);
- equality in the recognition of interests; which implies that the goods and services that are exchanged during interactions should be at least equivalent to each other (commutative justice).

There is no uniform criterion of justice. Instead, the respect for boundaries between different forms of interaction and social spheres constitutes the prerequisite for creating a “complex equality”, as a variety of different opportunities and reciprocal power control (Walzer, 1992). Hence, the manifold overcoming or rejection of uniformity becomes the guiding criterion of what is just.

Especially the variety of the view points on what is considered just in the individual spheres opens up various opportunities and limits one-sided dominance. Therefore, the differentiation by the theory of justice between the spheres, cultures and culture dimensions is an essential feature of justice, as Michael Walzer stresses in his critique of John Rawls (Walzer, 1992). In various social areas – from the vantage point of the theory of justice – the principle of responsibility for the weak is to be taken into account, as well as the principle of commutative justice in the sense of equality of giving and taking, and also the aspects of productivity incentive. The idea of agonal competition has been fundamental to European approach to justice since the ancient times (for some basic information on this topic, see Kirchoff, 2015). A football team without the division into sub-groups would be unthinkable. This is precisely due to the fact that what matters in a football game is ultimately the final result, and this – perhaps in dealing with migrants – could bring about vital integration functions. It all comes down to striking a balance.

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CHAPTER 2

Social principles in the inclusion of young ex-prisoners

Stanisław Fel, Marek Wódka

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to identify a set of social principles that contribute to the inclusion of young ex-prisoners. The presentation of those principles is preceded by an outline of the analysis of approaches to the category of inclusion, i.e., in the context of integration, and a sociological profile of young ex-prisoners and their perception by employers. The authors seek a solution that would avoid both the individualistic approach that leaves ex-prisoners to their own devices in their attempts to return to society, and the approach that makes the State and other social categories responsible for this. As a result, we opt for a solution falling somewhere between the two, and based on collaboration between empowered young ex-prisoners and the involvement of a number of social groups and institutions on the basis of the necessary principles of social cooperation. The article describes the principles of personalism, solidarity, subsidiarity, openness, social justice, and social partnership, and provides examples of their application.

Keywords: inclusion, young ex-prisoners, social principles

Social inclusion is the process of including individuals, groups or social categories in society. This term is often equated with the notion of integration. Markus Vogt, German social ethicist, argues that inclusion and integration are two separate terms, even though they are often used interchangeably in colloquial speech. He claims that those notions differ in terms of the so-called ethical content (Vogt, 2016, p. 10). The starting point for understanding integration is to assume the existence of a specific form of society, with which an excluded individual or group is to be integrated. This interpretation of inclusion focuses on the elimination of social conditions that cause exclusion, and on efforts for immediate inclusion, without taking the social system as a whole into consideration. Vogt notes that the contemporary socio-political debate generally addresses inclusion in relation to people with disabilities, while integration is associated with outsiders or “those on the fringes of society” (Vogt, 2016, p. 11).

Talcott Parsons' Systems Theory introduces the category of inclusion to describe the functions a social system has to fulfil, namely adaptation, goal attainment, latency pattern maintenance, and integration, as the inclusion of new subsystems into society. In view of the above, inclusion is the opposite of exclusion. It is about including the previously excluded actors of social life into social subsystems, hence the notion of reintegration seems close to that of inclusion (Vogt, 2016, p. 10; Baratta, 2001, pp. 4–5). In the field of sociology, social inclusion is understood as the process of secondary socialisation, or reclaiming individuals or groups for the benefit of society.

Main terms associated with the application of inclusion to specific socio-economic and cultural conditions include, i.a., civic society, open society, and information society. The above-mentioned categories are listed by Piotr Szczepaniak when he describes the social context of exclusion. Civil society is characterised by collective consciousness, and its products are civil traditions and institutions. This concept includes the notions of community (*Gemeinschaft*) and society (*Gesellschaft*), introduced by Ferdinand Tönnies, and is complemented by ideas advocated by communitarianism (harmony, unity, coherence, brotherhood). This society produces involved and cooperating people (*Homo cooperativus*). Open society, on the other hand, is characterised by social mobility, especially in relation to professional and social advancement opportunities. Karl Popper exemplifies this society with democratic societies, which are open to accepting and including all human beings (inclusive) (Szczepaniak, 2014, pp. 150–151). Finally, as shown later in this article, information society, whose development is based on universal access to broadly defined information, plays an important role in the context of inclusion, which requires appropriate development of social awareness of the marginalised and the excluded.

The majority of strategies for the inclusion of the excluded have generally been implemented by national agendas or public bodies, and much less frequently by the stakeholders themselves, their support groups, or other initiative groups. Authors support the increased participation of stakeholders in this process, i.e., their empowerment. Currently, this approach has many advocates (Becka, 2016, pp. 265–371). The implementation of this approach is noticed by Szczepaniak, who declares for the subjective inclusion strategy. He argues that, in practice, subjective approach should be dominant, but objective approach is more common. Social work has a system for addressing social problems through support and empowerment, which builds on similar ideas as the subjective inclusion of individuals who experience problems with social functioning and are aware of their inalienable right to address such problems with a view to being included in the broadly defined social life (Szczepaniak, 2014, pp. 149–150).

The idea of inclusion and its standards characteristic for the subjective approach provide for extensive cooperation between various entities in relation to efforts for the inclusion of the previously excluded social life actors. The success of such efforts largely depends on the principles followed by the parties involved in the process of inclusion. This issue will be addressed in this study, which specifies fundamental social principles behind the process of inclusion of a specific group, namely young ex-prisoners.

Social profile of young ex-prisoners and attitudes of employers to their employment

This attempt to identify the social principles behind the process of including young ex-prisoners shall start with the construction of the social profile of social actors involved in the process of helping young ex-prisoners enter the open labour market. The application of practical solutions should take into account that the generalised character of the presented profile of the individual actors naturally includes some simplifications and requires each case to be addressed individually.

According to the results of selected sociological studies, an average ex-prisoner appears to be a person with relatively low social capital resources. Ex-prisoners have relatively poor networks of social connections, even in respect of family relations. As a result, they do not receive any support, even from their immediate family, when they attempt to enter the labour market. Ex-prisoners are characterised by the lack of professional experience and relatively low level of education, which, in a way, might seem obvious in the analysed age group. This group has no knowledge about navigating the labour market, and generally lacks resourcefulness. This profile, based on empirical knowledge, portrays an average young ex-prisoner as having relatively poor professional, social and personal skills. The initial position of this category of people on the labour market is further complicated by their relatively high payment expectations, disproportionate to the above-mentioned skills and the actual situation on the labour market.

Employers are another leading social actor. This study considers their attitude towards prospective employees, who have a criminal record. There seems to be certain variation in this respect. But the stereotypical (negative) attitude to candidates with a criminal record can be considered dominant. Positive, or at least neutral, attitudes to this category of people are characteristic of the employers who have previously hired persons who have been imprisoned.

Social principles as the rules for the development and functioning of modern societies

Individuals who have been excluded, for whatever reason (disability, criminal record), usually do not feel sorry about their own physical, intellectual, or mental limitations, or those connected with their difficult past, but rather about the disturbed social interactions, and the experienced discrimination and stigmatisation (Vogt, 2016, p. 13). In view of the above, for this problem to be solved, the relevant strategy must be based on the norms and principles that underlie social order and whose essential objective is the successful inclusion of the excluded.

Efforts for the inclusion of young ex-prisoners in the labour market should be based on the social principles that constitute the rules for the development and functioning of modern societies. Those principles serve to reduce the multitude of the manifestations and requirements of social life to simple, fundamental relationships. Ultimately, efforts to formulate such principles are to identify the basis for solutions that improve the quality of measures, and help to explain, organise and shape them. However, they are not actionable principles, executive regulations or prescriptions, but basic rules that are important for

creating frameworks and procedures. Therefore, they are more general in terms of their application and reliability. They are particularly relevant for high social dynamics and transformation processes, which make society lose, or at least reduce, its understanding of previous ways of explaining reality and frames of reference (Baumgartner & Korff, 2009, p. 225).

It needs to be noted that fundamental social principles that are the basis of the socio-economic system were identified in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997. As early as in its *Recitals*, it calls on everyone to respect the inherent human dignity¹. The person, who has dignity, is the absolute value, the measure of all things. This status is the basis of the personalist principle, which requires that social life and the law that governs it be designed in a way that serves the person and facilitates their optimum growth. The *Recitals* also refer to the principle of subsidiarity. This part of the Constitution states that the Polish legal system is based, i.a., “on the principle of subsidiarity that strengthens the powers of citizens and their communities”. In addition, the *Recitals* explicitly refer to the principle of solidarity. Article 2 of the Constitution invokes the principle of social justice (“The Republic of Poland shall be a democratic State ruled by law and implementing the principles of social justice”). Article 20, which provides guidelines for the economic system, invokes, i.a., the principles of solidarity, dialogue, and cooperation between social partners (“A social market economy, based on the freedom of economic activity, private ownership, and solidarity, dialogue and cooperation between social partners, shall be the basis of the economic system of the Republic of Poland”). The common good is mentioned several times. In the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the *Recitals* address the fundamental social principles in the context of respect for inherent human dignity.

Further on, this study will attempt to substantiate the claim about the applicability of the above-mentioned social principles in the field of inclusion. It seems that especially the application of the subsidiarity principle in relation to the partnership between public bodies and third-sector organisations in the field of inclusion of young ex-prisoners in the open labour market would support the transition from the dual model of such relationships to the collaborative model (in line with the typology proposed by Benjamin Gidron, Ralph M. Kramer and Lester M. Salamon, 1992). As a result, the above-mentioned constitutional provisions would no longer be considered merely as “ceremonial rules”, which are just part of a façade, and, instead, actual social mechanisms would be introduced, building on those principles.

Principle of personalism

As argued by Markus Vogt, the inclusion of the excluded is based on the most fundamental conviction about the dignity of the person. This value has grown to become the personalist principle associated with human rights, and has formed the basis for the modern concept of social ethics (Vogt, 2016, p. 14). This principle builds on the dignity of the person. It is what makes the person special, an end in themselves. They must not be treated instrumentally in any social, economic, or political frameworks. This is emphasised, e.g., by

¹ We call upon all those who will apply this Constitution for the good of the Third Republic to do so paying respect to the inherent dignity of the person, his or her right to freedom, the obligation of solidarity with others, and respect for these principles as the unshakeable foundation of the Republic of Poland (*Recitals*).

Article 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland: “The inherent and inalienable dignity of the person shall constitute a source of freedoms and rights of persons and citizens. It shall be inviolable. The respect and protection thereof shall be the obligation of public authorities”. Any social solution is justified only as long as it serves the person and creates conditions conducive to their growth. The subjective approach to the person as the source, creator and goal of each social institution, builds on the premise that social institutions, social structures, and systemic solutions are not solutions designed by nature, or ones based on some sort of a biological code, or previous practices. They are man-made and developed as a result of various circumstances.

The application of the personalism principle requires solutions that will contribute to human growth, not humiliation or degradation. In respect of rights, the dignity of the person requires equal treatment for everyone. Article 32 of the Polish Constitution states that “1. All persons shall be equal before the law. All persons shall have the right to equal treatment by public authorities. 2. No one shall be discriminated against in political, social or economic life for any reason whatsoever”. The role of the most objective test for the respect for the dignity of the person in social life is played by human rights (Fel, 2015, pp. 132–133; Kupny, 2007, p. 82). The degree to which such rights are respected corresponds to the level of respect for the dignity of the person in social life.

Principle of solidarity

The development of society is the most effective when it is based on collaboration. On the one hand, the individual requires services from society, and on the other, society depends on the services provided by its members. The principle of solidarity builds on multiple interrelations between all members and on various responsibilities that stem from this fact. In society, social groups, with various relationships between them, interact with one another. Solidarity can be manifested as the awareness of the membership of communities connected not only emotionally but also through shared interests. This is the source of the obligation to be responsible for one another, and the exclusion of any individual or group goes against the principle of solidarity.

Therefore, there is a number of motivations behind the responsibility for the weaker members of society. These range from religious, to humanistic, and economic. Solidarity, as a principle, is universal in nature, and it does not admit any form of exclusion. In contemporary European societies, solidarity is oriented mainly towards socially vulnerable, exploited and excluded individuals (Baumgartner & Korff, 2009). Specific cases include, i.a., those who have been marginalised and those who have lost in social competition.

Relationships between people result in mutual obligations. Such obligations are found in all the communities we are members of, and they have three forms: obligations between individuals and groups, obligations of individuals and groups in relation to society as a whole, and obligations of society as a whole in relation to individuals and groups. Therefore, solidarity excludes selfish separation and ruthless pursuit of individual interests. It always requires the interests of the community to be taken into consideration as the common good. Consequently, the achievement of the objectives set as part of the solidarity principle requires something more than just moral calls for action. As a social principle, it should be the structural element of institutions. Solidarity should be applied as a legal principle, or,

more specifically, obligations imposed on the individual by solidarity should become legally enforceable in some crucial areas. And conversely, undertakings whose status garners support from the ethical/social point of view, should not be subject to the “kindness” of the authorities, but rather become a legally sanctioned entitlement.

The principle of solidarity is inseparably linked to the principle of subsidiarity, which is intended to secure the implementation of the common good and human development through the appropriate cooperation between public bodies, NGOs and individual members of society.

Principle of subsidiarity

The principle of subsidiarity governs the rights of individuals and small communities (“from the bottom”), and responsibilities of the State and large communities (“from the top”) (Spieker, 1995, pp. 35–37). It regulates social relationships between large and small communities, and between communities and individuals, so that large communities provide supplementary help to small communities (individuals) (Millon-Delsol, 1995). The principle of subsidiarity defines the skills that serve as the basis for the allocation of responsibility. Socialisation should always be beneficial for the person, and it should contribute to their individual well-being. Since this is best achieved through own action, it is important to act and help in such a way so as to facilitate own action. The purpose of the role of the State and society as support providers to the individual and small communities is to allow the individual and communities achieve their objectives.

This theory distinguishes between the following aspects of subsidiarity – negative, positive, and the associated gradual withdrawal of assistance. In its negative aspect, the subsidiarity principle requires that the support not be provided, so that social actors (individuals and small and large communities) do not have their initiative and responsibility stifled. In its positive aspect, it is to be implemented when individuals or small communities, operating according to their place, position and rules, lack something. In practice, this means that assistance is provided on a one-off basis and as effectively as possible, to help the individual or medium-sized groups operate independently. This is known as helping people help themselves. Gradual withdrawal of assistance, on the other hand, requires that such help be reduced as the supported entity begins to succeed in its objectives on its own (Dylus, 2016, p. 55).

Therefore, the principle of subsidiarity ensures that responsibility is taken for one’s own actions. It safeguards the natural rights of individuals and small communities. It regulates the competence of authorities and the distribution of power. The State must not have the competence that restricts people’s freedom and responsibility. The State should not be interested in, or interfere with, the things that individual citizens or small communities are capable of doing. This is reflected in the following saying that synthetically describes the principle of subsidiarity – *as much State as necessary, as much society as possible*. The principle of subsidiarity stands against any demands for absolute social or national competence, thus safeguarding pluralism in a free society. However, this does not mean that the principle of subsidiarity calls for a weak State. It is more about organising the State in a way that allows it to achieve its specific objectives. In the welfare State, which is now represented by the majority of countries in the Western Hemisphere, this seems particularly valid. Indeed, such

societies are likely to burden the State with the responsibility for all possible services. At the same time, they show less and less understanding (in terms of their readiness for funding) for the central objectives of the State, such as legal protection and security.

In relation to the inclusion of young ex-prisoners in the open labour market, the principle of subsidiarity has several applications. The first concerns the distribution of tasks and competence between the public sector and NGOs in respect of the provision of professional assistance. Even though the distribution of responsibilities between public institutions and civil society, based on the principle of subsidiarity, favours NGOs to some extent, it does not absolve public administration bodies of all responsibility. Ultimately, the latter remain responsible for the systemic solution of problems on the basis of the subsidiarity principle, and for the effective functioning of the solution. Clear distribution of competence requires that public bodies remain responsible to persons seeking support, regardless of whether they have delegated their functions to third-sector organisations, or merely included them in their fulfilment. This means that public bodies should not be solely responsible for the objectives related to the integration of young ex-prisoners on the labour market, because they are not able to cope with it. Instead, they should choose the most suitable entities to complete each task related to such integration (Millon-Delsol, 1995, p. 60). Such suitability is both about economic effectiveness and appropriate support quality. Experience of Germany, a country with a long tradition of organising social services on the basis of the subsidiarity principle, shows that neither public sector institutions alone, nor the social sector alone, can meet the obligations in the area of social services, both for financial and organisational reasons (Leś, 2000, p. 171).

The second application is associated with the facilitation of independent action, as postulated by the subsidiarity principle. Nothing brings people so many benefits to the development of their personality, as their own actions and achievements. Each individual capable of independent action achieves growth and excellence through their own actions (e.g., athletes through sport activities, craftsmen through professional activities). The achievement of professional and social competence, through one's own actions, results in both improved self-esteem and social recognition. Therefore, the process of inclusion should seek to implement the aspect of the subsidiarity principle that rises in the defence of individuality, subjectivity, and independence of each person.

In addition, the principle of subsidiarity is the basis for determining the order in which various communities are asked to provide assistance. The first community that provides help should always be the one that is the closest to the person in need, and whose resources are sufficient to provide the required support. This suggests that professional support should be provided by the entities that are the closest in qualitative (first smaller, then larger ones) and quantitative terms (that have the actual contact, according to G. Küchenhoff's proximity principle) (Küchenhoff, 1959, pp. 201–206).

The last aspect of the discussed principle is known as the gradual withdrawal of assistance. Assistance provided on the basis of the subsidiarity principle should be gradually reduced. This means that, as beneficiaries' ability to function independently improves, support providers gradually withdraw from the provision of assistance to young ex-prisoners.

So far, this analysis has arrived at the following postulates, that should be the consequence of the application of the subsidiarity principle in the inclusion of ex-prisoners: 1. Create systemic solutions, which will allow small communities and individuals (in this case, public bodies that act as employment agencies at the regional level, NGOs and individuals) cope,

without the need for the State to interfere and “manually control” the process of developing solutions to problems. 2. Provide the above-mentioned social actors with financial and professional instruments and tools for informing the public. 3. Create opportunities for undertaking professional work in open labour market institutions. 4. Gradually withdraw support as the defined objectives are accomplished, until no support needs to be provided any more.

Principle of openness

The inclusion of ex-prisoners in the open labour market seems to rely on the principle of openness. In this case, it must not be limited to its narrow, legal understanding, which refers mainly to the openness of administrative procedures and access to public information. In its narrow sense, it is about making the information about administrative procedures and the available public funds and their allocation public². Such information is subject to public scrutiny. Sometimes, the principle of openness is differentiated from the principle of transparency. The latter is understood as a situation, in which the framework for the funding of undertakings, and the distribution of responsibilities and competence, as well as the use of procedures and code of conduct, including the publication of performance results for individual public bodies, are all made public and clearly defined. In a way, transparency is the precondition for openness, as it makes the available information comprehensible and interpretable.

The principle of openness in relation to the inclusion of young ex-prisoners, and especially the cooperation between public and social partners, should be understood in a broader and multifaceted way. In its narrow sense, openness seems to be relevant at the administrative stage in public bodies that serve as employment agencies. To be precise, when jobs are offered by employers, it is important that they accurately define the skills they expect their future employees to have. The clarity of such criteria can help eliminate, or at least reduce, discrimination on the grounds of the candidate’s criminal record. The issue of personal data openness, which might be in conflict with personal data protection and every citizen’s right to privacy, is much more complex³. What makes it so, among other things, is the scope of information about young ex-prisoners’ complicated past to be revealed by them, and the respect for their right for privacy in their relationships with colleagues. In addition, this issue is complex due to the combination of social (stereotypical prejudice), organisational (need for trust at the workplace), and legal problems (personal data protection law).

In relation to the principle of openness, it seems justified to increase employers’ awareness of the benefits they could derive from the employment of young ex-prisoners. Such benefits can be obtained as a result of new trends that have emerged in corporate management, such as corporate social responsibility (CSR). Indeed, the employment of young

2 Public authorities include commune, district and province bodies, and their organisational units. In its ruling, the Supreme Administrative Court stated that this category shall also include “... entities, which, in the organisational sense, are not part of administration, but are established by law to manage and implement public tasks” (SAC ruling of 6 March 2008, I OSK 1918/07, LEX Legal Information System No. 505424).

3 For more information about the right to openness and its restrictions, please see B. Dolnicki, R. Cybulska, *Realizacja zasady jawności i dostępu do informacji publicznej w samorządzie terytorialnym (The principle of openness and access to public information in local government)*, <http://antykorupcja.edu.pl/index.php?mnu=12&app=docs&action=get&iid=14840> (accessed on 20.12.2016).

ex-prisoners might become one of the ways for companies to put this more and more prominent idea into practice. Corporate social responsibility is about expanding company's operations beyond its narrow, basic, "conventional" objectives, and supporting stakeholders, i.e., entities affected by the company, and vice versa, those that affect the company, and, as a result, determine the achievement of its primary objectives (Adamczyk, 2009). This approach stems from the growing social awareness of the fact that economy is not a fully autonomous area, but functions as part of a broader social system. This awareness translates into the social expectations that businesses take responsibility for their stakeholders. Some businesses consider responsibility as their social obligation, while others accept social responsibility merely as part of their efforts to create a positive corporate image, or a marketing strategy. In both cases, the employment of young ex-prisoners has a beneficial effect on the implementation of corporate social responsibility by businesses. In practice, this should be combined with a social outreach campaign, presenting the situation of young ex-prisoners as a social problem, and their employment as the fulfilment of corporate social responsibility.

A specific way to apply the principle of openness in social life is through a massive educational campaign to inform society about current social problems, including those closely connected with economy. The application of this principle to the area addressed here should produce a social outreach campaign that presents this problem objectively. A successful outreach campaign should result in changes in the stereotypical image of young ex-prisoners among the general public, and in the development of the attitude of social responsibility for the resolution of this problem.

Principle of social justice

The principle of social justice covers the norm of relationships between individuals and social groups, and between social groups themselves, governing their rights and mutual obligations by requiring that everyone get what they deserve. What someone deserves is understood "socially", i.e., it takes into account the position of individuals in broader social relationships, and the requirements of social order, which manifests itself in the common good. While justice is the quality of a specific entity and a positive social trait, social justice is a value that is fostered in social life as a result of specific individual behaviour. Due to the dynamism of social life and its growing complexity, rather than a satisfactory social reality, social justice continues to be a desire shared by a large number of people, and a leading idea in the efforts of individuals and social groups, who aim for a more humane society. Nevertheless, as an idea, social justice has a positive effect on the operation of social forces and the functioning of social structures (Sztompka, 2016, pp. 232–234). In addition, there is always the issue of social justice interpretation, both in relation to its content and ways of its application. Social justice, that takes into consideration the individual good achieved through the pursuit of the common good, is the foundation of efforts intended to respect human dignity in social order. Its function is, firstly, to make sure everyone can exist and develop, and enjoy basic freedoms. Therefore, the goal of social justice is to give each person what they deserve as humans, based on their inalienable dignity. This goal is achieved through order aimed at the common good. Anna Kieszkowska takes this into account in her inclusive-catalytic model for the rehabilitation of convicts, arguing that, in practice, the convicts' perception of the world, and the perception of convicts by society,

vary considerably. In society, relationships and interrelations are often not considered in terms of the common good, and antagonisms and exclusion are very strong in many environments. In the above-mentioned rehabilitation model, convicts are given a chance to become entities that function autonomously, participate in rehabilitation programmes, try to change their perception of the world, redevelop or acquire interpersonal, prosocial and professional skills, which are necessary for functioning in their families and social and professional groups (Kieszkowska, 2012, p. 16). The effects produced by such efforts contribute to the broadly defined common good.

Principle of social partnership

Public-social partnerships should play a key role in the development of mechanisms for the inclusion of young ex-prisoners. Such partnerships are fostered by legal regulations concerning cooperation between public bodies and NGOs. The multitude and diversity of social aid and integration institutions and NGOs that support ex-prisoners on the labour market, make it necessary to have and enhance systemic and permanent solutions for the mode, scope and form of their operation. The individual powers, objectives and missions of public and social partners should not overlap but complement each other, based on cooperation without the domination of any organisation.

It is important to note some practical consequences of the structure of the Polish NGOs that provide post-penitentiary assistance. In addition to a large number of small NGOs which operate in this area, there are several major organisations. Large organisations are usually more professional, have greater human and infrastructural resources, and an impressive track record, and, as such, they can be “better” partners for public sector institutions. As a result, they might be provided financial support and might have a large number of projects commissioned to them. However, the more numerous, smaller NGOs operating in post-penitentiary assistance provision, increase the chances of introducing innovative solutions. In addition, their range of operations, usually more local in nature, is more likely to take local labour market conditions into account.

In respect of the need for help, the principle of partnership is complemented by the subsidiarity principle, which requires action from the communities that are the closest, in qualitative and quantitative terms, to the support recipient. In this case, these are the smaller NGOs that are closer to young ex-prisoners. Possible risks here include competition between NGOs that could attenuate smaller organisations, whose reach is limited, also geographically.

Principle of effectiveness

The principle of effectiveness is understood as the most positive relationship possible between the resources used to achieve the established goals, and their outcomes (Nowak, 1994). In relation to the process of supporting the inclusion of young ex-prisoners on the labour market, this principle has two meanings – a narrow one, which means as effective an access to support as possible, and a broad one, where effectiveness is understood as the achievement of the goal of providing optimum social and professional skills that allow

the support recipient to function on the labour market in a comparable way to people without a criminal record.

In relation to this principle, it is important to consider at least its two aspects – the most fundamental, economic aspect of effectiveness, and its broader, social aspect. It is crucial to avoid short-term solutions, because certain systemic approaches might seem too costly in the short run, and only the complete launch of the system in the long-run produces comprehensive, including economic, effects (Vogt, 2015, p. 108). The professional growth of young ex-prisoners can contribute not only to the individual improvement in their quality of life, but also to the reduction of social and economic costs of their being unemployed.

Conclusions

Efforts for the inclusion of young ex-prisoners in the labour market should be based on the social principles that constitute the rules for the development and functioning of modern societies. Those principles serve to reduce the multitude of the manifestations and requirements of social life to fundamental relationships, and, ultimately, to identify the basis for solutions that improve the quality of measures, and help to explain, organise and shape them.

Undoubtedly, the application of the principles described above in the area of the inclusion of young ex-prisoners in the labour market, contributes to the achievement of the objectives established as part of social inclusion. Many efforts are being taken to foster social inclusion, or even integration of various groups of the excluded. Despite ambitious regulations, convicts who go out of prison are yet to be covered with an effective and comprehensive programme for their inclusion in the open labour market, although such solutions are already being developed. It seems necessary to take the described social principles into account not only to make such solutions effective, but also to give society a sense of social responsibility, which should lead to cooperation in this area.

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CHAPTER 3

Inclusion of future generations from the perspective of intergenerational justice

Łukasz Marczak

ABSTRACT

The inclusion of future generations is prerequisite for intergenerational justice, which manifests itself in the access to resources across generations. On the one hand, responsibility for future generations seems obvious, but on the other, it creates a number of dilemmas, as such generations do not exist in the present. This responsibility has made it necessary to establish rules for the exploitation of natural resources to satisfy the needs of current generations without compromising the development opportunities of future generations. The purpose of this article is to present the category of future generations in view of the ecological crisis, and to identify the responsibility we have towards them. The article concludes with an attempt to define practical rules for the management of natural resources, while taking the interests of future generations into account.

Keywords: social inclusion, future generations, intergenerational justice, Catholic social teaching

Introduction

The processes of inclusion focus on providing various social groups with rights that they have not enjoyed before. Those processes are characteristic of contemporary societies, which have seen a marked shift from exclusiveness to inclusiveness (Słaboń, 2010, p. 72). This transition will also affect future generations – people who are yet to be born. People of the future, who do not exist yet and have no identity, do not have any rights yet (Lewandowski, 2015, p. 13). Therefore, on the one hand, the category of future generations, or rather their real absence, creates many dilemmas, but on the other, it is the subject of study which has become more and more prominent in the Catholic social teaching (CST) as part

of ethical considerations concerning the protection of the environment in view of the responsibility for future generations.

This study starts with the presentation of social justice as the central value in the organisation of social life. Later on, it presents the category of future generations against the backdrop of the ecological crisis, and defines responsibility to them on the basis of Dieter Birnbacher's theory about the representation of future generations' interests. Birnbacher (1999) argues that the "generation" category is a group of people born in a specific period of time, whose interval corresponds to the average period in which children become parents and parents become grandparents (Birnbacher, 1999, p. 17). Therefore, the category of "future generations" means the future children of specific people, i.e., generations, that will exist after the current generation (Lewandowski, 2015, p. 13). In the context of rules for managing natural resources, this study views "future generations" as generations that are more distant in time. The article concludes with an attempt to define practical rules for the management of natural resources, while taking the interests of future generations into account. For this purpose, it will use the elements of the circular economy proposed by Markus Vogt in an attempt to combine them with the logic of gratuitousness advocated by Pope Benedict XVI in his *Caritas in veritate* encyclical.

Social justice – central value in the organisation of social life

The constancy, continuity and topicality of the CST are all based on the transcendental human dignity, and the continuous verification whether the conditions for human development are fair or not. The dynamics of the social teaching of the Church are linked with the emerging, new issues, which now apply not to individual people, local communities or States, but to humanity in general. In this sense, Franciszek Mazurek uses such phenomena as extreme poverty in Third-World countries, international debts, terrorism, and degradation of the natural environment, to demonstrate the lack of respect for the person (Mazurek, 2007, p. 14).

Dynamic approach to the category of social justice adjusts the norms of justice to the changing social reality (Bogusz, 2013, p. 148). While social problems that are faced by the specific participants of social life can be resolved with the basic ethical and social principles in order to stand up for the rights of the unemployed or people excluded from social life, in the case of people who will only exist in the future, our moral duty generally boils down to the category of responsibility. In this respect, social justice and solidarity acquire intergenerational, future dimensions, while at the same time becoming difficult to define clearly as a result of the lack of reference to any specific social reality.

Social justice, understood in the CST as one of the primary moral virtues, an ability involving readiness to give all people what they rightly deserve, in the perspective of future generations requires respect especially for the inalienable dignity of the persons who will come to be, and the provision of conditions for their decent life and growth (Żeleźniak, 1993, p. 171). It would be unfair to put more emphasis on the intergenerational aspect of social justice, thus limiting the rights of the people who live now, and depriving them of growth opportunities. A perfect approach to the priority of intragenerational justice, while also expressing concern for future generations, is presented by Pope John Paul II in his Social Triptych, which comprises three social encyclicals, namely *Laborem exercens*, *Sollicitudo rei*

socialis and *Centesimus annus*. The Pope reconstructs the socio-economic order brought to ruin by real socialism. The reconstruction of the social and moral order, reflecting fair living conditions of contemporary people, and presenting an attitude of responsibility for future generations, is achieved through the acknowledgement of the real concept of the person, subjective importance of human work, balance of power in the context of a democratic State, and human ecology. Social justice is implemented when people regain their central position across all areas of life.

Social justice can be categorised according to synchronic and diachronic categories. The intergenerational aspect of social justice is considered in diachronic terms, where the living conditions of generations separated by time intervals are compared. As argued by Joachim Wiemeyer, it is the issue of intergenerational justice, which focuses on future generations, that is now the most frequently addressed in relation to the environment. In addition, it is important to consider intragenerational justice, categorised synchronically and expressed through the traditional types of legal, replacement, or distributional justice, all of which refer to a closed time frame (Wiemeyer, 2011, pp. 72–74).

Future generations in the context of the ecological crisis

In view of the growing ecological crisis, the category of future generations has been given special focus in scientific dispute since the late 1980s. It corresponds to the concept of sustainable development, which combines social justice in its intragenerational, synchronic aspect, and intergenerational, diachronic aspect, with economic growth and ecological sustainability (Vogt, 2009). Below, you will find a description of future generations during a shift from intragenerational justice, expressed in global social inequality, to intergenerational justice, illustrated with climate change, and even a proposal to recognise a new geological era.

Global development inequality

The existence of future generations has come into question as a result of the irresponsible management of natural resources, whose extraction and exploitation have been determined, i.e., by the excessive consumption and production by contemporary generations. In addition, the domination of affluent countries, many of which have grown rich as a result of the overexploitation of resources, and which have ignored their moral duty to respect fair division of global resources, has contributed to growing neocolonial dependence, characterised by various degrees of technological innovations and level of value added, as a result of which poor countries struggle more and more with the problem of social exclusion, resulting from poverty, unemployment, housing shortage or illiteracy (*Sollicitudo rei socialis*, 1987, 14–15). Clearly, such injustice, which affects current generations in intragenerational terms in relation to the socio-economic area, must be addressed, especially given the growing risk of injustice in intergenerational terms.

The more explicit the huge, global development inequality between economic and social growth, industrial production and services, and technological-economic growth and the state of the environment, the more imperative it is to take action for the development of

tools for bridging such gaps (Mazurek, 1993, p. 93). This requires appropriate international cooperation, “which does not exclude profit, but considers it a tool for the achievement of humanistic and social goals” (*Caritas in veritate*, 2009, p. 46). The overexploitation by some countries, and unfair economic relations, have negatively affected not only the development of poor Third-World States, but also former Communist republics (*Caritas in veritate*, 2009, p. 49). In the second half of the 20th century, the lack of responsibility for one another have made “starving nations desperately turn to the affluent nations” (*Caritas in veritate*, 2009, p. 17; *Populorum progressio*, 1967, p. 15).

The concept of consistently implemented sustainable development is an attempt to reconcile the responsibility for contemporary and future generations at the levels of individual States and the world as a whole. Its global character and long-term perspective results from the noticeable degradation of the environment, which, however, sometimes seems to be overemphasised or ideologically motivated with the use of catastrophic narration, which often focuses on non-anthropogenic factors (Łużyński, 2013, p. 51). On the one hand, it is a fact that the ecological crisis has been observed since the second half of the 20th century, but on the other, its actuality and the seriousness of risks for human existence have been called into question. Even though current generations of people living in the 21st century are proud of the technological progress that has created favourable opportunities and prosperity, without the comprehensive and responsible management of scientific progress, and the containment of the associated risks, technological and scientific advancements might endanger all generations (Veith, 2004, p. 305). Ecological disasters, including nuclear power plant accidents, which have become the reason for seeking new ways of obtaining energy and management system modifications, might serve as warnings for contemporary generations (Vogt, 2014, pp. 19–37).

Climate change

In addition to disasters – sporadic, yet having devastating consequences, the ecological crisis is explained by the more and more often questioned climate change resulting from increased greenhouse gas emissions. Scientists who explore climate change believe that the future of coming generations depends on the continuously growing temperature of the globe, whose increase by 2°C compared to the pre-industrial times, is expected to have catastrophic consequences. Climate change, its forecasts, and dangerous consequences, have also been acknowledged by the Holy See in the long-awaited first ecological encyclical, in which Pope Francis argues that “if present trends continue, this century may well witness extraordinary climate change and an unprecedented destruction of ecosystems, with serious consequences for all of us” (*Laudato si'*, 2015, p. 24).

However, the most serious consequences are expected to be faced by developing countries, which struggle with poverty. Many poor people, who live in areas affected by phenomena associated with climate change, migrate. Max Plack Institute has warned that the increase in temperature in some regions around the world might even lead to mass migration. Pope Francis, too, has associated the migrations with the destruction of the environment, claiming that “there has been a tragic rise in the number of migrants seeking to flee from the growing poverty caused by environmental degradation; they are not recognized by international conventions as refugees” (*Laudato si'*, 2015, p. 25).

Anthropocene – are we there yet?

In his recent social encyclical, Pope Francis notes that “climate change is a global problem with grave implications: environmental, social, economic, political and for the distribution of goods; it represents one of the principal challenges facing humanity in our day” (*Laudato si'*, 2015, p. 25). The London Geological Society has proposed that a new epoch of geological time, anthropocene, be recognised to account for the impact of human activity on the environment. The Society argues that this new epoch, resulting from our unquestionable domination over nature, is characterised by irreversible changes in the damaged environment. This is exemplified by geologists with the occurrence of plastiglomerates, matter created as a result of mixing molten plastic and lava flowing out of volcanoes and covering large areas of Pacific islands (Corcoran, Biesinger & Grifi, 2009, pp. 80–84). Even though the idea of anthropocene, identified as a result of the development of urban-industrial society, has become more and more common in literature, stratigraphers argue that there is insufficient scientific evidence to officially accept it (Davis, 2009).

In view of the above, the destruction of the environment has become a serious global problem, which affects the interests of future generations. The inclusion of such interests, as the requirement of intergenerational justice, is advocated especially by global agreements designed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, particularly following the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris (*Adoption of the Paris Agreement*, 2015). Concern for future generations is also expressed in the respect for the specific nature of national economies, incapable of transformation on the basis of renewable energy sources, but making efforts for the neutralisation of harmful greenhouse gasses, and developing technologies for improving efficiency in areas such as energy, and resource, material, and waste management. Such efforts, supported through education to increase environmental awareness, actually express solidarity of contemporary generations with the generations that have not been born yet (Małachowski, 2012, pp. 35–44).

Responsibility towards future generations

Responsibility for future generations stems from solidarity and intergenerational justice, and nowadays, as shown by the overview of the ecological crisis, it is global in nature (*Caritas in veritate*, 2009, p. 50). A recurring question in the debate on the theory of justice concerns the rights of future generations. Tim Mulgan argues that the theory of generational justice is valid without the discussion about the rights given to future generations. Human rights are not the only starting point for ethical theories, including the theory of justice. Jörg C. Tremmel (2012) claims that the theory of justice needs to focus more on issues concerning resources and goods that should be available to future generations. This raises the question *what present generation should leave for future generations?* How many goods do we owe future generations (Tremmel, 2012, pp. 117–118)?

In addition to the emphasis on the importance of intergenerational justice, expressed in care for the environment as a living space for future generations, it is important to establish limits of responsibility. In this respect, M. Vogt (2009) asks questions concerning some practical issues related to the potential status of future generations. Can the norm of justice, which applies to human relationships, be used in relation to potential beings, who have not

yet come into existence? In what ways can intergenerational justice be ensured, given that current generations do not know the needs of future generations, or have only a vague idea of such needs? In what way can current generations be encouraged to feel responsible for their descendants, given the fact that future generations will not be able to repay people who live now for the efforts and sacrifices they make for posterity? (Vogt, 2009, pp. 386–387).

In view of the controversy over the limits of responsibility of current generations for those to come, scopes of ethical responsibility are defined. Based on the theory of the representation of future generations' interests, D. Birnbacher, an ethicist who departs from the anthropocentric approach, identified four major scopes of responsibility, namely temporal, ontological, content-related and motivational (Birnbacher, 2009, pp. 91–93, 96–105).

Temporal scope

The category of future generations covers people, whose existence we are able to forecast. Birnbacher notes that people from the future will have to come to grips with the fact that certain resources are unavailable to them because they have been depleted (Birnbacher, 2009, p. 96). This is inevitable, but at the same time it confirms a certain intellectual human capability, which allows us to create technology for using the resources available during our lifetime in order to survive. Markus Vogt argues that, in this sense, history is a teacher, that teaches current generations that technical innovations have often proved crucial for the ways resources have been used (Vogt, 2015, p. 1). In addition, the temporal scope shows one of the fundamental functions of social obligations, which is to expand responsibility to include people from outside the circle of emotional proximity (Birnbacher, 2009, p. 97).

Ontological scope

Responsibility for future generations in the ontological scope refers to the anthropocentric approach, which is based on responsibility for posterity. In this sense, the anthropocentric ontological scope diminishes the importance of biocentric, patocentric and ecocentric interpretations and suggests that future non-human beings have a certain instrumental value that serves the well-being of future human generations (Birnbacher, 2009, p. 97).

Content-related scope

The content-related scope of responsibility is associated more with ensuring the well-being, and satisfying the potential needs, of future generations, than with the obligation to ensure their survival. Moreover, the content-related scope, which refers to the improvement of the well-being of future generations, supports the utilitarian model of intergenerational justice. It is based on the distribution of wealth, whose size varies between historically different generations. As a result, current generations, which, for various reasons, strive for the satisfaction of their primary needs and well-being, are less obliged to secure the future of subsequent generations (Birnbacher, 2009, pp. 98–100).

It is also important to bear in mind that responsibility for future generations in the content-related scope must not be a minimalistic option that is to secure the resources left by ancestors for future generations. Each generation is required to use the available resources in a way that leaves the appropriate quantity and quality of resources for prosperity (Birnbacher, 2009, p. 100). Vogt claims that the implementation of intergenerational justice should result in the so-called world left behind, in which the innovative capacity is sustained and similar opportunities for well-being and growth are provided (Vogt, 2009, p. 389).

Motivational scope

The motivational scope of responsibility for future generations is essentially about the development of a connection between generations. Birnbacher argues that this should be achieved through gratitude to our ancestors (Birnbacher, 2009, p. 104). In relation to this requirement, Wojciech Lewandowski identifies two rules, namely intergenerational golden rule and intermediate gratitude rule (Lewandowski, 2015, pp. 125–126).

In view of the presented scopes of responsibility for future generations, the last part of this study focuses on the inclusion of future generations' interests in the principle of sustainable development. This principle is applied through practical rules for resource management, which take into account the responsibility for people who are yet to be born, based on the circular economy concept. This model of resource management is combined with the logic of gratuitousness advocated by Pope Benedict XVI in his *Caritas in veritate* encyclical. The encyclical formulates proposals for the long-term bridging of global development gaps, and the principle of sustainable growth, which is yet to be explicitly advocated in the social teaching of the Catholic Church, is expressed in the combination of the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity.

Logic of gratuitousness and the circular economy

Responsibility for future generations is expressed in the principle of sustainable development. Various habits of contemporary people, manifested, e.g., in national debts and excessive use of natural resources, contradict intergenerational justice. Vogt considers structural mistakes as the source of such problems, hence requirements for the responsibility for future generations must be associated more with the issues of politics and economic management (Vogt, 2009, pp. 390–392). This social ethicist from Munich, Germany, argues that, generally, there are no clear criteria for the implementation of global solidarity with future generations (Vogt, 2009, p. 374), so his ethical-social principle of sustainable growth calls for management rules oriented towards the inclusion of future generations in the contemporary socio-economic reality.

The contemporary cultural and moral crisis, which manifests itself in development disparities and destroyed environment in certain regions around the world, requires a far-sighted, profound revision of the resource management model (*Caritas in veritate*, 2009, p. 32). The conditions for the actual growth of each person can be created in sustainable systems, which comprise a market, a State, and a civil society, and do not preclude the logic of responsibility and gratuitousness. However, this logic cannot be actualised without

the unanimous responsibility for one another among the people who live now, especially in the economic entity management practice. The logic of gratuitousness is the precondition for social justice, which is manifested in organisations who pursue social objectives and provide help (*Caritas in veritate*, 2009, pp. 38–42).

One of the proposals that could follow the logic of gift-giving and gratuitousness is the concept of the circular economy, which is becoming a crucial reference point for the well developed economies of EU Member States. The concept of the circular economy was introduced by David Pearce and R. Kerry Turner in early 1990s (Andersen, 2007, p. 135). The first of its two pillars is the principle known as *cradle-to-cradle*, which concerns the design and manufacture of items with the intention of reusing them. This requires that non-renewable resources be used less extensively, and replaced with alternative, renewable resources. The second pillar of this concept is *industrial symbiosis*, which involves cooperation between economic entities, which are excluded from the network of interactions (Persson, 2015, pp. 3–4). A number of areas where the circular economy can be applied are presented by Joseph Huber in his book on environmental sociology (Huber, 2011, pp. 174–177).

While industrial symbiosis refers to the imitation of processes found in nature, and, from the point of view of the anthropocentric trend in the CST, it can be questionable, natural symbiosis could, in a parallel fashion, reflect the nature of economic cooperation as the result of the created conditions, under which each entity has the right to participate on an equitable basis in economic processes, while taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the economic system. However, economic cooperation, understood in a similar way, as economic symbiosis, should exclude any form of fighting against one another or even parasitism, and it should be rooted in the function of the State as the provider of aid to economic entities oriented towards supportive cooperation. The analogy to symbiosis must not create an economic system that would follow spontaneous rules, similarly to the self-regulating market. At the centre of its network of interdependencies, the analogy should put the person, considered as the regulator of economic processes, which resonate with the social and ecological systems (Vogt, 1998, pp. 209–210). Based on the ethical principle of *Retinität* [German – *thinking and acting in networks and systemic relationships* – translator's note], such a symbiotic economic interdependence considers human dignity as the fundamental value in the processes occurring in interdependent systems – economic, social and environmental. This principle of interconnectedness, based on *Retinität*, encouraged the system of ethical-social rules to incorporate a new ethical-social rule, i.e. that of sustainable development, which, as argued by Władysław Piwowski in his system of rules, is a specific social principle designed to create normative order. As a social rule, it is a specific social justice principle (Piwowski, 1993, pp. 64–68). In addition to introducing the sustainable development rule and expanding qualitatively the common good category (Schallenberg & Menke, 2016, pp. 173–174), this social principle is the ethical key to the interpretation of economic processes focused on the protection of the environment using technologies based on the generation of power from renewable resources.

Efforts to create environmentally oriented economies, characterised by their focus on low carbon dioxide emissions, must bear in mind the continuous coexistence of nations, where the development and reconstruction of statehood and economy is still a key factor in their growth (*Caritas in veritate*, 2009, p. 41). Well developed States must not forget about solidarity with countries that develop at a slower pace. In view of the ecological policy, this global solution is mainly the responsibility of well developed States (Dylus, 2005, pp. 152–153).

Principles of the circular economy

The circular economy is based on the substitution of natural resources and “weak” sustainable growth, which assumes that non-renewable resources can be replaced by other resources (Weiß, 2014, pp. 315–316; Hauff, 2014, p. 60). As argued by Holder Rogall, a supporter of “strong” sustainable development, since the 1980s, recycling has developed considerably, but in the early 21st century, the amount of recycled materials has decreased, and the recycling rate dropped (Rogall, 2010, pp. 529–534). Nevertheless, Vogt claims that the circular economy is more about the implementation of research programmes designed to develop principles for the substitution of resources, rather than about the emphasis on the effects of previous measures. Consequently, Vogt uses the following advice as the fundamental rules for the circular economy: 1. No renewable raw materials are to be used during their regeneration; 2. The amount of harmful substances and waste materials produced is not to be higher than the processing capacity of ecological systems; 3. The use of non-renewable resources should be compensated by the creation of substitutes, so that future generations are provided with similar opportunities for their welfare; 4. In order to avoid risks, the damage to ecological systems is to be so small that it can be controlled (Vogt, 2008, pp. 411–412).

The above-mentioned rules for the management of natural resources according to the circular economy, put special emphasis on intergenerational justice, which takes future generations’ interests into account.

Subjectivity and responsibility of current generations

On the one hand, the concept of the circular economy advocates the implementation of new technologies as a result of technological and economic progress, but on the other, there is a high risk of excluding the poor, the sick, the elderly, refugees and migrants from social life (*Centesimus annus*, 1991, p. 57). In view of the above, it is important to bear in mind that the intergenerational justice dimension is closely connected with the intragenerational justice dimension (*Laudato si’*, 2015, p. 162). Respect for human rights in the economic domain and the encouragement of mutual responsibility in society for the development of a State ruled by law, which ensures the “subjectivity” of society and reaffirms the transcendent dignity of the person, are the preconditions for social growth (*Centesimus annus*, 1991, pp. 46–49). In the context of the care for the environment and welfare, at the core of social growth is innovative low-emission economy based on the latest substitution technologies. In addition, well developed States, which follow this policy in their resource management, must not forget about the redistribution of wealth and profit. Otherwise, resource management will contribute to increased inequalities and poverty (*Caritas in veritate*, 2009, p. 42).

What guarantees social development, which safeguards the dignity of each person, in respect of both the future and the present, is the constant vigilance against any results of social exclusion, and appropriate laws, the compliance with which ensures social order. Any structural injustice, that leads to the exclusion of social entities, whose certain rights are based on the inalienable dignity of the person, is the example of the failure to respect fundamental ethical and social principles of the natural law, including in particular the guiding principle of subsidiarity. The combination of this widely accepted social principle with ethical and

social principles of the common good and solidarity makes it possible to clearly introduce detailed organisational principles of social life at both local and global levels (Piwowarski, 1993, pp. 64–68). This regularity supports the proposal for the full inclusion of the poorest countries in the world into the human community. This proposal has been advocated in the social teaching of the Church since the *Populorum progressio* encyclical (*Caritas in veritate*, 2009, pp. 54–59).

The social responsibility of current generations that respect fundamental moral values, is necessary for democratic stabilisation, which provides a solid basis for the security of interests, also those of future generations. However, attempts to address the issue of economic production or legal organisation, when made alone, are insufficient. They have to be supported by reference to ethical values that will guide economic efforts towards the logic of gratuitousness (*Centesimus annus*, 1991, p. 52, 60). Of all the values related to quality human life that is worthy of man, the one whose importance has been growing is the environment. This is due to the importance of the person, who is strongly connected with the environment, which is their natural setting. Through work, nature is transformed to harness it and use for human purposes – it becomes an instrumental, rather than an intrinsic, value. However, it is important to bear in mind that, from the CST point of view, the logic of gratuitousness on the one hand considers the environment in relation to the private property of economic entities, and on the other to the property generally intended for the common good of all people.

Conclusion

Even though there are certain inadequacies in the implementation of intergenerational justice in terms of the fair distribution of, share in, and exchange of, resources, such implementation must not be abandoned, as it stands up for the interests of future generations, demanding that they be taken into consideration in innovative resource management solutions. Intergenerational justice is manifested in the approach to resource management, which follows the principles of justice, as adopted by current generations, who are ever more convinced that their successors will also refrain from violating the dignity of the person (Wiemeyer, 2011, p. 78). Therefore, the provision of development opportunities to future generations is the result of respect for the dignity they deserve.

While no rights can be attributed to social life actors who do not exist yet, in a spirit of responsibility for them, they must be provided with similar opportunities for growth and welfare. Such responsibility for future generations is fulfilled through the above-mentioned practical management rules, which, in the long term, provide people of the future with opportunities for access to natural resources. However, for future generations not to be burdened with the consequences of irresponsible management, current generations of consumption-oriented people need to change their mentality and adopt new lifestyles that put more emphasis on such things as consumption economy, sensible economic investments, and the logic behind the redistribution of profit (*Caritas in veritate*, 2009, p. 51; *Laudato si'*, 2015, p. 23).

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CHAPTER 4

Adult Children of Divorce (ACOD) – personal adjustment and preferred coping strategies

Iwona Niewiadomska, Ewa Jakimowicz, Weronika Augustynowicz

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on Adult Children of Divorce (ADOC), i.e., adults who have been caught in the middle of their parents' divorce in their childhood. Difficult situations they have gone through as a result of the divorce continue to affect their lives, and influence their cognitive and emotional functioning, and social adjustment. The article addresses the relationship between personal adjustment and preferred coping strategies in this group. This questionnaire-based study covered 35 young adults. The obtained results show that adult children of divorce with poor personal adjustment tend to prefer avoidance strategies, avoid independent decision-making, and are afraid of getting involved. A significant correlation was also established between high level of adjustment and rare use of the support-seeking strategy, which could suggest that those ACOD are self-sufficient but distrustful.

Keywords: personal adjustment, coping strategies, adult children of divorce, ACOD, divorce, family

Theoretical background

Divorce, as a social phenomenon, was first addressed as late as in late 19th/early 20th century, when marriages were observed to be dissolved on a mass scale. At that time, divorce was considered a family dysfunction. This phenomenon has continued to be on the rise ever since, and people's attitude to it have changed. Wallerstein (1986) describes divorce as a crisis, Lazarus (1987) thinks of it in terms of stress, and Moss (1986) characterises it as a series of tasks and skills. However, regardless of nomenclature, they all agree that this is a stressful experience, whose impact can be compared to a natural and final loss caused by death or natural disaster.

Psychological studies on divorce generally focus on how spouses and their children experience and cope with this difficult situation. It has not always been clear whether parents' divorce affected their children. Long and Forehand (1987), and also Kurtz and Derevensky (1993), showed that divorce has negative consequences for children. They claim that such consequences persist for up to two years. However, other studies showed certain long-term after-effects of parental divorce. These can be observed in the social, emotional or behavioural sphere, even after many years (Aro & Palosaari, 1992; Kalter, 1987). Those findings gave rise to scientific endeavours to explore a whole range of effects that divorce might have on functioning and adjustment among children coming from single-parent families, also in adulthood. The term Adult Children of Divorce (ACOD) was coined on the basis of the Adult Children of Alcoholic (ACoA) syndrome. Both syndromes are related to Adult Children, so "Children of Trauma" (Gravitz & Bowden, 1987), who, despite the external façade of being adults, deep inside still consider themselves to be small, naughty children. Jim Conway (1995) describes ACOD as follows – "adult persons, whose life continues to be devastated as a result of the emotional or legal divorce of their parents, or dysfunctional marriage prior to divorce" (Conway, 1995, p. 32). Conway emphasises that this syndrome can also affect persons whose parents never divorced, but have never actually lived together but alongside each other; these are families with disturbed relationships, involving many arguments, or completely lacking contact. Even though they live together, such families can be divorced emotionally for a long time. Wallerstein and Blakeslee (2005) define this group as persons who have been deprived of childhood as a result of their parents' divorce, which gave them a certain identity and self-image which have an important influence over their current and future lives. Kaja and Wróblewska (2013) also developed a definition that describes Adult Children of Divorce. They characterise ACOD as adult persons who share similar problems, difficulties and experiences they had to go through. All those definitions have four main aspects, namely (1) the fact of being an adult, (2) the experience of divorce, or family break-up, in childhood, (3) the impact of past situations on current functioning of the person, and (4) adjustment problems. To sum up, Adult Children of Divorce is a syndrome that is present in adult people, who have experienced the divorce of their parents in childhood; difficult situations they have gone through as a result of the divorce continue to affect their lives, and influence their cognitive and emotional functioning, and social adjustment.

Adjustment among Adult Children of Divorce

Cognitive adjustment of ACOD is characterised by excessive sense of responsibility for other people (Conway, 1995), giving up one's needs to satisfy the needs of others, the desire to be accepted by everyone (Wallerstein & Blakeslee, 2005), the fear about the durability of relationships, in which they are involved, the belief that arguments bring no good, but are a disaster for the relationship (Kaja & Wróblewska, 2013), and low self-esteem. According to a study by McGuire (1987), 58% of the studied population, whose parents had divorced, still sought external approval. ACOD reasoning is based on the conviction that they will be accepted and liked, and they will feel good if they meet all the requirements of other people, and if they make other people happy. This is impossible to achieve, causing frustration and only reinforcing their belief that they must do even more. The perception Adult Children of

Divorce have is disturbed by the deep fear concerning social relationships. The experience of being abandoned and betrayed is an inseparable part of their life and is also carried over to friendly or intimate interactions. They consider each relationship a high-risk one, and analyse various situations against the possible danger of relationship break-up (Conway, 2010).

This social maladjustment of the Adult Children of Divorce is visible not only in their attitude to important persons, and their efforts not to lose them (Conway, 1995; Wallerstein & Blakeslee, 2005), but also in major problems with asking for help, inability to establish close relationships (Franczak, 2011), to maintain and foster long-term friendships (Kaja, 1993), unwillingness to have relationships formalised (Beer, 2005), or to have children (Kaja, 1993, 2013). A study by Franczak (2011) shows that Adult Children of Divorce are socially maladjusted. As a result of family break-up, they develop a maladjusted personality with inadequate social relationships. The deficiency of emotions, presence of negative situational factors, emotional and health-related disorders – they all put children from single-parent families at a serious disadvantage when it comes to entering social roles, such as that of a daughter, a son, a friend, a student, and an employee (Velleman & Orford, 1990). The feeling of guilt experienced in childhood, and the burden of responsibility for parents' problems and family break-up, can lead to emotional disorders and contributes to the development of many asocial behaviours (Cudak, 2010). A longitudinal study by Zill, Morrison & Coiro show that the negative effects of divorce manifest themselves in children approx. 12 to 22 years after the divorce.

The fear of becoming fully involved in a relationship is associated with the fear of making the same mistakes one's parents have made (Wallerstein, 1986), i.e., fear of cheating on, or being cheated on by, one's spouse. ACOD often say that "if you do not marry, you will not get divorced" (Knox, Zusman & DeCuzzi, 2004). Therefore, ACOD stay longer in relationships before they decide to marry, compared to a control group of adults from complete families (Knox, Zusman & DeCuzzi, 2004). In a way, this fear is justified. Research shows that Adult Children of Divorce do divorce more often (Kulka & Weingarten, 1979; Wallerstein, 1986; Krein & Beller, 1988; Crowder & Teachman, 2004). Kaja (1993, 2013) shows that the likelihood of divorce or separation is two times higher for this group. But when they decide to marry, it is a deliberate and well-thought-out step, taken in the sure knowledge that their partners feel the same way (Conway, 2010). However, other analyses show that the daughters of divorced parents are more likely to start their own families very early, often before they turn 20, and to have children early, even before they marry (Wallerstein, 1986). A study by S. W. Whitton and his colleagues (2008), conducted on a group of 161 women and 94 men, confirm that Adult Children of Divorce are more distrustful and reluctant to marry. These adjustment characteristics are more often observed in women than in men, so the lack of trust and commitment is as likely to occur in relationships where both partners have divorced parents, and in ones where only the woman comes from a single-parent family.

In addition to the fear of making the same mistakes as their parents, and the general fear of failure, the Adult Children of Divorce are characterised by impatience (Kaja, 1993, 2013), often a sense of helplessness (Conway, 1992; Wallerstein & Blakeslee, 2005), excessive emotional control, including the suppression of anger and bad temper (Kaja, 1993, 2013; Conway, 2005; Wallerstein & Blakeslee, 2005), and the sense of not being worth of love, because you are not perfect (McGuire, 1987; Conway, 1992; Kaja, 1993, 2013; Wallerstein

& Blakeslee, 2005; Trent & Weeden, 2006; Cudak, 2010; Franczak, 2011). For ACOD, negative emotions, such as anger, hostility, emptiness, and grief, are more painful (Conway, 1995; Wallerstein & Blakeslee, 2005). Most of them report deriving less satisfaction from their life and experiencing more mental discomfort, compared to persons raised in complete families (Wallerstein, 1986). The feeling of loneliness, harm, and betrayal, which are first experienced in connection with the divorce, as a result of failure to receive love from one's mother and/or father, continues to be felt in adulthood (Cudak, 2003). A study by McGuire (1987), shows that 51% of adults whose parents have divorced, have felt different and alienated since their parents' marriage broke up. This indicates a specific emotional illiteracy, i.e., a substantial deficit in the ability to express emotions, which results from insufficient social and mental interactions, but also the lack of emotional bonds with parents (Brągiel, 1996). This illiteracy is also associated with huge problems with identifying and naming negative emotions, both in oneself and in other people (Cudak, 2003).

Coping strategies preferred by ACOD

Adult Children of Divorce are persons who experienced many, different difficult situations in their lives. Their experiences have been inseparably linked with chronic stress in major spheres of their life. The coping strategies used in childhood often continue to serve as the preferred ones in adult life, and the difficult situations experienced in childhood affect coping in this group. The most typical coping method among ACOD is avoidance – ACOD prefer not to get involved, are afraid of active measures, which, in their opinion, lead to disappointment and pain, they use such strategies as quick withdrawal, delay in decision-making, and withdrawal from social life (Beer, 2005; Trent & Weeden, 2006). The area where the functioning of Adult Children of Divorce is distinctive are interpersonal relations, characterised by a substantial degree of caution, limited trust, and prudence (Cekiera, 1985; Farnicka, 2013). The strategy involving cautious action is typical for the described syndrome, but is limited to friendly and intimate relationships. In their interactions with other people, ACOD tend to contemplate each step and behaviour. They are afraid to open up and to trust other people (Cekiera, 1985). In difficult interpersonal situations, this strategy is used by the majority of respondents (Farnicka, 2013). Despite the considerable degree of caution and prudence in interpersonal relationships, Adult Children of Divorce need and seek social, and especially emotional, support. A study by Kaja (1992, 2013) shows that ACOD seek social support as much as the control group made up of persons raised in complete families. They seek support from their close relatives and want to be cared for (Cudak, 2010). The need for intimacy and love, unsatisfied during their childhood, follows them every step of the way. In order to satisfy it, ACOD would do anything to win approval and love (Kaja, 1993; 2013, Burrett, 2006). This strategy also includes loyalty towards other people (Farnicka, 2013), and honesty, or lies, depending on the situation, so as not to lose their position in the group (Cudak, 2003). Often, they would also pretend to have a neutral, or even negative, attitude towards their loved ones, to protect their relationships and avoid any conflicts, as they do not accept them (Burrett, 2006; Wallerstein & Blakeslee, 2006). On the other hand, Adult Children of Divorce are often forced by the situation at home to assume the role of a parent. The need to look after their siblings, support their parents, and do household chores, causes such persons to accept too much responsibility (Conway, 1995,

2010; Burrett, 2006). They approach difficult situations in a task-oriented manner, perceiving the problem as an obstacle to be overcome, thus reducing the role and involvement of emotional processes (Farnicka, 2013). The COPE Inventory describes such rapid action intended to remove the stimulus as Active Coping. Hobfoll (2006), in turn, considers them as assertive action.

Moderators of the relationship between coping and personal adjustment in ACOD

Adult Children of Divorce constitute a rather diversified group. Their adjustment, behaviour and social relationships depend on many things. One of major factors is their experience of the divorce situation and relationships with family members. As argued by Paulina Boss (1991), it is not the divorce itself that affects the child, but their perception of it. The literature on the subject describes many social and personal moderators of the relationships between coping and adjustment in the group of Adult Children of Divorce. These include the atmosphere of family life prior to the divorce, as the element that affects its impact on children (Smith, 1995; Ensign, Scherman & Clark, 1998; Burrett, 2006; Hart, 1996; Joedge, 2006; Kaja & Wróblewska, 2013), the mental well-being of the parent who is given custody over the child (Raschke, 1988; Amato, 2000; Pruett, Williams, Insabella & Little, 2003), and the maintenance of a good relationship with at least one parent, which cushions the impact of the conflict between parents on children, and positively influences their adjustment (Ensign, Scherman & Clark, 1998). Another social moderator variable is the reason for the divorce (Beer, 2005). When children discover the motives behind their parents' decision, this has positive impact on their adjustment. This knowledge produces higher self-esteem and life satisfaction in children, and reduces their efforts to suppress depression (Kaja & Wróblewska, 2013). The number of children in the family and the order of births also matter (Burrett, 2006).

Despite the profound importance of social, family moderators, the greatest impact on personal adjustment and coping preferences is exerted by personal factors. The way the individual functions and copes depends on their idiosyncrasies, and personal and mental characteristics (Burrett, 2006; Kaja & Wróblewska, 2013). Many studies consider the age of children at the time of the divorce (Allison & Furstenber, 1989; Amato & Keith, 1991; Brągiel, 1996; Burrett, 2006; Kaja & Wróblewska, 2013), or their gender (Emery, 1982; Amato & Keith, 1991; Zill, Morrison & Coiro, 1993; Smith, 1995; Brągiel, 1996; Kaja & Wróblewska, 2013) as factors that determine their functioning in the future. An important element that determines personal adjustment and coping preferences in the group of Adult Children of Divorce is the perceived social support (Brągiel, 1996; Sęk & Pasikowski, 2006; Kaja & Wróblewska, 2013). The severity and duration of the long-term consequences of parents' divorce depend on children's capacity to establish and use support systems (Amato & Keith, 1991).

Own research methodology

The following question was raised on the basis of the literature on the subject *What is the relationship between personal adjustment and coping preferences in the group of Adult Children of Divorce?*

Tools used

Personal adjustment was measured using Rotter Incomplete Sentence Blank. The questionnaire comprises 40 sentence stems, to which respondents are required to add endings. Adjustment is measured as the score obtained across all items; higher results correspond to poorer adjustment. Test reliability in the adult version is approximately 0.92, with significance level $p < 0.001$. Test result analysis also took into account the factors identified by Kalinowski and Niewiadomska (2010), including non-family relationships, family relationships, attitude to oneself, desires and goals, and experienced problems.

Preferences for coping strategies were examined using three questionnaires, namely the Strategic Approach to Coping Scale (SACS) by S. E. Hobfoll, the COPE Inventory, a multidimensional coping inventory, by Ch. Carver, M. Scheier and J. Weintraub, and the Brief RCOPE, a measure of religious coping with major life stressors, by K. I. Pargament.

The Strategic Approach to Coping Scale is used to examine the coping strategies preferred by the individual. It identifies 9 subscales, which can be divided into 3 major factors, or profiles, namely Active-Prosocial Coping, Active-Antisocial Coping, Asocial Coping (Hobfoll, 2006). In this study, the Strategic Approach to Coping Scale (SACS) was used together with items from Brief RCOPE that assess two coping strategies – Positive Religious Coping and Negative Religious Coping. COPE is based on the model of stress developed by Lazarus, and on the behaviour Self-Regulation Theory. It is designed to examine the individual in terms of their coping with stress, distinguishing between “Dispositional Coping” and “Situational Coping”. The questionnaire comprises 15 scales, which make up the following coping styles: Active Coping, Avoidance, seeking of support and emotion-focused coping (Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989).

In order to examine the hypotheses, the study used Pearson's r for the purposes of the statistical analysis of the obtained data. It defines the linear correlation between two variables. Its value is in a closed interval and ranges between -1 and $+1$.

Study group

The analysis covered questionnaires filled in by 35 persons (29 women and 6 men) who were Adult Children of Divorce in their early adulthood. The majority of people in the study group (71.4%) lived in cities with more than 100,000 residents. Most respondents were learners (82.9%), and some of them also worked (28.6%). The lowest number was represented by young adults who were only professionally active (17.1%). The majority of respondents declared that they were single (54.3%), some were in an informal relationship (34.3%), and only 3 persons were married (8.6%). One person got divorced (2.9%) and there were no widows/widowers.

Another important variable is the time that has passed since the divorce of respondents' parents. On average, divorce took place 11 years ago, and standard deviation was 6.23 years. The majority of respondents witnessed their parents' divorce between 11 and 15 years ago (28.57%). When asked about the reasons for their parents' break-up, 17.14% of respondents responded that they did not know. Other answers included unfaithfulness (40%), alcoholism (40%) and incompatibility of temperament. After the divorce, a substantial majority of respondents remained in the custody of their mothers (80%). No one lived only with their father, but 14.3% of respondents lived with each parent in turn. In more than half families, mothers did not build up a new relationship (51.42%). No respondent reported frequent changes in their mothers' partners, and the least frequent scenario was remarriage by the mother (11.43%). Divorced fathers, on the other hand, were the most likely to establish informal relationships (45.71%). However, there was a significant differentiation, because the following two answers received the same result: *My father did not establish a new relationship* and *My father has had many partners* (25.71%).

In order to address the research question, the study formulated the following hypotheses, based on the analysis of the literature on the subject:

- H1: There is a correlation between a low level of personal adjustment and frequent use of avoidance strategies by ACOD.
- H2: ACOD characterised by a high level of personal adjustment often use support seeking strategies.
- H3: A high level of personal adjustment in relation to experienced problems and desires and objectives correlates with frequent use of active strategies.
- H4: A higher level of personal adjustment correlates with frequent use of positive religious strategies.

No significant correlations were observed for the last two hypotheses. This might be due to the considerable diversification of the group in terms of coping. Studies show that hardships can be perceived by ACOD as intolerable, catch-22 situations (Kaja & Wróblewska, 2013), which can dishearten and discourage them from overcoming such obstacles. On the other hand, ACOD must become very responsible and independent as early as in their childhood (Conway, 1995). Personal adjustment in these areas is an individual matter and depends on one's background and experience. Similarly, positive or negative attitude to religion, or using it as a coping strategy, depends on one's personal experience and is not something characteristic of the study group as a whole.

Hypothesis 1 was confirmed. There is a strong positive correlation between the use of avoidance strategies and personal adjustment in the study group. This correlation is characterised by considerable statistical significance.

Table 1 *Correlation between personal adjustment and avoidance strategies in the group of Adult Children of Divorce*

<i>Preferred coping strategies</i>	<i>Personal adjustment</i>	
	<i>Pearson's r</i>	<i>p</i>
Avoidance behaviour*	0.562	0.000
Avoidance**	0.464	0.005

* Measured using the COPE inventory ** Measured using the Strategic Approach to Coping Scale (SACS)

Total score for personal adjustment shows strong positive correlation with avoidance behaviour measured using the COPE inventory. Correlation coefficient is 0.562 and $p = 0.000$. In addition, the study investigated correlations between personal adjustment and Avoidance strategy from the Strategic Approach to Coping Scale (SACS). Correlation also proved significant with $p = 0.005$, and $r = 0.464$ indicates that the correlation is moderate.

Based on these results, the study rejected the null hypothesis and formulated an alternative hypothesis about the existence of a one-way correlation between the variables. The stronger the tendency to opt for avoidance strategies, the poorer the personal adjustment in the study group. This hypothesis was supported.

Fearing failure and that they will make the same mistakes as their parents, ACOD refuse to take action, which is associated with their poor personal adjustment (Kaja & Wróblewska, 2013). As a result of parental divorce, this group might stop actively seeking solutions and escape into the world of fantasy and dreams instead (Finzi, 2007), which is not conducive to successful adjustment. ACOD tend to be helpless, postpone their decision-making, withdraw from social life, and often back out or put things off, waiting for a better time (Beer, 2005; Trent & Weeden, 2006; Coway, 2010), which is associated with their poor personal adjustment in emotional, social and cognitive terms.

The analyses showed a correlation between support-seeking and personal adjustment in the group of Adult Children of Divorce.

Table 2 *Correlation between personal adjustment and support-seeking and emotional focus strategies in the group of Adult Children of Divorce*

<i>Preferred coping strategies</i>	<i>Personal adjustment</i>	
	<i>Pearson's r</i>	<i>p</i>
Seeking emotional support*	0.498	0.002
Seeking instrumental support*	0.369	0.029
Seeking social support**	0.416	0.013

* Measured using the COPE inventory ** Measured using the Strategic Approach to Coping Scale (SACS)

The hypothesis formulated on the basis of literature predicted a negative correlation between the explained and explanatory variables. Findings show an inverse correlation. The Seeking social support strategy, measured using the Strategic Approach to Coping Scale

(SACS), shows significant positive correlation. Strategies measured using the COPE inventory, too, show significant positive correlations with the total score for personal adjustment.

This remarkable but significant correlation between frequent use of support-seeking strategies and poor personal adjustment can be associated with the specific nature of ACOD as a group. Due to their poor personal adjustment they tend to insist on seeking emotional or instrumental help from other people (Kaja, 1993, 2013; Burret, 2006; Farnicka, 2013). As a result of having dysfunctional families, ACOD lack some personal resources, have no self-confidence, and feel powerless. Consequently, they seek support from other people, but often do not receive it. The ways in which they seek support are ineffective, so they feel even more maladjusted.

Our findings might also indicate a significant correlation between high levels of adjustment in such aspects as Relationships outside the family, Desires and goals, and Experienced problems, and rare use of support-seeking strategies. This could suggest that Adult Children of Divorce are self-sufficient. Literature shows that such people tend to be very responsible and independent, because they need to grow up fast (Conway, 1995, 2010; Burret, 2006). When their family breaks up, children are often left to fend for themselves, so they have to take care of themselves, see about the house, or help their siblings. ACOD can be self-sufficient in the sense that they do not need support in situations in which they feel they are doing well and feel well adjusted.

Table 3 *Correlation between social support-seeking and personal adjustment aspects in the group of Adult Children of Divorce*

<i>Personal adjustment aspect</i>	<i>Seeking social support**</i>	
	<i>Pearson's r</i>	<i>p</i>
Relationships outside family	0.427	0.011
Relationships within family	0.106	0.546
Attitude to self	0.138	0.430
Desires and goals	0.489	0.003
Experienced problems	0.449	0.007

* Measured using the Strategic Approach to Coping Scale (SACS)

Table 3 shows correlations between personal adjustment aspects and social support-seeking strategy, measured using the Strategic Approach to Coping Scale (SACS). Significant correlations are observed in such aspects as Relationships outside family, Desires and goals, and Experienced problems.

Table 4 *Correlation between social support-seeking and personal adjustment aspects in the group of Adult Children of Divorce*

<i>Personal adjustment aspect</i>	<i>Seeking emotional support*</i>		<i>Seeking instrumental support*</i>	
	<i>Pearson's r</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Pearson's r</i>	<i>p</i>
Relationships outside family	0.367	0.030	0.263	0.127
Relationships within family	0.205	0.237	0.078	0.656
Attitude to self	0.128	0.463	0.159	0.362
Desires and goals	0.433	0.009	0.411	0.014
Experienced problems	0.490	0.003	0.373	0.027

* Measured using the COPE inventory

Table 4 presents correlations between personal adjustment aspects and Seeking emotional support and Seeking social support strategies, measured using the COPE inventory. There are significant correlations between Relationships outside family and Seeking emotional support, and between Desires and goals and Experienced problems, and both described strategies. All the correlations are moderate.

Both methods show an inversely proportional correlation between personal adjustment aspects Desires and goals and Experienced problems, and support-seeking strategies. When ACOD are well adjusted in relation to their plans, goals, and problem-solving, they rarely seek support. As shown in a study by McGuire (1987), ACOD find it difficult to ask for help, so they prefer to cope on their own, using their own resources and abilities, believing that no one else can help them. On the other hand, poor adjustment in these areas might be associated with frequent, but ineffective, seeking of social support. Significant correlations are also observed between seeking support and personal adjustment in terms of relationships outside family. In social interactions, whether intimate or friendly, poorly adjusted Adult Children of Divorce seek social or emotional support. However, no such correlation is observed for instrumental support.

The above-mentioned findings offer new psychological insights about Adult Children of Divorce, their functioning, personal adjustment, and preferred coping strategies. These conclusions can be used to help this group of people develop their coping strategies. Special attention needs to be paid to the effectiveness of the support ACOD seek. Knowledge of personal adjustment can also be tapped to provide various forms of therapy. Such efforts could help ACOD change their preferred coping strategies, reduce their anxiety and avoidance in relationships and behaviour, and, consequently, contribute to their positive adjustment and improved quality of life.

It would be advisable to broaden the knowledge of the problem addressed in this study. Further analyses and larger study groups would help verify these findings and provide more information about Adult Children of Divorce. The issue that needs to be explored further is the direction of the correlation between personal adjustment and support-seeking preferences in this group. This study focused solely on young adults. If middle-aged and older adults were taken into consideration, this could help identify correlations resulting from the passage of time from their parents' divorce. Last but not least, it would also be advisable

to further explore the support experienced and sought by ACOD, as well as their resources, in order to develop more effective support measures.

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About authors

MAŁGORZATA ARTYMIAK – Psychologist, mediator, PhD in the Humanities, specialising in psychology, Psychology graduate of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Head of the Psychological Centre for Diagnosis and Therapy, University of Economics and Innovation in Lublin. Her academic interests revolve around subjectivity and conflict, including psychological mechanisms of conflict and readiness for cooperation. As part of her psychological practice, she provides diagnostic and counselling services for adults.

WERONIKA AUGUSTYNOWICZ – Psychologist, PhD in Social Sciences. She works at the Chair of Social Psychoprevention, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Deputy President of the Natanaelum Association, Institute for Psychoprevention and Psychotherapy. Her academic interests pertain to psychoprevention, especially in the context of the workplace, and facilitation of, and conflicts between, family and professional roles.

JOANNA CHWASZCZ – Psychologist, PhD, lecturer at the Chair of Social Psychoprevention. Head of the Natanaelum Association, Institute for Psychoprevention and Psychotherapy. Specializes in the field of psychoprevention and social exclusion and inclusion. Research interests: psychoactive and behavioural addictions, psychoprevention, adaptive potential of socially excluded people.

STANISŁAW FEL – Associate Professor, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. Head of the Chair of Catholic Social Thought and Socioeconomic Ethics at the Institute of Sociology. Research interests: Catholic social teaching, the areas of economy and society and their interaction (economic sociology).

EWA JAKIMOWICZ – Psychologist, family scientist, coach. Graduated from the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. She pursues her wide academic interests by studying the consequences of family break-up, and elements that strengthen marriages. She implements psychoprevention programmes related to the psychological preparation for marriage.

KAROLINA KOS – Psychologist, graduate of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin and Higher School of Social Sciences. She works at the Centre for Social Integration and at the Therapy and Rehabilitation Centre in Przemyśl. Her academic interests include issues related to psychoprevention, developmental psychology, and risky behaviour among children and teenagers.

ŁUKASZ MARCZAK – Priest of the Zielona Góra-Gorzów Wielkopolski Diocese, Master of Theology, PhD student at the Chair of Catholic Social Thought and Socioeconomic Ethics at the Institute of Sociology at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin; research interests: Catholic social teaching, ethical principles, sociology, ethical dimension of sustainable development.

IWONA NIEWIADOMSKA – Vice Dean for Student Affairs, Associate Professor at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Master of Law. Head of the Chair of Social Psychoprevention at the Institute of Psychology. She specializes in the fields of psychoprevention, addictions and social exclusion and inclusion. Research interests: the search for psychosocial risk factors of social pathologies, mental health, social pathology, criminology, victimology, forensic psychology, criminal law enforcement, penitentiary psychology, treatment of substance and behavioural dependencies.

BEATA MARIA NOWAK – Associate Professor at the Pedagogium School of Social Sciences in Warsaw. Member of the Scientific Council Presidium (Scientific Secretary), Member of PhD Commission, Deputy Head of the Institute of Social Sciences, Head of the Scientific Research Academy for Pedagogium and post-graduate studies. Member of Social Rehabilitation Pedagogy Team of Educational Sciences Committee of Polish Academy of Sciences. In the period 2012–2013, Member of the Scientific Council at the Interdisciplinary Studies Institute in Brno, Czech Republic. Member of the editorial team of “Resocjalizacja Polska”, a semi-annual magazine. Expert and team member in Polish and international scientific and research projects. Supreme Audit Office (NIK) Assessor in the field of social readaptation of excluded persons.

DOROTA RYNKOWSKA – Hab. PhD in the field of sociology, University of Rzeszow, Institute of Sociology, Department of Social Policy and Social Work. Scientific interests: sociology of family, social pathologies, mediation.

MARKUS VOGT – Professor, Head of the Chair of Christian Social Ethics at the Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich; scope of research: theology of creation, environmental ethics, sustainable development.

MAREK WÓDKA – OFMConv, PhD in Social Sciences, specialising in sociology, Assistant Lecturer at the Institute of Sociology, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Member of Vereinigung für Katholische Sozialethik in Mitteleuropa (Association for Catholic Social Ethics in Central Europe) in Vienna, and Catholic Social Teaching Lecturers Section in Poland. He conducts research into Catholic social teaching and business ethics. He focuses on the history of the Lublin School of Catholic social teaching and moral capital, investigating its social and economic significance.

ANNA WÓJCIUK – Master of Psychology, currently 4th-year doctoral student at the Chair of Social Psychoprevention, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. She has worked at a local penitentiary for 7 years, currently as Junior Psychologist in the Therapeutic Department. Her academic interests include criminology, aggressive behaviour, psychosocial competences of convicts, and adjustment of convicts to prison confinement.