

e-ISSN 2300-9918

HUMANITIES | AND SOCIAL | SCIENCES |

Quarterly, Volume XXV
(October-December)
Research Journal 27
(4/2020)

Volume Editor
Grzegorz Roślan

HSS Journal indexed, among others, on the basis of the reference of the Minister of Science and Higher Education in The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (CEJSH), ERIH PLUS, DOAJ and Index Copernicus Journal Master List 2019.

Issued with the consent of the Rector

Editor in Chief
Publishing House of Rzeszow University of Technology
Lesław GNIEWEK

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-Chief
Grzegorz OSTASZ

Deputy of Editor-in-Chief
Justyna STECKO

Editorial assistant
Elżbieta KURZĘPA

Associate Editors
Eugeniusz MOCZUK, Tadeusz OLEJARZ, Marta POMYKAŁA
Grzegorz ROSŁAN, Beata ZATWARNICKA-MADURA, Dominik ZIMON

Scientific Board
Alla ARISTOVA (Ukraine), Heinrich BADURA (Austria), Guido BALDI (Germany)
Aleksander BOBKO (Poland), Zbigniew BOCHNIARZ (The USA), Viktor CHEPURKO (Ukraine)
Zuzana HAJDUOVÁ (Slovakia), Wilem J.M. HEIJMAN (The Netherlands)
Tamara HOVORUN (Ukraine), Paweł GRATA (Poland)
Beatriz Urbano LOPEZ DE MENESES (Spain), Aleksandr MEREZHKO (Ukraine)
Nellya NYCHKALO (Ukraine), Waldemar PARUCH (Poland), Krzysztof REJMAN (Poland)
Annely ROTHKEGEL (Germany), Josef SABLİK (Slovakia), Mykoła STADNIK (Ukraine)
Anatolij TKACH (Ukraine), Michael WARD (Ireland), Natalia ZHYHAYLO (Ukraine)

Statistical editor
Tomasz PISULA

Language editors
E-CORRECTOR
Magdalena REJMAN-ZIENTEK, Piotr CYREK

Volume editor
Grzegorz ROSŁAN (Poland)

Project of the cover
Damian GĘBAROWSKI

The electronic version of the Journal is the final, binding version.

e-ISSN 2300-9918

Publisher: Publishing House of Rzeszów University of Technology,
12 Powstańców Warszawy Ave., 35-959 Rzeszów (e-mail: oficyna@prz.edu.pl)
<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl>

Editorial Office: Rzeszów University of Technology, The Faculty of Management,
10 Powstańców Warszawy Ave., 35-959 Rzeszów, phone: 17 8651383, e-mail: zeszuty@prz.edu.pl
<http://hss.prz.edu.pl>

Additional information and an imprint – p. 185

CONTENTS

From the Editorial Committee	5
Katarzyna Coombs-Hoar: Effect of cultural differences on the principle of authority introduced by Robert Cialdini	7
Tetiana Hlushko, Mykola Kozlovets: Strategies of economic nationalism as an alternative to neoliberal ideology	19
Joanna Jaroszyk: Spain as the State of Autonomies. Principles behind the territorial organization between 1978 and 1983	29
Paweł Kępa: The issue of road visibility and road traffic safety	39
Grzegorz Kozłowski: Us-Japan burden-sharing during the presidency of Donald Trump	51
Ireneusz Piotr Maj, Joanna Maj: Senator Stanisław Siedlecki. Youth and the beginnings of political activity (1877–1918). Contribution to a biography	67
Krzysztof Predecki: Safety of the public at football facilities	87
Sabina Rokita: The influence of the COVID-19 pandemic on management actions and the financial performance of enterprises in Poland during the first half of 2020	97
Malwina Siewier: Polish-German struggle for influence in Upper Silesia during the sanitation period (1926–1939)	111
Mirosław Sołtysiak: Financial exclusion in Poland from the male point of view in the light of empirical research	125
Hanna Sommer, Grzegorz Zakrzewski: Ecological security vs. food security	139
Lilia Suchocka, Eleonora Krajewska, Małgorzata Pasek: The need for social support and the functioning of individuals in a health-limiting condition	155
Krzysztof Surowiec: Republic of China armed forces and their modernization in the years 2017–2020 in the background of the geopolitical crisis in relations with the people's Republic of China (PRC)	165
Justyna Stecko: Review of the book by W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, <i>Social Harmony or Principles of a Happy Society (Harmonia społeczna czyli zasady szczęśliwego społeczeństwa)</i> . Publisher: PIW, Warsaw 2017, p. 233, ISBN 978-83-06-03415-8	175

The list of reviewers cooperating with the Journal of Modern Management Review in 2020	179
The list of articles published in the Journal of Modern Management Review in 2020 ..	181
Additional Information	185

FROM THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

We are giving you the next 27th (4/2020) issue of the Scientific Journal of the Faculty of Management at the Rzeszow University of Technology entitled “Humanities and Social Sciences”.

The aim of the Publisher is to raise the merits and the international position of the quarterly published by the Faculty of Management, that is why we are still developing the cooperation with foreign team of reviewers, as well as an international Scientific Council. The Editors have also attempted to apply for international databases; currently the quarterly HSS is indexed in **Index Copernicus Journal Master List, The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (CEJSH) ERIH PLUS and DOAJ**.

The Journal has been also included in the list of projects qualified for funding under the **“Support for scientific magazines program”**.

The articles published in this publication are devoted to the broader issues of the humanities and social sciences. They are the result both of theoretical and empirical research. The subjects covered vary considerably and reflect the interdisciplinary nature of the Journal. We do hope that the papers published will meet your kind interest and will be an inspiration to further research and fruitful discussions.

On behalf of the Editorial Board of “Humanities and Social Sciences” we would like to thank the Authors for sending the outcomes of their research. We would like to express particular gratitude to the Reviewers for their valuable feedback that greatly contributed to increasing values of the scientific publications.

With compliments
Editorial Committee

Katarzyna COOMBS-HOAR¹

EFFECT OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES ON THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY INTRODUCED BY ROBERT CIALDINI

Robert Cialdini, in his book *Psychology of Persuasion*, presented six fundamental principles that are present in human interactions. These are reciprocity, social proof, commitment and consistency, liking, scarcity, and authority. These principles are universal and can be observed, more or less, everywhere we go. They are present in all ways of life in every nation. Nevertheless, there are noticeable differences when discussing the principle of authority concerning cultural and political backgrounds between various countries. Beliefs, customs, traditions, values and principles form the foundations of any culture. Because these factors vary between different nations, so do their cultural elements. In this paper, a case study approach is used to examine those differences by examining British and Polish ways of recognizing and submitting to the Principle of Authority.

Keywords: principles, influence, authority, power, culture.

1. INTRODUCTION

In order to understand better Cialdini's (2009) Principle of Authority it is necessary to identify two concepts, namely the notion of authority and the notion of power. According to Cole (1998), the notion of authority refers to the "formal power to act, conferred on an individual to enable him to fulfil his responsibilities. It is usually fairly well-defined in order to limit the powers available to the individual". Max Weber distinguishes between patriarchal powers, which are non-authoritarian, consensual, arbitral and political powers, which are autonomous military and judicial authority (Roth, 1968). Political authority involves the power over life and death. Nonetheless, it binds a community together not only through this coercion but also through common historical experiences. Furthermore, Weber (1968) distinguishes three types of legitimate authority, namely traditional authority, charismatic authority, and legal or rational authority. Traditional authority, as the name suggests, is power that is rooted in tradition, beliefs and practices of a society. For example, in the nineteenth century, as stated by Dahl (1961), "[t]he elite seems to have possessed that most indispensable of all characteristics in a dominant group – the sense, shared not only by themselves but by the populace, that their claim to govern was legitimate". Traditional authority can be assumed on the basis of it being inherited or on religious grounds (where the society believes figures of authority are appointed by God). Rational or legal authority,

¹ Katarzyna Coombs-Hoar, M.A., the Institute of English Studies, University of Rzeszów, Al. mjr. W. Kopisto 2 B, 35-315 Rzeszów; e-mail: kat.sok@op.pl. ORCID: 0000-0001-6177-0031.

according to Weber (1968), derives from law and is founded on the belief in the lawfulness of a society's laws and rules. Therefore, while traditional authority is presented to an individual because of inheritance or divine appointing, rational or legal authority resides in the office or in a position that an individual holds. Charismatic authority is described as "resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him" (Weber, 1968). The author emphasises that this type of authority is less stable than traditional authority or rational-legal authority as it expires with the individual.

A more developed division of the notion of authority is that presented by Paterson (1966), who identifies five basic forms of authority. Sapiential Authority is based on a person's superior knowledge and experience; Moral Authority, which is possessed by a person trying to improve a situation; Personal Authority, based on a person's own qualities; Structural Authority, gained by reason of a person's position within an organisation; and Charismatic Authority, given by God.

2. UNDERSTANDING POWER

One way of studying and understanding power, according to Morriss (1987), is by cataloguing the authors' resources. The relationship between the notion of authority and the notion of power has been explored in depth by many authors. According to Bierstedt (2001), "[p]ower is not force and power is not authority, but it is intimately related to both and may be defined in terms of them". The author also adds that authority cannot exist without the support of power and the sanction of force (Bierstedt, 2001). Furthermore, on the topic of power Arendt (1970) states that power does not belong to an individual; it belongs to a group and exists only as long as the group remains together. In Lukes' *Power a Radical View* (2005) it is also stated that "the bias of the system is not sustained simply by a series of individually chosen acts, but also, most importantly, by the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of institutions". While Russell (1938) defines power simply as the production of an intended effect, Parsons (2001) maintains that "the power is conceived as a circulating medium, analogous to money, within the political system. Therefore, specification of the properties of power can best be approached through an attempt to delineate very briefly the relevant properties of money as such a medium in the economy". According to Scott (2001), when discussing the notion of power it is vital to know "whether power involves only *intended* outcomes or whether *unintended* consequences of action may also count as features of the exercising of power"². In the opinion of the author when considering the subject of the agent's intention, it is vital to recognise the conditions under which they are acting, specifically to what extent people are aware of the probable consequences of their actions and those of others.

3. PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY

Cialdini's Principle of Authority dictates that people are more likely to obey a request coming from a person with some power (2009). A great deal of research has been conducted to prove this theory, starting with psychology professor Stanley Milgram's 1974 test, where electric shocks were administered to subjects on order by someone in charge, an authority figure, a person in a white coat with a clipboard posing as an expert (Cialdini, 2009). Of

² Emphasis original.

course, they were not real electric shocks, and the subjects receiving them were only trained actors, but the real study – the subjects of this experiment, namely the administrators of the shocks, were not aware of that fact. Implausible as it may seem the need to obey a figure of authority far outweighed any considerations of pity towards the ‘victims’ of the experiment. According to Milgram (2017) “[o]bedience is the psychological mechanism that links individual action to political purpose. It is the dispositional cement that binds men to system of authority”. This experiment was only one of many tests performed to prove the theory of influence by researchers, but at some point in their lives all people are prone to blindly follow the instructions of an authoritative figure. Most visits to a local GP result in the patient obtaining prescriptions; however, rarely is the opinion of the doctor questioned; most of the time the note itself is impossible to decipher. Nevertheless, a journey is made to a chemist where another person in a white coat with a name badge hands over boxes with medications and writes on them how they should be administered: it is rare indeed for someone to challenge such authority.

As Cialdini (2009) states:

Conforming to the dictates of authority figures has always had genuine practical advantages for us. Early on, these people (for example, parents, teachers) knew more than we did, and we found that taking their advice proved beneficial – partly because of their greater wisdom and partly because they controlled our rewards and punishments. As adults, the same benefits persist for the same reasons, though the authority figures now appear as employers, judges, and government leaders. Because their positions speak of superior access to information and power, it makes great sense to comply with the wishes of properly constituted authorities.

In general people are perceived as experts mainly due to their knowledge and credibility. Both of these aspects are not something that can be deduced just by simply glancing at a person, but what can be noticed first of all is someone’s appearance. Cialdini (2009) states that there are three symbols of authority: titles, clothes, and trappings. According to the author “[...] titles are the most difficult and the easiest symbols of authority to acquire. To earn one normally takes years of work and achievement. Yet it is possible for somebody who has put in none of this effort to adopt the mere label and receive a kind of automatic deference” (Cialdini, 2009). Clothing is, naturally, a more tangible symbol than a title. Whether it is a policeman’s uniform, a doctor’s white coat or a businessman’s suit, when approached by a person wearing one of these, we would consider what they have to say, and when combined with trappings such as cars or jewellery their words carry great import. The principle of authority can be observed everywhere, but the depth and intensity of it will vary depending on the country’s culture, traditions, and politics. The case study in this paper will compare the ways in which authority is perceived in the UK and in Poland.

4. INFLUENCE OF RELIGION

The culture of any given country consists of many factors such as beliefs, customs, behaviour, and the set of norms that exist within the populace of a sovereign nation. However, the biggest and the most influential component is religion. Religion dictates the rules to obey and values to follow. The role of a priest in Poland is not restricted simply to preaching during Sunday Mass, but to keep parishioners informed about everything that is going on in their church, starting with little things, such as whose turn it is to provide flowers

for the altar and who is responsible for cleaning that week, and finishing with information regarding donations to the church. Congregants comply with the requests given by the priest (it is more noticeable in villages and small towns) because in Poland the priest holds a position of power, the power to refuse a wedding or a funeral, the power to deny christening or communion.

In the UK, priests do not hold such an influential position, they are respected in their community for the work they provide, running a church, organizing events, accommodating requests in regards to weddings or christenings, but they lack the same authority as priests in Poland. In the UK people frequently relocate, moreover many of the population work on Sundays. Therefore, it is difficult for any priest to keep track of their congregation. The UK is an exceptionally multicultural country with so many different faiths that the attempt to respect and to accommodate all of them has led to the dilution of the power and the authority of the Church of England (Worley, 2016). Having new doctrines set up to deal with continually changing ways of life (regarding gay marriages, gay vicars, tolerance toward other faiths and races, gender identity and fluidity) made people, especially the older generation, less inclined towards the church (Roberts, 2017). Religion in Poland is stronger because it is utterly inflexible and uniform, priests have more authority because they speak relatively in one voice, a voice that gives unified and straightforward commands, and therefore is easy to follow. The views of the Church as a religious institution are not only present during Sunday Mass, or during R.E. lessons at schools but also during major political debates, playing a vital role in the government's decision making. In some Polish school next to the national emblem hangs a cross, while in England the Archbishop of York, John Sentamu (n.d.), appraises diversity stating that "[t]he organizational culture of the Church of England [...] is still socially glued together by a culture that is monochrome – that is white. [...] It lacks colour and spice".

However, the situation in Northern Ireland is different in that the dominant religion is Roman Catholic, 40.8%, (Census, 2011). Northern Ireland is considered the most religious part of the UK where as much as 82% of its residents described themselves as Christian (Census, 2011). But even there a change is taking place. The Republic of Ireland has recently conducted referendums, one in May 2018 to allow abortions, and the second one in October 2018 regarding the removal of the law on blasphemy from the constitution (McSorley, 2018). The results of a YouGov poll carried out by Amnesty International UK in October 2018 show that 75 per cent of people in Northern Ireland want to follow in the Republic of Ireland's footsteps and change the abortion law (Amnesty International UK, 2018). Furthermore, in the absence of the Northern Ireland Assembly, an institution responsible for the subject of health, 66 per cent thought that Westminster should reform the law and make it compatible with the rest of the UK (Kelly, 2019).

5. INFLUENCE OF SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS

It has to be noted that it was Henry VIII, in 1534, who set the precedent for shaking off the authority by breaking away from the papacy in Rome to remarry (Pollard, 2007). This single act showed the masses that the symbol of authority could be easily replaced to suit one's needs. Moreover, even the authority of the king can be curtailed as shown by another example from the past, namely the Magna Carta (Breay, 2014). When Magna Carta was sealed, England had endured 16 years of John's kingship – a rule based mainly on extortion, legal deception, blackmail, and violence (Jones, 2015). However, it was not within the remit

of the king's subjects to question the king's ways or condemn his actions; royal subjects were expected to obey the authority that the position of being the king brings. Magna Carta was created to curb the king's misuse of the loopholes in feudal customs, limiting payments funding wars, confirming people's rights under the common law of the land. For the first time in British history the king was a subject of the same law of the land as the commoners (Ibeji, 2011). Magna Carta laid down the principle that "No free man shall be arrested, or imprisoned, or deprived of his property, or outlawed, or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor shall we go against him or send against him, unless by legal judgement of his peers, or by the law of the land" (BBC UK The British Museum). Moreover, the king was no longer above the law.

History shows that for the country to be strong there needs to be one leader above all; after the signing of the Magna Carta and the death of King John the country spun into a civil war, "For a society to be strong and stable there was a need for a powerful rule, with ultimate authority resting with one man. For a country to go to war, it needed a single, supreme military leader. Arguments between great barons could only be settled if both agreed to submit to the judgement of one superior overlord" (Jones, 2015).

These two examples from British history, namely Henry's VIII disowning of Papal supremacy and Magna Carta's curbing of the king's powers, provide us with insights as to why authority in Britain is not so much disrespected but rather questioned.

A further example where authority is brought closer to the masses, and not just in name, is Parliament, and to be more precise the House of Commons, the elected legislative body of the British Parliament. Technically the lower House of Commons is predominant over the House of Lords, often the term *Parliament* is used synonymously with the *House of Commons* (EB). As the British historian A. F. Pollard states in his book *The Evolution of Parliament* (1920):

[t]he distinguishing feature of the English parliament is the junction it made between the government and the people. Not that the house of commons was ever intended as a house of the common people, which it is sometimes supposed to have been. For 'commons' means 'communes'. [...]

Common action was, however, commoner among the common people, because they had greater need than individualistic barons of union for self-protection, and it was only under the pressure of exceptional royal tyranny that barons borrowed the methods of association from the humbler townfolk who first put the fear of communism into the hearts of privileged classes.

Nowadays the House of Commons controls the government's finances, keeps a close eye on government administration and legislates (Parliament UK, Two house system). It is in a position of power and authority, which is not reflected in its name, contrary to the House of Lords, the second half of the same institution. The House of Lords has essential law-making and scrutiny functions, but its powers are limited by a combination of law and convention, for example, bills to authorise expenditure or raise taxes cannot be amended by the Lords (Parliament UK, Role and work).

6. PRESENT DAY DIFFERENCES AFFECTING THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY

In the following sections of the discussion, attention will focus on presenting differences affecting the Principle of Authority. There are a number of important differences between the Polish and the British ways of recognising and submitting to the Principle of Authority. In the following paragraphs an attempt will be made to analyse the way educational benefits are perceived; the way appearance is considered; the way uniformed services are viewed; the manner in which consumer rights are respected and the impact of the Principle of Authority on the media.

6.1. The way educational benefits are perceived

As was mentioned before, the primary attributes of perceiving authority, according to Cialdini (2009), are titles, clothes, and trappings, therefore the Polish and British ways of seeing power should be considered. Academic titles in Poland carry substantial weight. People possessing the title of a doctor or a professor are seen as experts, not only in their chosen field of expertise. In the last few years the number of Ph.D. students has increased dramatically according to Central Statistical Office, but, interestingly, only 20 percent of doctors stated that they intended to stay in academia (European University Institute, 2018). Furthermore, getting a Ph.D. degree nowadays does not guarantee getting a job at university, as it is a somewhat closed system with a limited number of new positions, and very little internal mobility; one usually retires from one's *alma mater* (European University Institute, 2018). All these facts are known, and yet the need for possessing a title is as great as ever. One of the possible answers is that it provides a feeling of authority and power that people seek so badly. Acquiring a title can take many years and a great deal of hard work, the financial gain is also of little incentive.

6.2. The way looks are considered

Clothing is yet another vital factor present when discussing the Rule of Authority. As was stated at the beginning of this paper, people tend to pay more attention to someone wearing a uniform, holding a briefcase or a clipboard. Nonetheless, these garnishes draw attention precisely because they are subconsciously associated with being an expert in a specific field. People possess a considerable need to follow someone, an authoritative figure, while only their authority is judged on the basis of their looks. There is a proverb in English: *clothes do not make a man (FD)*; there is a similar saying in Polish: *nie szata zdoobi człowieka*. The meaning of both proverbs is the same: people should be judged by their actions, rather than their clothing. Nevertheless, Britain and Poland display a somewhat diverse attitude towards this issue. British people are infamous for their fashion sense partially due to the speed with which fashion retailers introduce style changes (Sorensen 2009: 20), e.g. long fur coats with denim shorts or onesies as favourable ensemble for dropping children off at school in the morning (Groskop and Blanchard, 2016). According to an article in *The Guardian*, "there is an increasing tendency to escort children to and from school while still wearing pyjamas and, on occasion, even slippers" (Groskop and Blanchard, 2016). Furthermore, the article is summed up in the words: "who are we to judge?" In Poland after a whole day of manual labour one would consider a change of clothes before picking up children from school, even if it meant having to change back again if the work was not finished and the school was just around the corner. This begs the question as to why British people are considered such fashion victims. There is a saying in

Polish: *jak cię widzą tak cię piszą* meaning that people's opinion of someone is based entirely on their appearance. This may well explain the difference, especially when one considers the dominance of the philosophy of not judging a book by its cover, which is prevalent throughout the UK.

6.3. The way uniformed services are viewed

When researching cultural differences between the Polish and the British ways of perceiving authority there is another major reason why a uniform commands more respect in Poland than in the UK. In Poland, police officers carry weapons at all times; however, in Britain, it is not practiced “British police officers are traditionally unarmed, with guns going to those who volunteer and who undergo a high level of training. Only officers in Northern Ireland are routinely armed” (Dodd, 2017). The Police force in Britain was founded in 1829 on the principle of “policing by consent”, rather than by force (Smith, 2017). At that time it was believed that “giving everyday police officers guns sends the wrong message to communities, so this thinking goes, and can actually cause more problems than it solves” (Smith, 2017). Nowadays, with terrorist attacks so prominent, opinions are different with more officers showing a desire to carry firearms, according to a new survey conducted by the Police Federation (Dodd, 2017). “Arming all officers would change the power dynamic between the police and the public” (Obordo, 2017). That change may be reflected in the way the police are perceived in Britain. By any means it may be more similar to the way Polish people regard the police, with more respect and a little fear. It must not be forgotten that capital punishment in the UK was suspended in 1965 and abolished in 1969 (Allen, 2014). That is over thirty years prior to Poland, where until 1997 capital punishment remained a part of Polish law. A life sentence in the UK also does not carry the same weight as it does in Poland. In the UK one is eligible for parole after 15 years in prison (Gov UK n.d., Types of prison sentences), while in Poland after 25 years (Kancelaria Sejmu, Kodeks karny, art. 78 KK paragraf 3). These facts would imply that, through the power of threat, the justice system – whether it be judicial punishment or the police force – Polish institutions command greater respect and thus wield greater levels of authority.

On the question of authority, there are also differences regarding military service, yet another embodiment of power. Conscription to the army in Britain was introduced in 1945 and abolished in 1957, although it continued till 1960 with the last conscripts demobbed in 1963 (Davenport, 2014). In Poland, national service ended in 2008, that is over fifty years later (Day, 2015). Therefore, for half a century longer Polish people were taught to view military rank as a symbol of authority, and while attitudes may be changing, the hangover from the previous system is still felt in Poland, while in Britain the time gap between compulsory military service and the present has led to a general degradation in how the military is perceived.

6.4. Media and the principle of authority

Throughout history Polish people endured extended periods of time while subjected to some kind of control. While the UK exercised freedom of speech, press and religion (Coates, n.d.), in Poland the Soviet-backed communist regime controlled most aspects of life (Clought, 2014). One of the means of control was establishing a Censorship organization. As is stated by John M. Bates in *Censorship in Poland, 1976–1989* “[t]he creation of this central body, to which every publication had to be submitted, represented only one dimension of communist control over publishing and in fact, any form of public

expression” (Bates, 2004). It was only in 1990 that the Central Office for the Control of the Press, Publications, and Spectacles was disbanded by a parliamentary bill (The News, Radio Poland, 2015). In the UK, censorship was abolished much sooner in 1968, by the Theatre Act (Legislation UK, n.d.). It was stated in BBC News that “[c]hanges in society were beginning to grate – and the authorities were forced to revise their attitudes. There was the pressure of a more permissive society in the late 1950s and 1960. [...] Eventually, of course, the idea of censorship was unsustainable, and the Theatre Act was passed. The American hippy musical *Hair* opened in London just one day later” (BBC Today, 2008).

In October 1977 the premiere of the musical *Hair* portrayed the hippie culture, the sexual revolution of the 1960s, and anti-Vietnam War peace movement (Billington 2010). Few years later- December 1981 in Poland, behind the iron curtain, Martial Law was introduced to keep citizens under the maximum control of the communist government.

I wonder if the notion of a free press, which has existed in the UK since the 19th century, does not lend itself to the fact that British newspapers are much more respected, and what is written in a paper tends to be treated as gospel fact.

6.5. The way consumer rights are regarded

Consumer rights in the UK are protected by the Consumer Act of 2015 (Gov UK, n.d.). Moreover, the UK Ombudsman Association promotes independent complaint resolution and therefore the avoidance of the small claims court (Ombudsman Association, n.d.). There are also 316 Citizen Advice Bureaus which are charitable organisations, offering help in all legal matters to the public since 1939 (Gov UK, n.d.). With so much legal protection it is no wonder that British people feel more confident about their rights, are more knowledgeable in that respect, more prone to question authority, unwilling to obey without asking for the reason first. In contrast, where retail outlets were state-owned until 1989, there was an overriding sense that the shop was infallible. As a consequence, using consumer rights privileges is something that is not a part of the Polish national character, and it is only since Polish accession to the European Union in 2004 that some order has been brought to this area of public life, and Polish people have been directed towards the appropriate legal mechanisms which exist to facilitate the process of pursuing claims against a retailer/service provider.

Cialdini’s principles of influence are present in everyday human interactions regardless of the nation, religion, traditions or culture. They can be observed in all aspects of life at all stages of human evolution. Nevertheless, when discussing the Principle of Authority, it may be interesting to look deeper and take into account the cultural elements of a particular country.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Beliefs, customs, traditions, values and principles form the foundations of any nation. Because these factors vary between different countries, so do their cultures. Cialdini’s theory of influence is universal and can be observed everywhere regardless of the nations’ economic or political status. Nevertheless, the economy of a country and politics are integrated into the culture and reflected by it, and therefore human interactions are governed by these elements.

The way we perceive the world around us consists of our combined knowledge of the particular subject and the linguistic skills to express it. Although different nations possess

different linguistics skills and are capable of expressing their thoughts, the knowledge factor will differ as the combined knowledge of the nation is dictated by that nation's culture.

Cialdini's Principle of Authority stating that people are more likely to obey a person in a position of power is accurate, but the depth of such obedience will depend on the target country's cultural background. That cultural background determines the extent to which people are prepared to follow Cialdini's principle.

REFERENCES

- Allen, K. (2014). *Fifty years after the last hanging the UK has fallen out of love with the death penalty*. "The Guardian" [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/13/fifty-years-hanging-britain-death-penalty>.
- Amnesty International UK (2018). *Northern Ireland abortion: 75% of UK public want government to change law – new polls* [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/northern-ireland-abortion-75-uk-public-want-government-change-law-new-polls>.
- Arendt, H. (1970). *On Violence*. London: Allen Lane.
- Bates, J.M. (2004) *From State Monopoly to a Free Market of Ideas? Censorship in Poland, 1976–1989*. Amsterdam–New York: Editions Rodopi B.V.
- BBC Today (2008). *Censored on stage* [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_7638000/7638553.stm.
- BBC UK The British Museum (n.d.). *History of the World, the Magna Carta* [Access: 6.02.2018]. Access on the internet: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ahistoryoftheworld/objects/OiBPq_oTBydsT4NnccgSg.
- BBC UK. The British Museum (n.d.). *History of the World* [Access: 6.02.2018]. Access on the internet: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ahistoryoftheworld/objects/OiBPq_oTBydsT4NnccgSg.
- Bierstedt, R. (1960). *An Analysis of Social Power*. "American Sociological Review", Vol. 15. Edited by Scott John, *Power, Critical Concept*. 2001. London: Routledge.
- Billington, M. (2010). *Hair*. "The Guardian" [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2010/apr/14/hair-musical-review>.
- Breay, C., Harrison J. (2014). *Magna Carta: an introduction*. "British Library" [Access: 9.03.2019]. Access on the internet: <https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-an-introduction>.
- Census 2011. *Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. Key Statistics for Northern Ireland, Ethnicity, Identity Language and Religion* [Access: 30.06.2019]. Access on the internet: <https://www.nisra.gov.uk/sites/nisra.gov.uk/files/publications/2011-census-results-key-statistics-northern-ireland-report-11-december-2012.pdf>.
- Cialdini, R. B. (2009). *Influence – the Psychology of Persuasion*. New York: Harper Collins e-books.
- Clought, P. (2014). *Wojciech Jaruzelski Poland's last communist leader*. Independent UK [Access: 30.03.2018]. Access on the internet: [tps://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/wojciech-jaruzelski-polands-last-communist-leader-who-imposed-martial-law-on-the-soviet-satellite-in-9436739.html](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/wojciech-jaruzelski-polands-last-communist-leader-who-imposed-martial-law-on-the-soviet-satellite-in-9436739.html).
- Coates, S. (n.d.). *England. The Free Speech and Free Press Around the World* [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://freespeechfreepress.wordpress.com/england>.
- Cole, G.A. (1998). *Organisational Behaviour*. London UK: Continuum.

- Dahl, R.A. (1961). *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Davenport, R. (2014). *National service conscription in Britain 1945–1963*. “The Guardian” [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/aug/20/national-service-conscription-britain-richard-vinen-review>.
- Day, M. (2015). *Poland mulls compulsory army training due to Russia fears*. “The Telegraph” [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/11464797/Poland-mulls-compulsory-army-training-due-to-Russia-fears.html>.
- Dodd, V. (2017). *Majority of police officers are prepared to carry guns*. “The Guardian” UK [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/sep/22/one-in-three-uk-officers-want-all-police-to-carry-guns-survey-finds>.
- Dodd, V. (2017). *Police in England and Wales to be asked whether they want to carry a gun*. “The Guardian” UK [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/27/police-in-england-and-wales-asked-whether-they-want-to-carry-a-gun>.
- Encyclopaedia Britannica (n.d.). *House of Commons. British Government* [Access: 9.02.2019]. Access on the internet: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/House-of-Commons-British-government#ref215006>.
- Encyclopaedia Britannica (n.d.). *Parliament* [Access:30.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Parliament>.
- European University Institute (2018). *Poland, Academic Career Structure* [Access: 10.02.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.eui.eu/ProgrammesAndFellowships/AcademicCareersObservatory/AcademicCareersbyCountry/Poland>.
- Gov. UK (n.d.). *Consumer protection rights* [Access: 30.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.gov.uk/consumer-protection-rightsdos>.
- Gov.UK (n.d.). *Open Justice* [Access: 4.04.2018]. Access on the internet: <http://open.justice.gov.uk/courts/civil-cases>.
- Gov.UK (n.d.). *Types of prison sentences* [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.gov.uk/types-of-prison-sentence/life-sentences>.
- Graham-Harrison, E. (2018). *Ireland votes to oust 'medieval' blasphemy law*. “The Guardian” [Access: 22.11.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/27/ireland-votes-to-oust-blasphemy-ban-from-constitution>.
- Groskop, V., Bkanchard, T. (2016). *Is it ok to wear pyjamas in public?* “The Guardian” UK [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/30/is-it-ok-to-wear-pyjamas-in-public-darlington-head-teacher-primary-school>.
- Ibeji, M. (2011). *King John and the Magna Carta*. BBC History [Access: 6.02.2018]. Access on the internet: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/middle_ages/magna_01.shtml.
- Jones, D. (2015). “*Magna Carta and kingship*.” *British Library* [Access: 6.02.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-and-kingship>.
- Kancelaria Sejmu. n.d. *Kodeks Karny [Penal Code]* [Access: 9.03.2019]. Access on the internet: <http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU19970880553/U/D19970553Lj.pdf>.
- Kelly, B. (2019). *Abortion in Northern Ireland: Why terminations are illegal in one part of the UK*. Independent [Access: 20.02.2019]. Access on the internet: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/northern-ireland-abortion-illegal-laws-different-uk-pro-life-choice-derry-girls-a8797131.html>.

- Legislation.gov.UK. n.d. *Abolition of censorship of the theatre*. [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/54/crossheading/abolition-of-censorship-of-the-theatre>.
- Lukes, S. (2005). *Power, a Radical View Second Edition*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- McSorley, Ch. (2018). *Blasphemy, Stephen Fry and Referendum in Ireland*. BBC News [Access: 22.11.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45903094>.
- Milgram, S. (2017). *Obedience to Authority*. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers.
- Morriss, P. (1987). *Power – a philosophical analysis*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Obordo, R. (2017). *It would change the power dynamic: police officers on carrying guns*. “*The Guardian*” [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/28/it-would-change-the-power-dynamic-police-officers-on-carrying-guns>.
- Ombudsman Association (n.d.). *Promoting independent complaint resolution*. [Access: 1.04.2018]. Access on the internet: <http://www.ombudsmanassociation.org/find-an-ombudsman.php>.
- Parliament UK, House of Lords (n.d.). *Role and work* [Access:10.02.2018]. Access on the internet: <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-information-office/lords-briefing-papers/15595holbriefing-work-role-function.pdf>.
- Parliament UK. (n.d.). *The two house system* [Access: 18.03.2019]. Access on the internet: <https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/system>.
- Parsons, T. (1963). *On the Concept of Political Power*. “*Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*”. Vol. 107. Edited by Scott John Power, *Critical Concept*. 2001. London: Routledge.
- Paterson, T.T. (1966). *Management Theory*. London UK: Business Publications Limited.
- Pollard, A.F. (1920). *The evolution of Parliament*. London; New York: Longmans, Green.
- Pollard, A.F. (2007). *Henry VIII*. The Project Gutenberg EBook [Access: 1.03.2019]. Access on the internet: <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/20300/20300-h/20300-h.htm#page001>.
- Pollard, A.F. (n.d.). *The evolution of Parliament*. Public Domain Google [Access: 9.02.2018]. Access on the internet: [https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.\\$b22482;view=1up;seq=126](https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b22482;view=1up;seq=126).
- Roberts, R. (2017). *Church of England tells schools to let children explore gender identity*. Independent [Access: 6.02.2018]. Access on the internet: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/church-of-england-schools-let-children-explore-gender-identity-transgender-gender-fluid-a8051406.html>.
- Roth, G. “Introduction” to Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Russell, B. (1938). *Power: A New Social Analysis*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Sentamu, J. (n.d.). *Combating racism and celebrating diversity*. Archbishop of York [Access: 6.02.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.archbishopofyork.org/concerns/combating-racism-and-celebrating-diversity>.
- Sherwood, H. (2016). *Faith, hope and secularity: Ireland on brink of change as church powers wanes*. “*The Guardian*” UK [Access: 24.11.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/17/faith-hope-and-secularity-ireland-on-brink-of-change-as-church-power-wanes>.
- Smith, A. (2017). *The vast majority of UK police don't carry guns. Here is why*. NBC News [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/why-london-won-t-arm-all-police-despite-severe-terror-n737551>.

Sorensen, C. (2009). *Fashion Marketing* Third Edition, edited by Mike Easey, United Kingdom: A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication.

The Free Dictionary (n.d.). *The clothes don't make the man* [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/the+clothes+don%27t+make+the+man>.

The News, Radio Poland (2015). *Poland marks 25-years since lifting of censorship* [Access: 31.03.2018]. Access on the internet: <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/203213,Poland-marks-25-years-since-lifting-of-censorship>.

Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Worley, W. (2016). *Church of England loses more than 100,000 worshipers in a decade*. Independent [Access: 2.02.2018]. Access on the internet: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/church-of-england-anglican-statistics-loss-worshipers-decade-sunday-attendance-a7384631.html>.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.38

The text was submitted to the editorial office: March 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.

Tetiana HLUSHKO¹
Mykola KOZLOVETS²

*The wealth of nations is created through
industrialization and technological progress*

Erik S. Reinert

STRATEGIES OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NEOLIBERAL IDEOLOGY

The article analyzes the socio-practical potential of economic nationalism as a principal basis of economic strategies for modern developing countries. Based on a systematic analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of leading representatives of economic nationalism (from F. List to E. Reinert), and considering the situation of modern nation states in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, this article argues that the economic policy of Listianism is the most appropriate for practical implementation within societies that seek to develop their economic potential, rather than secure the status of raw materials in the global economy. This article analyzes the essential features of neoliberal economic policy of the “free market”, which at the level of social practice does not confirm its universal status and is arguably detrimental to countries that have not put into effect their productive potential and have not formed a domestic market before opening their economy to free trade.

Keywords: economic nationalism, strategy, protectionism, neoliberalism, ideology, economic policy, capital, political economy.

1. INTRODUCTION

Economic nationalism as a practically justified strategy was formed in the late nineteenth century and throughout its existence has been subject to ambiguous assessments by both liberal and neoliberal traditions. In today's world, at the level of theoretical analysis, this trend is still quite influential. However, with respect to the particularity of global economic crises, at the level of social practice, the strategy of economic nationalism is gradually being revived and becoming increasingly important. In particular, the United States, the European Union and China have actively used the tools of protectionist economic

¹ HlushkoTetiana Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Docent, Professor of the Department of Philosophy, Naional Pedagogical Dragomanov University, Ukraine, e-mail: tetyana.glushko@gmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0002-8759-7975.

² KozlovetsMykola Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor, Professor of the Department of Philosophy and Political Science, Zhytomyr Ivan Franko State University, Ukraine, e-mail: mykola.kozlovets@ukr.net (corresponding author), ORCID: 000-0002-5242-912X.

policy in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Riecke, 2020). There is also a trend according to which China, Germany and Japan are actively developing strategies to promote domestic industry and invest heavily in this process (Warren, 2019). Thus, the crisis of the globalization project, limited by the ideological doctrine of neoliberalism, finally became apparent in the context of the pandemic, which demonstrated the need for a developed national industrial production in any country. At the previous stage, this was especially felt at the level of the medical sector and the food industry. Under the conditions of closed borders, the inability of countries by means of domestic industrial potential to meet global challenges has demonstrated the socio-practical inexpediency of the reliance exclusively on the „free market”. Respectively, the need to rethink the nature and potential of economic processes in individual states has emerged today as one of the key task of both national and global scale. Thus, the formation of a new manner of economic thinking and the transformation of the ideological foundations of the global economy becomes an undisputed priority today. Considering the circumstances and global trends, economic nationalism is becoming one of the most effective alternative strategies to neoliberalism.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Over the past two centuries some economists, historians, and philosophers have given attention, though insignificantly, to the strategic dimensions of economic nationalism. And, although the theory of economic nationalism is not well known today, and the mainstream of modern economic worldview is the so-called neoclassical model of economics, socio-practical significance of F. List's legacy is analyzed from time to time by modern scholars. In particular, the Israeli researcher D. Levi-Faur at the end of the last century came to the conclusion that after the end of World War II, economic nationalism acquired the status of a neglected research field (Levi-Faur, 1997). Similarly, the modern Norwegian economist E. Reinert emphasizes the need to reject the orthodoxy of today's economic policy and to restore the ancient economic tradition, which is based on historical experience and which he calls the „Other Canon” (Reinert, 2007). As an alternative canon, the researcher considers those theories of economic development that, in practice, helped modern rich countries to get rich, and then disappeared from all textbooks and from the practical economic policy of developing countries. Addressing the origins of this canon is extremely important to ensure the conditions for the progressive development of all regions of the world. Whereas, blind faith in the free market is unable to provide such conditions. E. Reinert emphasizes that the modern world is so complex that we cannot afford to think non-strategically that is, the systemic and long-term results of our actions should become the main focus of the ruling elites. Therefore, economic science should be as pragmatic as possible and rely on experience, and not on theoretical considerations of the neoliberal doctrine.

And the experience of developed countries shows that at the stage of their development they implemented the strategies of economic nationalism, each of which was a unique, not a universal, copy of the „Procrustean” economy. In addition, an important argument in favor of E. Reinert's position is the fact that the Harvard School of Business to this day continues to use the experimental methodology of economic nationalism, on the basis of which the case-study method arose (Reinert, 2007). That is, economic nationalism is focused on the specifics of the conditions of a particular state and its economic particularity. In fact, the

uniqueness of economic nationalism lies precisely in the pluralistic approach to economic policy, which is significantly lacking in neoliberal doctrine. Note that the industrially developed „late capitalism” is characterized by state regulation of not only the economy but also of other spheres of social life.

The creation of development strategies in the modern world is significantly complicated by the „universal” recipes of neoliberal theory, the basic principles of which are included in international economic agreements. It is these principles, from E. Reinert's point of view, that ensure the specialization of third world countries in their poverty. Following F. List and other representatives of economic nationalism (S. Witte, D. Mendeleev, E. Helleiner, D. Frank, D. Levi-Faur, Ha-Joon Chang and others), E. Reinert emphasizes that the main source for enrichment of countries is their industrial complex and new technologies. A country that does not produce final products will get permanently impoverished and no external financial loans will save it from poverty, because the invested capital will simply not create conditions for the development of productive potential.

That is why the transformation of the global economy on the basis of the ideas of F. List, who emphasized the need for equal development of national economies as a necessary condition for the introduction of free trade (List, 1841), in modern conditions is becoming especially relevant. Even K. Schwab in his latest work on the economic consequences of COVID-19 recognizes that in today's world globalization „has been called in to question and even started to recede” (Schwab, Malleret, 2020). Despite the fact that the founder of the Economic Forum continues to defend the logic of globalization processes, it is important to recognize the existence of this dilemma and strengthen nationalist tendencies in the economic processes of the modern world that increasingly demonstrates elements of the globalization logic of development. In fact, in the new stage of the global economic crisis, complicated by the pandemic, there is a need for really deep strategic transformations and the formation of new approaches to the organization of economic processes. Thus, today, on our own mistakes, we are forced to return to the conclusions formed by F. List back in 1841. The researcher argued that liberal economic policy will only be effective when the economic power of nations is proportionate. Whereas failure to comply with this requirement results in the subordination of the economic potential of nations to that of them, which is characterized by stronger economic development, that is, it contributes to the economic colonization of less developed countries (non-industrialized) by more developed (industrialized) ones. For this very reason, F. List spoke about protectionism as the basis of „industrial education of nations”.

In addition, the researcher considered protectionism as a social mechanism that has certain limits – it is relevant only until the industry acquires an economic status that will allow it to withstand foreign competition. His views were conditioned by the fact that in the nineteenth century, in the context of trade relations with a more powerful Britain, there was a need to preserve economic independence of Germany. Therefore, in a situation of permanent invasion of the British market, F. List took up the development of an appropriate strategy. Its main goal was to develop a system of economic measures that would create an effective system of interaction with an economically more developed country. The essence of this approach was to preserve its own economic identity by the German state and prevent its transformation into an economic adjunct of the British economic system. Positioning the nation as an economic structure, F. List affirmed that countries achieve economic power and prosperity not because of the doctrine of liberalism, but because of protectionism, and insisted on the distinction between such phenomena as political (national) and cosmopolitan

(international) economy. Thus, according to F. List, the main task of any nation is the development of its own productive forces, that is to say high-quality industrialization, production of end products but not raw materials for them. The researcher insisted that *a free trade system can be introduced only if countries achieve economic parity*. In particular, he introduces detailed historical examples when nations lost their independence and even ceased to exist politically mainly because their economic system did not contribute to the development of their statehood (List, 1841). It should be noted that these remarks are quite important in the context of modern Ukraine that has not passed the stage of industrialization in full and currently has a rather difficult situation in the industrial sector of the national economy.

According to the position of the founder of economic nationalism, the economic systems of individual nations have their own structural specificity, which is determined by their history, traditions and legislation. The researcher believed that it would make sense for each country to search for its own "national economy". Therefore, state intervention in the economic life of society is a necessary condition until society reaches a level of economic development that is acceptable for the transformation of a closed economic system into an open one. That is, F. List placed liberal theory in a specific historical and national context, concluding that contrary to the claims of this theory to universality, it is actually not at all as scientific and aseptic as it wants to appear. F. List succeeded to evidentiate that only countries that have taken a dominant position in world competitiveness rankings and need new spaces for economic expansion are interested in liberalization. Instead, the implementation of the concept of national interests and the idea of statehood requires other approaches, namely a strategy that defends the right of the state to represent the interests of society and use national capital for its benefit. Thus, E. Reinert proves that the instrumentarium proposed by F. List has been effectively applied in Japan and South Korea. (Reinert, 2007).

However, in the global context, the concerns of the founder of economic nationalism have gone unnoticed by most politicians and influential economists of the modern world and the neoliberal doctrine of the free market became the basis of the leading scenario of globalization, which has been actively implemented since the 1970s and led to the deepening of economic equality between countries, forming a system of international loans, the basic principles of which do not provide for the implementation of development strategies for the "third world". Thus, studies of modern economists have shown that the more external financial borrowing a country uses, the slower its economy develops (Prasad, Rajan, Subramanian, 2007).

The same point of view can be traced in the study of the modern American economist of South Korean descent Ha-Joon Chang, who claims that the principles of neoliberalism – the free market and free trade – call for sacrificing equality for the sake of growth, but as a result neither the first nor the second is achieved. (Ha-Joon Chang, 2007). The researcher emphasizes that in the recent twenty-five years since borders got opened and a free market appeared the growth has only slowed down. At the same time, practically all modern countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States, which we now consider to be developing by means of implementing of free trade instruments, have created their capital and national wealth on principles that are completely contrary to the basic postulates of neoliberal economics (Ha-Joon Chang, 2007).

Being a specialist in economic development Ha-Joon Chang places special emphasis on the fact that modern developed countries have often used the tools of economic

protectionism in the process of development, defending itself from foreign investors, which is completely contrary to the principles of the neoliberal economic doctrine spread by the West. Intruding specific historical examples, Ha-Joon Chang demonstrates that Great Britain and the United States are not at all the birthplace of free trade. Moreover, for a long time they were the most protectionist countries in the world. While mental models of modern economic behavior in developing countries are „tailored” under the framework of market relations or so-called „market totemism” (a term of *J. K. Galbraith*) as an unalterable, the only „correct” vision of the essence of economic processes.

The policy of protectionism in the history of developed countries is confirmed in the thorough research of E. Reinert, previously mentioned, emphasizing that rich countries became rich solely through protectionist measures that protected domestic enterprises from foreign competition by imposing quotas and customs tariffs on imported goods. In particular, the researcher gives examples from the United States, Japan and other developed countries (Reinert, 2007). But the specificity of the current situation lies in the fact that today the policy of protectionism is directly prohibited by multilateral economic agreements and outlawed by international financial organizations (Ha-Joon Chang, 2007; Reinert, 2007). This position of the international community of neoliberals is a logical reflection of the negative attitude towards economic strategies of the national direction.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Within the modern Euro-Atlantic tradition, economic nationalism continues to be actively criticized and used to refer to the term "economic populism" (de Bolle, 2019), demonstrating negligence towards this alternative economic strategy. In particular, it is emphasized that economic nationalism is a threat to global cooperation and slowdown of global economic growth. A significant number of modern neoliberal researchers position themselves as sharp opponents of economic nationalism strategies. This bunch includes, in particular, such thinkers as K. Schwab, T. Malleret, J.A. Tucker, A. J. Abbas, J. Zralek, I. Colantone, P. Stanig and others. They see economic nationalism as a temporary product of the crisis of liberalism and democracy. Their criticisms relate primarily to accusation of political populism and the obsolescence of the "ideology" of economic nationalism as the one that takes us back to the 19th century and seems to have completely lost relevance for the modern global world. In particular, A. J. Abbas insists that the policy of economic nationalism, in the absence of strict control, can be quite dangerous, because it always seeks to maximize the wealth of the nation at the expense of other countries and encourages the use of force to achieve national goals.

However, in our opinion, such a danger lies precisely in the case of unilateral application of the policy of economic nationalism by individual countries. This very practice became the basis of neoliberal economic policy. According to the American researcher M. Mann, the United States itself is a nation-state. The researcher appeals to the fact that the value of national trade in the United States has always prevailed over the value of international trade. Their capitalism is much more national than the capitalism of any European country (Mann, 1993).

Thus, such an economic ideology as neoliberalism, in its essence, is also the embodiment of the principles of economic nationalism, but at the global level. Thus, the Canadian researcher E. Helleiner at the beginning of this century highlighted that economic nationalism continues to retain its ideological influence in the context of globalization since

it can have various manifestations and it is not necessary to pursue a policy of protectionism, because its essence is determined not by form, but by content. Thus, it is not just a policy of protectionism, but an approach that can be linked to a wide range of economic policies, including support for economic liberalization and globalization (Helleiner, 2002). Therefore, it can be embodied in various political projects, including within the framework of liberal economic policy. Another contemporary researcher, R. Mikecz, also demonstrates that economic nationalism and economic liberalism do not always contradict each other, because the economic policy of liberalism can be used to achieve nationally oriented economic goals. In particular, we are talking about the fact that «the self-image of a nation plays a significant role in shaping its economic policies» (Mikecz, 2019). Thus, economic policy is positioned as a product of national identity, testifying to the powerful strategic connection between these elements of public consciousness.

The global protectionism of the Euro-Atlantic economic culture has led to the dominance and assertion of the leading role of the United States in the modern world. The effectiveness of social governance based on the introduction of economic nationalism within the country and the spread of its economic interests at the global level led to extremely rapid growth of the country's economy, especially after World War II. Thus, D. Frank made a rather successful attempt to analyze the political history of American economic nationalism. The author has contributed to the renewal of the debate regarding the opposition between “free market” theory and protectionism. Her work «Buy American: The Untold Story of Economic Nationalism» demonstrates the economic manipulation of public consciousness by individual political parties throughout the history of American statehood (Frank, 2000). E. Reinert also draws attention to the fact that the United States subsidizes and protects many of its industries, from agriculture to high technology (Reinert, 2007). In modern conditions, however, such manipulations go beyond the boundaries of a separate state and in many respects become the basis of a globally oriented socio-economic policy. In particular, the prospects for further development of economic nationalism in the modern United States are actively illustrated by R. Kuttner, pointing to the corresponding program trends in both Trump's policy and J. Biden's future economic program (Kuttner, 2020). Moreover, such modern researchers as I. Colantone and P. Stanig acknowledge that «economic nationalism was already on the rise from the early 1990s, and it has been at the core of euroskeptic campaigns such as Brexit» (Colantone, Stanig, 2019).

In general, modern developed countries have followed somewhat different paths of economic nationalism implementation. Thus, in particular, the United States pursues a trade policy that prioritizes the interests of capital over the interests of workers but Great Britain and Germany have chosen another path: taking an active part in international trade, they also solidly supported their domestic industry and their workers (Warren, 2019). In addition, the American government does not fully comply with the principles of the free market and permanently interferes in the economic process, mainly in order to protect the interests of international corporations. Thus, in the conditions of the modern information age, it is also important to protect the national economic interests of countries and the formation of a self-sufficient economic life worlds.

Recovery and development of domestic industry remains the foundation for the progressive development of the economy and its permanent growth. A country with a feudal mode of production can not profit from interaction with economic systems that technologically dominate it. The expected result of this interaction is economic

obsolescence and poverty. The lack of a strong industrial sector causes significant depopulation of countries, which we observe in the practical experience of modern Ukraine – the phenomenon of guest workers and the refusal to have children. Whereas, according to E. Reinert, population growth is an important condition for economic growth. Rich countries, where workers from poor countries emigrate to (cheap labor), receive additional economic benefits from this. At the same time, one should not forget that the basis for making a profit is not the invested capital itself but capital combined with labor, that is, the creation of a new product, in terms of Marxism – added value.

In this way, the economic self-sufficiency of countries, that is, their ability to provide themselves with all the necessary funds of the national industrial sector, is becoming a new trend of the XXI century. Consequently, one of the recent key points of economic policy of developed countries has been the protection of their national companies, which they save from being absorbed by foreign investors, aware of the financial losses that will result from the implementation of such undesirable strategies (Macrae, 2020; Riecke, 2020), that have become especially relevant in a pandemic. For this very reason we insist that the formation of an economic strategy that meets *the needs and values of a particular society* – rather than functionate with abstract „universal” models – can be formed exclusively within the theoretical limits of economic nationalism. Indeed, it is just the kind of ideological basis that provides for the definition of *long-term development* goals and consideration of modern environmental and technological trends. In the modern world, it is also worth talking about *economic eco-nationalism* as a paradigm of social development that entail the introduction of economic strategies with maximum consideration of environmental factors and technological innovations in the production process.

4. CONCLUSIONS

As a matter of fact, the essence of economic nationalism is to use all available tools to stimulate the national producer and industry of the country in order to provide opportunities for being competitive in global stage. Thus, the main goal of economic policy should be the investment in national job opportunities and technological renewal of infrastructure. As a consequence, the new economic policy of developing countries should provide for the creation of conditions for the development of small and medium-sized businesses within the country. The economic success of the country is impossible on the basis of neoliberal theory, that is, without an industrial sector and a reliable technological base. Therefore, economic nationalism, as a fundamental strategy of progressive economic development, contributing to *the protection of systemically important economic sectors* of the state, is not just a historical heritage of economic thought. The policy of economic nationalism in its substantive features should be oriented towards the formation of a steadily running production core and provide society with its own internal „economic basis”. Consequently, the economic paths of the countries that are moving today along the neoliberal „route” require significant adjustments in the direction of control over the movement of national capital, as well as the approval of a strategic plan for the development of the major branches of domestic industry. It is the remedy for solving these complex problems at the level of socio-economic practice that will determine the place of modern countries on the geo-economic map of the world. Therefore, along with maintaining its political stability, Ukraine must finally move on to solving a key macro-problem – modernization of the

economy through reindustrialization, aiming to return our country to the world club of industrialized countries.

REFERENCES

- Abbas, A.J. (2017). *Economic Nationalism: Philosophical Foundations*. "Journal of Competitiveness Studies", Vol. 25. Issue 2.
- de Bolle, M. (2019). *The Rise of Economic Nationalism Threatens Global Cooperation*. Access on the internet: <https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/rise-economic-nationalism-threatens-global-cooperation>.
- Colantone, I. Stanig, P. (2019). *The Surge of Economic Nationalism in Western Europe*. "Journal of Economic Perspectives", Vol. 33, № 4.
- Frank, D. (2000). *Buy American: The Untold Story of Economic Nationalism*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Ha-Joon Chang (2007). *Bad Samaritans. Rich Nations, Poor Policies and the Treat to the developing World*. London: Random House.
- Helleiner, E. (2002). *Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism? Lessons from the 19th Century*. "International Studies Quarterly". Vol. 46, № 3.
- Kuttner, R. (2020). *Biden's New Economic Nationalism: Better Than You May Think*. Access on the internet: https://prospect.org/api/amp/economy/biden-new-economic-nationalism-better-than-you-may-think/?__twitter_impression=true
- Levi-Faur, D. (1997). *Friedrich List and the Political Economy of the Nation-State*. "Review of International Political Economy", Vol.4, № 1.
- List, F. (1841). *Das Nationale System Der Politischen Ökonomie*. Access on the internet: https://eet.pixel-online.org/files/etranslation/original/kreuzgang.org_pdf_friedrich-list.das-nationale-system-der-politischen-oekonomie.pdf
- Macrae, T. (2020). *Economic Nationalism and Merger Control: Impact of COVID-19*. Access on the internet: <https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/economic-nationalism-and-merger-control-impact-of-covid-19/>
- Mann, M. (1993) *Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing*. "Daedalus", Vol. 122, № 3.
- Mikecz, R. (2019). *The Cornerstone of Economic Nationalism: National Self-image*. Access on the internet: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40647-019-00271-5>.
- Reinert, E. (2007). *How Rich Countries Got Rich and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor*. New York: Hachette Book Group.
- Riecke, T. (2020). *Covid-19 Causes a New Wave of Economic Nationalism*// Access mode: <https://merics.org/en/analysis/covid-19-causes-new-wave-economic-nationalism>
- Prasad, E., Rajan, R., Subramanian, A. (2007). *The Paradox of Capital*. Access on the internet: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/03/prasad.htm>.
- Schwab, K., Malleret, T. (2020). *COVID-19: The Great Reset*, Geneva: World Economic Publishing.
- Tucker, J.A. (2018). *The Modern Origins of Economic Nationalism*. Access on the internet: <https://www.aier.org/article/the-modern-origins-of-economic-nationalism/>.
- Warren, E.A. (2019). *Plan for Economic Patriotism*. Access on the internet: <https://medium.com/@teamwarren/a-plan-for-economic-patriotism-13b879f4cfc7>.

Zralek, J. (2019). *The Impact of Economic Nationalism on Investment Arbitration – A Central European Perspective*. Access on the internet: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3573507.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.39

The text was submitted to the editorial office: September 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.

Joanna JAROSZYK¹

SPAIN AS THE STATE OF AUTONOMIES. PRINCIPLES BEHIND THE TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION BETWEEN 1978 AND 1983

This article examines the territorial configuration of Spain between 1978 and 1983. The article investigates whether the scope of autonomy granted to the regions inhabited by “the historical nationalities” fulfilled their need of being independent from the central government in Madrid. The article also examines the impact of regionalization on the awakening of local awareness and identification within communities in which it had not existed before. The creation of the Autonomous Communities also affected the party system of Spain in which the major role was played by the regional parties, especially in the construction of the electoral system to Cortes Generales. This allowed strong nationalist groups to become represented in the parliament, enhancing the impact of regionalization on the increase in self-awareness and making the regions fight over their interests in the national arena.

Keywords: Spain, Autonomous Communities, Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia.

1. INTRODUCTION

After nearly 40 years of dictatorship of the general Francisco Franco, the promulgation of the Spanish Constitution, on 27th December 1978, crowned the process of democratization which had been initiated in 1975 after the death of the dictator. One of the elements of this phenomenon was a considerable change in the territorial organization of the state which, until then, had rejected any form of regional autonomy. Although the Constitution of 1978 acknowledged “historical nationalities” of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia and granted them the right to autonomy, it simultaneously based the political system on the rule of indissoluble unity of Spanish Nation, in accordance with the Art. 2 of the Basic Law (The Spanish Constitution, 1978). The process of decentralization resulted in the establishment of seventeen Autonomous Communities and Spain became one of the most interesting examples of the regional state (although the three historical nationalities had rejected the term “region” from the very beginning).

The aim of the article is to present the process of the territorial configuration of the country between 1978 and 1983 and the accompanying disputes and doubts concerning the areas of competences given to respective regions. The article also tries to answer the question whether the scope of autonomy granted to the regions inhabited by “the

¹ Joanna Jaroszyk, PhD, Faculty of History, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, ul. Uniwersytetu Poznańskiego 7, 61-614 Poznań, Poland; e-mail: jaroszyk@amu.edu.pl. ORCID: 0000-0003-3285-2163.

historical nationalities”, especially the Basque Country and Catalonia, fulfilled their need of being independent of the central government in Madrid. Another interesting issue addressed in the article is an impact of regionalization on the awakening of local awareness and identification within communities in which it had not existed before.

2. THE RIGHT TO AUTONOMY IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1978

Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 acknowledged and guaranteed the right to autonomy to the regions as well as nationalities living in Spain. That was how the process of decentralization of political power started and it led to the establishment of seventeen Autonomous Communities. That way Spain adopted one of the most interesting legal forms of the state². The idiosyncrasy of Spain lies in the fact that it managed to escape a typical classification of the territorial organization which is in step with the characteristics of the federal system (like Germany or Belgium) or unitary system (like Poland or Sweden). At the same time, it is difficult to define Spain as the state of regions as, according to the Constitution, nationalities as well as regions can be autonomous entities. Although the model includes a lot of elements of federation³, the Autonomous States (*El Estado de las Autonomías*), established in 1978, cannot be identified as federation as the Communities did not obtain the constitutional rights, sovereignty or separate judiciary. Therefore, it may be concluded that the Spanish model oscillated between a regional and a federal model, following the philosophy of the former (Alvarez Conde, 1984: 59).

The process of developing the system of regional autonomies went through three phases. The first one covered the period from electing the government of Adolfo Suarez in June 1976 to passing the Basic Law in December 1978. For the Prime Minister Suarez the regional issues were a priority and, therefore, he entered into negotiations with the major opposition parties in order to restore *Generalidad* (of the Catalanian government, which happened by 41/1977 decree of 29th September) and to establish the Basque General Council (*Consejo General Vasco*, by 1/1978 decree of 4th January) (Ruiz Robledo, 2003-2004: 712). But as long as the restoration of *Generalidad* was the historical legitimacy of the Catalanian self-government, the Basque Council was a new body, established to meet the aspiration towards the autonomy of the Basque provinces.

The cooperation with the representatives of the regional political class was also far from typical. The Prime Minister managed to reach an agreement with the Catalanian groups, especially with Josep Taradellas, a leader who enjoyed the greatest trust and who authenticated the actions of the government in the eyes of the Catalanian public opinion. Suarez did not manage to reach a similar pact with the activists of the Basque Nationalist Party (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco – PNV*) who would have started the negotiations provided that the political prisoners, including terrorists, had been released. Suarez did not want to agree on that (Ruiz Robledo, 2003-2004). Jesus de Leizaola, one of the most prominent members of PNV, only granted his approval for the establishment of the Council.

² These were: Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias (Principado de Asturias), Balearic Islands (Islas Baleares), Extremadura, Galicia, Cantabria, Castilla La Mancha, Castile and Leon (Castilla y Leon), Catalonia (Catalunya), the Basque Country (Pais Vasco), La Rioja (La Rioja), Madrid (Comunidad de Madrid), Murcia (Comunidad de Murcia), Navarre (Navarra), Valencia (Comunidad Valenciana), Canary Islands (Islas Canarias).

³ Mainly, the reduction of the centralism in favour of the coexistence of two types of organizations, central and territorial, which had a certain degree of legislative and executive power.

However, what characterized the relation between the central government and PNV was the mutual distrust and PNV's relentless pursuit of autonomy, plus the growing terror used by ETA.

Along the ongoing negotiations, the process of establishing "preautonomies" covering the entire territory of Spain, started. According to Victor M. Perez-Diaz, the main reason behind such strategy was the intention of reducing the Catalanian and Basque problem, which could be proven by the fact that the system in question was also introduced in the regions which did not show any interest in it. The government in Madrid believed that it would be easy to manipulate the regional political class (Perez-Diaz, 1996: 220). However, setting up preautonomies on the territory of the entire country was a complicated issue as there was the same number of arguments for and against the introduction of the general system. Among the numerous drawbacks of such a solution were the lack of historical legitimacy which could lay the foundation for the new system, the absence of the representatives of nationalist parties in Cortes Generales from the remaining territories of Spain (apart from Catalonia and the Basque Country), the Italian experience after the 2nd World War and the difficulties concerning the integration into the work of the Constituent assembly. On the other hand, the political and social willingness to establish self-governments was becoming more and more common. In various parts of Spain, deputies and senators, appointed on 15th July, set up "the parliamentary congregations" demanding "preautonomy", which often received social support, e.g. in Andalusia where, on 4th December 1977, there were demonstrations in favour of electing the autonomous government. The tactical aspect of the general system was dulling the vigilance of the army and other "actual authorities" which were concerned about the reclamation of Basques and Catalonians (Ruiz Robledo, 2003-2004: 713).

At the beginning of January 1978, the Official Gazette of Cortes Generales published the initial project of the Constitution which, within the discussed scope (i.e. the territorial configuration of the political power), received a great number of amendments whose postulates were frequently contradictory. Some of them expressed the concerns of political class who was worried that the territorial unity of the country would be lost, others expressed the desire for introducing confederation (Ruiz Robledo, 2003-2004). As a result, as much as the project clearly recognized the right to the autonomy of the nationalities and regions and served as the uniform procedure for establishing autonomous territories, the final text of the Constitution became chaotic and complicated, causing serious problems with its interpretation.

For example, a number of "security measures" against the autonomies was introduced, mainly by the extensive article 2 of the General Law according to which: "The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all". Thus, the concept of the state was based on four fundamental principles:

- The principle of indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation and the existence of the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards,
- The principle of the right to autonomy,
- The principle of solidarity,
- The principle of cooperation.

The first principle was the most crucial as it indicated a uniform character of the state and denied respective regions the right to secession. Moreover, in section 145, the legislator introduced a ban on setting up the federation of autonomous communities and the paragraph 2 introduced an additional “safety brake” by obliging the Communities to define the rules of cooperation (Łabno-Jabłońska, 1996).

The approved methods used to establish self-governments led to the creation of the privileged autonomies which were equipped with a high degree of self-determination and did not have to meet the requirements imposed on other territories. What is more, the Constitution raised the possibility of creating first degree (*de primer grado*) and second degree (*de segundo grado*) autonomies. The differences between them lay in the political character of the former and the administrative character of the latter. According to the Second Interim Provision of the Basic Law, the privileged autonomies (Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia) were waived from the requirement of the autonomous initiative which was replaced by the agreement between preautonomous bodies. This made it possible to move to the second stage of creating self-governments – i.e. the preparation of the Autonomous Statute⁴. Moreover, according to the Resolution, the privileged communities did not have to meet the requirements set down in the article 148, section 2 (introducing five-year period after which the autonomies could gradually increase the scope of their competences) and, therefore, could reach the highest degree of self-determination without taking the dividing line set up in the Basic Law into account. The scope of competences acquired that way encompassed the issues defined in: art. 148.1; matters of exclusive State jurisdiction according to art. 149.1; competences included in the Statutes according to the art. 149.3 and competences acquired after passing the Statutes according to the art. 150 of the Constitution⁵.

⁴ Such a procedure was included in the Second Interim Provision: “The territories which in the past have, by plebiscite, approved draft Statutes of Autonomy and which at the time of the promulgation of this Constitution, have provisional autonomous regimes, may proceed immediately in the manner provided in clause 2 of Article 148, when agreement to do so is reached by an absolute majority of their pre-autonomous higher corporate bodies, and the Government is duly informed. The draft Statutes shall be drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Article 151, clause 2, when so requested by the pre-autonomous corporate body.”

⁵ Article 148 of the Spanish Constitution of 27th December 1978, (The Spanish Constitution, 1978):

1. The Autonomous Communities may assume competences over the following matters:
 - 1) organization of their institutions of self-government;
 - 2) changes in the municipal boundaries within their territory and, in general, the functions appertaining to the State Administration regarding local Corporations, whose transfer may be authorized by legislation on local government;
 - 3) town and country planning and housing;
 - 4) works of benefit to the Autonomous Community, within its own territory;
 - 5) railways and roads whose routes lie exclusively within the territory of the Autonomous Community and transport by the above means or by cable which also fulfils the same conditions;
 - 6) ports of haven, recreational ports and airports and, in general, those which are not engaged in commercial activities;
 - 7) agriculture and livestock raising, in accordance with general economic planning;
 - 8) woodlands and forestry;
 - 9) environmental protection management;

The second form of self-government, so-called first degree Autonomies, encompassed the territories which did not use the facilitations defined in the Second Interim Provision but had the possibility to reach the same degree of self-determination after fulfilling certain, sometimes strict, requirements. The autonomous initiative was undertaken in accordance with the art. 151.1 of the Constitution, i.e. within six months from passing the first resolution on the said initiative by one of the interested local bodies. Next, such initiative had to be ratified in a referendum by the absolute majority of the electors in each province of the future community⁶. Another step towards autonomy, i.e. the preparation of statutes, was taken in accordance with the procedure defined in the art. 151.2 (similarly as in the case of the privileged communities). The only difference lay in the fact that it was the

-
- 10) planning, construction and operation of hydraulic projects, canals and irrigation of benefit to the Autonomous Community; mineral and thermal waters;
 - 11) inland water fishing, the shellfish industry and aquaculture, shooting and river fishing;
 - 12) local fairs,
 - 13) promotion of the economic development of the Autonomous Community within the objectives set by national economic policy;
 - 14) handicrafts,
 - 15) (.....), 16) (.....)
 - 17) the promotion of culture, of research and, when applicable, the teaching of the language of the Autonomous Community;
 - 18) (.....), 19) (.....),
 - 20) social assistance,
 - 21) (.....), 22) (.....).

2. After five years have elapsed, the Autonomous Communities may, by amendment of their Statutes, successively expand their powers within the framework established in Article 149.

Article 49.3 Matters not expressly assigned to the State by virtue of the present Constitution may fall under the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Communities by virtue of their respective Statutes. Matters for which jurisdiction has not been assumed by the Statutes of Autonomy shall fall within the jurisdiction of the State, whose laws shall prevail, in case of conflict, over those of the Autonomous Communities regarding all matters over which exclusive jurisdiction has not been conferred upon the latter. State law shall, in all cases, be supplementary to that of the Autonomous Communities.

Article 150

1. The Cortes Generales, in matters of State competence, shall confer upon all or any of the Autonomous Communities the power to enact legislation for themselves within the framework of the principles, bases and guidelines established by State law. Without prejudice to the competence of the Courts, each basic law shall contain the method of control by the Cortes Generales over the Autonomous Communities' legislation.

2. The State may transfer or delegate to the Autonomous Communities, through an organic law, powers appertaining to it which by their very nature lend themselves to transfer or delegation. The law shall, in each case, provide for the appropriate transfer of financial means, as well as specify the forms of control to be retained by the State.

3. (.....)

⁶ Such strict requirements for the autonomous initiative resulted from the conviction of the creators of the Constitution that the path to autonomy, defined in the article 151.1, will be followed by way of exception and the territories that are not "historical communities" (like Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia for which the special procedure of the Second Interim Provision was prepared) will take the path to autonomy defined in the article 143.2 which is less demanding but which will make them obtain the autonomy after a longer period of time (Alvarez Conde, 1984).

government that summoned all the Senators and Deputies for the purpose of drawing up an adequate draft⁷. Once the draft was accepted by the Constitutional Committee of Congress, it was submitted in a referendum to the electorate of the province (majority of validly cast votes was enough). After that, it was remitted to the Cortes Generales which decided upon the text by means of a vote of ratification. If all the above mentioned requirements were met, the first degree community reached the same degree of independence as the privileged communities. The institutional organization of the autonomy was identical and it was based on the Legislative Assembly and the Governing Council with the President as its head (art. 152.1⁸).

According to the creators of the Constitution, the second degree autonomous communities were to encompass the majority of the territory of the state, especially those areas where self-governing aspirations did not have a long tradition. The autonomous initiative was defined in the art. 143.2 which simplified it in relation to the requirements laid down in the art. 151.1⁹. The procedure of drawing up the statutes of that kind of communities was defined in the art. 146, which left no room for negotiations. Once the preautonomous bodies submitted the proposal, the final decision was solely made by the Cortes Generales. In this case, we can talk about the autonomy granted by the state and not about the agreement between equal partners (Alvarez Conde, 1984: 409). The competences listed in the art. 148 were initially the only competences granted to the second degree autonomies. However, it did not mean that the Constitution left no room for expanding autonomy as, in accordance with the art. 148.2, after five years and the reform of the autonomous statutes, the communities could take over the remaining prerogatives guaranteed in the Basic Law.

3. TWO MODELS OF AUTONOMY AND THE SUCCESSIVE PHASES OF REGIONALIZATION

The approved models of autonomy led to the creation of the system called “asymmetric federalism” (*federalismo asimétrico*). Augustin Ruiz Robledo emphasized that this regulation was not free from a number of paradoxes. What was the purpose of holding a referendum, with the quorum difficult to achieve, in order to obtain the competences five years faster than the remaining communities which would obtain them anyway,¹⁰

⁷ The draft Statute was then remitted to the Constitutional Committee of Congress where it was possible to negotiate its definitive formulation with the cooperation and assistance of a delegation from the Assembly which has proposed it (art. 151.2, item 3).

⁸ Interestingly, the Constitution expanded the autonomous competences in relation to the regulations listed in the project of the Basic Law, introducing the Legislative Assemblies as the bodies of the Communities, which granted them the legislative powers (Ruiz Robledo, 2003-2004).

⁹ In such a way that the article 143.2 did not require the confirmation of the initiative in a referendum which, according to the article 151.1, had to be ratified by the absolute majority of the electors in each province. Another facilitation was the regulation of the First Interim Provision which all territories could refer to. According to this provision, in the territories with a provisional Autonomous regime the resolution of the higher corporate bodies could replace the autonomous initiative defined in the article 143.2 (which granted this right to the adequate Provincial Councils or inter-island bodies).

¹⁰ It can also be assumed that, at least theoretically, the second degree autonomies achieved greater scope of autonomy as they could freely define their bodies on the basis of the article 147. The article 152 of the Constitution did not apply to them. Eventually, they adopted the identical body

Moreover, chapter 8th of the Basic Law, as the compromise between various national and regional parties, did not solve the problem of conferring autonomous powers successfully, leaving the decision to the subsequent political negotiations. Nevertheless, the Constitution was passed by the parliament and ratified in a referendum in 1978. The Basque PNV called for a boycott of the referendum as, against their demands, the Basic Law did not mention “the historical rights” which would make negotiations over gaining the right to self-determination possible (Perez-Diaz, 1996).

The next phase of regionalization covered the period from the ratification of the Basic Law to the coup attempt in 1981. This period was characterized by two parallel processes. Firstly, the Prime Minister Suarez had to deal with the attempts at forcing the draft statutes prepared by the nationalists (Guernica and Sau Statutes) which deprived the central authorities of as many powers as possible and even reduced the freedom in carrying out foreign policy. Simultaneously, the process of activation of regional awareness among other regions was taking place. The main source of the phenomenon was the concern that a favourable treatment of Basques and Catalonians would have a negative effect on the remaining regions of Spain which argued about, e.g. taxes, investments, energy or natural resources. Along the pursuit of reducing economic inequalities, the claim of making the statutes of respective regions equal was also made. Some people could not accept the fact that some regions (Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia) would be granted full autonomy, whereas others only partial autonomy. Moreover, some regions would gain it very fast, whereas other slowly and with difficulty (which was suggested in the art. 143 and 151 of the Constitution), all the more that already in 1979 the preferential Basque and Catalanian statutes were passed¹¹. As the result, in the referendum of February 1980, Andalusians rejected the governmental proposal of the partial autonomy for that region¹². From that moment, the competition for the prestigious status of the nationality intensified in the entire country. However, as Perez-Diaz emphasized, it was difficult to say whether the feeling was authentic or whether it was just a projection of regional political class. Those events, as well as the intensification of ETA terrorist attacks (whose activity gained the support of 15% of the electorate) led to the unrest in the army, the cumulation of which was the coup attempt in February 1981.

The third phase of regionalization started with the coup attempt. As the result of the mediation of the king and the negotiations with the military powers, the coup was put down by the army. According to Victor M. Perez-Diaz, the directly expressed strategy was simple: “the military powers unambiguously informed the political class that they would force them to make a moral commitment to prioritize the pursuit of preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Spain” (Perez-Diaz, 1996). Although it would be possible to challenge that

structure as the autonomies established on the basis of the article 151 of the Constitution (Ruiz Robledo, 2003–2004).

¹¹ The whole procedure went exceptionally fast. On 22nd December 1978 (three days before the Constitution was adopted) the Basque members of the parliament passed the draft Statute which was remitted to the Cortes Generales on 29th December, i.e. on the day the Constitution entered into force. The Catalanian members of the parliament did not stay behind; they remitted their project an hour later. The statute of Galicia was drawn up only after the parliament election on 1st March 1979 and it was remitted to the Cortes Generales in June 1979 (Ruiz Robledo, 2003–2004).

¹² On 5th December 1978, eleven Andalusian groups, from Accion Popular to the extreme left, signed Pacto de Antequera, the agreement proposed by the president of the Preautonomous Junta, Placido Fernandez Viagas, in order to obtain the full autonomy (Ruiz Robledo, 2003–2004).

thesis, the fact was that, from that moment, the nationalist rhetoric gave way to the systematized work towards passing authorizations to the autonomous regions and imposing a legal framework which would protect the authority of the central government. The victorious Andalusian fight over the expansion of the scope of autonomy created “a domino effect”, which meant that other regions had similar expectations. As the result, the government of the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) signed an agreement in order to unify the model of autonomy in the entire country on 31st July 1981. A new law was introduced (LOAPA – An Organic Law related to the Process of Harmonizing the Autonomization Process) and it served as a model to many regional statutes passed in the coming years (although Basques and Catalonians challenged that law to the Constitutional Tribunal which decided that it was against the Constitution of 1983) (Santamaria Arinas, 2015).

As a result, a series of pacts between the central authority and various regional political elites was made. They included: chapter 8th of the Constitution, the Catalan and Basque statutes of 1979 and the remaining statutes of various regions and nationalities passed at a later time. What has to be added to that group of general standards are the institutions which regulated the process of ongoing negotiations on passing the resources to the regional authorities by the central administration. Thanks to the regional pacts, the national integration was strengthened. Nearly all the regional movements and a large part of peripheral nationalist movements were included in the political system. Although still at a margin of the political system, the Basque PNV showed certain readiness to cooperate with the central government, which was expressed by the limited legal pact made between the president of the autonomous Basque government, Jose Antonio Ardanza, and PSOE, the Basque authorities. However, PNV kept demonstrating the need for the final renegotiation of the statute.

The result of the third phase of regionalization was the resignation from the controversial division into political autonomies (first degree) and administrative autonomies (second degree) in favour of the differentiation between a fast road (*autonomias de via rapida*) and slow road (*autonomias de via lenta*) towards autonomy. By 1983, seventeen Autonomous Communities were established that way and the last statute of Kasilla and Leon was passed in February 1984. Segovia joined that community a month later under the Organic Law 5/1983 (Leguina Villa, 1985).

4. SUMMARY

The system of autonomy created between 1978 and 1983 radically changed the territorial organization of the country, affecting the political and party system of Spain. However, a wide scope of autonomy, granted to the Basque Country and Catalonia, did not satisfy their pursuit of self-determination expressed from the very beginning of democratization. From the point of view of those regions, the constitutional rule of indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation was like “the original sin”, making it impossible for the nationalist parties to fully accept the Basic Law and the constitutional order which ruled out the secession of the regions. Although further compromises in favour of the Communities were made and greater competences were passed in the coming years, such attitude did not change. The tension between the central government and the Basque Country and Catalonia reached its apogee every few years, which was caused

by the regions demanding increased autonomy or even secession. It finally led to the events of 29th December 2004 when the Basque parliament accepted the project (so-called Ibarretxe Plan) which assumed the proclamation of the independent Basque Country¹³. According to the plan, the existing autonomous statute would be rejected and replaced by the new one which would proclaim “a free union” between the Basque Country and Spain. Soon after that, in October 2005, the Generalitat parliament passed a new statute which defined Catalonians as “the nation” existing within “the multinational and federal state” and emphasized Catalonians’ right to freely decide about their future” (Propuesta, 2005). On the other hand, the referendum for independence, held in 2017, and the political crisis resulting from the increased separatist tendencies showed that the problem of the regional nationalism in Spain was still not solved and expanding the scope of autonomy did not make the problem any less serious. It was because the policy of concessions and compromises between the central government in Madrid and the nationalist powers of the discussed regions was always “a play for time” and the main problem, i.e. the demand to acknowledge the national subjectivity and the right to self-determination, was still not solved.

The creation of the Autonomous Communities also affected the party system of Spain in which the major role was played by the regional parties, especially in the construction of the electoral system to Cortes Generales. Thanks to the above mentioned system, strong nationalist groups had their representatives in the parliament and they became so-called “the tongue in the weight”, especially for the cabinets which did not have an absolute majority. Not only was it the case of the regional parties of the Basque Country and Catalonia but also of Galicia, Aragon or the Canary Islands. This proves the thesis about the impact of regionalization on the increase in self-awareness of the regions which also fought over their interests in the national arena.

REFERENCES

- Alvarez Conde, E. (1984). *El regimen politico español*. Madrid.
- Keating, M., Bray, Z. (2006). *Renegotiating Sovereignty: Basque Nationalism and the Rise and Fall of the Ibarretxe Plan*. “Ethnopolitics”, 5 (4).
- Leguina Villa, J. (1985). *El acceso forzoso a la autonomía política*. “Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional”, 14.
- Łabno-Jabłońska, A. (1996). *Iberyjska droga do demokracji*. Warsaw.
- Perez-Diaz, V.M. (1996). *Powrot społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Hiszpanii*. Cracow.
- Propuesta de reforma del Estatutode Autonomía de Cataluña*. Access on the internet: http://estaticos.elmundo.es/documentos/2005/10/01/estatuto_castellano.pdf.
- Ruiz Robledo, A. (2003–2004). *Veinticinco anos de Estado Autonomico*. “Revista de Derecho Politico (Numero monografico. Balance de la Constitucion en su XXV Aniversario)”.

¹³ The moderate PNV nationalists, who ruled from 1979, prepared the Ibarretxe Plan in 2002, and the Basque Prime Minister, Juan Jose Ibarretxe, subordinated his political program to it (Keating, Bray, 2006).

Santamaria Arinas, R.J. (2015). *Del ruido de sables a la algarbia de los mercados: la LOAPA vista desde las atípicas armonizaciones de hoy*. “*Iura Vasconiae*”, 12.

The Spanish Constitution of 27th December 1978 (1978). *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, 311.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.40

The text was submitted to the editorial office: November 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.

Paweł KEPA¹

THE ISSUE OF ROAD VISIBILITY AND ROAD TRAFFIC SAFETY

One of the most difficult problems faced by drivers at night is road visibility and difficulty in seeing obstacles in a timely manner. Many night-time accidents occur on roads with no artificial lighting, especially outside built-up areas. In 2014, in order to improve road safety, a provision for the obligatory use of reflective elements by pedestrians outside built-up areas at night was introduced. However, the exact parameters of these reflective elements (in particular the color, size and location) were not specified, which may have an impact on pedestrian safety.

This article compares a car driver's range of visibility when pedestrians are equipped with different colors of a reflective element, examining the influence of different colors on safety. The analysis shows that, despite the similar technical properties of the same reflective elements, their color contributed to the improvement of visibility, and thus road safety. An experiment conducted in real road conditions testing yellow and orange reflective elements proved that the yellow reflective element significantly improved the range of the driver's perception.

Keywords: road traffic safety, pedestrian, driver, traffic accident

1. INTRODUCTION

The current level of knowledge of road traffic organization shows that a change in visibility leads to a change in the level of traffic safety. This is related to the characteristic features of seeing and observing by both, the driver and other road users, especially pedestrians, as unprotected road users. These parameters can be properly controlled with a view to improving road safety, and thus making the appropriate decision related to increasing the visibility of road users. The majority of people travelling on the road at night do not realize how much visibility the driver has after dark. If the road conditions force the driver to move with the dipped headlights on, the headlamps can illuminate the road ahead of the vehicle to a distance of only 40 m. The pedestrian, on the other hand, is visible from an even shorter distance, because the light beam must illuminate him about 25–30 cm measured from the road surface to make him visible to the driver, which means that in fact the distance from seeing the pedestrian is much shorter (about 20–25 m).

Due to the uneven value of luminance, different colors, or different intensity of lighting directed at road users and road infrastructure, the vehicle driver is usually not aware of the

¹ Paweł Keпа, PhD, Eng., Rzeszow University of Technology, al. Powstańców Warszawy 12, 35-959 Rzeszów, Faculty of Management; e-mail: p.kepa@prz.edu.pl. ORCID: 0000-0003-2306-8748.

significant differences in perception of objects appearing on the road, and thus his reaction and adaptation of the way of driving towards these obstacles (Zielinkiewicz, 2013). The so-called unprotected road users (e.g. pedestrians, cyclists, users of personal transport devices, such as roller skates, skateboards, scooters, etc.) who do not have protection in the form of a vehicle body, and who, in contact with a speeding vehicle, usually have little or no chance (Podgórska, Rajchel, 2019).

There have been identified three main problems in terms of road safety at night (Fors, Lundkvist, 2009):

- light discomfort resulting from glare phenomenon or insufficient lighting;
- problems with correct distance estimation;
- not seeing other road users or obstacles in the immediate vicinity of the road;
- weakening of concentration associated with the increased role of fatigue.

Provisions regarding the improvement of visibility on the road were introduced into the Polish legal system on July 26, 2014 by the Act of July 26, 2013 amending the Road Traffic Act (The Act of July 26, 2013). Pursuant to Article 11 (4a) of the Act of June 20, 1997, Road Traffic Law (The Act of June 20, 1997), “A pedestrian walking on the road, after dusk, outside built-up areas, is obliged to use reflective elements in a manner visible to other road users, unless he is travelling on a road which is exclusively intended for pedestrians or on the sidewalk. This provision, in accordance with Article 11 (5) of this Act, “does not apply in the residential area where the pedestrian uses the entire width of the road and has priority over the vehicle”. The premise for introducing the obligation to use reflective elements after dusk in an undeveloped area into legal system was a relatively large number of road accidents involving unprotected road users, especially pedestrians. Therefore, it remained to analyze the possibility of avoiding this type of accidents involving pedestrians with and without luminous elements in real conditions.

2. THE INFLUENCE OF LIGHTING PARAMETERS OF THE OBJECT AND BACKGROUND ON THE VISIBILITY RANGE. A SIMPLIFIED PEDESTRIAN NOTICE MODEL IN NIGHT CONDITIONS

The driver’s perception of objects along a certain road section is closely related to the change in visibility. The consequence of this situation is a change in the level of road safety. The visibility of the objects along the road and the road itself depends on several factors. The most important of them are undoubtedly the level of road illumination, the contrast of objects and background, the degree of background and object luminance, as well as the adaptation of the driving sight and the angular size of objects, that is the observation distance (Żagan, Mazur, 1997; *Wypadki drogowe...*, 2006; Wolska, 1999).

Figure 1 shows the dependence of the background luminance on the object threshold contrast – the greater the background luminance, the greater the threshold contrast of the obstacle (Unarski, Zębala, 2006).

When analyzing the scope of perceiving obstacles in unfavorable lighting conditions, e.g. at night or after dusk, the following vision states should be indicated as (Żagan, 2014):

- negative contrast that occurs when the background luminance value exceeds the obstruction luminance value;
- positive contrast that occurs when the luminance values are inverse.




Fig. 1. The dependence of the background luminance on the threshold contrast of the obstacle

The observations of the conducted research on the scope of the possibility of noticing a pedestrian (dressed in uniform color clothes) in the area of the dipped beam of a vehicle without additional light elements (Reza, Wójcicki, 1994) indicate that the pedestrian's lower limbs will be noticed first, and then the torso. This order of noticing an obstacle is dictated by the direction in which the beam of the dipped beam lights is formed. In order to improve the safety of an unprotected road user outside built-up areas, on July 26, 2014, the legislator decided to introduce an obligation to use reflective elements by all pedestrians as road users.

The issue of accidents involving unprotected road users, and pedestrians in particular, is one of the most difficult legal problems that is the subject of struggle by both, procedural bodies and experts. As part of their duties, they perform, inter alia, reconstruction of road accidents in order to determine the range of pedestrian visibility. This reconstruction is the basis for inferring the causes of road accidents and for establishing the perpetrator of the event (*Wypadki drogowe...*, 2006; Prochowski, Unarski, Wach, Wicher, 2008; *Zbiór referatów...*, 2006). It should be noted that each traffic incident is characterized by individual features, therefore, an individual approach is also used to consider them. There are no patterns that could be used in a template manner for every traffic incident involving (not only) a pedestrian in night conditions.

The literature on the subject (*Wypadki drogowe...*, 2006) provides a basic mathematical scheme of noticing a pedestrian illuminated with dipped beam, depending in the properties and parameters of a given vehicle, however, it is not applicable during various road, weather and environmental conditions.

On the basis of the discussed model, it is generally assumed that a pedestrian located in the area of the beam light illuminating him at a minimum height of 25 to 30 cm from the road level, with simultaneous correct observation by the driver of the changing traffic and road conditions, will theoretically be noticed from a distance which results from dependence:

$$L = L_0(H - h)/h$$

where: L_0 – range of the distribution of the dipped beam on the road surface,
 H – distance from the axis of the headlamps to the road surface,
 h – pedestrian lighting height (30 cm from the road surface) so that he is noticed by the driver.

The algebraically determined distance on the basis of a mathematical model is only a theoretical value, because when determining the actual distance of perceiving the object, it is advisable to take into account the possible change in both, the range of visibility related to weather conditions, and natural lighting. The dipped beam is designed to illuminate the road ahead of the vehicle. However, due to the formulation of the beam of the dipped beam headlamps as scattered light, the rays of which are also reflected from road infrastructure elements at different angles, the range of visibility of a pedestrian at night with reflective elements should be examined in relation to a specific vehicle, as well as there should be examined the difference in the perception distance of a pedestrian equipped with luminance elements of different colors and the obtained results should be considered in terms of the possibility of avoiding a road accident by stopping the vehicle in front of a pedestrian.

3. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

The experiment was aimed at testing (checking) the range of visibility of a pedestrian equipped with reflective elements of different colors in natural conditions of night time using dipped headlights.

The tests were conducted under the following conditions:

- lighting: night time, hours from 11:30 pm to 00:45 am,
- road measurements section: straight, 365 m,
- road type: two-way, with a single lane (no road signs),
- area: outside built-up areas,
- type of surface: asphalt,
- weather conditions: moderate wind, partly cloudy without precipitation,
- direction of research (observation): north-eastern,
- air transparency – normal.

The following aids were used to conduct the research:

- Audi A4 B8 passenger car, year of production: 2009, dipped and high beam headlamp – combines, halogen H1 bulbs,
- respondents: 32 people aged 20–22,
- distance meter: measuring wheel “Nikel System M100”,
- reflective band – yellow,
- reflective band – orange.

During the experiment, the scope of the visibility of a pedestrian by the respondents with the dipped headlights was examined. The experiment was divided into two trials: in the first – the pedestrian was equipped with a yellow self-tightening prismatic band placed on the forearm, and in the second – an orange prismatic band. The distance between the vehicle and the pedestrian at the start of the maneuver was approx. 500 m, which was the basis for calculating the difference in the distance between the range of visibility of a pedestrian with, and without the reflective element.

4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE CONDUCTED RESEARCH

The graphical summary of the results of the experiment is shown in Fig. 2, while Fig. 3 shows the extreme results of perceiving a pedestrian equipped, first with a yellow and then an orange reflective band placed on the forearm. The results in terms of the avoidance of a road accident are presented in Table 1.




Fig. 2. The results of the distance of perceiving a pedestrian within the dipped beam (vertical axis – subjects, horizontal axis – distance in meters), blue – equipped with yellow reflective element, red – equipped with an orange reflective element




Fig. 3. Graphical representation of the spread of the results of the research on the distance from being perceived by the respondents of a pedestrian equipped with a yellow reflective element (a) and equipped with an orange reflective element














The conducted analysis shows that the color of the reflective element is of key importance in terms of the possibility of seeing a pedestrian. Research, using the same vehicle and the participation of the same people, showed that pedestrians equipped with a yellow reflective element would have an approximate 72 percent chance of avoiding a road incident, while the same pedestrians would have a chance of avoiding a traffic incident with an orange reflective element, as indicated by calculations, would drop down to 3.1 percent. Figure 4 shows the results of the driver's ability to avoid a road incident depending on the color of the reflective element used by a pedestrian.

In order to verify the significance of the statistical substance, the obtained test results (Tab. 1) were analyzed (Table 2, 3, 4) allowing the assessment of both, the reliability of the obtained results, and the correctness of the inference based on them. For this purpose, appropriate statistical tools were used (Prochowski, Unarski, Wach, Wicher, 2008; *Zbiór referatów...*, 2006), which, depending on the type of obtained results, were based on the tests adopted and valued in the statistics.

The statistically significant results of the research indicate the existence of differences between the normal distribution and the distribution of the variable, and the sizes used in the research were distributions consistent with the normal distribution. For this reason, appropriate parametric tests were prepared during further analysis.

The r/Pearson correlation analysis was performed in order to investigate the relationship between the measurements. Statistically significant results indicate the presence of such relationships.

Table 1. The range of visibility in the dipped beam headlamps of a person equipped with a yellow and orange reflective band and the possibility of avoiding a traffic incident by stopping the vehicle in front of a pedestrian depending on the color of the reflective element

No.	The scope of the person's visibility based on the experiment with a yellow reflective detail	The scope of the person's visibility based on the experiment with an orange reflective detail	The possibility of avoiding an accident by stopping the vehicle in front of a pedestrian	
	[m]	[m]	for dry asphalt	
	*	**	YES 	NO 
			yellow reflective band	orange reflective band
1	63,4	66,3		
2	108,1	60,4		
3	91,6	62,3		
4	75,5	59,4		
5	62,3	61,2		
6	65,7	59,8		
7	106,2	85,8		
8	66,9	61,4		
9	74,7	59,1		
10	76	61,3		
11	69,8	58,5		
12	84,3	63,3		
13	74,6	61,1		
14	81	62,0		
15	78,8	64,1		
16	69,4	61,2		
17	98,4	63,0		
18	83,2	57,8		
19	90,7	66,3		
20	69,9	60,2		
21	87,3	63,7		
22	94,6	62,2		
23	102,3	65,4		
24	79,7	58,3		
25	84,2	66,1		
26	78,6	59,7		
27	100,4	63,7		
28	99,2	61,0		
29	78,3	60,7		
30	90,5	66,5		
31	64,2	57,2		
32	66,8	59,6		

In order to check the compliance of the distribution of measurements in relation to the normal distribution, it was decided to perform the analysis using Shapiro-Wilk tests, verifying the hypothesis of such compliance.




Fig. 4. Percentage and numerical ability of the driver to avoid a traffic incident depending on the color of the reflective element used by the pedestrian (1 – yellow reflective element, 2 – orange reflective element)

Table 2. The results of normality analysis with the Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro, Wilk, 1965)

	Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistics	df	p
Visibility range of a person based on an experiment with a yellow reflective element	0,95	32	0,166
Visibility range of a person based on an experiment with an orange reflective element	0,66	32	<0,001

Table 3. The r/Rearson correlation analysis results

		with a yellow reflective element	with an orange reflective element
	with a yellow reflective element	1	0,48**
	with an orange reflective element		1

$p < 0,05^*$; $p < 0,01^{**}$

Table 4. Descriptive statistics for measurements

	Average	Standard deviation
Visibility range of a person based on an experiment with a yellow reflective element	81,77	13,29
Visibility range of a person based on an experiment with an orange reflective element	62,46	4,98

The strength of the correlation is measured segmentally: 0-0.1 is absent, 0.1-0.3 weak, 0.3-0.5 moderate, 0.5-0.7 strong, 0.7-0.9 very strong, 0.9-1 almost full. The analysis showed the existence of statistically significant correlation between the assessment of the visibility of a pedestrian (based on an experiment) with a reflective element and the assessment of the visibility of a pedestrian not equipped with such an element. In order to examine statistically significant differences, an analysis was made using the t-Student test (Zieliński, 1972) on dependent samples. The analysis of the test results proved the occurrences amounting to: $p < 0.001$.

5. THE IMPACT OF LUMINANCE ON THE SAFETY OF ROAD USERS

The majority of road users, especially at night, are not aware of the number of hazards that may appear on the road, including limited visibility for vehicle drivers after dark. Using the dipped beam during this time is not only a 24-hour obligation resulting from the regulations, but also a very helpful principle. During the day, the illuminated vehicle is visible to the pedestrians and other road users, and the driver himself uses natural light while driving, whilst at night the car's headlights are the only source of light.

The conducted analysis of the possibility of avoiding the road incident proved that this distance does not allow the vehicle to be stopped in front of a pedestrian. During the reaction, the driver cannot maneuver to change the vehicle trajectory. Therefore, an essential determinant enabling the avoidance of the tragic consequences of the vehicle-pedestrian "relation" is the appropriate visibility of this unprotected road user.

Undoubtedly, adequate pedestrian visibility is of great importance here. The simulation carried out during the tests showed that a pedestrian with a yellow reflective element was noticed by the driver from a distance of 62.3–108.1 m in front of the vehicle, while the same pedestrian with an orange luminous element was noticed by the driver from a distance of 22.4–33 m. Such a distance (even when assuming the administratively permissible speed), unfortunately, in 97% does not allow the driver to make the right decision resulting in avoiding a road incident. The driver simply has no time to stop his vehicle or avoid the "obstacle" noticed late. The conducted research has shown that the color of the reflective element used by a pedestrian is extremely important in order to spot it and undertake defensive maneuvers to avoid an accident. The pedestrian is noticed too late by the driver.

It should be emphasized that the research indicated in this article is real research, carried out in actual road conditions, in which people participated as actual road traffic participants. The provisions of the Act of June 20, 1997, Road Traffic Law (The Act of June 20, 1997) (in article 11, paragraph 4a, article 12, paragraph 6 and in article 41) require the use of reflective elements, however, they do not specify the type or technical parameters or the manner of wearing these elements. Therefore, unprotected road users often show their own inventions and use any bands attached to clothing, reflective lanyards, road vests, or even

a light source from mobile phones or flashlights to improve their visibility. Reflective elements of yellow and orange colors were used in the research, without testing to determine their reflectivity characteristics, because the author's intention was to use items available in commercial reality for research.

It is known that objects that do not emit light by themselves can be seen from different distances under night-time conditions, depending on the contrast between the subject and the background. In order to be able to see any object in difficult lighting conditions, there must be a difference in luminance or color, i.e. contrast. In order to distinguish the object from the background, there must be a difference in their luminance values, otherwise the object cannot be distinguished from the background. As the contrast increases, the viewing conditions improve. For example, reflective lights that do not emit light by themselves, due to their technical properties, can be seen directly in front of the vehicle.

As mentioned, the legislator obliged pedestrians to use the reflective element at night outside the built-up area, but without indicating parameters such as color, size, or location. The conducted research, which concerned the influence of the color of the reflective element on the range of visibility, showed that the color of the used reflective element is an extremely important factor significantly increasing the safety of a pedestrian on the road. Due to the multitude of different types of reflectors, the research work undertaken by the author can be used to assess the usefulness and effectiveness of the reflective elements used, and thus to assess their impact on increasing road safety.

REFERENCES

- Buda, A., Jarynowski, A. (2010). *Life-time of correlations and its applications*, vol. 1, Wydawnictwo Niezależne, December 2010.
- Fors, C., Lundkvist, S.O. (2009). *Night-time traffic in urban areas*: raport VTI no. 650A.
- Podgórska, A., Rajchel, J. (2019). *Wypadki drogowe w świetle badań. Prawo o ruchu drogowym*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Technicznego Wojsk Lotniczych.
- Prochowski, L., Unarski, J., Wach W., Wicher J. (2008). *Podstawy rekonstrukcji wypadków drogowych*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Komunikacji i Łączności.
- Reza, A., Wójcicki, B. (1991, 1994). *Badania widoczności światła odblaskowych. Zbiór referatów sympozjum: Problemy rekonstrukcji wypadków drogowych*, Cracow.
- Shapiro, S.S., Wilk, M.B. (1965). *An Analysis of Variance Test for Normality*. "Biometrika", Vol. 52, No. 3/4. (Dec., 1965).
- The Act of July 26, 2013 amending the Act – Road Traffic Law (Journal of Laws of 2013, item 991).
- The Act of June 20, 1997, Road Traffic Law (consolidated text, Journal of Laws of 2020, item 110).
- Unarski, J., Zębała, J. (2006). *Zbiór podstawowych wzorów i równań stosowanych w analizie wypadków drogowych*. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Ekspertyz Sądowych.
- Wolska, A. (1999). *Bezpieczeństwo pracy – nauka i praktyka*. Centralny Instytut Ochrony Pracy 1/1999.
- Wypadki drogowe. Vademecum biegłego sądowego*. Edition 2. Cracow: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Ekspertyz Sądowych, 2006.
- Zbiór referatów: Problemy rekonstrukcji wypadków drogowych*. Szczyrk: Instytut Ekspertyz Sądowych, 2006.

Zielinkiewicz, A. (2013). *Wpływ nocnych ograniczeń widoczności na bezpieczeństwo i wybrane parametry ruchu drogowego*. Cracow: Politechnika Krakowska.

Zieliński, R. (1972). *Tablice statystyczne*. Warsaw: PWN.

Żagan, W., Mazur, J.W. (1997). *Samochodowa technika świetlna*. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Warszawskiej.

Żagan, W. (2014). *Podstawy techniki świetlnej*. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Warszawskiej, edition 2 rev.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.41

The text was submitted to the editorial office: November 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.

Grzegorz KOZŁOWSKI¹

US-JAPAN BURDEN-SHARING DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF DONALD TRUMP

This paper analyzes the position of burden sharing between the US and Japan. The study describes the legal, political and military framework of the asymmetric relationship between these two countries and examines the financial conditions of the US military posture in Japan. In this context, several questions were posed: What is the cost sharing arrangement between Washington and Tokyo regarding deployment of the US troops and bases in Japan? What are the legal and financial constraints of Japan in its security relationship with the US? Should we expect any changes in the US – Japan burden sharing and how is that issue related to the US security policy against their European allies? The article uses comparative scientific literature and an analysis of source materials (legal acts, strategies, reports and statements). It argues that the Japanese government should reshape its security obligations aiming to keep the US forces and installations at home.

Keywords: burden-sharing, defense expenditures, the US, Japan.

1. INTRODUCTION

‘Burden sharing’ is one of the key elements of the current external US security policy. Washington emphasizes very strongly that allies do not pay enough for the security benefits they receive from the United States. This critic is directed both to NATO European members (Kozłowski, 2019b) and to the Asian and Pacific partners, including Japan. President Donald Trump pointed out that Tokyo needed to increase its share of costs for the US military presence in the country calling the 1951 bilateral security treaty as “one-sided deal that obligates the United States to come to Japan’s defense if the country falls under attack” (Shim, 2019).

Current US burden-sharing position vis-à-vis Japan can be explained on several dimensions. First, it represents broad American consensus, that the allies are “free-riders” using the US capabilities to preserve their defence and security with too limited costs. Second, the relationship between Washington and Tokyo cannot be extracted from the very dynamic environment in the Asia and Pacific; growing military and economic potential of China and increasing threat from North Korea bring new challenges to the region, increasing the risks to Japan and its allies. Third, it is directly connected with President’s Trump America First policy displaying critical position vis-à-vis international institutions and exposing important or even predominant role of business and economic elements in

¹ Grzegorz Kozłowski, PhD in Economics, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland in the Republic of Estonia; e-mail: Grzegorz.kozlowski@msz.gov.pl; ORCID: 0000-0002-2025-007X.

shaping US bi- and multilateral agreements. That has consequences for Tokyo, since Washington abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership, preferring to negotiate a bilateral trade agreements under threats of escalating tariffs (Solomon, 2018).

US policy on burden sharing is reflected in the main political documents. National Security Strategy relatively broadly refers to ‘burden sharing’ stipulating i.e. that “allies and partners magnify our power; we expect them to shoulder a fair share of the burden of responsibility to protect against common threats” (National Security Strategy of the United States, 2017, 4). The necessity to remove inequalities in burden sharing have been repeated in the text (i.e. “cooperation means sharing responsibilities and burdens”), however, unlike with an explicit expectations from US to European allies to pay more for defense (National Security Strategy..., p. 48), the document emphasizes that Japan (and other countries from Indo-Pacific region) needs to pursue fair and reciprocal trade. US National Defense Strategy brings similar understanding of the quality and importance of alliances setting expectations towards allies and partners “to contribute an equitable share to our mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing their defense capabilities” (Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2018, p. 8).

All above mentioned elements of the US security policy are indicated in the current stance of the dialogue between Washington and Tokyo. The piece would examine a term of burden-sharing, the legal and financial framework of the alliance and the current and prospective understanding of the cost-sharing arrangements between these two countries.

2. BURDEN SHARING

There are different definitions and understandings of the term ‘burden-sharing’. Historically it is associated with NATO, stemming directly from the art. V of the Washington Treaty, which stipulates that

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949).

This norm can be understood that the building of a defense base capable of responding to the perceived threat is based on the principle that “the burden of defending the West should be shared equitably among the member countries” (United States General Accounting Office, 1990, p. 10). Former US Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger identified two elements of ‘burden-sharing’: a. risks and responsibilities of allies need to be (and need to be perceived as) equitably shared and b. contributions of partners, which could include both material (quantifiable) as well as intangible (e.g. political) factors (Weinberger, 1987). The latter corresponds with the evolution of the transatlantic (and non-transatlantic) debate in burden sharing, which can be analyzed not only in terms of financial conditions, but broader as the general contributions to collective security, including humanitarian aid, diplomatic mediation or fight against climate (Foucault, Mérand, 2012).

Burden-sharing might be analyzed from different perspectives. First, it has been researched in the literature across the disciplines, including economics, international political economy and international relations (Zyla, 2016) and is mostly associated with economic theory of alliances. In their seminal study, Olson and Zeckhauser interpreted 'security' (output) as a pure public good, where nation's consumption of defence does not affect the amount available for consumption by other nations (non-rivalry) and when the goods are provided, they are available for everyone (non-excludability). That could create an incentive for a nation to 'free-ride' when it knows that other nation will provide sufficient alliance defence for its needs; there will also be a tendency for the bigger members to bear a disproportionate share of the burden (Olson, Zeckhauser, 1966). In the later studies this theory expanded into the joint product (or impure public good) model, which lead to the testable hypothesis that states do not only contribute to the public good exclusively for public, but also for private benefits (Zyla, 2016). Second, current political discussion tends to simplify 'burden-sharing' with the level of defence expenditures. The best example of such debate is NATO. Art. 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that "in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" (North Atlantic Treaty, 1949). The range of these obligations are expressed in the NATO Strategic Concept by full scope of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of NATO members' territories and populations. Concurrently, art. 19 of the Concept emphasizes (in the last *tiret*) that member states will sustain "the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced" (Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of NATO, 2010). The "necessary level of defence spending in NATO" is described in art. 14 of the NATO Wales Summit Declaration, which stipulates that Allies will spend at least 2 % of their GDP for defence and will allocate "more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research & Development" (Wales Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of States and Governments participating in the meeting of North Atlantic Council, 2014). Third, burden sharing can also be interpreted as the cost-sharing arrangements between 'sending' and 'receiving' state in terms of common obligations dedicated to the deployment – by the former state – troops on the territory of receiving state. In the alliance terminology it is understood as Host Nations Support (HNS). HNS is defined in the US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as "civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations" (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2020). NATO clarifies the aim of HNS as provision of effective support to military activities and to achieving efficiencies and economies of scale "through the best use of a host nation's available resources" (Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nation Support, 2013). In common usage, HNS can be associated with a broad range of contributions of the host country, most typically identified as either 'cash' or 'in-kind' support, on the one hand, and either 'direct' or indirect' support on the other hand.

Table 1. Forms of support and illustrative examples of contributions to US from the Host Nation

Type	Direct	Indirect
Cash	Compensation for local national employees and supplies and services of US Department of Defense, including refunds of utilities and payroll costs.	Not applicable
In-kind	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payments for damage claims; • Compensation of various kinds to local communities; • Direct provisions of labor, land and infrastructure as well as supplies and services. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forgone rent or lease payments; • Waivers of customs duties and other taxes, fees and damage claims.

Source: (Losumbo, 2013).

US internal regulations precisely defines the scope and the conditions of the Host Nation financial contributions towards US forces stationing abroad (10 US Code par. 2350).

3. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE

Japan is one of the closest allies of the United States. Art. 22 par. 2321 k. of the US Code puts Japan – together with Australia, Egypt, Israel, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand – into the category of ‘major non-NATO ally’. Department of States outlines bilateral ties between Washington and Tokyo as “the cornerstone of US security interests in Asia and (...) fundamental to regional stability and prosperity” (United States Department of State, 2020). The National Security Strategy of the US determines the relationship with Japan as a: i. long term commitment to support Tokyo to “become successful democracies and among the most prosperous economy in the world”; ii. critical ally to respond to threat (like e.g. stemming from the North Korean policy) in the Indo-Pacific region (“we welcome and support strong leadership role of our critical ally, Japan”) and iii. partner in cooperation on missile defense (US “will cooperate on missile defense with Japan....to move toward an area defense capability”) (National Security Strategy..., 2017).

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan is the legal foundation of the bilateral relations between Washington and Tokyo. Article V of this Treaty stipulates that

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, 1960).

Simultaneously, article III states that “the Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack”. These norms in clearly asymmetric approach define the right and obligations of both parties.

Unlike in the NATO Charter, commitments to defence concern only one party covering the territory of Japan, and not the territory of the United States. As Robert F. Reed emphasizes „Japan is committed to act only when under attack itself or when US forces within Japan are attacked. There is no obligation to come to the aid of the United States if attack occurs anywhere outside Japanese territory” (Reed, 1983, p. 9). Simultaneously, they refer to constitutional provisions of both countries. The key considerations can be taken from the text of the Japanese charter, which strictly limits the use of force by Tokyo. Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan specifies that

the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (...) land, sea, and air forces as well as war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized (The Constitution of Japan, 1946).

This norm has been a matter of evaluation and interpretation by doctrine, which came to the conclusion that Tokyo can – under certain circumstances (self-defence and participation in the non-combat operations) and in a limited scope – use forces. Ministry of Japan recognizes the meaning of its own defence-oriented policy as

the force is used only in the event of an attack (...) the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2018).

Legal constraints are not the only limitation on the Japanese side. Tokyo decided in 1976 that defence budget would be limited to not more than 1% of GDP. Since its pronouncement, this ceiling has become not only a psychological barrier to comprehensive defense planning, but also an element of Japanese ‘security culture’, which puts defence expenditures in certain political and historical framework. It limits (or even blocks) the readiness of Tokyo to increase defence spending (especially in the context of relatively low growth of national income and big public debt), while leading to broadening of perception of the scope and the role of military expenditures. For Japan – like for Germany (Kozłowski, 2019a) – security cannot be narrowed down to military spending; development aid and humanitarian assistance also count as contributions to global security.

Japan places 9th position in the world in terms of defence spending. In 2019 it allocated in this regard 47.6 bln USD and has 2.5% of the world of defense expenditures. Simultaneously, the level of GDP spending was the lowest among ten biggest spenders, which was lower by 1 percentage point vis-à-vis China and 1.8 point against South Korea.

While US-Japan bilateral security relationship is clearly asymmetric with Tokyo relying on the support from Washington, the economic collaboration can be characterized by Japanese trade competitiveness (within the years 2010–2019 US deficit against Japan ranged between 63 and 76 billion USD per year) (United States Census Bureau, 2020). That has direct and obvious consequences for the Washington’s policy vis-à-vis Tokyo; to win trade concessions (e.g. purchase of American defense equipment) US is using the argument of its own defense commitments. As Awonahara states “trade and defense issues have also been combined when the United States has limited imports of Japanese products for national security reasons. As Japan continues to make major strides in dual-use technology, it will

become increasingly difficult to separate trade and defense issues” (Awonahara, 1990, p. 5).

Table 2. The World’s biggest spenders on defense (2019)

Country	Amount in bln USD	Share of GDP in %	World share in %
1. USA	732	3.4	38
2. China	261	1.9	14
3. India	71.1	2.4	3.7
4. Russia	65.1	3.9	3.4
5. Saudi Arabia	61.9	8.0	3.2
6. France	50.1	1.9	2.6
7. Germany	49.3	1.3	2.6
8. United Kingdom	48.7	1.7	2.5
9. Japan	47.6	0.9	2.5
10. South Korea	43.9	2.7	2.3

Source: SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 2019.

4. BURDEN SHARING IN THE HISTORY OF THE POSTWAR US-JAPAN RELATIONS

The 1950s and 1960s security arrangement between US and Japan indicated willingness of Washington to assume the financial burden of defending Japan and maintaining regional security in the Far East. The United States agreed to provide troops and pay for all related expenses and Japan consented to bestow military bases and facilities. Even though this formal arrangement has in general terms remained unchanged, the character of the alliance between Washington and Tokyo has been dynamically evolving during the last 75 years, which had also direct consequences for a burden sharing settings (United States General Accounting Office, 1989).

In a broad sense, US burden sharing demands on the government in Tokyo started already in the late 1940s, but the real pressure started in the mid-1960s, when Japan had begun to accumulate trade surpluses with the United States. The idea of burden-sharing was implicit in the President’s Richard Nixon Guam Doctrine of 1969, in which he called on friendly countries (including Japan) to accept financial burden of their own conventional defence (Awonahara, 1990). These expectations grew especially in 1970s when the stationing costs for US forces in Japan sharply increased. US dollar weakened in the relation to the yen², while the construction costs and labor wages were augmenting; it made long-term, unilateral sustainment of US bases less economically feasible whereas Japanese economy was at the same time flourishing. That must have led to negotiating in 1978 host nation support agreement, which reduced the financial burden on US forces (Bosack, 2019).

Despite these arrangements, burden-sharing demands became acute during the administrations of Presidents Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) and Ronald Reagan (1981-1989). The White House expected specific, often quantitative, commitments from Tokyo on its

² Up until 1971, the yen was pegged with a fixed exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar; by 1978, the rate was already plummeting below 200 yen.

defense buildup and Congress was sharing and even amplifying that approach. In 1981 Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) proposed a renegotiation of the US-Japan security treaty to make it reciprocal arrangement, while Congressman Stephen Neal (D-NC) demanded from Japan to share the burden by allocating at least 2% of its Gross National Product (GNP) to defense (see later part of this article). In 1982, in a letter to the Japanese Prime Minister Zenkō Suzuki, 66 members of Congress urged Tokyo to spend a greater percentage of its GNP for defense due to counter the increased Soviet threat. In the following years (1983, 1985 and 1987) members of the House of Representatives suggested that Japan either increases its defense spending or face US penalties (among proposals: tariff surcharges or a security tax on Japanese imports and relocating some of the US troops in Japan to other areas of the Western Pacific). The burden sharing debate between US and Japan in 1980s was particularly intense since the US suffered from a severe economic recession caused by both the increase of military expenditure and a growing national budget deficit (Satake, 2012). A 1988 House Armed Services Committee interim report on burden sharing reflected the frustration of American authorities. The report said that “many Americans feel that we are competing 100 percent militarily with the Soviets and 100 percent economically with our defense allies” and stated i.e. that: a. Japan’s defense contributions and capabilities are inadequate given its tremendous economic strength; b. Japanese HNS for US service personnel is overstated; c. Japanese Government needs to accelerate its ability to perform the self-defense missions without direct US assistance and d. Japan should increase its official development assistance substantially and should target aid towards countries which have strategic importance for Washington and Tokyo (Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 1988).

The post-Cold War era faces new types of threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferations, ethnic conflicts and others. The US capacity to address these threats has been in relative decline, which is one of the reason the Washington began to further demand more burden-sharing from Japan in 1990s (Kohno, 1999).

Over the next decades, the burden sharing discussions and the host nations arrangement between US and Japan have been evolving. They resulted in more defence efforts from Japan, including dispatching in 2003 the Maritime Self-Defence Force to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support for US military operations and sending in 2003 forces to aid in Iraq’s postwar reconstruction efforts (Maizland, Xu, 2019). They also shaped financial arrangements, which was agreed in 1987 as the Special Measures Agreement and was amended since that time every five years. Although the US expectations vis-à-vis Japan to balance some of the American costs continued, only the presidency of Donald Trump brought unprecedented pressure towards Japan and other allies in that regard.

5. BURDEN-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS

Art. VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security states that „for the purposes of contributing to the security of Japan and maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, The United States of America is granted the by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan” (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 1960). This norm was specified in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA; rights and obligations of US stationing troops in Japan), which defines that Japan was to furnish, without cost to the United States, facilities and areas for the use of US forces in Japan. Simultaneously, US agreed to bear without cost to Japan all expenses incident to the maintenance of these forces

(Reed, 1983). The other important documents constituting rights and obligations of both sides on burden sharing are Special Measures Agreement (SMA) and Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) – see below.

Up until 2004, Department of Defense provided aggregate national-level information on direct and indirect cost sharing and other forms of contributions toward the common defense and mutual security of the US and its allies. According to the last report Japan's yearly contribution under the Host Nation Support 4.4 million USD, which constituted 74.5% of US stationing costs (US Department of Defense, 2004). The data for recent years are unfortunately less available, since there are no centralized sources of information on contributions or US payments, other than those pertaining to cash support and multilateral cost sharing (Losumbo, 2013). According to different information, Tokyo's contribution towards US military posture in Japan ranges from 40% (various media reports) to 86% (Japanese Government) (Chanlett-Avery, 2019).

Table 3. US Forces in Japan

US Forces	Number of troops
Navy	20.250 sailors
Air Force	12.500 airmen
Army	2.700 soldiers
Marine Corps	18.800 marines

Source: (Chanlett-Avery et al., 2019).

Burden-sharing arrangements between Japan and USA can be interpreted on three dimensions. First, Tokyo provides to the US Army Host Nation Support. HNS is composed of two funding sources: SMA and FIP. SMA is a bilateral agreement, covering usually five years, which obligates Japan to pay a certain amount for utility and labor costs of US bases and for relocating training exercises away from populated areas. Under the current SMA (2016–2021), Tokyo contributes circa 1.7 billion USD per year and at least 187 million USD for the FIP (this funding is not strictly defined, other than the agreed minimum). FIP (initiated in 1978 to provide housing for the US military personnel) is not included in SMA and has a voluntary character (Inquiry into US Costs and Allied Contributions to Support the US Military Presence Overseas, 2013). According to Chanlett-Avery both sums set the Japanese contribution under HNS (in-kind and cash) in the range of 1.7–2.1 billion USD per year to offset the direct cost of stationing of US forces in Japan (Chanlett-Avery, 2019). Second, Japan spends approximately 1.65 billion USD annually on measures to subsidize or compensate base-hosting communities. Upon the norms outlined in the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, Tokyo also pays the cost of relocating US bases within Japan and rent to any landowners on which US military facilities are located in Japan. That includes i.e. covering of majority of costs regarding three of the largest international military base construction projects since World War II (replacement facility in Okinawa – 12.1 billion USD; air station Iwakuni – over 4.5 billion USD and facilities in Guam – 3.1 billion USD) (Chanlett-Avery, 2019). According to the Ministry of Defense of Japan, these costs in the 2016 budget reached a level of approximately 1.6 billion of USD (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2016). Third, Japanese financial contributions to the United States have to be seen

in the wider context of close political and military collaboration between the two countries. Tokyo has been a major purchaser of US-produced defense equipment (more than 90% of equipment comes from US) being the major recipient of the Department of Defense Foreign Military Sales program (on the level of 3 billion USD yearly). Japan provides an economic aid to strategically important countries (Islam, 1993); only in 2018 Japanese contribution under Official Development Assistance grant equals to 14.2 billion USD; top three recipients of Japanese aid were India, Bangladesh and Viet Nam (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2019). Simultaneously, Tokyo supports Washington in peacekeeping efforts. Despite restrictive legislation (limiting deployment to settings in which cease-fire is in place and use of force is reduced to self-defence), Japan has already been able to deploy since 1992 more than 10 thousand personnel to peacekeeping missions (Hutchinson, Day, 2018). Japan plays also an important role for US in terms of cooperation in defense technology and security cooperation (e.g. through US Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities).

Based on the available data from Ministry of Defense of Japan and RAND we can assume that the Tokyo's costs for the stationing of US troops on its territory can be shown as presented in table 4.

Table 4. US Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY2016)

Types of costs	Million USD ³
Costs clearly covered under Ministry of Defense (MOD) budget documents, labeled as "Cost-Sharing for the stationing of US Forces in Japan".	1.776
Costs likely covered under MOD budget documents as base promotion, including measures to improve surrounding living environments and facilities rent.	1.704
Costs additional to those covered under MOD budget documents (i.e. expenditures borne by non-MOD Ministries).	1.650
Total	5.130

Source: (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2016 and Losumbo et al., 2013).

Annual Japanese support (direct and indirect) for the US stationing forces could be estimated on the level of just over 5 billion USD. Taking into account that the US pays for their troops in Japan approximately 2 billion USD (Hoff, 2016), Tokyo's share in overall costs could reach just over 70 %.

6. BURDEN SHARING IN THE CURRENT AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVE OF US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP

President Donald Trump has repeatedly questioned the economics of US global security alliances saying that the countries Washington protects must "pay up". Trump emphasized that the allies are "not paying enough their share" and they "must contribute toward their financial, political, and human costs". He warned that the countries US are defending "must

³ 1 USD-108.69 Yen (average closing price from 2016). *Dollar Yen Exchange Rate – Historical Data Chart*. [Access: 8 September 2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.macrotrends.net/2550/dollar-yen-exchange-rate-historical-chart>.

pay for the cost of this defense, and if not, the US must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves” (Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech, 2016). Trump contended that Japan should pay more host-nation support or face a drawback of US defense commitments. These expectations were strengthened in the last several years; the most exorbitant demand reached the so called “Cost Plus 50” formula, which is defined that Japan (or any other country hosting US troops) pay the full price of American soldiers deployed on their soil plus 50 % or more for the privilege of hosting them (Wadhams, Jacobs, 2018).

President’s Trump rhetoric created real and effective pressure on the NATO allies. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, announced in November 2019 (ahead of the Alliance summit in London) that defense spending across European Allies and Canada increased in real terms by 4.6 % and revealed that the Allies would invest in defense by the end of 2020 130 billion USD more than in 2016 (NATO HQ, 2019).

Table 5. NATO defence expenditures dynamic of growth (2016–2019)

Regions	2016		2019		Change (2019/2016)	
	billion ⁴ USD	% GDP	billion USD	% GDP	billion USD	% GDP
NATO Europe and Canada	255,3	1.44	309,5	1.57	54,2	0.13
NATO Total	911,4	2.49	1.039,6	2.52	128,2	0.03

Source: (NATO HQ, 2019).

Data in table 5 proved the real increase of defence expenditures among NATO allies (54 billion USD in the case of European countries and Canada). However, some of them, have been still keeping their outlays under NATO guidelines, which is at least 2 % of GDP. The most tensed US critic was addressed toward Germany (Herszenhorn, 2019), which finally has consequences for the American presence in this country. As US Department of Defense announces in July 2020, approximately 11,900 military personnel will be repositioned from Germany with nearly 5,600 repositioned within other NATO countries and 6,400 returning to the United States to address readiness and prepare for rotational deployments (US Department of Defense, 2020). According to President Trump the reason for this decision was mostly financial as Germany are not paying their bills (Borger, 2020). The same pressure is addressed towards non-NATO allies. In currently negotiating agreement between Washington and Seoul, the White House expects that South Korea radically (even up to five fold from the current level 920 million USD) increase its support for the US stationing forces in its country, suggesting that without such a move, withdrawal of troops could be decided (Klinger, 2020).

Under current and prospective circumstances, there will be a continued Washington’s pressure on Tokyo to increase Japanese contribution in bilateral burden sharing. Potential change on the position of the US President in the upcoming in November 2020 presidential election (Democrats’ candidate Joe Biden succeeding president Trump) would not alter much, since there is a bipartisan consensus in the US Congress to expect more from

⁴ Current prices and exchange rates.

the allies in terms of financial engagement and no one can argue that the White House policy brought changes in the policy of European allies in terms of defense spending (see table 5).

In that context, Tokyo – trying to keep close political, military and economic relations, especially in the era of growing interests from China and remaining nuclear threat from North Korea – will have to adjust its policy vis-à-vis Washington, Japan remains a non-nuclear weapons state, being a signatory to the Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. While it has to be underlined that Japan acquired from the US highly potent Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities and continued to advance bilateral cooperation with US in that regard, but Tokyo has to rely – especially in the context of growing concerns coming from North Korean nuclear weapons development and China’s modernization of its nuclear arsenal - on the US policy of extended deterrence (commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella”). The defense of Japan against atomic threats from Pyongyang is explicitly reflected in the US Nuclear Posture (US Department of Defense, 2018). US nuclear guarantee is de facto the most important factor (apart from bilateral Treaty rights and obligations see above) determining asymmetric position between US and Japan and shaping the status of Tokyo to large extent as a free rider.

Having no real alternatives than to increase its financial burden vis-à-vis US, Japan will have limited sphere of maneuvering. Unlike some of the European allies, Japan does not have a possibility to increase (or even plan to increase) its defense expenditures. Current and ongoing political requirements to keep the ceiling of allocation not more of 1% of GDP for defense will maintain the Japanese Government against US expectations to spend more for defense without “room for maneuver”. Tokyo has also limited flexibility in some of the indirect contribution, which would serve US interest. It cannot radically enhance of purchasing of US defense equipment (Japan already buys more than 90% of military goods from US); simultaneously current US administrations is not very enthusiastically interested in development assistance spending.

Where are the potential concessions of Japan? First, Tokyo has to be ready to reshape SMA in favor of Washington. Japan can – as Bosack suggested – identify new existing areas to include into the SMA and should be open to negotiate increases in existing cost-sharing areas (Bosack, 2019). That would directly benefit Washington by decreasing its costs of US stationing in Japan. Second, Tokyo needs to consider further progressing its defense policy with more emphasis on increasing its defense capabilities and the role in the peacekeeping operations. Third, the key to burden sharing might be economic (trade) area, where Japan can consider further compromises toward US. The old Japanese policy of separation defence and trade cannot be further maintained in the relationship with US.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Burden sharing remains one of the priorities of the current US Government. Washington expects that Japan, like a lot of European allies of US, will be prone to increase its security and financial contributions regarding the stationing of the American troops in Japan and – in broader terms – aiming to support US interest in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

Tokyo will not be able to avoid increasing its economic and military engagement in the alliance with the US. Asymmetric character of relationship with a clear significance of US nuclear capabilities would make Japan induced to grant Washington more concessions.

However, having legal and financial constraints and being not ready to increase its defense spending over 1% of GDP, Japan will seek to grow its contribution under present cost sharing arrangements (like SMA), while pursuing other, indirect forms of support of the United States in defense related areas.

REFERENCES

- Allied Joint Doctrine for Host Nation Support* (2013) [Access:25.08.2020]. Access on the internet: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/628308/ajp-4.5_edb_v1_e.pdf.
- Awonahara, S. (1990). *The Burden-Sharing Issues in US-Japan Security Relations. A Perspective from Japan*. Honolulu: East-West Center [Access:1.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/23828/BurdenSharingIssuesInUSJapanSecurityRelations1990%5Bpdfa%5D.PDF>.
- Borger, J. (2020). *US to pull 12,000 troops out of Germany as Trump blasts ‘delinquent’ Berlin*. “*The Guardian*”. [Access:9.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jul/29/us-germany-troop-withdrawal-donald-trump>.
- Bosack, M.M. (2019). *The Looming Cost-Sharing Storm. Mitigating the Impacts of Special Measures Agreement Negotiations on the US-Japan Alliance*. Sasakawa US Forum, Issue No 18 [Access: 1.09.2020]. Access on the internet: https://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/The-Looming-Cost-Sharing-Storm_Bosack.-formatted.pdf.
- US Census Bureau (2020). *Trade in Goods with Japan* [Access: 4.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5880.html>.
- Chanlett-Avery, E. et al (2019). *The US-Japan Alliance*, Washington: Congressional Research Service [Access: 7.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf>.
- U.S. Code no date [Access: 1.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/2350j>.
- Committee on Armed Services. US House of Representatives (1988). *Interim Report of the Defense Burden-sharing Panel*. Washington: US Government Printing Office.
- Committee on Armed Services, US Senate (2013). *Inquiry into US Costs and Allied Contributions to Support the US Military Presence Overseas* [Access: 8.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/REPORT-FOR-POSTING-4-16-2013-WITH-5-14-2013-CORRECTION.pdf>.
- The Constitution of Japan* (1946) [Access: 6.09.2020]. Access on the internet: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.
- US Department of Defense (2004). *2004 Statistical Compendium on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*. [Access: 7.09.2020]. Access on the internet: https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/allied_contrib2004/allied2004.pdf.
- US Department of Defense (2018). *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Sharpening the American Military Competitive Edge*, [Access: 27.08.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.
- US Department of Defense (2018). “*Nuclear Posture Review*” [Access: 10.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://dod.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx>.
- US Department of Defense (2020). *US European Command Force Posture Review* [Access: 9.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/>

Article/2292244/departement-of-defense-statement-us-european-command-force-posture-review/source/GovDelivery/.

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2020) [Access: 25.08.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf>.

US Department of State (2020) *US Relations With Japan. Bilateral Fact Sheet* [Access: 4.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-japan/>.

Foucault, M., Mérand, F. (2012). *The challenge of burden-sharing*. "International Journal", Vol. 67, No 2.

US General Accounting Office (1989). *US-Japan Burden Sharing. Japan has Increased Its Contributions, but Could Do More*. [Access:1.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/148034.pdf>.

US General Accounting Office (1990). *US-NATO Burden Sharing. Allies' Contributions to Common Defense*. [Access: 27.08.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/149781.pdf>.

Herszenhorn, D. (2019). *Trump threatens to punish Germany over military spending*. Politico [Access: 9.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-threatens-germany-military-spending/>.

Hoff, R. (2016). *Burden-Sharing with Allies: Examining the Budgetary Realities*. American Action Forum [Access: 9.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/burden-sharing-allies-examining-budgetary-realities/>.

Hutchinson, E., Day, A. (2018). *Is the Cruz Report the end of peacekeeping for Japan?*. "Japan Times" [Access: 8.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/06/12/commentary/japan-commentary/cruz-report-end-peacekeeping-japan/>.

Islam, S. (1993). *Foreign Aid and Burdensharing: Is Japan Free Riding to a Coprosperity Sphere in Pacific Asia* [In:] Frankel, J., Kahler, M., *Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Klinger, B. (2020). *US-South Korea Burden-Sharing Talk Remain Stuck. Here's How to Fix It*. Heritage Foundation [Access: 9.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/us-south-korea-burden-sharing-talk-remain-stuck-heres-how-fix-it>.

Kohno, M. (1999). *In Search of Proactive Diplomacy: Increasing Japan's International Role in the 1990s*. Brookings Institute [Access: 3.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/in-search-of-proactive-diplomacy-increasing-japans-international-role-in-the-1990s/>.

Kozłowski, G. (2019a). *NATO Defence Expenditures and the Baltic Member-States* [In:] Voyger, M., ed., *NATO at 70 and the Baltic States: Strengthening the Euro-Atlantic Alliance in an Age of Non-Linear Threats*, Tartu: The Baltic Defence College.

Kozłowski, G. (2019b). *The Position of Burden Sharing the Current US Security Policy vis-à-vis European Allies*. "Baltic Journal of European Studies", Vol. 9, No 4 (29).

Losumbo, M. et al. (2013). *Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Maizland, L., Xu, B. (2019). *The US-Japan Security Alliance*. Council of Foreign Relations [Access: 3.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance>.

Ministry of Defense of Japan (2016). *Defense of Japan* [Access: 8.09.2020]. Access on the internet: https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2016/DOJ2016_2-4-4_web.pdf.

- Ministry of Defense of Japan (2018). *Defense of Japan* [Access: 6.09.2020]. Access on the internet: https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2018/DOJ2018_Full_1130.pdf.
- NATO HQ (1949). *The North Atlantic Treaty* [Access: 27.08.2020]. Access on the internet: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.
- NATO HQ (2010). *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* [Access: 31.08.2020]. Access on the internet: https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf.
- NATO HQ (2014). *Wales Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales* [Access: 31.08.2020]. Access on the internet: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
- NATO HQ (2019). *NATO Secretary General announces increased defence spending by Allies* [Access: 9.09.2020]. Access on the internet: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_171458.htm?selectedLocale=en.
- “The New York Times” (2016). *Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech* [Access: 9.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html>.
- OECD (2019). *Development Co-operation Report. 2019: A Fairer, Greener, Safer Tomorrow*, Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Olson, M., Zeckhauser, R. (1966). *An Economic Theory of Alliances*. “*Review of Economics and Statistics*”, No. 48.
- Reed, R.F. (1983). *The US-Japan Alliance: Sharing the Burden of Defense*. Washington: National Defense University Press.
- Satake, T. (2012). *Japan, Australia and International Security Burden-Sharing with the United States* [In:] Tow, W.T., Kersten, R., eds., *Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security. Australia, Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Shim, E. (2019). *Report: Bolton discussed fivefold increase in military burden sharing in Japan*. United Press International [Access: 26.08.2020]. Access on the internet: https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2019/07/31/Report-Bolton-discussed-fivefold-increase-in-military-burden-sharing-in-Japan/7201564580052/.
- SIPRI (2020). *Trends in World Military Expenditure* [Access: 6.09.2020]. Access on the internet: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/fs_2020_04_milex_0_0.pdf.
- Solomon, R. (2018). *Japan Must Do More to Support the US-Japan Alliance*. The Diplomat [Access: 26.08.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/japan-must-do-more-to-support-the-us-japan-alliance/>.
- Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan* (1960) [Access: 4.09.2020]. Access on the internet: http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/japan/mutual_cooperation_treaty.pdf.
- Wadhams, N., Jacobs, J. (2019). *Trump Seeks Huge Premium From Allies Hosting US Troops*. Bloomberg [Access: 3.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-08/trump-said-to-seek-huge-premium-from-allies-hosting-u-s-troops>.
- Weinberger, C. (1987). *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense. A Report to the United States Congress* [Access: 27.08.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a192414.pdf>.

The White House (2017). *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* [Access: 27.08.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

Zyla, B. (2016). *NATO Burden Sharing: A New Research Agenda*. "Journal of International Organizations Studies", Vol. 7, Issue 2.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.42

The text was submitted to the editorial office: October 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.

Ireneusz Piotr MAJ¹
Joanna MAJ²

SENATOR STANISŁAW SIEDLECKI. YOUTH AND THE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY (1877–1918). CONTRIBUTION TO A BIOGRAPHY

The aim of this article is to present the biography and the political activity of Stanisław Siedlecki (1877–1939). A chemical engineer, independence and socialist activist, conspirator, specialist in printing technology and emissary, publicist, politician and social activist, Stanisław Siedlecki had outstanding abilities in every field of his activity. This article focuses on the initial period of Siedlecki's political activity, setting the final turning point for the year of regaining independence. It was in this period that the future senator of the Republic of Poland shaped his worldview, acquired the necessary political experience and entered the pages of history as one of the leading activists of the Polish independence left. The article utilizes a wide ranging analysis of the literature to verify arguments made in journals and studies, as well as presenting the results from an analysis of source documentation and research conducted on previously unknown hypotheses. The publication fills another gap in Polish historiography and is an introduction to a broader research undertaking, i.e., the full biography of Senator Stanisław Siedlecki.

Keywords: Stanisław Siedlecki, Polish Socialist Party, Polish-Ukrainian relations, Polish Legions, World War I.

1. INTRODUCTION

On September 17, 2019, eighty years had passed since the tragic death of Stanisław Siedlecki³. The figure of Senator Siedlecki, apart from a relatively narrow circle of specialists – researchers of the recent political history of Poland – is little known⁴.

¹ Ireneusz Piotr Maj, PhD, assistant professor at the Jagiellonian University, Faculty of International and Political Studies; e-mail: ireneusz.maj@uj.edu.pl (corresponding author). ORCID: 0000-0001-8684-0374.

² Joanna Maj, PhD, assistant professor at the University of Łódź, Faculty of Philosophy and History. ORCID: 0000-0002-0295-9245.

³ Stanisław Siedlecki in the face of the Soviet aggression on September 17, 1939, committed suicide in Krzemieniec in Wołyń. Information on the place, cause of death, date and place of burial was included in the records of baptisms and deaths of the Krzemieniec parish (from January 1, 1936, item no. 62, Regional State Archives in Tarnopol, Record book of the Roman Catholic Parish in Krzemieniec (from 1936), microfilm reference number F4260.1D.150 - 19.

⁴ Stanisław Siedlecki (1877–1939), *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (hereinafter PSB), Vol. XXXVI, Warsaw 1995, pp. 555-558.

Contemporary historiography assigns Siedlecki the role of a promoter of the Promethean movement and he is most often perceived in the context of activities for the revival of enslaved nations (Maj, 2007)⁵. It is impossible to depict the hero's life without analyzing the events that took place in his youth. The experiences of the adolescence period permanently shaped Siedlecki's life attitude and political beliefs. It is from them that the future senator will draw strength in the years filled with the struggle for an independent and just Poland.

2. FAMILY, UPBRINGING AND THE FIRST CONSPIRACY

Stanisław Siedlecki (pseud.: Grzymała, Eustachy) was born on February 19, 1877 in the town of Sima, located in central Russia in the province of Volodymyr⁶. The Siedlecki family, descended from the farm nobility, who settled in Podolia, sealed with the coat of arms of Grzymała (Niesiecki, 1839–1845). His father, also Stanisław, for taking part in the January Uprising, was sentenced to forced labor and settlement in the Kostroma province (Przybysz, 2013; Siedlecki, 1928; Siedlecki, 1933; Siedlecki, 1937)⁷. His mother, Józefa née Przedpełski, came from a landed gentry family in which the memory of national liberation struggles had been cultivated for generations. The grandfather of the future senator – Aleksander Przedpełski, an officer of the Polish army, participant in subsequent uprisings, paid for his political activity with a hard labor. When characterizing the family environment of the senator from his mother's line, it is impossible to ignore the close relatives who sacrificed their life on the altar of the Homeland during the uprising. And so, a tragic fate also befell Uncle Gotfryd Przedpełski – a student who promoted freedom ideals,

⁵ Among the first organizational measures for the rebirth of enslaved nations initiated by Siedlecki, one should mention the magazine *Przymierze*, the Association for the Approximation of the Reborn Nations and, above all, the Eastern Institute in Warsaw, of which he was the founder and president.

⁶ Sima, a village situated on the Simka River in the Yuryevo-Polish region, in the Volodymyr Oblast, about 200 km east of Moscow. From the 18th century, the village belonged to the Golitsyn family. In the second half of the 19th century, it had over 1,500 inhabitants. It housed an Orthodox church, a school, a hospital, a post office, a market and a factory. *Библиографическое описание. Списки населенных мест Российской империи, составленные и издаваемые Центральным статистическим комитетом Министерства внутренних дел.* - СПб. изд. Центр. стат. ком. Мин. внутр. дел, 1861-1885. [Вып. 6]: *Владимирская губерния: ... по сведениям 1859 года / обраб. ст. ред. М. Раевским.* - 1863. - ЛIII, 283 с., 1 л. к., с. 234. Cf.: <http://elib.shpl.ru/ru/nodes/16016-vyp-6-vladimirskaya-guberniya-po-svedeniyam-1859-goda-1863#mode/inspect/page/290/zoom/6>.

⁷ Stanisław Siedlecki (1844–1928) – the senator's father was born in Podolia, in Wachnowka. According to Stanisław Siedlecki Jr.'s account: "Father was sent for attempting to join the insurgent party in Podolia", while his mother acted as "a courier and delivery agent for the orders of the National Government". The niece of Senator Siedlecki – Ludwika Wlochowa, née Siedlecka – recalled that Grandfather in the January Uprising served as a courier liaison. In the 1920s, the Senator's parents lived in Brwinów near Warsaw. Their graves are located in the local cemetery. The application for the award of the Order of Polonia Restituta for Stanisław Siedlecki, born on November 19, 1844 for participation in the organization of the 1863 uprising and exile to the Kostroma province probably concerns the senator's father. Cf.: Military Historical Office in Warsaw, Collection of Personnel and Decoration Files (hereinafter: WBH KAPiO), File reference number OOP 27-317 (Stanisław Siedlecki), sheet 1.

who was murdered by Ukrainian peasants in 1863 near Sołowiówka (Jarnecki, 2004; Dutka, 2012)⁸. The remaining members of the Przedpeński family, including Józefa, were relocated deep into Russia after the fall of the uprising. As Ludwik Siedlecki, Stanisław's brother recalled:

“They both came from Ukraine – father from Lipowiecki, mother from Zwinogrodzki powiat in the Kiev region. Deported in almost boyhood years (Father was 19, Mother 18) to the far north, having heroically survived all the miseries of political prisoners chased to Siberia and yearning with all their pure and noble souls to their distant motherland” (Siedlecki Grzymała, 1938).

Stanisław's parents got married in exile. Siedlecki spent his early childhood in the province of Volodymyr and Samara. Near Samara, his father was appointed manager of the estate of Prince Lev Golitsyn. As he recalled that time, “I had the opportunity to come into contact with the peoples conquered by Russia: Tatars, Bashkirs, Kyrgyz, Chuvash, Mordwin and Ukrainians, forced deportees from Ukraine in the 18th century” (Siedlecki, 1937). It was then that Siedlecki's national interests began to arise. Understanding the independence aspirations of the peoples of the East, identical to the fate of Poles, aroused sympathy and a sense of solidarity. This experience will leave a permanent mark on Stanisław's life and will later turn into a passion that made Siedlecki one of the most outstanding representatives of the Promethean movement.

The Siedlecki family came to Ukraine in 1888. They lived between Złotopol (Hulajpol) and Nowomirgorod in a leased farm, which was later called “futorek”⁹. Six siblings were brought up in the modest Siedlecki manor. Stanisław, his older brother Godfryd (Bednarek,

⁸ The event took place on May 10, 1863, when the local population, probably incited by tsarist officials, attacked a group of noble youth led by Antoni Jurewicz. The insurgents intended to announce to Ukrainian peasants the provisions of the decree on expropriation, known as the Golden Hramota. According to various sources, from 12 to 15 insurgents were murdered. The death of Godfryd Przedpeński was part of the collective image of Polish martyrs who lay down their lives “for our freedom and yours.” These tragic events were described in the then Polish-language press. Cf: *Korespondencja Czasu*, “Czas”, No. 126, Krakow, June 6, 1863, p. 1.

⁹ Złotopol (until 1787 Hulajpol), currently a district of the Ukrainian city of Novomyrhorod, located north of the city center, on the right bank of the Great Wysia river. The town was described in the Geographical Dictionary published at the end of the 19th century: *Słownik Geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich*, edited by B. Chlebowski, J. Krzywicki, F. Sulimierski, Volume XIV, Warsaw 1895, p. 642-642; Cf.: http://dir.icm.edu.pl/pl/Sloownik_geograficzny/. We can also find here an explanation of the term ‘futor’: “Futor or chutor, in Ukraine and Podolia this is the name of a small farm, usually established in a secluded place, far from the village. The founders of futors were usually in previous centuries, well-deserved soldiers, both from noble banners and from the chosen or foreign infantry, to whom the hetman gave a piece of steppe land as a reward for merit. While settling here, they did not abandon their military duties and, on occasion, usually stood under banners, W. Pol in *Mohotr* (Wincenty Pol, *Mohotr. Rapsod rycerski z podania* – authors' note) presented the type of such a knight-farmer”. The Siedlecki farm was about 150 ha. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 425.

2008)¹⁰ and younger Ludwik (Uziębło, 1958)¹¹ were accompanied by three sisters: Wanda, Józefa and Jadwiga (Przybysz, 2013)¹². Stanisław's mother had the greatest influence on his worldview. He recalled her as “an ardent patriot who puts the struggle for Polish independence above all else”. His brother Ludwik left an emotionally charged account of his parents: “They poured into our children's hearts all the flame of love and dedication, all the impulse to heroically fight the invader, all enthusiasm and reverence for fortitude and truth, all contempt for lies and cowardice, all these feelings were direct and knew no compromises” (Siedlecki Grzymała, 1938).

The seniors of the family also played an undivided role in raising children. Grandfather Przedpełski popularized among his grandchildren the traditions of the great French revolution, and uncle Walery Przedpełski, a “writer, philosopher and realist” – then common in Polish society, ideas of organic work. It should be mentioned that the favorite novelist of Stanisław Siedlecki was Teodor Tomasz Jeż: “With him I learned to respect and honor all nations fighting for independence” (Siedlecki Grzymała, 1938)¹³.

He started his political activity in a junior high school in Złotów. Facing Russification, he organized a secret Polish student library at school and initiated Polish language courses. In 1894, together with his brother Ludwik, he found himself in a group of 15 students expelled from the junior high school without the possibility of continuing education due to the dissemination of forbidden Polish poetry among his peers. Stanisław was recognized as “the organizer of a self-education and patriotic circle and for Polish-revolutionary activity”

¹⁰ Gotfryd Siedlecki, born on in 1871 in Romancewo, a naturalist, graduated from the Agricultural Academy in Puławy. He and his family moved to Biała Cerkiew. Gottfried's son and Stanisław Siedlecki's nephew was Jerzy Siedlecki (1907-1996), a member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, a colonel in the Ministry of Public Security, the ambassador of the Polish People's Republic in Pyongyang.

¹¹ Ludwik Siedlecki (Sidlečkyj), pseud. Grzymalita, Sawa Kryłacz (1878-1943). Activist of the Ukrainian socialist and conservative movement. PSB, Vol. XXXVI, Warsaw 1995, pp. 549-550. Ludwik Siedlecki was recalled by Adam Uziębło: “So Poles are setting out to Ukraine. There are also those who will accept Ukrainian nationality. Among others, Ludwik Siedlecki set off from Lviv. He will soon become famous as Sawa Kryłacz. A really beautiful figure. In love with Ukraine as the land that fed him, he sets out, as he used to say, to Zaporizhia to serve it. He spent hours talking with Jodka. He used to come to him - big, black, in Cossack pants, in an embroidered shirt. In the Kiev region, he met those who were walking there under the influence of Piłsudski. They created an independence organization. People realized the program.

¹² Wanda Siedlecka – medical doctor. A graduate of the Medical Academy in Zurich. She married Mikołaj Stroński. Józefa Siedlecka – a teacher. For two years she studied nature at the University of Lviv. Jadwiga Siedlecka - married to Marian Wieleżyński.

¹³ More information on this subject was provided by Ludwik Siedlecki: “Raised in the traditions of the heroic fights of the Polish Uprisings, on the novels of Maurycy Jokay and T.T. Jeż, describing the equally heroic and victorious struggle for the independence of the Balkan and Hungarian nations, we understood that such a fight was not” a wild goose chase” or “a pernicious utopia” as the elders we met at our parents' home sometimes claimed, who, terrified of the recent defeat of 1863, preached organic work and eagerly warned us against “dangerous fantasies that lose the flower of the nation and are a crime against the Motherland”. We knew – it was rather full of healthy instinct that we felt that they were saying it “out of fear” and that they were wrong, because we knew the history of Marathon, Thermopylae, Ordon Reduta, Bem, Haji Dumitra, Skanderberg, Miłosz Obrenowicz, Garibaldi ... so we loved those heroes and we were preparing for such a fight”.

he was placed under police supervision. He passed his final exams and Matura exams in extramural studies in Bila Tserkva (Siedlecki, 1937; Siedlecki Grzymała, 1938)¹⁴.

At that time, the first copies of *Robotnik* and socialist brochures arrived at the Siedlecki home. Futorek has become the “center of the radical-patriotic youth movement”. As he recalled: “Orienting from 1898 clearly in the spirit of the Polish Socialist Party program, I easily fought against national-democratic or conciliatory tendencies, appearing from time to time in youth clubs on futorek” (Grzymała Siedlecki, 1938)¹⁵. However, as Stanisław Siedlecki emphasized, “parents made sure that (futorek – the authors' note) remained the mainstay of Polishness” (Siedlecki, 1933)¹⁶. These words are confirmed in the memories of friends of the Siedlecki family. Marian Wieleżyński talked about the home of his in-laws as “a wonderful corner of the world, where he was welcomed like a son, where he realized that the most powerful source of creative power in the world was that spirit of family and human love, which he did not meet in his early youth” (Wieleżyński, 1985).

3. STUDIES, AT THE EDITORIAL OFFICE OF *PROMIEŃ* AND THE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY

The end of the 19th century turned out to be a breakthrough in the biography of Stanisław Siedlecki. As was the case in many Polish homes, the decision to continue education abroad by young people was a derivative of the policy of the Russian authorities. And in this case, the tsarist repressions prevented Siedlecki from being admitted as a student at the universities in Dorpat, then in Kazan. With the consent of his parents, Stanisław chose Lviv, which enjoyed cultural and political freedom.

In 1897, he began studies at the Faculty of Chemistry at the Lviv Polytechnic. As an activist of the socialist academic association “Zjednoczenie” and “Bratnia Pomoc” for students, he became closer to the group of independence and socialist youth (Siedlecki, 1937)¹⁷. At that time, in Poland, mass political and social movements were activated, around which Polish youth organizations were formed. In 1898, Siedlecki joined the secret foreign section of the Polish Socialist Party (hereinafter: PPS) of the Russian partition, introduced to the organization by Bolesław Miklaszewski¹⁸. It was then that he took the pseudonym of Eustachy. Soon, with a group of his closest associates, he founded the journal “Promień” (Nowicki, 1936; Siedlecki, 1933; Weinfeld, 1938; Zaczyński, 1984)¹⁹, which became an

¹⁴ WBH KAPiO, ref. No. June 15, 1932, KN (Stanisław Siedlecki), sheet 9.

¹⁵ These words are confirmed in the memoirs of Ludwik Siedlecki: “The information of our parents was no longer sufficient for us. They looked at national matters through the prism of tradition, when the “nation” was still the “noble nation”, while the people were only an addition to this nation and an addition without any political significance. We saw clearly that that epoch was gone forever and that the people begin to stand out as a national factor”.

¹⁶ As Siedlecki recalled years later: “A worker who has been leaving without a break for several years has been close to our hearts for his boldness, for the direct approach to working-class life”.

¹⁷ As he recalled years later: “Feliks Perl, Kazimierz Mokłowski, Dr. Kazimierz Górczycki, Stanisław Kachnikiewicz, Wacław Studnicki, Andrzej Galica, Adolf Macierza – this was the environment in which I lived and shaped my social worldview”.

¹⁸ Bolesław Grzegorz Miklaszewski (1871–1941) chemist, activist of the Foreign Union of Polish Socialists, organizer and rector of the Warsaw School of Economics, minister of education, senator. PSB, Vol. XXI. Wrocław 1976, p. 58-61.

¹⁹ As Siedlecki recalled: “The idea of establishing an independence magazine for young people arose during the evenings of the literary club, which was established in November 1898 at the Brotherly

important tool for the Galician socialists to influence the young generation of “rebellious” (Siedlecki, 1937)²⁰. Intellectuals gathered around the periodical, referred to as ‘Promieniści’, contributed to the future elite of the Polish independence left.

In 1900, Siedlecki meets Józef Piłsudski personally. The meeting took place during a secret visit of young PPS activists and supporters of the independence movement in Brzuchowice, not far from Lviv. The meeting with Piłsudski was organized by his companion from the period of exile, Bronisław Szwarce²¹. Siedlecki, a young PPS activist at the time, was greatly impressed by the personality of the Marshal: “As for us – as he wrote – we, young people, did not know how to approach him, although he would certainly talk to each of us as easily and cordially as when he lived already with his family in Brzuchowice and when we played chess on his simple Spartan bed” (Siedlecki, 1933).

Apart from their journalistic activity, the ‘radiant’ youth initiated anti-Russian protests. The pretext was the consecutive anniversaries of the January Uprising. In 1902, one of such demonstrations was also led by Stanisław Siedlecki (Weinfeld, 1938). As he recalled years later: “If it were not for *Promień* and its many years of work, I do not know if Józef Piłsudski would have been able to find several thousand young people in Galicia in 1910–1914 for his rifle units” (Siedlecki, 1933.04).

The Lviv period also changed the personal life of the future senator. In 1903, he gained in his wife, Felicja née Iwanowska, “a companion and support in the work for independence”. Felicja Siedlecka practically did not leave her husband, combining the role of a home carer with the hardships of working in the underground. Often, thanks to her vigilance and devotion, the printing house was saved “from being turned in” and her husband did not share the fate of many of his companions imprisoned and sent to Siberia (Siedlecki, 1933.04; Siedlecki, 1937; Siedlecki, 1938; Wołyniak, 1994)²².

Help of the Lviv Polytechnic. The title of the magazine was proposed by Feliks Perl”. Among the founders were also Wacław Wolski, Aleksander Wielzyński, Ludwik Siedlecki, A. Galica and Leon Weinfeld.

²⁰ “My parents, who were always a little wry about socialism, welcomed *Promień*, although definitely socialist, with kind hearts, read, supported and distributed”.

²¹ Bronisław Antoni Szwarce (1834–1904) – engineer and independence activist, member of the Central National Committee (1862), prisoner, among others of the Warsaw Citadel and Szlisselburg, an exile, member of the Polish League, journalist, translator of Russian literature. PSB, Vol. XLIX, Warsaw 2013, pp. 443–446.

²² Felicja Maria née Iwanowska Siedlecka pseud. Irena, daughter of Ernest and Leopoldyna Kamińska, born on November 21, 1882 in Konstanyńów in the Kiev province, died in 1944 in Bombay. On May 21, 1903, she married Stanisław Siedlecki in the parish of St. Mary Magdalene in Lviv. The Siedlecki family had two daughters: Maria (in 1939 she married Lieutenant Zdzisław Dąbski) and Irena (Wołyniak). The eldest son died in childhood in 1905. Felicja Iwanowska met her future husband at the home of her in-laws called “Futerek”, where she stayed with her sister Jadwiga in a boarding house. Aunt Emeryka Grodzicka (a friend of Eliza Orzeszkowa) placed her in the Siedlecki house. She attended the girls' junior high school in Złotopol. She belonged to the “Promieniści” organization affiliated with the socialist youth magazine *Promień*. In 1905, she joined the PPS, then the PPS-Revolutionary Fraction. In the years 1905-1908 in Warsaw she conducted underground activities in publishing technology. Together with her husband, she worked in secret PPS printing houses. In 1908, she hid Józef Piłsudski in the apartment at Piękna Street. During the meeting with Piłsudski, she was offered to join the PPS Combat Organization. In the years 1913-1914, while in Boryslaw, she helped members of the ZWC and PPS activists. In the years 1915-1917 she worked at the Legionnaires' Inn in Vienna functioning at the NKN. There,

In 1900, Siedlecki interrupted his studies and started apprenticeships in the Uładówka sugar factories in Podolia, the Żuczka-Czerniowce in Bukovina and farms²³. The experience of the living and working conditions of workers strengthened his political views. As he recalled: “it was really only after I went to the factory and tried the 18-hour working day (after changing the 12-hour night shift to the day shift at the sugar factory) that I understood what exploitation was and I felt not only an independentist, but also a socialist” (Siedlecki, 1937).

In the summer of 1904, he initiated political activities “to stimulate the independence movement in Ukraine among Ukrainians”. The Siedlecki family then lived in Władysławka near Kaniów, where they prepared the texts of the appeals, which were then printed on hectographs and were handed over to the local population²⁴. Devotion to the cause of the nations enslaved by Russia, especially the Ukrainians, grew in Siedlecki's mind already in his childhood. As his brother Ludwik reported: “After a long reflection, we came to the conclusion that the people living in the country that my parents called the Homeland are not primarily Polish, because they do not understand the Polish language, nor are they Russian (...). The people themselves called themselves „Christians” or simply „people” (...). Local Russians (...) claimed that it is a Russian nation. All this did not put us off. We knew that it was so often the case that the conquered nations, if they lose their knightly class, often lose their national and state traditions, and even their national name (...). We finally established that the people were Ukrainians, but we saw with sadness that they themselves did not know about it and the question seemed to be of no interest to them. But that didn't put us off. We started to work out this question” (Grzymała Siedlecki; 1938).

she dealt with material support for soldiers, organization of cultural activities, and helped families find prisoners (information section). In 1918, in Kalusz, together with her husband, she hid from the Ukrainians a POW member named Orzechowski, who was sentenced to death (perhaps it was Second Lieutenant Marian Witalis Orzechowski aka Marian Burkacki). In 1932, she was awarded the Independence Cross. In September 1939, after leaving Warsaw, suffering from illness (typhus), she left with her family for Wołyń. She stayed in Łuck, under the care of her family. On the news of her husband's tragic death and after the end of the fighting, she managed to get to Włodzimierz to obtain the consent of the repatriation commission to return to the General Government. On June 28, 1940, she and her daughters were arrested by the NKWD and deported to a labor camp in Siberia (the village of Asino near Tomsk in the Novosibirsk region). Under the amnesty in 1941, she got to Uzbekistan. She was there in the cities of Fergana, Tashkent and Shahrizabz, where the 6th Infantry Division of General Anders' Army was formed. Due to poor health, she was placed in a Polish field hospital. Her daughters served in the Women's Auxiliary Service. In August 1942, the Siedlecki family was evacuated from Krasnowoek across the Caspian Sea to Pahlevi in Iran. Felicja and her daughter Irena stayed in the hospital and then in a refugee camp in Tehran. At the invitation of Countess Ewa Dzieduszycka and her daughter Aniela, Felicja and her daughters came to India. She died of cancer at the Red Cross Hospital in Bombay. In 1950, her daughters emigrated to Australia.

Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Group No. 301 - Record books of the Roman Catholic denomination from the Archdiocese of Lviv from 1604–1945, Parish of St. Mary Magdalene in Lviv, Liber Copulatorum 55/1903, pp. 118-119; Application for the award of Felicja Siedlecka (biography). WBH KAPiO, ref. No. June 15, 1932, KN (Felicja Siedlecka née Iwanowscy), sheet 8.

²³ WBH KAPiO, ref. No. June 15, 1932, KN (Stanisław Siedlecki), sheet 9.

²⁴ WBH KAPiO, ref. No. June 15, 1932, KN (Stanisław Siedlecki), sheet 9.

In December 1904, Siedlecki resumed his studies at the Lviv Polytechnic, so that “after doing the practical course of producing nitroglycerine and mercury fulminate, he put himself at the disposal of the party for secret work in the Kingdom”. For this purpose, he contacted Bolesław Czarkowski, who was staying in Lviv at the time²⁵. By the decision of the Central Committee of the PPS, Eustachy was sent to the Russian partition as a technical employee of a combat organization (Nowicki, 1936; Pająk, 1985).

4. CONSPIRACY AND SECRET PRINTING HOUSES OF THE PPS

Shortly before the outbreak of the revolution, in the spring of 1905, the Siedlecki family moved to Warsaw. On the spot, it was decided to assign a different task to the newly arrived comrades from Galicia. As Siedlecki wrote: “Contrary to my demand, we were devoted not to combat technology, but to party technology, i.e. to secret printing. Our fate was then decided by three people: Walery Sławek²⁶, Bolesław Czarkowski and Ludwik Wernyhora (Siedlecki, 1938; Wasilewski 1933)²⁷ (*Kapral*)”²⁸.

Under the watchful eye of PPS activist Mateusz Józef Uziembło, Eustachy learned the secrets of the art of printing in an underground party printing house. He began his first work, in the publishing technology field designated by the party, in 1905 in a secret printing house run by Uziembło at 4 Komitetowa Street. As Adam Uziembło recalled: “In less than a year, three people made 1,300,000 prints on a press! The following persons worked in the printing house: Józef Uziembło, Stanisław Siedlecki and Felicja née Iwanowska Siedlecka. After receiving the millionth copy, the printing house sent a report with attachments to Hr. Witte, the Russian prime minister for St. Petersburg. As a confirmation of his words that it is impossible to fight the secret press, because it mobilizes unexpected forces” (Uziembło 1936; Uziembło 1958).

In the years 1905–1908, the secret printing houses of the PPS Revolutionary Fraction were located in the apartments of the Siedlecki family, one by one at 37 Złota Street (Burkot, 1933), 59 Nowy Świat and 64 Piękna Street. At that time, Siedlecki was the manager of a small printing house that copied PPS's appeals, then a typesetter that carried out orders for the main PPS printing house, located at 18 Foksal Street. After the split in the PPS, he joined the printing house at Piękna Street to the PPS Revolutionary Fraction. His activity for the workers' movement was appreciated in 1907, when, as a delegate representing publishing technology, he took part in the 10th PPS Congress in Vienna (Ładyka, 1972).

²⁵ Bolesław Czarkowski (1873 – around 1937), a socialist and independence activist, belonged to the PPS leadership, then to the PPS Revolutionary Fraction, one of Józef Piłsudski's closest associates, member of the Provisional Council of State, head of the Ministry of Justice – he reformed the prison system, supporter of the Sanation, president of the Association of former PPS political prisoners of the Revolutionary Fraction. *Słownik Biograficzny Działaczy Polskiego Ruchu Robotniczego*, Vol. I, Warsaw 1985, p. 465–466.

²⁶ Sławek Walery Jan (1879–1939), socialist and political activist, colonel of the Polish Army, parliamentarian, prime minister. PSB, Vol. XXXVIII, Warsaw 1998, p. 586–595.

²⁷ Ludwik Wernyhora (1867–1919), ps. Kapral, Zieliński, socialist activist, party printer, arrested in 1894, exiled to Siberia, from 1901 in exile in Great Britain, worked in the PPS printing house in London (Lingwood – name of the house where the typesetting room and printing house were located), then he returned to Poland, where, until August 1906, he was the head of the printing technique of the Polish Socialist Party. WBH KAPiO, ref. No. 19/12/1930, KN (Ludwik Wernyhora). *Listy Józefa Piłsudskiego*, Ibid., Vol. XV, Warsaw 1937, p. 117–118;

²⁸ Quoted after: WBH KAPiO, ref. No. June 15, 1932, KN (Stanisław Siedlecki), sheet 9.

While preparing subsequent issues of *Robotnik*, a number of other titles and brochures, he met Leon Wasilewski, responsible for the publishing policy, and Aleksander Sulkiewicz, the technical manager. The Siedlecki family also hosted Józef Piłsudski for a few days in the apartment at Piękna Street (Siedlecki, 1938)²⁹. In 1908, while spending their vacation in Ukraine, the Siedleccy learned about the discovery of “buda”³⁰. After the tsarist security discovered the printing house at 18 Foksal Street, Siedlecki took over, in place of Sulkiewicz, the management of the publishing activity of the PPS (Ładyka, 1972). The new seat of the printing house and typesetting room was initially located near Wawer, in the working class settlement of Kaczy Dół (later Wiśniowa Góra near Miłosna) (Filipowicz, 1938)³¹. After it was exposed in 1909, Siedlecki undertook to edit *Robotnik*, which was folded and printed in Kiev at Dmytrowska Street, and then distributed to the territory of the Russian partition (Siedlecki, 1920; Siedlecki, 1922)³². As he recalled: “It was in November 1909. The PPS printing house was located in Kiev at that time, and I was the manager of technology of the party, which in practice meant that, having collected the manuscripts for the issue, I went to Kiev, where, together with my comrades Wiktor and Jadwiga, we prepared the issue, we printed it, and then with Wiktor we put it into our suitcases and left” (Kunicka, 1923; Siedlecki, 1920). The termination of the printing house is associated with a conflict within the party. The printing house was finally closed in December 1910 by the decision of the Central Workers' Committee of the PPS.

Siedlecki's party work was not limited to managing a secret printing house. He also coordinated the operation of securing the money obtained during the action of the Combat Organization of the PPS Revolutionary Fraction for the postal van near Turek in 1911 (Krzesławski, 1935)³³. In his memoirs, Jan Krzesławski draws a picture of Siedlecki as a deeply secretive representative of the PPS leadership: “Comrade Eustachy was the most conspiratorial of all comrades that I have ever met, and the conspiracy, about which we

²⁹ Piłsudski came to Warsaw in February 1908 for a combat conference. Before that, for three days he stayed with the Siedlecki family at Piękna Street.

³⁰ “Buda” was the seat of a secret printing house in the PPS underground dictionary.

³¹ The Kaczy Dół colony (currently Międzyzlesie - Wiśniowa Góra) was inhabited by workers from the metal products factory “Wawer”. As Tytus Filipowicz recalled at that time: “The farmhouse, housing the machine and typesetting room, was occupied by the typesetter Wiktor Jasiński, registered under a false name together with his passport wife Jadwiga. The whole house was served by maid Wikcia, the perfect type of servant, devoted to her work, full of appreciation for the printing work, which she watched eagerly around the house and listened to the machine's noise as Eustachy printed *Robotnik* or the appeals at night. Two dromedaries took ready-made copies: grandma Golińska and her assistant Hanka (later wife of Kazimierz Dobrowolski). And the most problematic was delivering blank paper and carrying fonts for replacement, in which for some time at the end of 1908 Eustachy was assisted by T. Długoszewski, who was practicing in the printing house.” The reason for closing the printing house in Wiśniowa Góra was a break-in into the working rooms, and thus the disclosure of party activity. WBH KAPiO, ref. No. June 15, 1932, KN (Stanisław Siedlecki), sheet 9.

³² The secret printing house managed by Siedlecki was used by: Wiktor Jasiński (“Wiktor”), Jadwiga Zaborowska (“Jadwiga”), Wiktoria Zygmunt (“Wikcia”), Zofia Kunicka and Bolesław Zahorski (“Zygmunt Ból”). Stanisław's wife, Felicja, was then with relatives in Biała Cerkiew.

³³ As Jan Krzesławski recalled: “(...) thanks to Eustachy's orders, the successfully started work was completed. The money reached Krakow, where, as we know, the issue of its division deepened the conflict between the Central Committee of the Republic of Poland and the Combat Department, a conflict that, after a year and a half, would lead to a split and the formation of a new party.

often told each other cheerful anecdotes, was explained not only by the properties of his character, but responsible work that lay on his shoulders (party printing house). In the party spheres that I encountered in Warsaw, it was heard more than once that there was a comrade called Eustachy, but no one had ever seen him. The more skeptical people said he might not exist, but PPS executives deliberately said it was to prove that there were more of them. Eustachy became therefore legendary, like General Maj from a famous novel" (Krzyszewski, 1928).

5. IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PPS

In 1909, Siedlecki became a member of the Central Workers' Committee of the PPS (hereinafter: CKR PPS), then he represented the party leadership at the 11th Congress of the PPS Revolutionary Fraction in Vienna. In 1910, he headed the Organizational Department of the PPS, which together with the Combat Department created the left-wing and independence fraction of the PPS (Ładyka, 1972; Siedlecki 1922)³⁴.

At that time, there was a sharp dispute within the party over Piłsudski's new concept, the aim of which was to focus the PPS's organizational work on military preparation and expansion of the Active Combat Union. Siedlecki, in contrast to the right-wing party (CKR and the Foreign Department of the PPS), did not support Piłsudski's military plans (Ładyka, 1972; Krzyszewski, 1935)³⁵.

The conflict within the party escalated during the Fourth Party Council in January 1911 in Kraków, in which Siedlecki was a participant. The victory of the 'militarists' led to his resignation from the PPS leadership. In the content of the confidential circular of the 'opposition', to which he was a signatory, it was argued that the party was „deviating from the socialist path, and the leaders who set the tone became more and more indifferent to the obligations imposed on them by the socialist character.” Pursuant to the resolution of the 5th Party Council of June 1911, Siedlecki was among the members excluded from the organization for a year (Ładyka, 1972; Siedlecki 1922)³⁶. “From 1911 to 1914 – as he wrote – as an opponent of the transfer of revolutionary labor from the country to abroad (from the Russian partition to Galicia), I belonged to the so-called Opposition that was liquidated only

³⁴ Siedlecki was present at the opening of the Congress. Upon hearing of the disclosure of a printing press in Kiev, he was forced to interrupt his stay in Vienna. The CKR PPS also included: Tomasz Arciszewski, Tytus Filipowicz, Józef Froelich and A. Sulkiewicz.

³⁵ The right-wing of the PPS was accused of: “one-sidedness of combat-military training, neglecting socialist work and the current needs of combat operations”. The secession of the leftists was also deepened by the conflict over the distribution of funds (including from the operation in Turek) obtained for combat and military activity.

³⁶ As Siedlecki described that time: “We, the few natives, defended the remnants of our nationality against the policy of emigrants and the old. And here were two groups in the P.P.S. Party Council, in which, apart from program differences (searched for ad hoc very carefully), the struggle to concentrate work in the country or behind the cordon was frenzied. It was clear that the natives must succumb if they did not want to create a new party, because the entire political situation and the increasingly widespread reaction were against them, and their intellectual superiority was behind the emigrants ... and also the quiet walls of Krakow and Zakopane, shrouded in snow, hugging at the foot of the Tatra Mountains. The struggle between the young and the old had been going on since the summer of 1910. However, the decisive fight took place at the end of 1911. It lasted at the Party Council for about two weeks and (...) it was clear that the emigrants had an overwhelming majority against us”.

with the outbreak of the world war". Siedlecki's activity in the authorities of the new formation was small. His name was not included in the leadership of the PPS Opposition. From the current activities of the organization, it is worth noting the commitment he showed for the party's intellectual group of the Opposition in Warsaw (Wasilewski, 1925; Zaremba, 1983)³⁷.

Siedlecki explained the distancing from party work in the years 1912–1914 by dedicating himself to work in the oil and gas industry. Material considerations were not without significance here. They prompted him to take up employment in Borysław in a mining enterprise³⁸ founded by Marian Wieleżyński (Wieleżyński, 1985; Tołwiński, 1937)³⁹ – Jadwiga Siedlecka's husband. He came there with Tomasz Arciszewski⁴⁰. It should be mentioned that from 1909 there was a training center for the military personnel of the Active Combat Union (further ZWC) in Borysław, and membership of the PPS Opposition did not formally restrict activity in the structures of military rifle unions (Ładyka, 1972). Although no information has survived that would link Siedlecki with cooperation with the ZWC, however, in view of the support that Felicja Siedlecka provided to the members of the Riflemen's Association in Borysław, her husband's active role is clearly evident⁴¹. After two years of working in the oil industry, the group of friends T. Arciszewski and Aleksander Wieleżyński, made a decision to join the Legions⁴².

6. LEGIONNAIRE, COMMISSIONER AND EMISSARY

On August 4, 1914, Siedlecki contacted Walery Sławek in Kraków and the next day he officially joined the rifle army to join the ranks of the 1st Infantry Regiment of the 1st Brigade of the Polish Legions. He used the skills acquired in the underground in his agitation work. He collaborated in this field with Leon Wasilewski, to whom the Commander assigned the task of organizing a printing house next to shooting units.

³⁷ In the Warsaw structures of the Opposition PPS, he collaborated with Jan Libkind, Kazimierz Gromadzki, W. Straszewski, Mieczysław Baumgart and Jan Maurycy Borski.

³⁸ Zakład Gazu Ziemnego Inż. Marian Wieleżyński Sp. z o.o. in Hubicze (near Borysław). *Wspólna praca wspólny plan 1912-1937. W dwudziestopięciolecie SA Gazolina 1912-1937*, Lviv 1937, p. 9.

³⁹ Marian Wieleżyński (1879–1945) Piłsudski follower, chemical engineer, founder of the Polish gas industry, precursor of shareholding. He was friends with the Siedlecki brothers. The plant in Borysław he created at that time built the first gasoline factory in Europe. In 1920, the factory was transformed into a joint-stock company "Gazolina".

⁴⁰ Tomasz Arciszewski (1877–1955) – a socialist activist, politician of the Polish Socialist Party, a longtime member of the Polish Parliament. During World War II, he headed the underground Polish Socialist Party - Freedom Equality Independence (PPS-WRN), member of the Council for National Unity, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile. *Słownik biograficzny działaczy polskiego ruchu robotniczego*, Vol. 1, Warsaw 1978, p. 75–77.

⁴¹ WBH KAPiO, ref. No. June 15, 1932, KN (Felicja Siedlecka née Iwanowska), sheet 8.

⁴² Stanisław Siedlecki, along with Tomasz Arciszewski and Aleksander Wieleżyński were included among the first employees of Zakład Gazu Ziemnego. Inż. Marian Wieleżyński Sp. z o.o. They probably contributed to the transfer of a donation in the amount of 2 thousand crowns for the 1st Brigade of the Polish Legions. Confirmation of receipt of the amount and acknowledgment signed by Józef Piłsudski on behalf of the Headquarters of the 1st Brigade of the Polish Legions. Field mail 118, on May 24, 1916, No.P.464. A copy of the document included in the guest book. Cf.: *Wspólna praca...*, p. 5.

Siedlecki was to be a typesetter in the printing house (Pelczarski, 1939; Wasilewski, 1935)⁴³. He was also assigned a special task. On behalf of Józef Piłsudski, he supervised the execution of the seal for the Commander-in-Chief and the National Government (Pobóg-Malinowski, 1990; Wasilewski, 1935)⁴⁴. On August 7, assigned to the department of T. Arciszewski, he left for Miechów. After a few days in Miechów, from August 14, he started cooperation with the Commissioner of the Polish Army in Jędrzejów, Emil Bobrowski (Pelczarski, 1939)⁴⁵. Siedlecki was responsible for ensuring food supplies for the army.

Worth emphasizing in his biography is the initiative of support he gave to Władysław Belina-Prażmowski⁴⁶, contributing to the increase of the number of the famous ‘Belina Seven’ and to transform the platoon into a squadron of lancers of the Polish Legions. Formed in Ostrowiec from a volatile reconnaissance group, a unit of 14 horsemen joined the Belina group in Kielce on August 21, 1914 (Hubiak, 2003; Majchrowski, 2014)⁴⁷.

On August 23, Siedlecki, at the request of Józef Piłsudski, was assigned to the office of the Polish Army Commissioner in Kielce, Michał Sokolnicki⁴⁸. In Kielce, he was the head

⁴³ In the memoirs of Leon Wasilewski, we read: “When we got to Miechów, it turned out that our printing house was completely redundant in view of the existence of printing houses in all poviats of the Kingdom, where it was possible to easily print the proclamations, which we also took full advantage of organizing agitation”.

⁴⁴ The source message related to the history of the seal's creation is not coherent: “The appeal was written and approved by the Commander, and then printed conspiratorially in the People's Printing House on specially selected paper. The stamp was made overnight by comrade Stanisław Siedlecki (“Eustachy”) – the future senator of the Republic of Poland, who indeed, using an ordinary pocket knife, carved a neat eagle with an appropriate inscription in a soft stone. This is how Siedlecki relates these events: “On August 4, 1914, I found myself at the disposal of W. Sławek in Krakow. Here I was instructed, in the highest secrecy, to order 2 stamps with the words: 1) “Chief Commander” and 2) “National Government”. I went to see Maciejewski (at one time he belonged to the employees of the secret printing house at Foksal Street), who made these stamps. I gave them either to A. Sulkiwicz or W. Sławek”. WBH KAPiO, ref. No. June 15, 1932, KN (Stanisław Siedlecki), sheet 9.

⁴⁵ Emil Zygmunt Wiktor Bobrowski (1876-1938), colonel physician of the Polish Army, socialist activist: Polish Social Democratic Party, then Polish Socialist Party; Commissioner of the Polish National Organization, member of the Supreme National Committee and the Polish Liquidation Commission; from 1930, an activist of the Independent Block of Cooperation with the Government, senator. *Słownik biograficzny oficerów Legionów Polskich*. Warsaw 1992, pp. 16-17.

⁴⁶ Prażmowski (Belina-Prażmowski) Władysław Zygmunt (1888–1938), founder and commander of the legionary cavalry, colonel of the Polish Army, president of Krakow, voivode of Lviv. PSB, vol. XXVIII, Warsaw 1985, pp. 393-395.

⁴⁷ As Siedlecki recalled: “From the stables I chose 14 horses suitable for the saddle (...). After selecting 14 volunteers, I sent them to Kielce, to Belina. Back then, when all of Belina's cavalry consisted of a dozen or so men, it was a big thing. (...) On August 21 (the day of the solar eclipse) I followed the unit on horseback (...). The next day I went to the cavalry barracks where Belina was doing a survey of “my cavalry”. After the inspection – he took the horses, and he sent almost all the people away, rightly claiming that he had a lot of real cavalrymen, only horses were missing.” WBH KAPiO, ref. No. June 15, 1932, KN (Stanisław Siedlecki), sheet 10.

⁴⁸ Sokolnicki Michał Hubert (1880–1967), independence activist, diplomat, historian, close associate of Józef Piłsudski. PSB, Vol. XL, Warsaw 2001, p. 80-87.

of the city commissariat until the end of August (Pelczarski, 1939; Sokolnicki, 1961)⁴⁹. Siedlecki, having extensive experience in the profession of typesetter, played an important – not previously recorded in literature – role in recreating the symbolism of the Polish national emblem. In addition to placing the image of the eagle on the seal of the National Government, he prepared a die in Kielce for striking shooting eagles. As he recalled: “At that time, I ordered a die for the second edition of the shooting eagle from the local Kielce foremen (it was in agreement with J. Moraczewski, the commanding officer of the shooting forces)”⁵⁰.

From August 30 – on the nomination of Sokolnicki – for several days he was the temporary Polish Army Commissar of the National Government in the Ostrow Basin – in Starachowice and Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski (Pelczarski, 1939)⁵¹. Earlier, he commanded a seven-man reconnaissance unit of riflemen that reached Ostrowiec. The city was located near the frontline and Commissioner “Grzymała” was to come across “a particularly unfavorable atmosphere”. He outlines it in his report to Sokolnicki: “On September 1, I stopped in Ostrowiec and as far as I know, the mood among the workers is not as good as it was first assumed. The search for weapons was unsuccessful and the volunteers were reluctant. In the municipality of Ostrowiec, there are great debates on what to do and how to respond to change”. The quoted document contains information about the approval by Stanisław Siedlecki – the first death sentence issued on behalf of the Polish authorities, i.e. by Michał Sokolnicki (Pelczarski, 1939; Sokolnicki, 1961; Urbankowski, 1997)⁵². The authority of the commissioner was to be weakened by rumors about the approaching Russian troops and the involvement of the Austrian authorities in this matter. As reported by Siedlecki: “After two days of quite turbulent office as a commissioner, I had to withdraw

⁴⁹ As Sokolnicki mentioned: “On August 23, he (J. Piłsudski) from Jędrzejów sent me to help *Osarz* – Leon Wasilewski, Michał – Aleksander Sulkiewicz, *Eustachy* – Stanisław Siedlecki, Iza Moszczeńska, Haecker (editor of *Naprzodu*) to work among Jews and known to me participant of the Combat Organization, Aleksandra Szczerbińska”.

⁵⁰ In 1914, the rifle troops adopted the eagle as the emblem of the soldiers of the Kingdom of Poland. General Czesław Jarnuszkiewicz is considered the author of the design of the shooting eagle. The shooting eagle was smaller in size, adapted to the *maciejówka* [a type of cap] and without the crown, which was to take place during the preparation of the pattern, emphasizing the democratic, civic and republican ideas that followed the shooting community. It is worth noting that the legionary units derived from the rifle, remained faithful to the left-wing tradition, also referring to the tradition of the January Uprising. *Wspomnienia gen. Czesława Jarnuszkiewicza. Od Sybiru do Łubianki*, Warsaw 1996, p. 8–10.

⁵¹ Sokolnicki's report to Piłsudski of August 29, 1914: “In Ostrowiec and Starachowice, I took over the local offices and appointed Grzymała as my temporary commissioner for Zagłębie Ostrowieckie”.

⁵² Abraham Racimora, a resident of Ostrowiec of Jewish origin, was accused of spying for Russia. Contrary to the information contained in the studies, the decision to execute him was made by Sokolnicki himself: “Soon Eustachy gave me a long report: a city patrol brought a spy. It was a Jew, Rabinowicz, as far as I remember, and various documents found on him testified to Russian contacts, obvious evidence in the form of codes and encrypted correspondence. I asked what the unit's instructions in these cases are. He replied that spies caught red-handed were shot at the place of capture. So I ordered Eustachy to check the documents found on the spy once more and shoot him if they prove to be unquestionable. Half an hour later, the execution took place on a hill outside the city”.

from Starachowice-Ostrowiec due to the defeat of the Austrians in the Battle of Kraśnik and the withdrawal of the front there”⁵³.

At the beginning of September 1914 – for health reasons – Siedlecki left for Zakopane. There, during conversations “among legionary factors” he met the writer Stefan Żeromski, with whom he traveled – described in his memoirs – to the seat of the Polish National Organization in Piotrków Trybunalski (Siedlecki, October 1933.1)⁵⁴. The same month, he actively joined the organization of the structures of the Polish National Organization (hereinafter: PON) (Kochanowski 1987; Pająk 1996)⁵⁵ on the territory of the Russian partition. As a commissioner for the city of Ostrowiec, he designated – as a member of the PON Council – the main directions of the organization's work (Pająk, 1996)⁵⁶.

From December 1914 to the end of 1915, first as an emissary of the PON, then the Military Department of the Supreme National Committee (hereinafter: DW NKN), he conducted an agitation and recruitment campaign and collected funds for the Legions in the Prussian partition. Siedlecki's candidacy was approved by Władysław Sikorski, the head of the Military Department of the NKN in Krakow. He received a formal nomination for the NKN commissioner in Piotrków from the authorities of the Polish National Organization (Przeniosło, 2014; Srokowski 1923). Having reached the Polish colonies in Dresden, Leipzig, Wrocław and Poznań, he conducted his agitation in the company of the legionaries of the 2nd Brigade: Wincenty Gorzycki⁵⁷ and Wiktor Stachowiak (Dolata, 2014)⁵⁸. As

⁵³ WBH KAPiO, ref. no. June 15, 1932, KN (Stanisław Siedlecki), sheet 10.

⁵⁴ Siedlecki met Żeromski in Zakopane at the turn of September and October 1914. They participated in a meeting organized by Tytus Czaka and Zofia Prauss. Stefan Żeromski then proposed Siedlecki as a candidate for the post of an emissary “for the Prussian partition for agitation for the Legions and for collecting funds”. After obtaining the consent of the NKN Department in Krakow, he set off by train to the PON headquarters in Piotrków. In Krakow, Siedlecki met Żeromski again, this time in a legionnaire's uniform. The joint trip to Piotrków did not reach the destination. After the train stopped in Szczakowa, Siedlecki and Żeromski returned to Kraków.

⁵⁵ Polish National Organization – an organization established on the initiative of Józef Piłsudski in September 1914. Piłsudski entrusted the task of expanding the PON structures to Michał Sokolnicki and Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz. The aim of PON was to promote the program of state independence and to create a political base for the anti-Russian camp in the Kingdom. Thanks to it, Józef Piłsudski sought to become independent from the Supreme National Committee (NKN). The previously existing Military Commissariats of the National Government were transformed into PON Commissariats. The establishment of the PON was, on the one hand, an attempt to continue the hitherto activities of military commissariats, and on the other hand, a specific response to the establishment of the NKN. Under an agreement concluded with Germany, PON could recruit to the Legions and agitate in the areas of German occupation. PON also conducted anti-Russian intelligence activities. Due to the reluctance of the inhabitants of Congress Poland towards the Germans, the effects of PON's propaganda activity were small. Despite this, it should be emphasized that the activity of PON emissaries influenced the awakening of the political awareness of Poles in the Russian partition. In November 1914, PON was incorporated into the Supreme National Committee.

⁵⁶ Siedlecki was a participant of the PON congress, which took place on November 29-30, 1914 in Vienna, where it was decided that PON would join the NKN.

⁵⁷ Wincenty Gorzycki (1893–1923), (pseud.: Zygmunt Narski); Polish historian, teacher, independence activist. *Historians and socialism*, ed. J. Kolbuszewska, M. Sikorska-Kowalska, Łódź 2014, p. 211–2017.

⁵⁸ Wiktor Stachowiak (1889–1964), independence activist, member of the Legionnaires' Union, historian-regionalist, museum curator, patron of the Museum of the Nadnotecka Land in Trzcianka.

Siedlecki recalled, "We had a great moral success in Dresden and Wrocław. We started to work in Poznań from scratch (...). There has been no financial success so far". As a result of the intervention of the German authorities, Siedlecki was forced to leave Poznań first, then Wrocław, to return to Vienna after a month-long stay in Germany⁵⁹.

From March 1915 – on the nomination of W. Sikorski – Siedlecki performed the duties of the NKN emissary in the Sieradz district. In Sieradz, Kalisz, Warta and in the surrounding villages, he spread „legionary and independence ideas” among the population⁶⁰. At that time, his reluctant attitude towards Sikorski grew in him. As he wrote: „(...) already knowing the disloyalty of Wł. Sikorski in relation to Commander Piłsudski, I have previously consulted with the PPS authorities in Dąbrowa Górnicza and R. Jaworowski, the intelligence chief of the 1st Brigade, declaring that while working in the Military Department of the NKN, I would follow the instructions of the Commander and possibly I would sabotage Sikorski's orders inconsistent with the above indications. (Mainly it was about not recruiting a volunteer back then)”⁶¹.

In the face of the ban introduced by the German authorities on the agitation activity of legionary emissaries, Siedlecki took the position of a delegate of the DW NKN in Łódź. He recalled that: "The task was very difficult. It was also one of the main reasons that I, an old conspirator, was sent to Łódź. Of course, I had to work in secret here. Before leaving, I communicated with Tytus Filipowicz. (...) he did not want to give me any instructions, claiming that I myself know how to proceed”⁶². From May 1915, Siedlecki developed independence activities in Łódź. As a representative of NKN, he gathered patriotic organizations, initiating and co-creating an inter-party institution – the National Committee of the City of Łódź (hereinafter: KNmŁ)⁶³. He developed the action of repolonization by organizing the so-called city polonization section. These activities were aimed at encouraging the inhabitants of Łódź to boycott shops and institutions, including schools, on the buildings of which there were Russian and German-language signs. In the absence of a response to the statements of the KNmŁ, fighters of the PPS and the National Workers' Union (NZR) removed or painted the signs without the owners' knowledge (Karwacki,

⁵⁹ Siedlecki recalls the arrest of Gorzycki and Stachowiak in Wrocław: "The German authorities were dissatisfied mainly with how they communicated to us with disarming frankness that I did not write letters to my authorities in Kraków and Piotrków". WBH KAPiO, ref. No. June 15, 1932, KN (Stanisław Siedlecki), sheet 10.

⁶⁰ "Going from village to village and giving a series of lectures (one in Kalisz) about the necessity for Poland to create army cadres, which are the Legions. The director of the hospital in Warta, Dr. Łuniewski, helped me a lot in this work". Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ The National Committee was composed of the following groups: represented by the National Workers' Union, the Polish Socialist Party, the Union of Polish Youth Organizations, the Women's League, the Peasants' Union, and the National Peasants' Union. WBH KAPiO, ref. No. June 15, 1932, KN (Stanisław Siedlecki), sheet 10. From this period, there are forms of appeals addressed to the inhabitants of Łódź: Odezwa Zjednoczonej Młodzieży Niepodległościowej, Łódź, sierpień 1914 roku; Odezwa informująca o powstającym Rządzie Narodowym, wzywająca do walki przeciw Rosji z maja 1915 r. Department of Social Life Documents of the National Library in Warsaw (hereinafter: BN), reference number DŹS IA 5/73 Cim, reference number DŹS IA 5/804 Cim.

1984; Pająk, 2003; Siedlecki, 1923; Stawiszyńska, 2016)⁶⁴. Having exposed himself to the German authorities, to avoid being arrested he first hid and then, under cover of night, got to Piotrków.

The end of Siedlecki's cooperation with NKN coincides with the genesis of the "dismissal crisis" which was a consequence of the occupation of Warsaw by the Germans in August 1915 (Pobóg-Malinowski, 1990). The political goal of the war that had been common to NKN and Piłsudski so far, that is to "merge Galicia and the Kingdom as part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy" became incompatible with the second postulate – the maximum independence of the Legions and their subordination to Piłsudski's command. Facing the dilemma of choosing between the „Austro-Polish program” of the NKN, endorsed by W. Sikorski, and the „updated independence postulates” of J. Piłsudski, Siedlecki chooses the political orientation of the Piłsudski camp. Soon, he joins the group of trusted legionnaires transferred to the civil life, who, in place of their previous form – Legions – join the secret Polish Military Organization (hereinafter: POW) (Pobóg-Malinowski, 1990; Sokolnicki, 1961). Siedlecki is still considering taking up front service with the 1st Brigade, but his poor health prevents him from implementing these plans. In April 1916 he was super-arbitrated⁶⁵, then declared fit for service without weapons. Eventually, for health reasons, he was released from the Legions on November 25, 1916⁶⁶.

At the urging of Marian Wieleżyński, the Siedlecki family returned to Borysław. In the nearby Kałusz in 1916–1919, Stanisław was the director of the Natural Gas Plant⁶⁷. He combined his professional work with political activity. Through Jędrzej Moraczewski, he maintained contacts with the Polish Military Organization, and finally took over the leadership of "independence organizations" in the Borysław-Kałusz region, effectively preventing the formation of National Democratic organizations. Among the events that should be highlighted in his biography, one should mention his accession to the secret A-Organization Convention in 1917 (Malczewska-Pawelec, 1999). In agreement with the secret management of the Piłsudski camp, he prepared a conspiratorial apartment near Kałusz "in case Commandant Piłsudski escaped from the fortress and had to go into hiding"⁶⁸. *In 1918, the Siedlecki family gave shelter to a POW member called Orzechowski, sentenced to death by Ukrainians⁶⁹. Siedlecki's relations to the decision-making factors of the West Ukrainian People's Republic were quite tense. As he recalled: "Despite my well-known Ukrainian sympathies, my relations with the Galician-Ukrainian factors were*

⁶⁴ Appeal L4 / 15 pt. *Citizens Merchants and Industrialists*, National Committee of the City of Łódź, City Polonization Section, Łódź September 8, 1915, National Museum in Krakow, sign. 113698 III akc 270/04/311 p. 1–2; Announcement about the award for the recovery of the portrait of Tsar Nicholas II stolen from the School of Economics in Łódź, signed by director Waclaw Kloss, Łódź, May 1915, in fact issued by the National Committee of the City of Łódź. BN, ref. DŻS IA 5/354 Cim.

⁶⁵ Super-arbitrated – a soldier dismissed from military service due to illness or wounds.

⁶⁶ Military Historical Office, Polish Legions Team and Polish Auxiliary Corps 1914–1918, sign. I.120.63.103; Oss. manuscript 15813 / IV; Cf.: <https://zolnierze-niepodleglosci.pl/zołnierz/221248/>

⁶⁷ The Natural Gas Plant in Kałusz belonged to the joint stock company "Gazolina".

⁶⁸ The place was made available by the parish priest in Dołha Wojniłoska. Siedlecki was assigned this task by Jędrzej Moraczewski. WBH KAPiO, ref. No. June 15, 1932, KN (Stanisław Siedlecki), sheet 10.

⁶⁹ *Perhaps it is about Second Lt. Marian Witalis Orzechowski pseud. Marian Burkacki. Ibid.*

merely correct. Besides, my loyalty to the Stanisławowski government was not 100%". Siedlecki, who was the director of the credit union in Katusz, after obtaining the approval of the Krakow management of POW, granted loans to Poles „for the account of future salaries in the Polish state”. After disclosure of the abuses in this institution, the Ukrainian authorities decided to intern Siedlecki to Kolomyia. However, there has been no arrest since the intervention in the case of Siedlecki was undertaken by representatives of the local elite – ‘Ukrainian friends’⁷⁰.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The youth of Stanisław Siedlecki was marked by the reign of three partitioning powers over Poland. When he was forty, a new Poland was born out of the fumes of blood and the fire of the ‘great war’. These events were not only the background of Siedlecki's life. Belonging to the generation that was fortunate enough to see an independent homeland again, he could at the same time have the satisfaction that, also through his struggle and sacrifice, Poland rose to live.

From an early age, Siedlecki began to engage in independence activities. Its beginnings were connected with a rebellion against tsarism, and consequently against social relations, which was the pillar of this system. He was influenced by socialist slogans already in junior high school. At that time, he saw socialism as an imperative of active struggle, but above all of the struggle for independence. With time, he approved the PPS program of the Revolutionary Faction, emphasizing the need for armed struggle against the Russian invader for Poland's independence. At the same time, he was influenced by the personality of Józef Piłsudski. Siedlecki's political views were deeply influenced by the thought of the Piłsudski camp, which ordered to see Russia as Poland's main enemy. Hence the belief that only breaking Russia “along national seams” and creating national states will ensure the security of the Polish state. Distrust and hostility towards tsarist Russia Siedlecki transferred onto the USSR. These beliefs made him a federalist and a supporter of the Promethean concept, to which he will devote his further life.

REFERENCES

- Bednarek, J. (2008). *Przestępczość wśród funkcjonariuszy aparatu bezpieczeństwa w latach 1946–1950 w ocenie Biura do spraw Funkcjonariuszy MBP*. „Przegląd Archiwalny Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej”, Vol. 1.
- Burkot, A. (1933). *Łódzka drukarnia PPS w latach 1905–1907*. „Niepodległość”, Vol. VIII.
- Dolata, J. (2014). *Muzeum w Trzciance 1924–2004*. Trzcianka.
- Dutka, W. (2012). *Masakra w Sołowijówce w historiografii powstania styczniowego 1863–1918*. „Niepodległość i Pamięć”, 19/1–4 (37–40).
- Filipowicz, T. (1938). *W potrzasku. Urywek wspomnień*. „Gazeta Robotnicza. Organ Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej Śląska i Zagłębia Dąbrowskiego”. No. 165, Year 42.
- Historycy a socjalizm* (2014). ed. J. Kolbuszewska, M. Sikorska-Kowalska. Łódź.
- Hubiak, P. (2003). *Belina z jego ulani*. Kraków.
- <http://elib.shpl.ru/ru/nodes/16016-vyp-6-vladimirskaya-guberniya-po-svedeniyam-1859-goda-1863#mode/inspect/page/290/zoom/6>.

⁷⁰ Siedlecki mentions a Ukrainian named “Łeszczycj senior”. Ibid.

- http://dir.icm.edu.pl/pl/Slownik_geograficzny/
<https://zolnierze-niepodleglosci.pl/zołnierz/221248/>
- Jarnecki, M. (2004). Powstanie styczniowe w oczach Agatona Gillera. „Mazowieckie Studia Humanistyczne”, No. 1–2.
- Karwacki, W. (1984). *Łódzka organizacja PPS-L 1906–1918*. Łódź.
- Kochanowski, J. (1987). Sprawozdanie z działalności komisariatu Polskiej Organizacji Narodowej w Łodzi w październiku 1914 roku. „Przegląd Historyczny” 78/1.
- Kunicka, Z. (1923), *Ostatnia drukarnia PPS w Kijowie* [In:] *Księga pamiątkowa PPS. W trzydziestą rocznicę*. Warszawa.
- Krzyształowski, J. (1935). Więzienie w ratuszu za rządów Nazarowa. „Kronika Ruchu Rewolucyjnego w Polsce. Organ Stowarzyszenia Byłych Więźniów Politycznych. Kwartalnik Poświęcony Dziejom Walk o Niepodległość i Socjalizm”. ed. J. Krzyształowski, A. Próchnik. No. 2.
- (1928). *Moja noc sylwestrowa, czyli niefortunna podróż na Radę Partyjną (Wspomnienie z 1910 r.)*. „Robotnik. Centralny Organ PPS”, No. 1, Year XXXIII.
- Listy Józefa Piłsudskiego* (1937). „Niepodległość”, Vol. XV.
- Maj, I.P. (2007). *Działalność Instytutu Wschodniego w Warszawie 1926–1939*. Warszawa.
- Majchrowski, J. (2014). *Pierwsza Kompania kadrowa. Portret Oddziału*. Kraków.
- Malczewska-Pawelec, D. (1999). *U źródeł niepodległości. Spory wokół Konwentu*, „Res Historica” *Józef Piłsudski i piłsudczycy*, Vol. VIII.
- Nowicki, J. (1936). *Wspomnienia starego działacza*. „Niepodległość”, Vol. XIII.
- (1936). *Wspomnienia starego działacza III*. „Niepodległość”, Vol. XIII.
- Ładyka, T. (1972). *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Frakcja Rewolucyjna) w latach 1906–1914*. Warszawa.
- Łepkowski, T. (1964), *Kilka uwag o historycznej biografistyce*. „Kwartalnik Historyczny”, No. 3.
- Niesiecki, K. (1839–1845), *Herbarz Polski*, ed. J. N. Bobrowicz, Vol. 8. Lipsk.
- Pająk, J. (1985), *Organizacje bojowe partii politycznych w Królestwie Polskim 1904–1911*. Warszawa.
- (2003). *O rząd i armię. Centralny Komitet Narodowy (1915–1917)*. Kielce.
- (Kielce 1996). *Z dziejów Polskiej Organizacji Narodowej (wrzesień–grudzień 1914)*. „Kieleckie Studia Historyczne”, Vol. 14.
- Pelczarski, T. (1939), *Komisariaty Wojskowe Rządu Narodowego w Królestwie Polskim 6 VIII – 5 IX 1914 (geneza i działalność)*. Warszawa.
- Pobóg-Malinowski, W. (1937). *Leon Wasilewski – szkic biograficzny*. „Niepodległość”, t. XVI.
- (1990). *Najnowsza Historia Polityczna Polski*, Vol. I. Gdańsk.
- Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk 1976), Vol. XXI; (Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1985), Vol. XXVIII; (Warszawa–Kraków 1995), Vol. XXXVI; (Warszawa–Kraków 1998), Vol. XXXVIII; (Warszawa–Kraków 2001), Vol. XL; (Warszawa–Kraków 2013), Vol. XLIX.
- Przybysz, G. (2013). *Powstanie Styczniowe na Zachodnim Mazowszu*. „Przegląd Pruszkowski”, No. 1.
- Przeniosło, M. (2014). *Placówki werbunkowe Departamentu Wojskowego Naczelnego Komitetu Narodowego na terenie okupacji austro-węgierskiej 1915–1916*. „Res Historica”, No. 37.

- Siedlecki, S. (1937). „Futerek” na Ukrainie pod Złotopolem (*Dzieje placówki niepodległościowej*). „*Niepodległość. Czasopismo poświęcone dziejom polskich walk wyzwoleniczych w dobie powstaniowej*”, Vol. XV.
- (1933). Józef Piłsudski w Brzuchowicach pod Lwowem w lecie 1900 r. „*Gazeta Polska*”, No. 285, 15 XI.
- (1922). Ostatnia „Buda” (w Kijowie od 1909–1911 roku) [In:] *Kalendarz Robotniczy PPS na rok 1922*. Warszawa.
- (1920). *Przygoda w podróży* [In:] *Kalendarz Robotniczy PPS na rok 1920*. Warszawa.
- (1923). *Spolszczenie Łodzi. Wspomnienie z czasów okupacji niemieckiej* [in:] *Kalendarz Robotniczy PPS na rok 1923*. Warszawa.
- (1933). Stefan Żeromski w Legionach. „*Gazeta Polska*”, Year V, No. 271, Sunday October 1.
- (1938). Tajna zecernia na Pięknej i Józef Piłsudski jako jej gość. „*Niepodległość*”, Vol. XVII.
- (1933). Założenie „Promienia”. „*Niepodległość*”, Vol. IV.
- Siedlecki Grzymała, L. (Warszawa 1938). „Polska intryga”. „*Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński*”, No. 24 (263), 12 czerwca.
- Słownik biograficzny działaczy Polskiego Ruchu Robotniczego*. Warszawa 1985.
- Słownik biograficzny oficerów Legionów Polskich*. Warszawa 1992.
- Słownik Geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich*. edited by B. Chlebowski, J. Krzywicki, F. Sulimierski (1895), Vol. XIV. Warszawa.
- Sokolnicki, M. (1961). *Rok czternasty*. Londyn.
- Srokowski, K. (1923). *N.K.N. Zarys historii Naczelnego Komitetu Narodowego*. Kraków.
- Stawiszyńska, A. (2016). *Łódź w czasie I wojny światowej*. Oświęcim.
- Tołwiński, K. (1937). *Kopalnie ropy i gazów ziemnych w Polsce. Borysław*. Warszawa–Borysław–Lwów.
- Urbankowski, B. (1997). *Józef Piłsudski marzyciel i strateg*, Vol. I. Warszawa.
- Uziębło, A. 1958). *Na przystanku*. „*Kultura. Szkice. Opowiadania. Sprawozdania*”, No. 3/125.
- (1936). *W Częstochowie i na Rakowie*. „*Niepodległość*”, Vol. XIV.
- Wasilewski, L. (1935). *Józef Piłsudski. Jakim Go znałem*. Warszawa.
- (1933). *Polska emigracja londyńska na przełomie XIX i XX stulecia*, „*Niepodległość*”, Vol. I.
- (1925). *Zarys dziejów Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej w związku z historią socjalizmu polskiego w trzech zaborach i na emigracji*. Warszawa.
- Weinfeld, L. (1938). *Z życia i działalności młodzieży „Promienistej” we Lwowie na początku XX stulecia*. „*Niepodległość*”, Vol. XVII.
- Wieleżyński, L. (1985). *Wspólna praca – wspólny plan. Dzieło i życie mądrego człowieka*. Londyn.
- Wołyniak, I. (1994). *My Story*. Perth, Western Australia
- Wspomnienia gen. Czesława Jarnuszkiewicza. Od Sybiru do Łubianki*. Warszawa 1996.
- Wspólna praca wspólny plan 1912–1937. W dwudziestopięciolecie SA Gazolina 1912–1937*. Lwów 1937.

Zaczyński, M. (1984). „*Młodość jest rzeźbiarką, co wykuwa żywot cały*”. Z dziejów ruchu niepodległościowego w Galicji (o lwowskim „Promieniu”). „*Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace historycznoliterackie*”, issue 53.

Zaremba, Z. (1983). *Wspomnienia. Pokolenie przelomu*. Kraków.

ARCHIVES

Regional State Archives in Ternopil (Ukraine). Record book of the Roman Catholic parish in Krzemieniec 1936.

Military Historical Office in Warsaw. *Zespół Legiony Polskie i Polski Korpus Posiłkowy 1914–1918*.

Kolekcja Akt Personalnych i Odznaczeniowych Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw Complex no. 301 – Record books of the Roman Catholic denomination from the Archdiocese of Lviv from 1604–1945, Parish of St. Mary Magdalene in Lviv.

Department of Social Life Documents of the National Library in Warsaw.

National Museum in Krakow.

MAGAZINES/PERIODICALS

Robotnik (Warszawa 1928).

Czas (Kraków 1863).

Kultura. Szkice. Opowiadania. Sprawozdania (Paryż 1958).

Gazeta Polska (Warszawa 1933).

Niepodległość. Czasopismo poświęcone dziejom polskich walk wyzwoleniczych w dobie powstaniowej (Warszawa 1929-1939).

Gazeta Robotnicza. Organ Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej Śląska i Zagłębia Dąbrowskiego (Katowice 1938).

Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński (Warszawa 1938).

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.43

The text was submitted to the editorial office: October 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.

Krzysztof PRENDECKI¹

SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC AT FOOTBALL FACILITIES

The Police Service has a series of rules that govern its behavior towards football fans, with concern, tolerance, and suppressing violence being key overarching principles. A main priority during events should be to inform fans of which routes they should travel to guarantee safety, creating assurance of tolerance from both police and members of the public. This article examines the “Law on the safety of Mass Events” which was brought into force with the support of numerous stakeholders. While the Act arguably introduced the correct regulations, the issue of aggression on match days has not been entirely eliminated.

Keywords: fans, police, safety.

1. INTRODUCTION

The roots of negative behaviour of fans go back to ancient times. In 1300 BC, Egyptian fans as a result of the so-called “stadium war” led to the outbreak of a civil war, which resulted in the overthrow of the pharaoh Fikas. What we call cheering today has its roots in the Roman Empire. The crowd cheering for the chariot races fought fierce battles with each other. People identified with “their” players by taking on their colours. Today, however, football attracts the largest crowds of fans and the media, and it is at football facilities that the most fights take place (Dudała, 2004). The 1960s are considered to be the beginning of stadium hooliganism². It was at that time this phenomenon began to be pointed out as behaviours affecting safety and public order at the stadium and within it. Hooliganism originated in Great Britain, although at first it was not treated as a social problem. However, it is difficult to clearly define when the behaviour of fans began to bear traces of deliberate and planned creation of conflicts and violence in order to obtain satisfaction from participation in them, but practically from then on, stadium hooliganism is considered a social problem (Radwaniak, 2011). This results in the search for appropriate and better solutions to be able to provide the participants of mass events with protection and security at a high level to the greatest possible extent. The aim of the article is to present the problem of the

¹ Krzysztof Prendecki, DSc, PhD, Associate Prof., professor at Rzeszów University of Technology, Faculty of Management, al. Powstańców Warszawy 12, 35-959 Rzeszów, e-mail: prend@prz.edu.pl. ORCID 0000-0003-1396-3108

² The very term “hooligan” probably comes from the surname of an Irish family living in southern London – Hooligan, headed by Edward Hooligan, who was famous for his turmoil during football matches. According to other sources, the origin of this term can also be found in the name of Hooley. He was the famous leader of juvenile criminals who headed the so-called Hooley Gang. The name “hooliganism” has been a synonym for derailed youth in England since 1880s.

safety of participants of mass events, with particular emphasis on football stadiums, as well as the resulting legal and organizational issues.

2. THE ISSUE OF SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF STADIUM HOOLIGANISM

Security is fundamental to the existence of every individual and entire community (Koziej, 2011). It is defined as a state (achieving a sense of security of a given subject) and as a process (ensuring a sense of security) that is more practical because it shows how dynamic it is. The security of a given entity includes ensuring the possibility of survival (being, existence), ensuring the freedom to achieve one's own goals, reducing risk, preventing and opposing various threats to the entity and its interests (Koziej, 2011). The subject of security are all individuals with individual interests and expressing ambitions to implement them; starting from individuals, to social groups, nations, international communities, and ending with the whole of humanity (Koziej, 2011). Public order in doctrine and legal regulations is considered together with the concept of security. The definitions of public order and security cannot be unequivocally established once and for all as they depend on many changing factors. The meaning of these concepts is influenced by, among others, standards of behaviour prevailing in a specific social group, constantly changing living conditions, social views, legal regulations (Kotulski, 2000).

The fact that the safety of citizens is one of the most important values protected by the state is also stated in the first chapter of the Polish Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997, art. 5). Security of a mass event is based on guaranteeing the safety of all participants of this event, obliging the organizer to meet many requirements in this regard. The legal definition of such an event requires it to be understood as a mass artistic and entertainment event or a mass sports event, including a football match³. It should be noted that the issue of security of mass events is related to the term public security and public order⁴.

The variety of people participating in a sporting event and the variety of motivations related to cheering rises many questions and makes us wonder how important it is to ensure the safety of participants in a sports event. Safety is of paramount importance for every human being, and in the opinion of the society, football stadiums have become places of increased risk and threat to health. Safety during mass events, sports events such as Championships and Games, but also during matches and other sports competitions qualified as mass events, is not only about fighting hooligans and their behaviour deviating from the norm. It is also a fight against terrorism, discrimination and taking care of cultural cheering.

³ Art. 3 point 1. The Act of March 20, 2009 on the safety of mass events (Journal of Laws of 2015, item 2139), hereinafter referred to as SMEA. The legal acts regulating the organization and securing of mass events also include other acts, e.g. the Act of May 24, 2013 on measures of direct coercion and firearms and the Act of May 21, 1999 on weapons and ammunition.

⁴ Public safety is defined as the actual situation inside the country, which allows a state organization to function freely and pursue its interests, preserve the life, health and property of particular individual individuals living in this organization, and allow these individuals to exercise their rights and freedoms. On the other hand, public order is a system of binding legal norms, customs and public relations, the respect and application of which determines the possibility of proper and normal development of coexistence in society and allows for harmonious operation of state institutions and offices.

The term “stadium crime” is currently not legally defined in a footnote. It is often associated with mass sports events (Obronca24h.pl). Stadium crime is interchangeably used as stadium hooliganism. In the criminal code, the legislator has included a definition that defines a hooligan act. A hooligan offense consists in a public, intentional and unreasonable attack on health, freedom, honour, bodily inviolability, general safety, public order, activities of state institutions or local self-government, or the deliberate destruction, damage or rendering unfit for use of someone else’s property (The Act, 1997, art. 115 § 21). This phenomenon is still current and so willingly presented by the media, but it does not include only fights or vandalism, as we have been used to in the media, but it has a much larger dimension (Morgała, 2012).

Stadium hooliganism, and more specifically its behaviour, is subject to legal regulations. Stadium crime refers to statutory prohibited acts committed in connection with football matches. Such behaviour applies not only to offenses or crimes committed during the football matches themselves, but also takes part outside the stadium before or after sports games, thus posing a threat to the local community (Morgała, 2012).

The participation of many people at the same time and in one place at the events resulted in the emergence of the threat. Such behaviour causes the man (Le Bon, 1997); is unable to think logically, cannot properly assess the current situation in which he is, often acts in a random and irrational way, sometimes takes unpredictable activities that pose a threat to others, does not feel the need to respect the rules and all civil rules, and also civil norms, he decisively, and sometimes even ruthlessly fights for his life, fighting to save himself, he does not pay attention to the lives of other people and also targets his conflicting actions and aggressive reactions towards order units. Gustaw Le Bon (Le Bon, 1997) also characterized the crowd by features; lack of unity, changeability, lack of persistence in pursuing a goal, feeling exaggerated, extreme emotions, impulsiveness in action, which sometimes leads to destructive behaviour, no tolerance for views other than one’s own, lower intellectual level of the crowd than distinct individuals who create it, thinking with images and combining them through simple associations, susceptibility to suggestions and collective “hallucinations”, loss of separateness and individuality, “disappearance of self-awareness”, a sense of impunity and invincibility, being guided in behaviour by suggestion, not rational processes, predominance of unconscious processes over conscious ones, overwhelming desire to realize the idea that has overwhelmed the crowd.

T. Milcarz in his work “Knights in scarves” states (Milcarz, 2006); most of the aggressive behaviour of fans is “malicious”, the subcultural activity of scarf-makers is an example of the inability to realize the positive aspects of freedom, escape from the freedom of fanatics is conditioned by the regularities of adolescence (...) and macrosocial processes (...), the mechanism of escaping from freedom of scarf-makers is authoritarianism, authoritarian personality traits visible in football fanatics arise as a result of defective socialization (...), “the syndrome of chivalry” is characteristic of participants of authoritarian youth subcultures, scarves do not fall within the criteria of mental health in the sense of normative humanism (...).

During mass meetings, many dangers and situations that compromise security may appear. It is distinguished, among other things, by damage to property or a threat to life. The level of threats is also influenced by activities undertaken by units designed to participate in security, as well as the location of facilities where games are organized, or the weather conditions prevailing on a given day (Struniawski, 2014). Such situations put the state in a negative light, as there is a conviction that the government is ineffective and

operative in implementing security for citizens (Police Headquarters, 2000). Such situations put the state in a negative light, as there is a conviction that the government is ineffective and operative in implementing security for citizens. Dangerous situations may occur not only in the stadium. Events that threaten human life or public order may also arise before or immediately after the events. In particular, this applies to breaking the prohibitions, having narcotic drugs with you during the event and bringing harmful and dangerous tools or objects to the play area. Examples include knives, glass bottles, and even weapons or flares. Violations of the law also include various types of offenses and violations of the law, such as drug trafficking, counterfeiting of match tickets, or theft (Wysocka, Łazaj, Hausman, 2010).

3. SAFETY OF FANS IN PRACTICE

Pursuant to the Act on the Safety of Mass Events, the *Police Register of Mass Events* “PRIM” has been established in Poland. In particular, the inventory records data on: security of mass sports events, security of non-sports events, units delegated to prepare inquiries and data to the Register, security measures and actions by Police officers in connection with organized mass events. It is mainly the Police officers who undertake activities aimed at securing the course of all events⁵. This applies in particular to sports games⁶. The participants of this kind of meetings are supporters of the opposition and not very supportive clubs and sports teams, who show their reluctance between clubs in a very visible and intrusive way.

The act on safety of mass events specifies in detail the rules of organization and safety of a football match as well as the tasks and powers of the services responsible for securing the event, i.e. security and information services. These documents define the limits of the powers of the services that take part in securing mass events (Act, 1997, art. 41). The security threats of a mass event are associated with the fact that such events attract a large number of people, which causes crowds and densities and thus carries the risk of injury (Lipski 2012). Age and racial diversity, views and even differences in character or appearance are, among others, the reasons for starting fights, quarrels and committing acts of vandalism by hooligans present at events.

We distinguish the following prohibited acts (Jurczewski 2013):

- Failure to carry out the order of the security services, the Police and the Military Police.
- Being in a place not intended for the public and in a sector other than that indicated on the ticket.
- Bringing or carrying alcoholic beverages at matches.

⁵ In 2005, the National Information Point for Mass Events was established. The point is subordinate to the Main Police Staff of the General Police Headquarters, and its purpose is to gather all pieces of information about mass events in one place.

⁶ The second place indicates also games of a musical nature, in which various subcultures take part, for example during hip-hop concerts, participants may fear the unfavourable behaviour of representatives of the punk community. As a rule, the lowest level of emerging situations that threaten public order is characteristic of artistic and entertainment games organized in the form of charity.

- The use of clothing or an object that makes identification impossible or significantly difficult.
- Bringing and having pyrotechnics, fire hazardous materials or explosives at the match.
- Breaking into the competition area or the mass event area.
- Throwing dangerous objects.
- Violation of the bodily integrity of a member of the law enforcement service, IT service or public official.
- Provoking fans to act in a way that threatens safety.
- Destruction of property.
- Promoting fascism or other totalitarian regimes and insulting a person or a group of people due to their origin or religion.
- Fight and beating.

According to the data provided by the GS KGP (Police Headquarters, 2020), in which the Police participated in carrying out defense and security activities, amounted to 7,812. Of all types of events, 226 were assigned to the category of higher risk events. The most frequently arranged type of mass events in Poland in the discussed year were artistic and entertainment events. Then, sports events were very popular. On the other hand, football matches were held least frequently, only 14%. However, the greatest strength was directed at football matches.

The costs borne by the Police in this respect amount to tens of millions of zlotys per year. The number of uniformed services directed to ensure order in connection with sports events would be enough to provide service in a large city or poviát headquarters. In 2017, the Police spent PLN 58,745.253 on the implementation of activities related to the conduct of mass events. The Police allocated PLN 16,308.706 for activities related to the organization of mass high-risk events. The highest costs were incurred by the Police in connection with securing football matches – PLN 37,341.945 (63.6% of the total). Securing the journeys of participants of mass events consumed PLN 8,884.146 in 2017. The Police allocated PLN 1,118.828 to secure the journeys of participants of mass events by rail transport, with the highest costs incurred in connection with the journeys of football fans – PLN 1,096.239, which constitutes 98% of the total (kpk.policja.gov.pl). This report shows that the protection and security of mass events is getting better organized and minimizes the crimes and offenses committed during the event.

Effective counteracting stadium hooliganism is based on the use of appropriate strategies and methods, which boil down to the appropriate preparation of the area and sports facility, as well as proper coordination of the activities of the match organizer's services and cooperating entities such as the Police. The essence of all actions is to prevent crimes, minimize the possibility of committing them and increase the chance of apprehending the perpetrator. The safety of participants in a mass event against attacks of aggression by fans is determined by three aspects (Chlebowicz, 2009). The first is to provide protection to those present against possible attacks by aggressive fans. The second is to protect fans of one team from possible attacks by fans of the opposing team. The third, however, is to ensure the safety of people participating in the event against possible attacks by people who have not been admitted to the event and are outside the facility.

Adequate infrastructure, a high level of training of services securing a mass event and cooperation with public law entities in the future result in a reduction of threats occurring

during mass events, not only those of a sports nature. It is worth emphasizing that all negative events taking place during mass events indicate what else needs to be done to increase the level of security and ensure better security for the participants of the event.

In turn, the reports of the Polish Football Association show behaviours that are driven by the aggression of fans and disrupt the order and security of the match:

- Uncontrolled intrusions of fans onto the facility, ramming the external fence of the facility.
- Incursions of fans into the field of the game or its zone, stands, sectors and other rooms on the site.
- Illegal consent of the organizer to bring and use pyrotechnics and combat tools, weapons, streamers and other items prohibited by the Act, the facility regulations, and resulting from the lack of proper control at the gates.
- Fights of fans with the police, security services, among themselves on the premises.
- The use and throwing of pyrotechnics, chemicals into the field of the game and its zone to sectors, causing a health hazard, reduced visibility or contamination of the area.
- Throwing objects (seats, bench strips, bottles, stones, snowballs, metal baskets, streamers, metal drain grates, etc.) at the referees, players, officials, law enforcement services, the police.
- Bringing and drinking alcohol at the stadium, presence of drunk spectators at the facility.
- Bringing and hanging banners, flags, expressing slogans with hostile, inflammatory, fascist symbols, anarchist signs and hooligan content etc.
- Setting fire, burning scarves, club-coloured flags, buffets, shops, toilets, creating fire hazards in the facility.
- Threats, intimidation, insults from fans, players, referees, coaches, officials, activists and against each other.
- Violation of personal inviolability, bodily injuries of judges, players, coaches, officials by fans at the sports facility.
- Damage to guest coaches, referees' vehicles, persons delegated to the competition.
- Breaks in the game due to disturbances in order and safety in the area of the field of play and in the stands.
- Interrupted competitions caused by hooligan disturbances of order and safety in the area of the game area of the playing field and in the stands.
- Manifestations of racist, anti-Semitic, provocative behaviour of the public towards themselves, players, judges, activists, officials.
- Police intervention – the use of direct coercion measures against aggressive behaviour of fans.
- Devastation of the facility, destruction of its devices by fans.

The organization and security of football matches of the PZPN central level are improving. In the 2019/2020⁷ season, during 23 events, sports competitions were

⁷ The document prepared by the Department of Event Organization, Safety and Infrastructure of the Polish Football Association was based on the reports of the PZPN Match Delegates, information from the organizers of the competition (604 matches carried out in the normal mode) and the assessment of the condition of the pitch made by the referees (all matches of the season).

interrupted/suspended (3.3% of all matches – mainly due to the use of pyrotechnics and throwing objects towards the pitch), and the command/management of a mass event was delegated to the Police once (0.2% of all matches). The most common incidents at matches were shouting hostile/vulgar shouts (53% of matches), use of pyrotechnics (14% of matches) and late arrival of fans at the stadium (12% of matches). In the 208 matches analysed in the premier league, throwing objects or at other sectors took place during 18 matches. Vandalism related activities took place at the facility during 15 matches.

Other incidents at the level of Ekstraklasa:

- Intrusion onto the playing field (1).
- Disturbance of order in the stadium (2).
- Attack on a player, referee, other player (3).
- Protests, demonstrations (10).
- Racist and anti-Semitic behaviour (2).
- Problems with tickets, accreditation, identifiers (1)
- Problems with crowding, overcrowding, panic, queues (1).
- Incorrectly organized segregation of fans (2).
- Technical infrastructure problems (4).
- Problems related to detaining fans after the match (8).

However, there was no disturbance of order around the stadium and the use of laser pointers.

It is also worth noting that in terms of safety during the games organized by the Polish Football Association and Ekstraklasa SA: “clubs must support and develop good relations with their official and registered fan associations” (Janus, 2014). The safety regulations include cooperation with fans (www.pzpn.pl): 1. Clubs must foster and develop good relations with their official and registered fan associations. 2. Clubs must require associations to insist on standards of good behaviour for their members and to exclude the membership of those involved in any form of hooliganism or anti-social behaviour. 3. Clubs must insist that fan associations make effective efforts to ensure that alcohol is not picked up or consumed during organized tours.

Securing mass events and involving the police in it are also dealt with by the Council of the European Union, which in its resolution of June 3, 2010 on the updated manual with recommendations on international police cooperation and on preventive and control actions related to acts of violence and disruptions order during international football matches⁸.

⁸ List of documents previously adopted by the Council of the EU 1. Council Recommendation of November 30, 1993 concerning the liability of organizers of sporting events. 2. Council Recommendation of December 1, 1994 on direct, informal information exchange with Central and Eastern European countries in the field of international sporting events (network of contact persons). 3. Council Recommendation of December 1, 1994 on the exchange of information relating to international sporting events and meetings (network of contact persons). 4. Council Recommendation of April 22, 1996 on guidelines for the prevention and reduction of disorder related to football matches, with an attached standard format for the exchange of police information on football hooligans. 5. Joint action of May 26, 1997 on cooperation in the field of law, order and security. 6. Resolution of the Council of June 9, 1997 on preventing and reducing football hooliganism through the exchange of experiences, the ban on admission to stadiums and through media policy. 7. Council Resolution of June 21, 1999 on a handbook on international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control acts of violence and disorder in connection with

4. SUMMARY

During the outbreaks of aggression in the stadiums, groups began to form that began competing outside the stadium, arranging the so-called “Acts”, and in this case the “Act on safety of mass events” does not apply. Effective counteracting stadium hooliganism is based on the use of appropriate strategies and methods, which boil down to the appropriate preparation of the area and sports facility as well as proper coordination of the activities of the match organizer’s services and cooperating entities such as the Police. The essence of all activities is to prevent crimes, minimize the possibility of committing them and increase the chance of apprehending the perpetrator. Security at stadiums is not only about securing guests and locals by the supporters’ services or the proper transport of fans. These include the efficient and safe introduction of fans to the visiting sectors, counteracting inappropriate acts, or ensuring the comfort of watching the match for fans. More and more modern stadiums, increased security, fewer and fewer incidents – these are just some of the few issues that have improved in recent years.

REFERENCES

- Chlebowicz, P. (2009). *Stadium hooliganism. Criminological study*. Warsaw: Wolters Kulwer Polska.
- Dudała, J. (2004). *Fans-Hooligans. A thing about Polish fans*. Warsaw: Academic Publishing House “Żak”.
- Janus, T. (2014). *The phenomenon of aggression in sports spectacles. Characteristics and evaluation*. Warsaw.
- Jurczewski, M. (2013). *Legal forensic issues of stadium crime*. Białystok.
- Kotulski, M., (2000). *Local government in the face of ensuring public order and safety* [In:] Bednarek, W., Pikulski, S., ed., *Legal and administrative aspects of the safety of persons and public order in the period of political and economic transformation*, Olsztyn.
- Koziej, S. (2011). *Security: the essence, basic categories and historical evolution*. “Political and strategic aspects of security”, II – 2011/18.
- Lipski, S. (2012) *Risk and risk management of mass events hazards* [In:] Ura, E., Pieprzny, S., ed., *Security of mass events*. Rzeszów: RS DRUK.
- Le Bon, G. (1997). *Psychology of crowd*. Warsaw.
- Milcarz, T. (2006). *Knights in scarves. The subculture of football hooligans in the light of Reich Fromm’s concept*. Szczecin.
- Morgała, D. (2012). *Definition and scope of the term stadium hooliganism*. “Prosecution and Office”, No. 7/8.

international football matches. 8. Council Resolution of December 6, 2001 on a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and on measures to prevent and control acts of violence and disturbances of public order, which affect one or more Member States. 9. Council Decision of April 25, 2002 concerning safety in connection with football matches with an international dimension. 10. Council Resolution of November 17, 2003 on the introduction of a ban on access to sports venues hosting football matches with an international dimension by the Member States. 11. Council Resolution of December 4, 2006 on a handbook of recommendations for international police cooperation and the prevention and control of violence and disorder in international football matches involving at least one Member States. 12. Council Decision of June 12, 2007 amending Decision 2002/348/JHA concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension.

Radwaniak, K. (2011). *From the issues of characterization and combating hooliganism and stadium crime, taking into account the use of the white intelligence method*, "Security. Theory and Practice" 2011 no. 3 (IV).

Struniawski, J. (2014). *Command during police operations in the field of mass events and public gatherings*. Szczytno.

Wysocka, E, Łazaj, A, Hausman, M. (2010). *The use of databases and other sources in the process of criminal analysis to combat the crime of hooligans* [In:] Pływaczewski, W., Kudrelek, J., ed., *Stadium crime. Aetiology, phenomenology, counteracting the phenomenon*, Szczytno.

<https://obronca24h.pl/przestepczosc-stadionowa/>

kpk.policja.gov.pl ›

[https://www.pzpn.pl/public/system/files/site_content/635/561-](https://www.pzpn.pl/public/system/files/site_content/635/561-RB%2022.ZA%C5%81%C4%84CZNIK%20REGULAMIN%20BEZPIECZE%C5%83STWA.pdf)

[RB%2022.ZA%C5%81%C4%84CZNIK%20REGULAMIN%20BEZPIECZE%C5%83STWA.pdf](https://www.pzpn.pl/public/system/files/site_content/635/561-RB%2022.ZA%C5%81%C4%84CZNIK%20REGULAMIN%20BEZPIECZE%C5%83STWA.pdf)

LEGAL ACTS

Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997 (Journal of Laws of 1997, no. 78, item 483, as amended).

The Act of March 20, 2009 on the safety of mass events (Journal of Laws of 2015, item 2139).

The Act of June 6, 1997 Penal Code (Journal of Laws 2018.0.1600, i.e.) art. 115 § 21.

Act of August 22, 1997 on the protection of persons and property (Journal of Laws of 2014, item 1099 – uniform text).

Police Headquarters, Procedures of Police conduct during securing mass events, assemblies, demonstrations and other mass events. Warsaw 2000.

Police Headquarters Chief Police Staff, Report. Security of mass events in 2019. Warsaw 2020.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.44

The text was submitted to the editorial office: July 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.

Sabina ROKITA¹

THE INFLUENCE OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON MANAGEMENT ACTIONS AND THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF ENTERPRISES IN POLAND DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 2020

The unexpected outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic caused severe issues globally, with problems focused on health, social, and economic factors. Many economies experienced shocks to supply and demand. This article presents the findings of Statistics Poland's research on the experiences of enterprises and managerial activities undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the degree of changes in financial performance for the first half of 2020. The analyses have shown that approximately 90% of the enterprises surveyed in Poland in the first half of 2020 experienced a negative impact from the COVID-19 pandemic, while approximately 70% took management actions to mitigate the negative impacts. In addition, taking into account changes in financial performance, construction companies appear to be in the best situation, as their net financial results increased by approximately 44% compared to the first half of 2019. Companies in the processing industry appear to have been worst hit, as their net financial results decreased by as much as 40% compared to the same period in 2019.

Keywords: COVID-19 pandemic, financial performance, business activity.

1. INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of 2020, the world was apparently on the threshold of another crisis, whose primary, though not only, cause was the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus and the COVID-19 illness it triggers. The pandemic has had severe negative consequences, not only in terms of health and society, but also economically. An attempt to reduce the number of illnesses by introducing social distancing had a destructive effect on public finances, enterprises and citizens. In view of the enormous importance of enterprises in the economy, the article undertakes the following research problems:

1. whether enterprises in Poland experienced negative effects from the COVID-19 pandemic in the first half of 2020 and took management actions to mitigate them,
2. what is the financial performance of enterprises in Poland in the first half of 2020?

The aim of the article is to present the results of analyses of Statistics Poland's data on the experiences of enterprises and management actions undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic in the first half of 2020, as well as the degree of changes in the financial

¹ Sabina Rokita, PhD, Department of Finance, Banking and Accountancy, Rzeszow University of Technology, al. Powstańców Warszawy 12, 35-959 Rzeszów, Poland; e-mail: srokita@prz.edu.pl. ORCID: 0000-0002-2185-6399.

performance of enterprises for the first half of 2020 compared to the same period the previous year.

2. THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON BUSINESS

The rate of spread of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus as well as the incidence of COVID-19 has taken the whole world by surprise. Apparently, the first infection with the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus occurred on November 17, 2019 in China (Rzeczpospolita, 2020), and at the end of June 2020 there were approximately 10 million infected people globally, and over 500,000 had died due to COVID-19 (polsatnews.pl, 2020). In many countries, the health service were overloaded, and attempts were made to stop the spread of the coronavirus, including introducing restrictions on movement in public places the operation of businesses, closing borders, and banning mass gatherings. The most important economic problems resulting from this include: increased costs to health care, an increase in public debt, a decrease in labor productivity, an increase in unemployment, a decrease in GDP, the upsetting of global value chains of goods and services, and a limitation of investments (Oldekop et al., 2020; Goodell, 2020; Craven et al., 2020).

The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus initially attacked China, where as a result of illnesses and the introduction of restrictions aimed at suppressing infection outbreaks, the activities of companies, including manufacturing companies, were slowed down or even suspended. Delays caused by production downtime have further aggravated restrictions on international transport. Consequently, issues began to appear in those entities whose activities were to some extent dependent on supplies from China, and ergo, practically all over the world. Disruptions in global supply chains arose. In addition, the rate of spread of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, its impact on practically every aspect of functioning, as well as great uncertainty, caused a change in existing consumer preferences. Economies experienced a shock to both supply and demand (McKibbin, Fernando, 2020).

However, the Covid-19 pandemic affects different sectors and actors in different ways and to varying degrees. Some businesses experience mostly negative consequences, others positive ones. Restrictions to movement affected, among others, a decline in the demand for hotel and restaurant services, which translated into a decrease in the demand for agricultural products. Aviation (especially airlines and airports, due to reduced passenger traffic), tourism and the service sector may suffer difficulties. Opportunities for development, in turn, appeared in the pharmaceutical industry, e.g. companies involved in the development of a vaccine for Covid-19, as well as the manufacture of respirators. Markets, in turn, experienced a siege at the beginning of the pandemic due to panic and forward buying. Companies operating in the field of information technology, conducting online sales or courier activities are experiencing a period of glory (Nicola et al., 2020; Craven et al., 2020).

Research shows, however, that the situation of enterprises is influenced not only by the industry and type of business, but also by their size - usually the smaller ones more suffer the negative effects of the crisis caused by the coronavirus and are more prone to bankruptcy (Bartik et al., 2020; Bartik et al., 2020a).

The numerous problems and challenges caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and the desire to survive in difficult times force a search for new ways of functioning, better and more efficient use of resources, as evidenced by, inter alia, the implementation in organizations of so-called imposed service innovations (e.g. delivery of parcels with the use of robots,

virtual medical visits), which under normal operating conditions might not have a chance to exist because of adopted business strategies and a focus on stability and linear development (Heinonen, Strandvik, 2020), which can be considered a favorable aspect of its impact. Moreover, in a broader perspective, as Ch. Wyplosz notes, ways of responding to threats caused by the coronavirus reveal the true nature of governments and societies (Wyplosz, 2020).

Under the influence of these events, a huge uncertainty appeared in societies, related not only to the duration of the pandemic and the duration of restrictions, health concerns, the possibility of discovering a vaccine or an effective drug for COVID-19, but also concern for material existence, the possibility of maintaining employment or the scale of changes in economies. An analysis of the values of selected economic uncertainty indicators from the USA and UK (including VIX implied stock returns volatility, News Economic Policy Uncertainty, Twitter Economic Uncertainty, Firm Subjective Sales Uncertainty, Macro Forecaster disagreement, Model-Based Macro Uncertainty) from the first half of 2020 demonstrated that all of them indicate huge spikes in uncertainty in response to a pandemic, with most reaching their highest recorded levels. In addition, it was noted that the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy is surprisingly large (as evidenced in the USA and UK by, among others, a dozen or even several dozen percent increase in the number of unemployed individuals or claims for unemployment benefits, drops in production or GDP), to mortality caused by this illness (which during the study period was at a much lower level than, for example, during the Spanish Flu). The authors of the study see the reasons for this in the unusual scale and nature of COVID-19 (Altig et al., 2020). However, this uncertainty has a huge impact on the structure and size of demand.

3. RESEARCH SUBJECT AND METHODOLOGY

The subject of the research was the experiences of enterprises in Poland and management actions undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic in the first half of 2020, as well as financial performance for the first half of 2019 and 2020. The analysis examined data from Statistics Poland on the economic situation and financial performance of non-financial enterprises for the first half of 2019 and 2020.

Research on the business tendency survey allows for the assessment of the situation of the enterprise sector and its individual departments, based on the opinions of entrepreneurs regarding the current and future conditions of their functioning, based on their impressions, and not on data contained in accounting systems (GUS, 2018). The research is conducted by the Statistics Poland on a monthly basis (from the 1st to the 10th day of the month), using surveys that, from April 2020, also contain questions about the impact of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus on the economic situation. The research is carried out among entities conducting business activity classified as (sections according to NACE REV. 2) (GUS, 2020a–2020f):

- manufacturing (section C) – the sample includes 3,500 enterprises,
- construction (section F) – the sample includes 3,999 enterprises,
- trade (section G, including wholesale and retail trade) – the sample includes 7,797 enterprises,
- services – the sample covers 5,000 enterprises, including:
 - Transportation and storage (section H),
 - Accommodation and food service activities (section I),

- Information and communication (section J not including cultural institutions with a legal personality),
- Financial and insurance activities (section K),
- Real estate activities (section L),
- Professional, scientific and technical activities (section M),
- Administrative and support service activities (section N),
- Education (section P not including universities),
- Human health and social work activities (section Q not including health maintenance organizations),
- Arts, entertainment and recreation (section R not including cultural institutions with legal personality),
- Other service activities (section S not including division 94 – activities of membership organizations).

Statistics Poland conducts quarterly research on revenues, costs and financial results among enterprises keeping account books and employing at least 10 people (GUS, 2019). The article uses the results of surveys of enterprises operating in the same sections according to NACE REV. 2, which were indicated in the survey of the economic situation, with the exception of section K Financial and insurance activities. The number of enterprises covered by the financial performance survey is shown in tables 5–8.

The research method utilized in this article was desk research – secondary data analysis using the aforementioned Statistics Poland databases. Comparative analysis was conducted with respect to financial data, perceived negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and management measures to counteract these negative effects in enterprises in Poland.

4. EXPERIENCE AND MANAGEMENT ACTIONS OF ENTERPRISES IN POLAND DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

In Poland, initial preparations for the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus infections were undertaken at the turn of January and February 2020, and from March 2020 a number of restrictions have been introduced for movement in a public place, organizing mass gatherings, and the way institutions function and conduct business activities (e.g. limiting the number of people who may simultaneously be inside stores or service points). The uncertainty connected with the emergence of a new infectious disease and the implemented restrictions had already affected enterprises in the first half of 2020.

The results of the value of the general business climate indicator from January to June 2020 are presented in Table 1.

The general business climate indicator is a composite measure presenting a synthetic assessment of the current and forecasted activity of enterprises including, based on their general condition, business barriers, financial situation, employment, demand for finished products, and goods or services (GUS, 2020). As demonstrated by an analysis of the data contained in Table 1, the values of this indicator significantly deteriorated in Q2 2020, i.e. they showed a significant deterioration in the sentiment of entrepreneurs after the introduction of restrictions related to the prevention of the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus. Pessimistic moods prevailed among all entities, i.e. those operating in manufacturing, construction, trade, and services. The general business climate indicator in manufacturing in April 2020 was minus 44.2, in construction minus 47.1, in wholesale trade

minus 39.8, in retail minus 48.3, in services (e.g. accommodation and catering) as low as minus 70, and as emphasized by Statistics Poland, the economic situation in April 2020 was assessed as “the worst in all the presented areas of the economy since the beginning of the survey (GUS, 2020g)”.

Table 1. General business climate indicator in the months of January-June 2020 (possible maximum values: from -100 to +100)

General business climate indicator (non-seasonally adjusted indicator) in selected areas of activity:	January 2020	February 2020	March 2020	April 2020	May 2020	June 2020
manufacturing	3.2	1.6	-1.1	-44.2	-34.9	-19.9
construction	-0.7	0.1	-1.9	-47.1	-38.8	-25.9
wholesale trade	4.0	4.5	0.4	-39.8	-33.3	-16.5
retail trade, including the repair of motor vehicles	-0.3	-0.8	-3.1	-49.5	-43.4	-25.1
transportation and storage	-0.5	0.1	-5.8	-48.3	-39.4	-20.4
accommodation and food service activities	-0.5	-5.6	-9.1	-70.0	-60.4	-34.0
information and communication	19.7	19.0	16.8	-19.4	-12.0	-4.3
real estate market services	3.5	8.8	6.4	-29.9	-25.9	-9.7

Source: personal study based on Statistics Poland's data (GUS 2020a–2020f).

The moods of enterprises improved in May and June 2020, possibly due to the gradual easing of the restrictions introduced at the turn of March and April 2020, and the introduction of financial support programs aimed at mitigating the negative effects of the pandemic, which is visible in the successively increasing values of the general climate indicators of the economic situation.

In each of the months from March to June 2020, more than 90% of enterprises have experienced the negative effects of the coronavirus pandemic, albeit to a different extent: insignificant, serious, or even threatening their stability. In each of the analyzed areas of activity, entities indicating a threat to their stability were generally from a few to a dozen or so percent, and these values were the highest in April 2020. Moreover, in April 2020 it was at that moment that the largest number of enterprises operating in retail indicated a threat to stability, as much as 22.90%. Detailed results of Statistics Poland's research in this area are presented in Table 2.

In the face of new challenges, enterprises proved to be very active in taking management actions aimed at counteracting the negative effects caused by the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic (Table 3).

As shown in Table 3, manufacturing companies were the outright leaders in this regard, because in the period of March–June 2020 as many as 33.00% to 41.10% of them took actions strongly affecting functioning, in order to mitigate the negative effects of the pandemic, while slightly affecting from 51.10% to 56.00%. Slightly less active in this respect were enterprises conducting a wholesale, retail or services trade – decisions strongly influencing the activity were made by 25.00% to 39.30% of the surveyed entities, while slightly influencing ones were implemented by 48.30% to 58.90% of them. On the other

hand, the fewest of the surveyed enterprises indicated that measures were taken to mitigate the negative effects of the pandemic strongly affecting construction activity, i.e. from 15.80% to 24.20%. Actions slightly affecting functioning were introduced by 55.70% to 62.50% of entities, while no special activities were undertaken in this regard for 19.60% to 28.50% of them.

Table 2. The “coronavirus” pandemic and its impact on a company's operations in the period March-June 2020.

In connection with the outbreak of the “coronavirus” pandemic and its consequences, have you possibly experienced negative consequences in your business?		March 2020	April 2020	May 2020	June 2020
Manufacturing	slight	65.30%	35.50%	41.10%	51.00%
	serious	29.40%	47.20%	43.50%	37.20%
	threatening the stability of the company	5.30%	13.00%	9.90%	5.70%
	no negative effects	-	4.30%	5.50%	6.10%
Construction	slight	63.70%	42.30%	47.00%	52.50%
	serious	28.40%	41.30%	35.30%	28.80%
	threatening the stability of the company	7.90%	12.90%	11.60%	10.30%
	no negative effects	-	3.50%	6.10%	8.40%
Wholesale trade	slight	62.60%	40.10%	47.30%	52.20%
	serious	28.30%	39.30%	39.20%	33.40%
	threatening the stability of the company	9.10%	14.30%	7.10%	6.60%
	no negative effects	-	6.30%	6.40%	7.80%
Retail trade	slight	48.20%	28.20%	32.40%	42.80%
	serious	35.30%	45.90%	49.80%	41.60%
	threatening the stability of the company	16.50%	22.90%	15.50%	9.60%
	no negative effects	-	3.00%	2.30%	6.00%
Services	slight	56.00%	43.00%	37.50%	49.20%
	serious	33.90%	37.80%	45.30%	32.70%
	threatening the stability of the company	10.10%	15.60%	13.10%	12.10%
	no negative effects	-	3.60%	4.10%	6.00%

Source: personal study based on Statistics Poland's data (GUS, 2020h–2020j).

Table 3. Management actions taken aimed at reducing the negative effects of the “coronavirus” pandemic for the company in the period March–June 2020

In connection with the outbreak of the “coronavirus” pandemic, have you implemented any measures to reduce its negative effects on the company?		March 2020	April 2020	May 2020	June 2020
Manufacturing	yes, slightly affecting the business	56%	51.20%	51.10%	55.40%
	yes, strongly influencing	33%	39.60%	41.10%	35%
	we did not take any special action	11%	9.20%	7.80%	9.60%
Construction	yes, slightly affecting the business	55.70%	55.80%	62.50%	57%
	yes, strongly influencing	15.80%	24.20%	17.90%	21.30%
	we did not take any special action	28.50%	20%	19.60%	21.70%
Wholesale trade	yes, slightly affecting the business	52.80%	53.20%	52.30%	58.90%
	yes, strongly influencing	25.60%	28.90%	31.60%	25%
	we did not take any special action	21.60%	17.90%	16.10%	16.10%
Retail trade	yes, slightly affecting the business	52.70%	48.30%	52.30%	50.80%
	yes, strongly influencing	28.90%	39.30%	38.20%	37.70%
	we did not take any special action	18.40%	12.40%	9.50%	11.50%
Services	yes, slightly affecting the business	52.40%	50.40%	50.20%	54.90%
	yes, strongly influencing	27.30%	33.50%	35%	30.30%
	we did not take any special action	20.30%	16.10%	14.80%	14.80%

Source: Personal study based on Statistics Poland's data (GUS, 2020h–2020j).

Unfortunately, the issue of mitigating the negative impact of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus on operations has not been included in more detail in the Statistics Poland's survey on the economic situation; hence it is not possible to precisely analyze specific strategies or methods undertaken by enterprises in this area (GUS, 2020). Nevertheless, undoubtedly one of the decisions taken by management that almost all enterprises had to face were those related to work, starting with the introduction of various measures to protect employees against infection, such as protective masks, gloves, disinfectants, to changes in the forms of work (e.g. introducing telework), shortening working hours, changes to working hour systems, and even up to the dismissal of employees.

The research of Statistics Poland demonstrated (Table 4) that in the period from March to June 2020, the percentage of employees working remotely and/or in similar forms varied between 24.10% and 46.20% in enterprises operating in wholesale trade and services. In the processing industry, construction and retail trade, from 5.50% to 17.00% of employees worked remotely or in similar forms. It can be noted, however, that in all the surveyed areas of enterprise activity, the percentage of people working remotely decreased with the incremental easing of restrictions, and thus the fewest people worked remotely in June 2020.

Table 4. Forms of work in companies during the “coronavirus” pandemic in the period March-June 2020

Estimated percentage of the company's employees (regardless of the type of contract: employment, civil law, self-employed workers, interns, agents, etc.) covered by each of the following situations:		March 2020	April 2020	May 2020	June 2020
Manufacturing	telework and similar forms of work	15%	16.70%	15.30%	10.50%
	unplanned absences due to holidays, care of children or family members, etc.	10.80%	10.90%	7.50%	6.10%
	lack of employees due to quarantine or other restrictions	3.20%	2.90%	2.80%	1.60%
Construction	telework and similar forms of work	14.50%	11.90%	12.70%	5.50%
	unplanned absences due to holidays, care of children or family members, etc.	11.10%	11.60%	7.20%	5.90%
	lack of employees due to quarantine or other restrictions	7.60%	5%	4.70%	2.90%
Wholesale trade	telework and similar forms of work	33.60%	34.50%	30.40%	24.10%
	unplanned absences due to holidays, care of children or family members, etc.	13%	9.60%	7.80%	6.80%
	lack of employees due to quarantine or other restrictions	3.50%	3.10%	1.80%	0.70%
Retail trade	telework and similar forms of work	17%	16%	14.50%	11.50%
	unplanned absences due to holidays, care of children or family members, etc.	15.30%	13%	7.90%	7.70%
	lack of employees due to quarantine or other restrictions	8.20%	7.70%	4.20%	2.30%
Services	telework and similar forms of work	44.40%	46.20%	40.20%	35.40%
	unplanned absences due to holidays, care of children or family members, etc.	12.40%	9.60%	7.80%	6.90%
	lack of employees due to quarantine or other restrictions	4%	4.40%	2.90%	1.40%

Source: personal study based on Statistics Poland's data (GUS, 2020h–2020j).

The percentage of employees on unplanned leave, caring for children or dependants (from 5.90% to 15.30%), as well as absent from work because of quarantine or other restrictions (from 0.70% to 8.20%) was at a similar level in all the surveyed companies, regardless of the type of business. In the case of employees' absence, the same correlation can be noticed as in the case of telework, i.e. the percentage of people absent from work for various reasons decreased with the incremental easing of restrictions.

5. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF ENTERPRISES IN POLAND IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2020

The existing market conditions, in which economic entities had to function, to a varying degree influenced their condition, including their financial situation. Tables 5–8 present the

financial performance of enterprises operating in the field of manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade and services in the first half of 2020.

Table 5. Financial performance of enterprises operating in the field of construction for the first half of 2020

Items	Construction		
	January-June 2019	January-June 2020	2020/2019
Enterprises covered by the study	1 139	1 160	101.84%
Revenue from overall activity (total revenues)	50 835 404 000 zł	51 898 720 000 zł	102.09%
Tax deductible costs from overall activity (total costs)	49 025 277 000 zł	49 380 353 000 zł	100.72%
Financial result from the sale of products, goods and materials	1 253 762 000 zł	2 092 600 000 zł	166.91%
Gross financial result	1 810 127 000 zł	2 518 367 000 zł	139.13%
Gross profit	2 679 509 000 zł	3 356 848 000 zł	125.28%
Gross loss	869 382 000 zł	838 481 000 zł	96.45%
Net financial result	1 454 817 000 zł	2 091 270 000 zł	143.75%
Net profit	2 345 245 000 zł	2 937 902 000 zł	125.27%
Net loss	890 428 000 zł	846 632 000 zł	95.08%
Share of total costs in total revenues	96.44%	95.15%	98.66%

Source: personal study based on Statistics Poland's data (Local Data Bank).

Table 6. Financial performance of enterprises operating in the field of wholesale and retail trade for the first half of 2020

Items	Wholesale and retail trade		
	January-June 2019	January-June 2020	2020/2019
Enterprises covered by the study	3232	3268	101.11%
Revenue from overall activity (total revenues)	483 590 933 000 zł	464 634 868 000 zł	96.08%
Tax deductible costs from overall activity (total costs)	471 542 633 000 zł	453 940 764 000 zł	96.27%
Financial result from the sale of products, goods and materials	13 093 288 000 zł	12 158 835 000 zł	92.86%
Gross financial result	12 048 300 000 zł	10 694 104 000 zł	88.76%
Gross profit	15 115 962 000 zł	15 767 186 000 zł	104.31%
Gross loss	3 067 662 000 zł	5 073 082 000 zł	165.37%
Net financial result	9 713 663 000 zł	8 516 709 000 zł	87.68%
Net profit	12 828 664 000 zł	13 617 064 000 zł	106.15%
Net loss	3 115 001 000 zł	5 100 355 000 zł	163.74%
Share of total costs in total revenues	97.51%	97.70%	100.19%

Source: personal study based on Statistics Poland's data (Local Data Bank).

Among the analyzed areas of the economy, only enterprises operating in the construction industry generated net financial results in the first half of 2020 higher by 43.75% than in the corresponding period of the previous year, with net profits increasing by 25.27%, while losses decreased by 4.92%. The achieved revenues were higher by 2.09% than in 2019, and the costs incurred only increased by 0.72%, which is reflected in the share of the total cost level in total revenues, which in the first half of 2019 was 96.44%, and in 2020 decreased to 95.15%.

The smallest decrease in net financial results was recorded by wholesale and retail companies, which were 12.32% lower in the first half of 2020 than in 2019, including 6.15% higher net profits; but losses increased by as much as 63.74%. Compared to the same period of the previous year, revenues and costs decreased to a similar extent, i.e. by approximately 4%, while revenues decreased by 0.19% more than costs. For this reason, the share of costs in revenues in the first half of 2019 was 97.51%, while in 2020 it was 97.70%.

Table 7. Financial performance of enterprises operating in the field of services for the first half of 2020

Items	Services		
	January–June 2019	January–June 2020	2020/2019
Enterprises covered by the study	4635	4779	103.11%
Revenue from overall activity (total revenues)	223 340 634 000 zł	220 309 964 000 zł	98.64%
Tax deductible costs from overall activity (total costs)	210 154 280 000 zł	210 577 089 000 zł	100.20%
Financial result from the sale of products, goods and materials	9 841 168 000 zł	8 115 915 000 zł	82.47%
Gross financial result	13 186 354 000 zł	9 732 875 000 zł	73.81%
Gross profit	16 832 595 000 zł	16 988 407 000 zł	100.93%
Gross loss	3 646 241 000 zł	7 255 532 000 zł	198.99%
Net financial result	10 660 817 000 zł	7 317 718 000 zł	68.64%
Net profit	14 495 274 000 zł	14 603 428 000 zł	100.75%
Net loss	3 834 457 000 zł	7 285 710 000 zł	190.01%
Share of total costs in total revenues	94.10%	95.58%	101.58%

Source: personal study based on Statistics Poland's data (Local Data Bank).

Service enterprises in the first half of 2020 achieved financial results at a level of 68.64% of those from the first half of 2019, so the decrease amounted to 31.36%, with the value of net profits increasing by 0.75%; while losses increased by as much as 90.01%. Revenues decreased by 1.36% and costs increased by 0.20%. In the period January–June 2019, the share of costs in revenues was 94.10%; while in the period January–June 2020, 95.58%.

Table 8. Financial performance of enterprises operating in the field of manufacturing for the first half of 2020

Items	Manufacturing		
	January-June 2019	January-June 2020	2020/2019
Enterprises covered by the study	6 890	6 901	100.16%
Revenue from overall activity (total revenues)	647 463 670 000 zł	590 377 298 000 zł	91.18%
Tax deductible costs from the overall activity (total costs)	610 638 241 000 zł	567 175 868 000 zł	92.88%
Financial result from the sale of products, goods and materials	35 086 651 000 zł	25 812 414 000 zł	73.57%
Gross financial result	36 825 429 000 zł	23 201 430 000 zł	63.00%
Gross profit	41 218 329 000 zł	35 484 070 000 zł	86.09%
Gross loss	4 392 900 000 zł	12 282 640 000 zł	279.60%
Net financial result	31 225 372 000 zł	19 036 764 000 zł	60.97%
Net profit	35 690 174 000 zł	30 827 745 000 zł	86.38%
Net loss	4 464 802 000 zł	11 790 981 000 zł	264.09%
Share of total costs in total revenues	94.31%	96.07%	101.86%

Source: personal study based on Statistics Poland's data (Local Data Bank).

The worst situation appeared in processing industry enterprises, where the net financial results achieved in the first half of 2020 were lower by 39.03% compared to the same period of the previous year; net profits were lower by 13.62%, but losses increased by 164.09%. Revenues were at a level of 91.18% of those from the first half of 2019, and the costs at 92.88%. For this reason, the share of costs in revenues increased in the first half of 2020 to 96.07% from 94.30% in the comparative period of the previous year.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic, as well as the restrictions introduced in connection with attempts to limit it, have drastically changed the conditions for the functioning of economic entities and consumer reactions. Enterprises have new threats, challenges and opportunities to development.

The results of Statistics Poland research in the first half of 2020 indicate that the emergence of the new Covid-19 illness, the speed and scale of its spread globally, implemented restrictions, and also possibly the media buzz related to it, has caused great uncertainty; and as a result, a sharp deterioration to entrepreneurs' moods in March and April 2020, as evidenced by drastic drops in the values of economic indicators. These moods improved in May and June 2020, despite the fact that the number of illnesses in Poland was gradually increasing at that time. It was likely caused by several factors, i.e. the passing of the initial shock, the gradual getting accustomed to new conditions of functioning, a relatively low percentage of illnesses (compared to other countries), the easing of restrictions, the launching of the Anti-Crisis Shield and financial support for enterprises, improving weather and the approaching holiday period.

As of March 2020, over 90% of surveyed business entities declared that they had experienced (to a lesser or greater extent) the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their business. However, taking actions to mitigate these negative effects (slightly or strongly affecting the activity) was indicated by over 70% of the surveyed enterprises. The largest percentage of entities which declared that they had not taken any special measures in this regard was recorded in the construction industry.

During the pandemic, the popularity of telework increased and a dependence on the need to maintain social distancing is quite evident - the greatest number of employees performed telework in March and April 2020, when restrictions in this regard were the highest. The experience of entrepreneurs shows that the most important advantages of this form of work include the reduction of the risk of contracting the coronavirus, and an increase in the flexibility of working hours. Yet, among the disadvantages are: lower efficiency, hardware problems, limitations in introducing new employees to duties, and difficulties in building social relationships and corporate culture (Kunica, 2020).

The shock caused by the pandemic was reflected not only in moods, but also in the financial results achieved by economic entities in the first half of 2020. As indicated by the results of the analysis, the largest decrease in net financial results was recorded by processing industry enterprises, as much as approximately 40% compared to the same period the previous year. Business entities providing services recorded a decrease in net financial results at a level of approximately 32%, and those engaged in wholesale and retail trade at a level of approximately 12%. However, companies conducting renovation and construction activities were in the most favorable situation; where net financial results for the period from January to June 2020, approximately 44% higher than for the same period of 2019, were recorded. Interestingly, such good financial results were not heralded by the mood in the construction industry, which were as pessimistic as in entities operating in manufacturing, trade or services, as evidenced by the monthly values of the general business climate indicator in the first half of 2020.

After the first half of 2020, the construction industry seems to be in the best situation, this may be due to the fact that it largely operates based on long-term contracts, and thus is less susceptible to temporary economic turmoil. The situation may change, however, as the uncertainty caused by the pandemic and the deterioration of the financial situation are not conducive to incurring capital expenditure, neither from public nor private funds.

The SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic is still ongoing. At the moment it is difficult to predict when it will end and what its further consequences will be; which will certainly be the subject of further scientific research.

The most important limitations of the analyses conducted in this article include:

- comparative analysis of companies' financial results in semi-annual instead of quarterly periods,
- generality of research on management actions taken by enterprises to counteract the negative effects caused by the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus pandemic,
- incomplete consistency of the groups of enterprises included in the survey in terms of revenues, costs and financial results in 2019 and 2020, as well as groups of enterprises covered by the economic climate survey and the survey in terms of revenues, costs and financial results.

These limitations result mainly from the adopted research methodologies conducted by Statistics Poland. The indicated limitations also create the possibility of conducting in-depth research in the future.

REFERENCES

- Altig, D., Baker, S., Barrero, J.M., Bloom, N., Bunn, P., Chen, S., Davis, S.J., Leather, J., Meyer, B., Mihaylov, E., Mizen, P., Parker, N., Renault, T., Smietanka, P., Thwaites, G. (2020). *Economic uncertainty before and during the COVID-19 pandemic*. "Journal of Public Economics" 191 (2020) 104274.
- Bartik, A.W., Bertrand, M., Cullen, Z.B., Glaeser, E.L., Luca, M., Stanton, Ch. (2020a). *How are small businesses adjusting to covid-19? Early evidence from a survey*. Working Paper 26989, "National Bureau of Economic Research". Access on the internet: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w26989>.
- Bartik, A.W., Bertrand, M., Cullen, Z., Glaeser, E.L., Luca, M., Stanton, Ch. (2020). *The impact of COVID-19 on small business outcomes and expectations*. PNAS July 28, 2020 117 (30). Access on the internet: <https://www.pnas.org/content/117/30/17656>.
- Chiny: Najwcześniejszy zanotowany przypadek COVID-19 pochodzi z 17 listopada 2019, publikacja: 13.03.2020, „Rzeczpospolita”. Access on the internet: <https://www.rp.pl/Koronawirus-2019-nCoV/200319608-Chiny-Najwcześniejszy-zanotowany-przypadek-COVID-19-pochodzi-z-17-listopada-2019.html>
- Craven, M., Liu, L., Mysore, M., Wilson, M. (2020). *COVID-19: Implications for business*. McKinsey & Company.
- Goodell, J.W. (2020). *COVID-19 and finance: Agendas for future research*. "Finance Research Letters" 35 (2020) 101512.
- GUS (2018). *Zeszyt metodologiczny. Badanie koniunktury gospodarczej*. Warszawa: GUS.
- GUS (2019). *Zeszyt metodologiczny. Badania przedsiębiorstw niefinansowych*. Warszawa: GUS.
- GUS (2020a). *Koniunktura w przetwórstwie przemysłowym, budownictwie, handlu i usługach 2000–2020 (czerwiec 2020)*. Warszawa: GUS.
- GUS (2020b). *Koniunktura w przetwórstwie przemysłowym, budownictwie, handlu i usługach 2000–2020 (maj 2020)*. Warszawa: GUS.
- GUS (2020c). *Koniunktura w przetwórstwie przemysłowym, budownictwie, handlu i usługach 2000–2020 (kwiecień 2020)*. Warszawa: GUS.
- GUS (2020d). *Koniunktura w przetwórstwie przemysłowym, budownictwie, handlu i usługach 2000–2020 (marzec 2020)*. Warszawa: GUS.
- GUS (2020e). *Koniunktura w przetwórstwie przemysłowym, budownictwie, handlu i usługach 2000–2020 (luty 2020)*. Warszawa: GUS.
- GUS (2020f). *Koniunktura w przetwórstwie przemysłowym, budownictwie, handlu i usługach 2000–2020 (styczeń 2020)*. Warszawa: GUS.
- GUS (2020g). *Koniunktura w przetwórstwie przemysłowym, budownictwie, handlu i usługach – kwiecień 2020 r. Informacje sygnałne*. Warszawa: GUS.
- GUS (2020h). *Wpływ pandemii koronawirusa SARS-CoV-2 na koniunkturę gospodarczą – oceny i oczekiwania (dane szczegółowe). Aneks do publikacji „Koniunktura w przetwórstwie przemysłowym, budownictwie, handlu i usługach 2000–2020 (kwiecień 2020)*. Warszawa: GUS.

GUS (2020i). *Wpływ pandemii koronawirusa SARS-CoV-2 na koniunkturę gospodarczą – oceny i oczekiwania (dane szczegółowe). Aneks do publikacji „Koniunktura w przetwórstwie przemysłowym, budownictwie, handlu i usługach 2000–2020 (maj 2020)*. Warszawa: GUS.

GUS (2020j). *Wpływ pandemii koronawirusa SARS-CoV-2 na koniunkturę gospodarczą – oceny i oczekiwania (dane szczegółowe). Aneks do publikacji „Koniunktura w przetwórstwie przemysłowym, budownictwie, handlu i usługach 2000–2020 (czerwiec 2020)*. Warszawa: GUS.

Heinonen, K., Strandvik, T. (2020). *Reframing service innovation: COVID-19 as a catalyst for imposed service innovation*. “*Journal of Service Management Emerald Publishing Limited*”. Access on the internet: <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JOSM-05-2020-0161/full/pdf?title=reframing-service-innovation-covid-19-as-a-catalyst-for-imposed-service-innovation>

https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pandemia_COVID-19_w_Polsce

Koronawirus. Najnowsze informacje z Polski i świata (RELACJA), publikacja: 30.06.2020 (2020). [polsatnews.pl](https://www.polsatnews.pl). Access on the internet: <https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2020-06-30/koronawirus-najnowsze-informacje-z-polski-i-swiata-relacja3006/>

Kunica, M. (2020). *„Powinniśmy przejść na model szwedzki”. Prezes Comarchu podsumowuje pół roku lockdownu*. Access on the internet: <https://businessinsider.com.pl/firmy/janusz-filipiak-prezes-comarchu-o-koronawirusie-i-pracy-zdalnej/fd2bv4h>.

McKibbin, W., Fernando, R. (2020). *The economic impact of COVID-19*, [In:] Baldwin, R., Weder di Mauro, B. *Economics in the Time of COVID-19*. London: CEPR Press.

Nicola, M., Alsafi, Z., Sohrabi, C., Kerwan, A., Al-Jabir, A., Iosifidis, Ch., Agha, M., Agha, R. (2020). *The socio-economic implications of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19): A review*. “*International Journal of Surgery*” 78.

Oldekop, J.A., Horner, R., Hulme, D., Adhikari, R., Agarwal, B., Alford, M., Bakewell, O., Banks, N., Barrientos, S., Bastia, T., Bebbington, A.J., Das, U., Dimova, R., Duncombe, R., Enns, Ch., Fielding, D., Foster, Ch., Foster, T., Frederiksen, T., Gao, P., Gillespie, T., Heeks, R., Hickey, S., Hess, M., Jepson, N., Karamchedu, A., Kothari, U., Krishnan, A., Lavers, T., Mamman, A., Mitlin, D., Tabrizi, N.M., Müller, T.R., Nadvi, K., Pasquali, G., Pritchard, R., Pruce, K., Rees, Ch., Renken, J., Savoia, A., Schindler, S., Surmeier, A., Tampubolon, G., Tyce, M., Unnikrishnan, V., Zhang, Y.-F. (2020). *COVID-19 and the case for global development*. “*World Development*” 134.

Wyplosz Ch. (2020). *The good thing about coronavirus* [In:] Baldwin, R., Weder di Mauro, B. *Economics in the Time of COVID-19*. London: CEPR Press.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.45

The text was submitted to the editorial office: September 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.

Malwina SIEWIER¹

POLISH-GERMAN STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE IN UPPER SILESIA DURING THE SANITATION PERIOD (1926–1939)

In 1922, by decision of the Council of Ambassadors of the great powers, part of the lands of Upper Silesia was incorporated into the Polish State. Germany has never accepted these provisions. Throughout the interwar period, Upper Silesia was a space of Polish-German competition for political, economic, social and cultural influence. This region was important for the economy of The Second Republic of Poland. The Silesian Voivode Michał Grażyński, associated with the sanitation camp, conducted a repolonization policy. Upper Silesia was particularly vulnerable to the hostile activities of foreign intelligence, especially the German *Abwehr*. German intelligence involved representatives of the German minority living in the Polish part of Upper Silesia. This was a major challenge for Polish special services. The protection of the counter-intelligence service of Upper Silesia was a priority task of the special services of the Second Republic of Poland. The article uses a method of analysis of archival sources and a critical analysis of the literature of the subject. Archival sources and scientific publications were used in the work.

Keywords: security policy, Upper Silesia, Silesian sanation, counterintelligence of the Second Republic of Poland, German minority.

1. INTRODUCTION

On October 20, 1921, the Council of Ambassadors of the Great Powers issued a decision on the division of Upper Silesia between Poland and Germany. 16 July 1922 in Katowice, a ceremony was held for the unification of Upper Silesia with Poland, during which a symbolic act of integration into the Republic of Poland was signed, which for several hundred years remained outside its territories. A border line between the two countries has been set up and a number of administrative, communication and economic issues have been addressed (Oświadczenie rządowe z dnia 23 maja 1922 r. w sprawie podziału Górnego Śląska...). The Polish and German sides are committed to respecting the rights of national minorities. Germany, however, has never accepted the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Already in the first years after the war, they began the process of consolidating the German population living outside the country. This posed a great danger of changing the established *status quo* in Europe. Throughout the interwar period, Upper Silesia

¹ Malwina Siewier, PhD, Department of Security Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Jan Długosz University, ul. Waszyngtona 4/8, 42-200 Częstochowa; e-mail: malwina.siewier@gmail.com. ORCID: 0000-0001-6734-0745.

remained a space of Polish-German competition for political, economic, social and cultural influence.

The May coup in 1926 transformed the political scene of interwar Poland. Józef Piłsudski and his supporters took power. They called for a sanitation programme, that is, the healing of moral socio-political and systemic relations in the state. Reform has been launched from parliamentary democracy to authoritarian rule. Józef Piłsudski played a special role in this process (Długajczyk, 1986). It was envisaged to introduce a form of state governance that provided for the smooth implementation of the strategic objectives of the Second Republic, including the maintenance of internal stabilisation (Paruch, 2009). This event also had negative consequences. The Polish armed forces were used for fratricidal fighting, which was de facto a political battle for power in the state. Many soldiers, as well as civilians, were killed. In addition, the image of the Polish Army, as an apolitical force defending the country's independence and sovereignty, was undermined (Wiśniewska i Wyszczelski, 2009).

In 1926, the socio-political situation in the Silesian Voivodeship was complicated. The Union for the Defense of the Western Borderlands and the Union of Silesian Insurgents demanded the resignation of The Voivode Mieczysław Bilski, accusing him of having no effect in the polonization of Upper Silesia. The political struggles that led to the consolidation of Polish society have had a negative impact. Internal divisions and conflicts were exploited by the German minority. It affected the part of the population of the Silesian voivodeship, which did not have a national identity (Gerlich, 1998). In January this year, Voivode Bilski resigned. However, it was not accepted by the Polish Government. In April, the delegates of the Union of Silesian Insurgents – Michał Grażyński, Rudolf Kornke, Antoni Olszowski and Alfons Zgrzebnik went to Sulejówek. Marshal Józef Piłsudski expressed his support for the presented demands of the Polonization policy of Upper Silesia. The dominant position among the delegates was Michał Grażyński, who was a recognized leader in the Silesian sanitation camp. He supported the May upheaval and the actions Piłsudski-ite, which influenced his further political career. August 28, 1926 President Ignacy Mościcki appointed Michał Grażyński as the governor of Silesia. As the leader of the Silesian Sanation, he established a pro-government political camp, operating within the framework of the National-Christian Labour Union, the Silesian equivalent of the Non-Partisan Bloc of Cooperation with the Government. He was a member of the sanatorium left, since May 1926, concentrated in the Union for the Repair of the Republic of Poland (Nowak, 2014). Grażyński was a supporter of the policy of "equal steps", the main objective of which was to eliminate the disparities that existed in the position of the Polish and German minorities and the gradual repolonization of Upper Silesia, which in the context of the existing conditions was a difficult task (Drozdowski, 1991); (Łączewski, 2000).

One of the factors influencing the situation in the Silesian voivodeship was German revisionism, systematically implemented since the mid-1930s. In January 1933, Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, leading the National Socialist Movement. It has, in general, created a programme to accelerate arms and conquer Europe. An important role in this regard was assigned to Abwehr. Division of the II General Staff (since 1928 Main) of the Polish Army dealt with the identification and fight of German espionage. Abwehr's most important task was to get to know Polish defensive preparations. The German secret services used the German minority to a large extent for intelligence activities. Cooperated with social, cultural, sports associations, banks and scientific institutions operating on Polish territory (Ćwięk, 2001).

Upper Silesia was particularly vulnerable to the hostile activities of Abwehr. The protection of the counter-intelligence service of the region was an important task of the Polish special services. The events at home and around the world, the May coup in 1926, the economic crisis of 1929, the political crisis in Germany in 1933, which ended with Hitler taking power, did not interrupt the continuity of German intelligence activities against Poland. Since 1933, the spy operations of the Secret Service of the Third Reich have been carried out on a much larger scale, reaching the highest level before the outbreak of World War II (Kozaczuk, 1977). During this difficult period, the counter-intelligence facilities of The Division II, as well as supporting them, other security authorities in Upper Silesia, were forced to make an increased effort to ensure the safety and interests of the Polish state.

The research objective of this article is to present the Polish-German competition for influence in Upper Silesia, in the context of existing conditions. The security threat in the area has been characterised by German intelligence. The role of the German minority in the revisionist policy of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich was highlighted. In addition, the harmful activities of the so-called 5th column in Upper Silesia in the last months before the outbreak of the war in 1939.

When considering research problems, the method of analysis of archival sources and critical analysis of the literature of the subject were used. Source material and scientific papers on certain aspects of the issue have been used.

2. THE ROLE OF THE GERMAN MINORITY

The national situation in the Silesian Voivodeship was shaped by three factors, the first was the conferral of autonomy to the Silesian voivodeship, the second – the adoption of the Upper Silesian Geneva Convention, the third – the signing of 28 June 1919. treaty on the protection of national minorities. Weimar Germany was not required to meet this condition, although national minorities, including the Polish minority, lived on their territory. This was contrary to the principle of equality of state before international law. It also meant that Poland's internal affairs would be dealt with at an international forum in Geneva. This unfavourable situation for the Polish side was often exploited by The Germans, referring to the complaint procedure of the Upper Silesian Geneva Convention, trivial matters giving rise to serious abuses, while creating an atmosphere of anxiety and insecurity of internal security. This was part of the tactics adopted by the German authorities to deliberately and systematically discredit the Polish State on the international stage (Łączewski, 2000). Despite the obligations contained in the Upper Silesian Convention, the situation of the Polish and German minorities was different. Poles living in Opole Silesia had to fight for basic rights to children in Polish schools, to have a Polish-speaking press and trade unions. The German minority in this area was able to function fairly freely. Germans living in the Polish part of Upper Silesia often engaged in social, political, economic and cultural life (APK, PWS, sygn. 196, Pismo Miej. i Pow. Kom. PWS do kierowników Komisariatów i Posterunków PWS powiatu katowickiego, dot. szkół niemieckich, z 12 VI 1926 r., k. 1; APK, PWS, sygn. 130, Sprawozdanie miesięczne ze stycznia 1927 r., z 8 II 1927 r., k. 34).

A large part of the Upper Silesian industry belonged to German investors and entrepreneurs, which resulted in the Germans exerting economic pressure on the authorities of the Polish State. In this regard too, a strong and well-organised German minority was an important link in economic domination. the Weimar Republic, and since 1933 the Third Reich has been keen to maintain influence in the region. Various forms of support were

used for compatriots living in "lost areas". Under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was not allowed to conduct offensive intelligence. However, despite the imposed restrictions, they efficiently organized special actions against Poland. The functions of camouflaged intermediaries were performed by seemingly private and non-government-related minority organizations. Very often, in addition to achieving their statutory objectives, they were assigned intelligence tasks. They provided important information on strategic and military importance to the German services. This phenomenon was widespread and had a very negative impact on the security of the Second Republic (Ćwiąg, 1999).

Deutscher Volksbund für Polnisch-Schlesien (Volksbund – VB, The German People's Union for Polish Silesia) was considered a political representation of the German minority. His longtime leader was Otto Ulitz. *Volksbund* played an important role in conducting espionage activities against Poland. He was the political, military and economic intelligence body of the German Consulate in Katowice. He maintained close contact with the Political Department of the Upper Silesian Province in Opole and the border police station in Opole. He cooperated with the *Abwehrstelle-Schlesien* intelligence service in Wrocław and in Opole and Bytom. A special information facility was set up in the Main Board of the Union to oversee the activities of these cells in peripheral organizations, which in turn were involved in recruiting trustees for intelligence work. *Volksbund* sent to the German authorities reports on the activities of the party, reports on the internal situation in the Polish state, messages on the defence of the Republic of Poland (APK, PWS, sygn. 243, Pismo 23 Dywizji Piechoty do Śląskiego Urzędu Policji Politycznej w Katowicach, z 26 V 1925 r., k. 7; APK, PWS, sygn. 243, Pismo Miejs. i Pow. Kom. PWS do Śląskiego Urzędu Policji Politycznej w Katowicach, z 11 VII 1925 r., k. 9). He participated largely in propaganda activities against Poland. In December 1930, the union filed a complaint with the League of Nations, citing as many as 255 acts of terror allegedly experienced by the German minority in Upper Silesia by the Union of Silesian Insurgents. Participation in these incidents was also attributed to officers of the Silesian Voivodeship Police, who were accused of using threats and blackmail and unlawfully conducting house searches (APK, PWS, sygn. 215, Wycinek z prasy, br., k. 222); (APK, PWS, sygn. 215, Pismo Pow. Kom. PWS w Tarnowskich Górach do GK PWS w Katowicach, z 1VI 1927 r., k. 223).

The governor of Grażyński, who took the floor on the matter, was responsible for the alleged persecution. In an interview with foreign journalists, he noted that the main cause of concern is the desire of the leaders of the German minority and the authorities in Berlin to change the decision on the division of Upper Silesia and the inclusion of the region in Germany. The voivode believed that, according to the Polish state ration, the privileges of the German minority should be reduced and its economic advantage in Silesia should be reduced. Felix Calonder, President of the Polish-German Mixed Committee in Katowice, strongly supported the Germans without listening to the arguments of the Polish side. On 5 and 6 December 1930, in an interview with The Minister of Foreign Affairs, August Zaleski, he demanded the resignation of Michał Grażyński from his office and the official condemnation by the Polish authorities of the acts of terror in the Silesian voivodeship. The Polish Government has not agreed to such a solution. It was important to continue the process of integration of Upper Silesia into the Republic of Poland (APK, PWS, sygn. 247, „Polska Zachodnia” z 3 IV 1931 r., k. 171). Over time, Nazi ideology became increasingly popular among the German minority living in the region. The Germans were mostly seduced by Hitler's national socialist vision of The Great Germany (*Großdeutschland*).

Jungdeutsche Partei (JDP) was the second Nazi party in the Silesian voivodeship. After the transformation in 1932, the JDP fought for the political support of the German minority in Upper Silesia (APK, PWS, sygn. 202, Raport przygotowany dla Departamentu I Politycznego MSW w Warszawie, dot. ruchu hitlerowskiego w województwie śląskim, z 1 XII 1932 r., k. 105–108). *Jungdeutsche Partei's* activities consisted of consistent and intensive pushing of the Nazi programme and the indoctrination of the population in Poland (APK, PWS, sygn. 209, Doniesienie w sprawie członków „Jungdeutsche Partei” i „Deutsche Arbeiterpartei”, z 1932 r., k. 3).

Adolf Hitler called for the merging of German irredents outside Germany. At a confidential meeting in Berlin in the spring of 1934, he said to the current leaders of the German minority:

“You should transform yourself into a combat unit (...) Therefore, you cannot act at your discretion, but listen to commands. What seems beneficial to you, from a higher point of view, can be harmful. You will not judge what is within your scope of action. That is why I demand from you, above all, blind obedience” (Potocki, 1984).

The JDP almost completely became like the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP, The National Socialist German Workers' Party) (APK, PWS, sygn. 212, Pismo Wydziału Śledczego Miej. i Pow. Kom. PWS w Katowicach do Prokuratury Sądu Okręgowego w Katowicach, z 11 VII 1936 r., k. 236–237).

The *National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Bewegung* (NSDAB, National Socialist German Workers' Movement) also ran anti-Polish activity in the Silesian Voivodeship. Its main purpose was to detach the Polish part of Upper Silesia from the Republic and join it to Germany. It was planned that this would happen through a political and armed speech against Poland. An intelligence service was set up at the NSDAB to gather information about the political activities of Polish and German organizations in Poland. She was also involved in the reconnaissance of police dislocation, border guards and the development of the activities of semi-military organizations (APK, PWS, sygn. 207, Pismo Miej. Kom. PWS w Chorzowie do GK PWS w Katowicach, z 18 III 1936 r., k. 180–183).

The German organisation *Bund Deutscher Osten* (BDO, Union of the German East) was involved in the process of depolonization in Opole Silesia and the conduct of anti-Polish propaganda activities among German society. She called for an armed speech against Poland and the seizure of Upper Silesia by German military troops (APK, PWS, sygn. 406, Orzeczenie Ekspozytury nr IV Oddziału II SG w Katowicach, z 21 VI 1939 r., k. 9–10).

The *Gewerkschaft Deutscher Arbeiter* (GDA, German Workers' Union) implemented the political ordinances of the *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* (DAF) operating under the aegis of the Nazi Party. GDA recruited its members from among German workers. The union apparently carried out legal activities, pursuing the basic statutory objectives. However, during board meetings and meetings in a narrow, trusted group, decisions were taken of the anti-Polish nature of the (APK, PWS, sygn. 388, Opinia Miej. Kom. PWS w Chorzowie o członkach zarządu GDA, 14 III 1939 r. k. 247–248). Jobseekers in Germany were encouraged to bring military books to guarantee some work. In fact, these documents were material for analysis for the German intelligence services. Deserters from Polish army units were willingly accepted, which were meticulously recorded in the register. GDA members were involved in collecting a variety of information about job applicants, which they provided to German

intelligence officers (APK, PWS, sygn. 406, Orzeczenie Ekspozytury nr IV Oddziału II SG w Katowicach..., k. 10–11).

The hostile attitude of The Voivode Michał Grażyński to Nazi ideology was known to the Polish authorities. On May 3, 1935, Foreign Minister Józef Beck and Deputy Minister of this Ministry Jan Szembek refused to organize a demonstration in the capital of 5,000 Silesian insurgents on the anniversary of the outbreak of the third uprising. The ban was issued at the last minute under pressure from the German government. Minister Szembek accused the Silesian Voivodeship of reporting "territorial pretensions against the Reich" and "violent anti-German attitude". He was of the opinion that Grażyński's policy of "strong hand" towards the German minority is detrimental to Poland, as it further complicates the already poor relations on the Warsaw–Berlin line (Ajnenkiel, 1980).

In 1937, the Upper Silesian Convention of Geneva ceased to apply. In Opole Silesia there was an aggressive policy of inflicting Polish skies. Josef Wagner, Nazi superpresident of the Upper Silesian province, took an extremely anti-Polish course. He believed that all historical evidence of Upper Silesia should be destroyed. According to his policy, Polish inscriptions on tombstones, cemeteries, monuments, churches were abolished, Polish journalists were stripped of their work, the lives of Polish families were monitored. The names of the inhabitants and the names of the localities were changed administratively (APK, PWS, sygn. 172, Pismo Pow. Kom. PWS w Lublińcu do GK PWS w Katowicach, z 23 XII 1925 r., k.377; Łączewski, 2000).

Voivode Michał Grażyński saw the danger of expansion of Nazi influence in Upper Silesia. He tried to stop her, but he did not have the right freedom of action. The continuing intervention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, demanding that the governor maintain a proper relationship with Germany, greatly limited his ability to act appropriately against Nazi groups. The authorities of the Second Republic at all costs tried to prevent the deterioration of Polish-German relations, considering that in this way they would ensure the security of the state.

3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY OF THE SECOND DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE POLISH ARMY IN UPPER SILESIA

Abwehr was established in January 1921. The name was derived from the headquarters of the *Abwehrgruppe der Reichswehr*, a convent in the Department of Statistics of the Military Office. This office was the General Staff of the Reichswehr in the *Reichswehrministerium*. Abwehr included two papers: "Ost" and "West", under which the departments of three divisions: intelligence, radio intelligence and ciphers, and counterintelligence. It was to fight foreign espionage, sabotage, protect the military from subversive agitation and assassination attempts. In addition to counterintelligence tasks, Abwehra was involved in offensive intelligence against Poland, among others. Intelligence tasks on its territory carried out as many as five (out of eight) field displays (*Abwehrstellen*). These were the I – *Abwehrstelle* in Królewiec, II – in Szczecin, III – in Berlin (with a branch in Frankfurt (Oder), IV – in Dresden, VIII – in Wrocław (Ćwiąg, 2001). The Polish-German struggle on the secret front continued throughout the interwar period, albeit with varying intensity. Abwehr's activities in the Silesian Voivodeship and its fight by the Polish counterintelligence authorities constitute an important part of Polish-German relations.

Active intelligence activity in the area of Upper Silesia was carried out by the *Abwehrstelle-Schlesien* facility. It covered the scope of western provinces, especially

Silesian, as well as central and south-eastern ones. *Abwehrstelle-Schlesien* was established in 1921 at the command of the 2nd Cavalry Division in Wrocław. Experienced intelligence officers from the Polish-German struggles for Upper Silesia (1919–1921) worked there. Since 1933 in Germany, an army expansion programme was launched, which also meant an increase in the size and importance of Abwehr. During this period, German intelligence services were primarily interested in issues relating to the armed forces and industry of the Second Republic. They conducted recognition in the areas of organization, training, armaments, supply, combat and moral value of soldiers, industrial innovation, manufacturing matters, number of employees (Ćwięk, 1998).

Since 1928 Polish political and military circles began to see the need to expand the measures to secure the western border of the Republic, on the Silesian section. Operational studies conducted in Upper Silesia have made it clear how important this region is to the defence of the whole country. The analyses showed that in the event of armed conflict, the demand for Upper Silesian coal would be 80 percent. It was found that during the mobilization and war, the production of metallurgical iron must be 100 percent based on Upper Silesian coke, which was also necessary for the chemical industry in other parts of Poland. In addition, the semi-finished products of the Upper Silesian metallurgical industry were highly important. In the following years, efforts were made to solve the problem related to the nationality of the workers of the mining and metallurgical industry, taking further steps towards its polonization (Wanatowicz, 1997).

Due to the special place of Upper Silesia in the defence system of the Second Republic, it was exposed to intensive and systematic penetration of the German special services. The expanded apparatus of German intelligence, dragged into the orbit of all pro-German organizations, after 1933. pro-Nazi, out-of-bounds. Lively border traffic, good communication links, intelligence involvement of representatives of the German minority and the passivity of certain groups of Poles, financially and economically linked to German industry, fostered the espionage activities of Germany (Ćwięk, 2006). Ensuring counter-intelligence protection in Upper Silesia was an important task of the services of the Second Republic.

Tasks in this regard were carried out by employees of the Independent Information Office (IIO) of the Corps District Command No V in Krakow. IIO facility, located at 23. the Infantry Division in Katowice conducted operational activities in Upper Silesia. In addition to combating the influence of foreign intelligence and the diversion of the enemy, the protection of military secrets and the security of military institutions and the recognition of the political, social and national situation were addressed (IPN Ka, sygn. 063/84 t. 1, Charakterystyka kontrwywiadowcza województwa katowickiego, k. 77; Misiuk, 2016).

As part of Department II a. offensive intelligence against Germany was conducted by the Department of the 4th Division of the General Staff in Krakow (from 1930 in Katowice). It covered the entire area of Silesia. Due to the specificity of the region, the facility had to actively participate in counter-intelligence protection. Branch 4, operating in difficult conditions, successfully performed the tasks of observing the intelligence field, which was particularly important in the situation of persistent tension in Polish-German relations (Kozaczuk, 1977). Officer's Post No. 2 in Katowice performed counter-intelligence tasks in the area of Upper Silesia and the surrounding area (IPN Ka, sygn. 063/84 t. 1, Charakterystyka kontrwywiadowcza..., k. 85–86). Interesting materials in the scope of intelligence reconnaissance of the western neighbor were also in the 3rd Department of the Main Staff in Poznań (from 1930 in Bydgoszcz). It conducted intelligence activities in the

area of the Free City of Gdansk, East Prussia, Western Pomerania and in the border area north of the Warta and the Poznań–Berlin railway line. The activities of the offensive intelligence exhibition were correlated with counterintelligence activities (Ćwięk, 2009).

The organizational and economic superiority of the German minority in Poland, compared to the Polish minority in Germany, as well as the cautious policies of Minister Józef Beck, gave Germany an advantage in the economic interview. The authorities responsible for ensuring security in Poland have increasingly communicated the problem related to the activities of trade and industrial intelligence institutions in the country. It was estimated that many intelligence agencies, both private and state-owned, collected information about Poland's war industry, which was meticulously used by German intelligence. It was important to secure the state against further leakage of economic data of strategic importance for national security (Peptoński, 2002).

The problem with the activity of commercial intelligence, which is a source of information about the economy of the Second Republic for foreign countries, was particularly highlighted in Upper Silesia. For example, in 1927, Department No. 4 of the Second Division of the General Staff in Krakow sent a notification to the Silesian Political Police Office in Katowice about the foreign and local interview conducted, as a result of which it was found that companies: *Auskunftei Schimmelpfennig* (Schimmelpfenni (Credit Agency Schimmelpfennig), *Deutsche Auskunftei Breslau* (German Information Agency Wrocław), *Auslandsabteilung des Verbandes der Vereine Creditreform Leipzig* (Foreign Department of the Creditreform Leipzig Association) and *Handelsauskunftei Joks - Görs - Gabriel, Danzig* (Trade Agency Joks - Görs - Gabriel, Gdańsk), *Auskunftsstelle des Kartells der Auskunfteien Bürger Danzig* (Cartel Information Office for Credit Bureaus, Gdansk, Poland), have their counterparts in the Silesian Voivodeship. Under the guise of commercial intelligence, they conducted economic and military intelligence. They had representatives in district cities and larger towns in Upper Silesia, as well as paid agents throughout the country (APK, PWS, sygn. 237, Pismo Ekspozytury nr 4 Oddziału II SG w Krakowie do Śląskiego Urzędu Policji Politycznej w Katowicach, z 25 VII 1927 r., k. 841).

They provided detailed information on the functioning of the Polish State. It was found that Wrocław companies worked according to the instructions and under the direction of *Abwehrstelle-Schlesien* and the German political police. In addition to their commercial intelligence, they engaged in military espionage. They employed German intelligence officers to achieve these objectives. Wrocław agencies were in close contact with the superintendent of the political police, as well as the head of *Abwehrstelle-Schlesien*. Information on economic espionage of these companies was provided to the management of the competent security authorities and the Ministry of the Interior (APK, PWS, sygn. 237, Pismo Kierownika Posterunku Oficerskiego nr 2 w Katowicach, dot. szpiegostwa niemieckiego, z 1 VIII 1927 r., k. 842).

The expanded outposts of German economic intelligence against the Second Republic for many years had no equivalent on the Polish side. In December 1932, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, with the consent of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and in consultation with the Department of the Second Main Staff, established a specialized industrial and commercial intelligence facility – the Polish Trade Information Agency (PTIA). State and local authorities were to support its activities and, if necessary, use its services (APK, PWS, sygn. 237, Pismo MSW do wojewodów, dot. utworzenia PAIH, z 23 II 1932 r., k. 374). PTIA was established as a seemingly private company based in Warsaw, which was in fact an unofficial outpost of the broadly understood economic intelligence of

the Second Republic. PTIA interviewed, gave opinions and provided information about suppliers, companies and companies in contact with the military. Their loyalty to the Polish State, as well as their functioning, financial responsibility and professionalism were (Kozaczuk, 1977).

PTIA performed thematic analyzes commissioned by the Second Department of the General Staff, which were to show the impact of various industrial and commercial facilities operating on the basis of foreign capital harmful to the defense of the country. This task was performed by the "S" Department within the Agency. Its employees produced periodic studies on key industries and trade, assessing their condition in terms of the country's defence needs. Employees of the Polish special services verified the received documents. In 1937, the news was rated as "good" or "pretty good". There were also attempts to use PTIA to conduct deep intelligence in the Third Reich, especially penetrating its military industry. The materials provided by the Agency showed the scale of exploitation and influence of foreign capital in almost every segment of the Polish economy (Kozaczuk, 1977).

Polish counterintelligence facilities correctly assessed the threat posed by persons of German origin employed in the German industry. The execution of military orders often required insight into the structural elements of military equipment. The counter-intelligence authorities had data showing the links between the staff of the "Bismarck" steel works in Katowice with German intelligence. The chief executive was Robert Scherff, Polish national of German nationality. The smelter produced for the Polish army: cannon cores, pitchers, barrels and bearings for machine guns, plates for armored cars. This situation also affected other factories in Upper Silesia, such as the "Baildon" in Katowice, or "Bethlen-Falva" in Świętochłowice (Peplowski, 2002).

Counter-intelligence facilities in Upper Silesia, taking into account the existing conditions, have achieved satisfactory results in the fight against the influence of German intelligence. The most effective was the Independent Information Department of the Corps V District Command and the Department of the 4th Division of the 2nd General Staff. Polish courts have sentenced them to death or long prison sentences for espionage. However, the penalties were relatively low compared to the losses suffered by the Polish State as a result of hostile activities. The great indulgence of the German minority involved in intelligence activities encouraged the creation of further secret organizations and the involvement of espionage and diversionary actions (Ćwiak, 2001).

In 1938, the Polish-German border was extended. The counter-intelligence facilities of the Second Republic were much more difficult to protect the state from the influence of German intelligence. Abwehr's facilities in Upper Silesia collected data on the system of fortifications and fortifications. In the run-up to the outbreak of the war in 1939, German military intelligence focused on recognizing Poland's defence capabilities. In Upper Silesia, 55 suspects were arrested on suspicion of espionage between March and July this year. Between 1929 and 1939, about 4,000 people were detected on the services of foreign intelligence. About two-thirds of the agents were Polish nationals of other nationalities. Between 1935 and 1938, counter-intelligence authorities revealed about 300 cases of espionage for the Third Reich (Ćwiak, 1999). Since April 1939, there have been numerous preventive arrests, due to the deterioration of Polish-German relations and the intensification of German intelligence and diversionary activities. It is difficult to accurately estimate the scale of espionage in interwar Poland. It is highly likely that up to a dozen thousand people could cooperate with interviews of foreign countries. The data contained

in the source material indicate that the scale of espionage has increased significantly over the years. The majority of the detected crimes took place in the last years of interwar Poland (Długajczyk, 2007; Sprengel, 2014).

4. V COLUMN BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II

In March 1939, a new phase in Polish-German relations began. The reason for these changes was the territorial demands made by the Third Reich against Poland. The deepening Polish-German conflict was accompanied by the propaganda of Joseph Goebbels, which strongly influenced most of German society. The Germans were pleased with Hitler's policies. They expressed the belief that soon Upper Silesia would be German. The mood of expectation and excitement of the German minority due to the entry of the Wehrmacht troops into Poland was exacerbated by the German intelligence services (APK, PWŚ, sygn. 176, Pismo Miej. Kom. PWŚ w Chorzowie, dot. nastrojów ludności na Śląsku w związku z wydarzeniami w Czechosłowacji, z 24 III 1939 r., k. 1–2). During this period, Polish security authorities organized numerous operations to combat German intelligence and diversionary networks. Preparations for armed diversion were revealed in the Silesian Voivodeship (Chinciński, 2010). Diversionary cells equipped with weapons, ammunition, explosives and radiostations have been neutralized. In the activities of the V column in Upper Silesia, the JDP and VB were led, who were ordered to provoke incidents with the Polish population, which was to justify German aggression against Poland (Ćwiąg, 1999). German magazines such as the *Kattowitzer Zeitung*, *Der Oberschlesische Kurier*, *Schlesische Zeitung* and others have become propaganda tubes of the Third Reich. News of the alleged wrongs and persecution suffered by Germans by Poles was exposed. In the minority press, you could also read about the exceptionally peaceful foreign policy of the Third Reich (Cygański, 1972).

A few months before the outbreak of World War II, the activities of the V column intensified. In April 1939 *Abwehrstelle-Schlesien* joined the organisation of battle groups – *Kampf-Organisationen*. They were intended to protect upper Silesian industrial plants from destruction, so that they could work for the needs of the military without much disturbance. These groups were formed by activists of Nazi parties, under the command of agents of German services, transferred from the Third Reich. The Wrocław Abwehr facility also formed organizations whose aim was to carry out subversive and sabotage operations in the last days before the outbreak of the war. They were called *Sabotage-Organisationen*. In May 1939, almost 2,500 people were among them, and two months later the number of diversionaries and saboteurs increased to almost 4,500 (Ćwiąg, 1999). In May and June, the V Column in the Silesian Voivodeship completed preparations for espionage and diversionary operations in August 1939. Provocative actions against the German minority were planned in order to provide further arguments justifying the entry of the Wehrmacht troops into Poland (Cygański, 1972).

In mid-May 1939, security authorities in the Silesian voivodeship obtained information about the bombings on public buildings prepared by German intelligence. In view of the real threat, security procedures were implemented at the beginning of June 1939. The number of police patrols at public buildings and public facilities has been increased to protect them. Staff were ordered to pay attention to suspects hanging around the property, but also to official affairs incoming. All alarming signals were to be immediately reported to security authorities, in particular the counterintelligence services and the police (APK,

PWŚ, sygn. 520, Pismo Urzędu Śledczego GK PWŚ w Katowicach, dot. sygnałów o zamachach bombowych, z 7 VI 1939 r., k. 86).

On June 20, 1939, the voivode Grażyński met with Wiesner and admonished him that the further enemy activities of the Germans would have serious consequences. Soon Wiesner, along with other Nazis, was arrested by the police. In this case, minister Józef Beck intervened, forcing the governor to release most of the diversionists and Nazis arrested in the Silesian voivodeship. Among them was Wiesner, who fled to the Free City of Gdańsk on 21 August 1939. Otto Ulitz left Poland on 19 August this year. On 29th August the Silesian Voivode appointed the Civic Guard, whose task was to prepare civil defense in the province. However, no action could save Polish Upper Silesia from the encroaching branches of the Wehrmacht (Łączewski, 2000). The German army was assisted by local people of German origin.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The interwar period was a time of increasing danger. The Germans did not come to terms with the loss of part of Upper Silesia. The consequences of losing World War I have resulted in a desire to retaliate in the western neighbour's mentality. The aim of lifting the treaty's restrictions on The Treaty of Versailles has become a priority objective of German policy. The resurgent forces of the Third Reich have created a serious threat to Poland's security. The increase in aggressive preparations of the Western neighbour marked a new quality of Polish-German relations.

In the run-up to the outbreak of the war in 1939, German military intelligence focused on recognizing Poland's defence capabilities. Abwehr agents often recruited from among Polish citizens of German nationality. They were commissioned in addition to intelligence tasks, organizing diversion and sabotage. Between 1935 and 1938, counter-intelligence authorities revealed about 300 cases of espionage in favour of Nazi Germany. The scale of espionage has increased significantly over the years. Most of the detected crimes took place in the last years of interwar Poland.

The politician, led over thirteen years, has made a major contribution to strengthening Polish national and state consciousness among the people of Upper Silesia. The voivode correctly assessed the anti-Polish nature of German actions, which were particularly strong in the years 1933–1939.

REFERENCES

- Ajnenkiel, A. (1980) *Polska po przewrocie majowym. Zarys dziejów politycznych Polski 1926–1939*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wiedza Powszechna.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 196, Pismo Miej. i Pow. Kom. PWŚ do kierowników Komisariatów i Posterunków PWŚ powiatu katowickiego, dot. szkół niemieckich, z 12 VI 1926 r., k. 1
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 130, Sprawozdanie miesięczne ze stycznia 1927 r., z 8 II 1927 r., k. 34.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 243, Pismo 23 Dywizji Piechoty do Śląskiego Urzędu Policji Politycznej w Katowicach, z 26 V 1925 r., k. 7.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 243, Pismo Miej. i Pow. Kom. PWŚ do Śląskiego Urzędu Policji Politycznej w Katowicach, z 11 VII 1925 r., k. 9.
- APK, PWŚ sygn. 215, Wycinek z prasy, br., k. 222.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 215, Pismo Pow. Kom. PWŚ w Tarnowskich Górach do GK PWŚ w Katowicach, z 1VI 1927 r., k. 223.

- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 247, „Polska Zachodnia” z 3 IV 1931 r., k. 171.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 202, Raport przygotowany dla Departamentu I Politycznego MSW w Warszawie, dot. ruchu hitlerowskiego w województwie śląskim, z 1 XII 1932 r., k. 105-108.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 209, Doniesienie w sprawie członków „Jungdeutsche Partei” i „Deutsche Arbeiterpartei”, z 1932 r., k. 3.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 212, Pismo Wydziału Śledczego Miej. i Pow. Kom. PWŚ w Katowicach do Prokuratury Sądu Okręgowego w Katowicach, z 11 VII 1936 r., k. 236-237.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 207, Pismo Miej. Kom. PWŚ w Chorzowie do GK PWŚ w Katowicach, z 18 III 1936 r., k. 180-183.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 406, Orzeczenie Ekspozytury nr IV Oddziału II SG w Katowicach, z 21 VI 1939 r., k. 9-10.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 388, Opinia Miej. Kom. PWŚ w Chorzowie o członkach zarządu GDA, z 14 III 1939 r. k. 247-248.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 172, Pismo Pow. Kom. PWŚ w Lublińcu do GK PWŚ w Katowicach, dot. wywiadu granicznego, z 9 IV 1937 r., k. 417.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 2, Rozkaz nr 230, GK PWŚ w Katowicach, z 23 XII 1925 r., k. 377.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 237, Pismo Ekspozytury nr 4 Oddziału II SG w Krakowie do Śląskiego Urzędu Policji Politycznej w Katowicach, z 25 VII 1927 r., k. 841.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 237, Pismo Kierownika Posterunku Oficerskiego nr 2 w Katowicach, dot. szpiegostwa niemieckiego, z 1 VIII 1927 r., k. 842.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 237, Pismo MWS do wojewodów, dot. utworzenia Polskiej Agencji Informacji Handlowej, z 23 II 1932 r., k. 374.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 176, Pismo Miej. Kom. PWŚ w Chorzowie, dot. nastrojów ludności na Śląsku w związku z wydarzeniami w Czechosłowacji, z 24 III 1939 r., k. 1-2.
- APK, PWŚ, sygn. 520, Pismo Urzędu Śledczego GK PWŚ w Katowicach, dot. sygnałów o zamachach bombowych, z 7 VI 1939 r., k. 86.
- Chinciński, T. (2010). *Fortpoczta Hitlera. Niemiecka dywersja w Polsce w 1939 roku*. Gdańsk-Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR.
- Cygański, M. (1972) *Hitlerowska V kolumna w województwie śląskim i krakowskim w 1939 roku*. Opole: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Śląskiego w Opolu.
- Ćwięk, H. (1999). *Obrona Śląska przed wpływami wywiadu niemieckiego w latach 1933-1939*. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Naukowe „Śląsk”.
- (2006). *O niektórych aspektach bezpieczeństwa na obszarze województwa śląskiego w latach dwudziestych*. „Res Polticae”, red. H. Ćwięk, t. I.
- (2001). *Przeciw Abwehrze*. Warszawa: Bellona.
- (2009). *W tajnej służbie II Rzeczypospolitej. Wywiad Polski wobec Niemiec w latach 1918-1939*. Częstochowa: Wydawnictwo Akademii im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie.
- (1998), *Zwalczanie niemieckich służb specjalnych na ziemiach zachodnich i północnych II Rzeczypospolitej*. Warszawa: Urząd Ochrony Państwa.
- Długajczyk, E. (1986). *Panorama polityczna województwa śląskiego 1922-1939*. Katowice: Muzeum Śląskie.
- (2007). *Zestawienie osób aresztowanych i zasądzonych w województwie śląskim w latach 1922-1939 z powodu współpracy z wywiadem niemieckim*. „Szkice Archiwalno-Historyczne”, nr 3.

- Drozdowski, M.M. (1991). *Śląsk i Zagłębie Dąbrowskie w myśli politycznej Józefa Piłsudskiego*. „*Niepodległość i Pamięć*”, nr 4/8 (8).
- Gerlich, M.G. (1997). *Poczucie tożsamości etnicznej ludności rodzimej Górnego Śląska w XX wieku (do 1989 roku)*. „*Niepodległość i Pamięć*”, nr 4/2 (8).
- IPN Ka, sygn. 063/84 t. 1, Charakterystyka kontrwywiadowcza województwa katowickiego, k. 77.
- Kozaczuk, W. (1977). *Bitwa o tajemnice. Służby wywiadowcze Polski i Rzeszy Niemieckiej 1922–1939*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Książka i Wiedza.
- Łączewski, J. (2000). *Michał Grażyński (1890–1965). Sylwetka polityka*. Częstochowa: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Częstochowie.
- Misiuk, A. (2016). *Służby wywiadu i kontrwywiadu II Rzeczypospolitej*, Warszawa: Difin.
- Nowak, K. (2014). *Michał Grażyński* [w:] Mokrosz, J., Węcki, M., red., *Oni decydowali na Górnym Śląsku w XX wieku*. Katowice-Rybnik: Archiwum Państwowe w Katowicach, Stowarzyszenie Humanistyczne Europa, Śląsk, Świat Najmniejszy.
- Oświadczenie rządowe z dnia 23 maja 1922r. w sprawie podziału Górnego Śląska (Dz.U. nr 44, poz. 369).
- Paruch, W. (2009). *Parlament w państwie autorytarnym. Rozważania o myśli politycznej Józefa Piłsudskiego (1926–1935)* [w:] Adamczyk, W.A., red., *Józef Piłsudski a parlamentaryzm polski*. Warszawa: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego; Bełchatów: Związek Strzelecki „Strzelec” Organizacja Społeczno-Wychowawcza. Jednostka Strzelecka nr 1001 im. gen. dyw. Janusza Głuchowskiego.
- Peplowski, A. (2002). *Kontrwywiad II Rzeczypospolitej*. Warszawa: Bellona.
- Pindel, K. (1998). *Śląsk w systemie obronnym II Rzeczypospolitej*. Warszawa: Bellona.
- Potocki, S. (1984). *Deutsche Stiftung – tajna agenda rządu niemieckiego w okresie międzywojennym do spraw mniejszości niemieckich* [w:] Czubiński, A., red., *Rola mniejszości niemieckiej w rozwoju stosunków politycznych w Europie 1918–1945*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu.
- Sprengel, B. (2014). *Aspekty procesowe ścigania szpiegostwa w przedwojennej Polsce* [w:] Nawrocki, Z., red., *Kontrwywiad II RP (1914) 1918–1945 (1948)*, t. II. Emów: Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego. Centralny Ośrodek Szkolenia.
- Wanatowicz, M.W. (1997). *Górny Śląsk i jego miejsce w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*. „*Niepodległość i Pamięć*”, 4/2 (8).
- Wiśniewska, M., Wyszczelski, L. (2009). *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w latach 1918–1939*. Toruń: Dom Wydawniczy DUET.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.46

The text was submitted to the editorial office: July 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.

Mirosław SOŁTYSIAK¹

FINANCIAL EXCLUSION IN POLAND FROM THE MALE POINT OF VIEW IN THE LIGHT OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Although the phenomenon of exclusion has been present in our reality for thousands of years, it only became the point of scientific interest a quarter of century ago. It seems a vital issue since it may concern any citizen in any of their walks of life. They may become financially excluded due to their educational background, income, financial status, nationality, sex or even lifestyle. In practice, excluded individuals are deprived of performing certain social activities despite their abilities or willingness to do so.

This paper is aimed at identifying the awareness of issues concerning financial exclusion in a group of males in Poland. It provides the outcome of a survey held in a research group of 898 males on the topic of perceived financial exclusion. Moreover, the study elaborates on the determinants of financial exclusion in Poland, as well as individuals or whole social groups potentially at risk, in the opinion of the male respondents. The results enhance the wider knowledge of financial exclusion in Polish society.

Keywords: financial exclusion, perception, men.

1. INTRODUCTION

The issues of an entity's or whole social groups' exclusion became the point of specific scientific interest at the end of 20th century. Social exclusion was defined and elaborated on as first and, according to M. Weber it refers to certain limitation in the access of some social groups to opportunities or resources that could contribute to maximising benefits by the groups (Weber, 2002). In turns, L. Richardson and J. Le Grand persuade that exclusion takes place only when a person shows willingness but cannot participate in everyday activities that other community members actually do perform (Richardson, Le Grand, 2002). Thus, social exclusion is regarded a form of excluding an entity from full participation in social life of a community (Giddens, 2004).

Financial exclusion is categorised by some researchers as a part of social exclusion and is considered as a complex issue, difficult to explain or define unequivocally. For the first time, it was illustrated in reference to banking services being available for customers in a geographical sense (Leyshon, Thrift, 1995). From S. Sinclair's standpoint financial exclusion can be observed when there is no access to necessary financial services in

¹ Mirosław Sołtysiak, PhD, Eng., Rzeszow University of Technology, The Faculty of Management; e-mail: miroslaw@prz.edu.pl. ORCID: 0000-0003-3366-1537.

a sufficient form as resulting from problems in accessibility, conditions, pricing, marketing² or self-exclusion being the consequence of bad experience or perception (Sinclair, 2001). L. Anderloni, on the other hand, argues that financial exclusion occurs when one experiences obstacles in the access to universal products, which normally give them the sense of security and thus contribute to a satisfactory social and economic life³ (Anderloni, 2007). In 2008, based on the above definitions, the European Commission defined financial exclusion as a process during which citizens face difficulties in approaching financial products and services in the main market⁴ that satisfy their needs and allow successful life (European Commission, 2008).

Financial exclusion may take place at any stage of one's life. However, the probability varies greatly for particular society members. The financial exclusion risk is dependent on numerous factors that include, among others, place of residence⁵, income status, age, education, financial expertise, practised religion⁶ or sex⁷. As the level of financial exclusion risk depends directly on a number of variables, it seems clear that the phenomenon's perception may be different for the representatives of different sexes, age groups or people residing in areas of various infrastructure allowing access to financial services.

The study of the literature on the topic of financial exclusion proves that the up-to-day research mainly focuses on the assessment of the phenomenon occurrence in certain area and identifying its determinants, as well as residents potentially endangered. The research is normally performed using statistical data concerning consumer behaviour on financial service market and is realised in reference to whole populations or homogenous groups (using criteria of origin, age, place of residence or education) on both domestic and international levels (Financial, 2015; Triki, Faye [eds.] 2013; Russell, Maître, Donnelly, 2011; European Commission, 2008; Corr, 2006; Kempson, Whyley, 1999; Leyshon and Thrift, 1995). Less attention is paid, however, to the assessment of the phenomenon awareness and the way it is perceived by members of a particular community (Sołtysiak 2017a; Sołtysiak 2017b).

² Price- and non-price related obstacles are identified as factors of financial exclusion of an individual by the authors of the World Bank's report entitled: *Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access* (Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck, Honohan, 2008).

³ L. Anderloni signifies that individuals generating low income and experiencing unfavourable social condition are particularly endangered of financial exclusion (Anderloni, 2007).

⁴ The research performed in Great Britain allow the statement that individuals with low income have problems being granted credits which results in their search alternative creditors who provide loans based on significantly worse conditions (Kempson, Whyley, 1999).

⁵ The risk of financial exclusion as dependent on place of residence should be regarded according to continent, country or the very location (village, town or city). For instance, the banking level globally equals 68.5% - the highest in Eastern Asia (70.6%) and the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa (42.6%). The banking level in Europe and Center Asia runs at (65.3%) – the highest in Denmark (99.9%), Finland (99.8%), Sweden (99.7%) whereas the lowest in Albania (40%) (The Little, 2018).

⁶ The research realised by N. Mylonidis, M. Chletsos, V.Barbagianni proves that religion actually influences the access to fundamental banking services in the USA and simultaneously directly affects the level of financial exclusion of an individual (Mylonidis, Chletsos, Barbagianni, 2017).

⁷ Women more often face financial exclusion than men. The discrepancies are more visible in the countries with lower level of economic development. To exemplify in Turkey a bank account is held by 68.6% citizens and mere 54.3% women, in Bangladesh – 50% citizens i 35.8% women, in Pakistan 21.3% citizens and 7% women, in Saudi Arabia – 71.7% citizens and 58.2% women, in Algeria 42.8% citizens and 29.3% women, in Nigeria 39.7% citizens and 27.3% women.


2. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH RESULTS

The financial exclusion perception by Polish citizens was the topic of the survey held on the group of 898 male respondents aged 18 and more years. The survey was preceded by the pilotage survey in 2017. The male respondents were categorised according to the age criterion into six segments⁸; according to the residence location into five segments⁹ and education into three segments¹⁰.

The underlying aim of the performed research was the attempt to assess the scope of Poles' expertise in the field of financial exclusion. What is more, the study was to elicit groups of people endangered of financial exclusion according to the male respondents. Last but not least, it was to identify the phenomenon's determinants in the opinion of the survey respondents.

3. FINANCIAL EXCLUSION PHENOMENON'S AWARENESS

Despite its presence for thousands of years, the issues of financial exclusion have been studied only for a quarter of century. This may directly contribute to how well the society is aware of its existence. For this reason the male respondents attending the survey were earlier acquainted with the notion of financial exclusion. Such author's approach aimed at limiting false answers from the survey respondents as resulting from the knowledge deficiency concerning the core of financial exclusion.



Picture 1. Financial exclusion awareness among the survey's male respondents (%)

Source: the author's own research elaboration.

⁸ 18–25 years (15.93%), 26–35 years (16.59%), 36–45 years (17.37%), 46–55 years (17.04%), 56–65 years (16.37%), aged 65 years and more (16.7%).

⁹ Village (17.6%), town up to 25 thousand (23.05%), town 25–50 thousand (19.04%), town 50–100 thousand (19.15%), city over 100 thousand (21.16%).

¹⁰ Primary school/gymnasium (8.13%), secondary school (61.69%), higher education (30.18%).

The evaluation of the results allow the statement that 58.13% the males taking part in the survey admitted being aware of the phenomenon of financial exclusion (Picture 1). The highest level of awareness was noted among men in the age segment of 56–65 years (71.43%) and the lowest in the segment 18–25 years (44.06%). Taking into account the awareness level according to the place of residence, the level was comparable. It should be highlighted that the most significant number of respondents declaring financial exclusion's awareness lived in villages (59.49%). It should also be stressed that the higher education of the male respondents, the higher awareness of the topic in question.

The awareness of the essence of financial exclusion, as well as the scope of knowledge in this field of the surveyed males, is directly dependent on both the willingness to learn and information sources used. It is important to note that according to the respondents the access to information is limited. Over 78% of the surveyed regarded the access very little (45.43%) or little (32.74%). Only 3.45% respondents considered the access as significant and none of the respondents evaluated the access as very significant.

Male respondents attending the survey learned about financial exclusion mainly from mass media (Table 1.) i.e., television (17.26%)¹¹, newspapers (12.92%)¹², Internet (10.24%)¹³ and radio broadcasts (7.57%)¹⁴.

In the research sample there was a small group of respondents who took advantage of expert literature in search of the information (5.46%) or informational booklets issued by banks or other financial institutions (6.01%). Those using expert literature were relatively young respondents aged 26–35 years (8.05%) and those learning from informational material of banks or other institutions were 36–45 years old (8.33%). Both sources of information were used by the respondents residing in cities over 100 thousand population and males with higher educational background.

It is interesting to note that the issue of financial exclusion is not a popular topic for social campaigns, school activities or conversations among family members or acquaintances. In the research sample mere 1.22% respondents declared gaining information on financial exclusion from social campaigns' materials, 0.44% from

¹¹ Television sources were mainly used by the respondents aged 26–35 years (20.8%), residing in towns up to 25 thous. population (20.77%) and holding higher education degrees (19.19%). To the contrary, these sources were the least popular among the respondents aged more than 65 years (12.66%), residing in cities with over 100 thous. population (14.21%) and those with primary or grammar educational background (15.07%).

¹² Press releases were mainly used by the respondents aged 46–55 years (16.34%), residing in cities with over 100 thous. population (14.21%), and those with higher educational background (15.87%). To the contrary, these sources were the least popular among the respondents aged 18–25 years (7.61%), living in villages (12.02%) and those with primary or grammar educational background (9.59%).

¹³ Internet sources were mainly used by the respondents aged 26–35 years (14.68%), residing in towns up to 25 thous. population (11.11%) and those with higher educational background (11.44%). To the contrary, these sources were the least popular among the respondents aged more than 65 years (2%), residing in towns with 50–100 thous. population (9.3%) and those with primary or grammar educational background (5.48%).

¹⁴ Radio broadcast information was mainly used by the respondents aged more than 65 years (11.33%), residing in villages (8,86%) and those with primary or grammar educational background (12.33%). To the contrary, this source was the least popular among the respondents aged 26–35 years (4.7%), residing in towns with 5–50 thous. population (6.43%) and those with higher educational background (5.9%).

acquaintances and 0.11% from family members. None of the respondents admitted learning about the issue while attending school activities.

Table 1. Sources of information the male respondents used with respect to financial exclusion phenomenon (%)

Details	Age criterion	18-25 years old	26-35 years old	36-45 years old	46-55 years old	56-65 years old	above 65 years old
relatives		0	0	0	0	0,68	0
acquaintances		0	0	0	0,65	1,36	0,67
informational materials of social campaigns		0,7	1,34	1,92	1,31	1,36	0,67
other		2,1	2,01	1,28	1,96	2,72	2
expert literature		3,5	8,05	5,77	7,19	4,76	3,33
informational materials of banks and other financial institutions		3,5	7,38	8,33	7,19	5,44	4
radio		4,89	4,7	5,77	9,15	9,52	11,33
Internet		14,68	16,78	12,18	10,46	5,44	2
press		7,69	15,44	14,10	16,34	12,24	11,33
television		17,48	20,8	17,31	18,95	16,33	12,66

Details	Residence criterion	Village	town up to 25 thous.	town 25–50 thous.	town 50–100 thous.	city over 100 thous.
relatives		0	0	0,58	0	0
acquaintances		0,63	0	1,16	0	0,53
informational materials of social campaigns		0,63	0,48	1,16	1,74	2,1
other		1,26	1,45	1,75	2,32	2,1
expert literature		2,53	4,35	4,68	6,39	8,95
informational materials of banks and other financial institutions		6,33	6,28	5,26	5,23	6,84
radio		8,86	8,21	6,43	7,56	6,84
Internet		9,49	11,11	9,94	9,30	11,05
press		12,02	12,08	13,45	12,79	14,21
television		20,25	20,77	16,96	13,95	14,21

Source: the author's own research elaboration.

4. FACTORS OF FINANCIAL EXCLUSION

A number of determinants were listed by the male respondents as influencing the risk of financial exclusion of an individual (Table 2). According to them the two main causes of this phenomenon are: the lack of permanent employment (83.4%) and low income

(77.73%)¹⁵. Lack of permanent job was signified more often by males in the age segment of 56–65 years (89.11%), residents of cities with over 100 thousand population (88.42%) and those with secondary education (86.82%). The factor of low income was most often selected by the respondents in the age segment of 65 and more (88.67%), residents of cities with over 100 thousand population (80.53%) and those with higher degrees in education (80.07%).

Table 2. Fundamental causes of financial exclusion according to the survey respondents (%)

Details	in total	18-25 years old	26-35 years old	36-45 years old	46-55 years old	56-65 years old	above 65 years old
no access to mobile devices	6,01	10,96	8,05	6,41	5,23	3,4	2
young age	15,48	18,49	10,74	13,46	15,03	16,33	18,67
single parenthood	15,51	14,68	18,12	16,02	15,69	14,29	15,33
lack of trust towards financial institutions	17,04	17,12	14,09	15,38	13,38	20,41	20,67
retirement age	29,29	26,71	28,86	28,2	28,1	30,61	32,66
place of residence	34,19	23,29	42,28	42,95	42,48	29,25	23,33
no personal finance management skills	36,75	28,08	36,24	40,38	41,83	38,77	34
low education level	39,98	40,41	49,66	44,23	47,06	33,3	24
no Internet access	41,20	49,31	49,66	44,87	46,4	34,69	21,33
low income level	77,73	71,23	73,15	74,36	77,42	79,59	88,67
lack of permanent employment	83,40	74,68	81,21	82,05	84,97	89,11	86,67

Source: the author's own research elaboration

The third most significant cause of financial exclusion identified by the respondents was the lack of Internet access that directly results in the exclusion due to the lack of technical infrastructure, vital for up-to-date distribution channels for banking services¹⁶. This factor was most often signified by the respondents falling into the age segment 26–35 years (49.66%), residents of cities with over 100 thousand population (44.21%) and those with higher education degrees (43.91%).

Among other causes mentioned by the respondents and having effect on financial exclusion of an individual were also listed low level of education (39.98%) and no practical skills in managing one's own finances (36.75%). The most attention to the former cause was paid by the respondents aged 26–35 years (49.66%) and to the latter by those aged

¹⁵ Research carried out in the countries of Western Europe concerning indebtedness and related financial exclusion allowed to state that its major causes are low income and unfavourable life changes, job loss among others (Russell, Maître, Donnelly, 2011).

¹⁶ Over 6% of the respondents understand the significance of the access to mobile devices, or its lack, in terms of the financial exclusion risk. This factor was most often regarded by the younger respondents aged 18–25 years (10.96%), residing in towns with 25–50 thous. population (6.76%) and those with higher educational background (7.75%).

46–55 years (41.83%). Both factors were most popular among the residents of cities with over 100 thousand population¹⁷ and those with higher education degrees¹⁸.

Some of the survey respondents claimed there was the linkage between the exclusion risk and the age of an individual¹⁹ or the place of their residence (34.19%). The place of residence was most often the exclusion cause for the respondents aged 36–45 years (42.95%), living in cities with over 100 thousand population (37.37%) and with primary or grammar education (43.83%).

It is interesting to note that every sixth survey participant admitted that the lack of trust towards financial institutions may contribute to financial exclusion of an individual. This answer was most often selected by the respondents aged 65 years and more (20.67%), living in towns with 50–100 thousand residents (18.02%) and with primary or grammar educational background (24.66%).

5. INDIVIDUALS ENDANGERED OF FINANCIAL EXCLUSION

The aforementioned determinants having influence on financial exclusion, and provided by the survey respondents, relate directly to the profiles of individuals endangered of such exclusion (again as provided by the respondents). According to them the highest risk can be attributed to the unemployed (76.61%) and those with low income (56.35%). Unemployment as the risk factor was most often regarded by the respondents aged 26–35 years (85.23%), residing in the cities with over 100 thous. population (81.05%) and those with primary or grammar educational background (84.93%). Low income was most important for the respondents aged 65 years and more (62%), living in villages (62.02%) and holding higher education degrees (58.67%).

From the perspective of the respondents, the group of people particularly in jeopardy - of exclusion are elderly people already inactive in the professional sense, i.e. pensioners (30.51%). Such opinion was shared by the male respondents in the retirement age, 65 years and more, (42%), residents of towns with up to 25 thous. population (33.33%) and those with primary or grammar educational background (31.51%).

Again, according to the survey male respondents the probability of an individual's exclusion is directly proportional to the size of residence place. Thus, the most endangered of exclusion according to the surveyed were the residents of villages (22.16%)²⁰. Lower risk was attributed to the residents of small towns (14.7%) and the lowest – to large city dwellers (4.09%).

¹⁷ Low level of educational background was regarded by 41.58% respondents and the lack of managing skills in the field of personal finances – 37.89% respondents.

¹⁸ Low level of educational background was regarded by 46.86% respondents and the lack of managing skills in the field of personal finances – 51.29% respondents.

¹⁹ The surveyed claimed that both retirement age (29,29%) and young age (15,48%), may contribute to an individual's exclusion.

²⁰ It should be explained that the respondents do not associate village residents with farmers. In their opinion, farmers are less endangered of exclusion (14.81%) than village residents (22.16%). It is also interesting to note that 22.15% of respondents actually living in villages indicated the risk of village residents' exclusion, whereas only 9.49% of them – the risk of farmers' exclusion

Table 3. Individuals endangered of financial exclusion according to the survey respondents

Details	in total	18-25 years old	26-35 years old	36-45 years old	46-55 years old	56-65 years old	above 65 years old
students	2,23	0,70	2,01	1,92	1,96	2,72	4
large city residents	4,09	6,29	3,35	1,92	2,61	4,76	5,33
families of many children	7,13	5,59	4,03	6,41	5,88	11,56	9,33
single mothers	11,91	11,89	14,09	9,61	11,11	12,92	12
residents of small towns	14,7	12,59	12,75	13,36	13,07	17	19,33
farmers	14,81	12,59	8,72	13,46	16,34	17	20,66
immigrants	20,04	11,19	12,75	16,67	24,18	28,57	26
village residents	22,16	16,08	17,45	20,51	23,53	27,21	28
pensioners	30,51	22,38	27,52	27,56	31,37	31,97	42
low income individuals	56,35	55,24	50,33	51,92	57,52	61,22	62
unemployed	76,61	82,52	85,23	73,08	77,12	72,79	69,33

Source: the author's own research elaboration.

6. LEVEL OF FINANCIAL EXCLUSION ACCORDING TO SURVEY RESPONDENTS

In the following part of the survey the participants were asked to assess the level of financial exclusion in Poland (Picture 2) and probability of their own becoming financially excluded (Picture 3).

Poland is not regarded a country burdened with high risk of citizens' financial, according to the survey respondents. Only 13.36% respondents indicated the risk level as high (11.47%) or very high (1.89%). On the other hand, over 41% surveyed evaluated the risk of exclusion in Poland as low.


The highest risk was attributed by the males aged 65 and more (15.34%), residing in towns with 25–50 thous. population (15.2%), with primary or grammar educational background (20.55%), whereas the lowest risk by the representatives of young generation of male Poles aged 26–35 years (10.06%), living in cities over 100 thous. residents (9.47%), with secondary educational level (12.27%)²¹.

Self-evaluation of financial exclusion risk allows the statement that majority of the male survey participants do not see themselves significantly in jeopardy. Over 76% respondents believe the possibility of their becoming excluded financially is low. Mere 8,24% respondents claim in their case the probability is high (8.13%) or very high (0.11%).

This opinion is shared by the respondents aged 26–35 years (14.76%)²², residing in towns up to 25 thous. population (9.66%), with primary or grammar educational level (9.59%). The lower risk of financial exclusion is self-evaluated by the representatives of age group 56–65 years (5.44%), residents of large cities over 100 thous. population (5.79%), and those holding higher education degrees (5.53%).


²¹ The bracketed values were created by summing up answers „very high” and „high”.

²² What may be particularly interesting is the self-evaluation of risk performed by the respondents aged 26–35 years. They were the only ones to assess their own risk of becoming financially excluded as higher than general risk of exclusion in Poland.



Picture 2. Level of financial exclusion in Poland according to the male survey respondents

Source: the author's own research elaboration.



Picture 3. One's own financial exclusion risk as evaluated by the very respondents


Source: the author's own research elaboration.

7. COMBATING FINANCIAL EXCLUSION PHENOMENON

The obligation to undertake certain activities aiming at combating the financial exclusion phenomenon in Poland, most of all, should rest in hands of banks (86.41%) and the State (80.18%), according to the male participants of the survey.


Banks are institutions that may have the key influence on the financial exclusion phenomenon by developing proper portfolio of financial products offered to their clients. This opinion was mainly shared by the young respondents aged 26–35 years (94.63%) and 36–45 years (94.23%), residents of medium-sized towns 25–50 thous. population (89.47%) and 50–100 thous. population (90.7%), and those with secondary educational level (90.07%). It should be noted that almost 70% respondents claimed that other financial institutions should also be in charge of combating the exclusion. Such need was highlighted by male respondents aged 56–65 years (80.95%), residing in villages (71.15%) and holding higher education degrees (75.58%).

The State as the entity mainly in charge of fighting any exclusion, including financial exclusion, was most often signified by the respondents aged 46 years and more (95.55%). It also should be stressed that the biggest number of respondents claiming it is the State's main obligation to launch initiatives fighting the phenomenon lived in villages (94.94%)²³ and completed primary or grammar education (87.67%). Almost 45% respondents admitted that the State's efforts should be supported by local governments. This opinion was expressed most often by the respondents aged 56 years and more (74.41%), living in towns with population of 50–100 thous. residents (51.16%) and those with primary or grammar education (58.9%).



Picture 4. Entities responsible for combating financial exclusion in Poland according to the survey respondents (%)

²³ The share of respondents claiming that it was the State's responsibility decreased with the declining number of residents in the respondent's place of residence.



Picture 4 (cont.). Entities responsible for combating financial exclusion in Poland according to the survey respondents (%)

Source: the author's own research elaboration.

8. CONCLUSIONS

Financial exclusion has been a relatively new research area for scientists, even though the phenomenon is generally well-known and can be observed easily. The issue of financial exclusion is not really the topic of school activities nor the discussions held among family members or acquaintances. Social campaigns relating to this problem are also not very popular in Poland and normally barely noticed by our community. In the research sample of the survey being elaborated on in this article, only every second male respondent was aware of such phenomenon's existence. What is more, the study results prove that limited access to the information sources results directly in using mainly mass media to learn about it. Only every twentieth participant of the study declared building their expertise in financial exclusion by means of specialist elaborations. Despite such low level of knowledge in financial exclusion, the vast majority of the respondents stated Poland is a country with

relatively low risk of its citizens' financial exclusion. Only every twelfth respondent assessed the risk as high. This undoubtedly leads to conclusion that the unemployed and employees with low income are mostly endangered of financial exclusion in this country.

The survey respondents obviously notice the changes that have occurred on financial service market, especially when it comes to providing the services. They understand the significance of the place of residence, which may influence the direct, or not, access to financial institutions' POSs, as well as the infrastructure sufficient for performing financial services via the Internet²⁴. Limitations or lack of such access may have direct effect on the possibility of an individual's financial exclusion. Thus, in the opinion of the survey respondents, the first to be held responsible for combating financial exclusion are banks and cooperating financial institutions. Not only are they in charge of developing optimal portfolio of financial products but also provide convenient channels of distribution. The second responsible in this case should be the State and cooperating local governments due to creating proper infrastructure minimising the risk of any possible form of financial exclusion of Polish citizens.

Last but not least, it shall be highlighted that the male respondents drew their attention to the need of comprehensive educational activities aiming to increase the level of social awareness in the field of financial exclusion. Over two thirds of the respondents agreed that the issues should be the part of school curriculum.

REFERENCES

- Anderloni, L. (2007). *Access to Bank Account and Payment Services* [in:] Anderloni, L., Braga, M.D., Carluccio, E.M., eds., *New Frontiers in Banking Services. Emerging Needs and Tailored Products for Untapped Markets* Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer – Verlag.
- Corr, C. (2006). *Financial Exclusion in Ireland: an Exploratory Study and Policy Review*. Dublin: Combat Poverty Agency..
- Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Beck, T., Honohan, P. (2008). *Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access*. Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank,.
- European Commission, 2008. *Financial Services Provision and Prevention of Financial Exclusion, EC Report VC/2006/0183*, Brussels.
- Financial Inclusion Improving The Financial Health of The Nation* (2015). Financial Inclusion Commission.
- Giddens, A. (2004). *Socjologia*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
- Kempson, E., Whyley, C. (1999). *Kept Out or Opted Out? Understanding and Combating Financial Exclusion*. Bristol: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Policy Press.
- Leyshon, A., Thrift, N. (1995). 'Geographies of financial exclusion: financial abandonment in Britain and the United States', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series*, 20.
- Mylonidis, N. Chletsos, M., Barbagianni, V. (2017). *Financial exclusion in the USA: Looking beyond demographics*. *Journal of Financial Stability*. DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2017.09.004.

²⁴ Over 41% respondents indicated the lack of access to the Internet and 17.04% – the lack of access to mobile devices as factors contributing to an individual's financial exclusion.

- Richardson, L., Le Grand, J. (2002). *Outsider and insider expertise: The Response of Residents of Deprived Neighbourhoods to an Academic Definition of Social Exclusion*. CASE Papers 57, London School of Economics, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
- Russell, H., Maître, B., Donnelly, N. (2011). *Financial Exclusion and Over-indebtedness in Irish Households. Social Inclusion Research Report*. Dublin.
- Sinclair, S. (2001). *Financial Exclusion: An Introductory Survey*. Centre for Research into Socially Inclusive Services (CRSIS). Edinburgh: Edinburgh College of Art/Heriot Watt University.
- Sołtysiak, M. (2017a). *Postrzeganie zjawiska wykluczenia finansowego przez młode pokolenie Polaków*. „*Ekonomiczne Problemy Usług*” nr 127. DOI: 10.18276/epu.2017.127-26.
- Sołtysiak, M. (2017b). *Zjawisko wykluczenia finansowego w opiniach przedstawicieli pokolenia baby boomers*. „*Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziału Nauk Ekonomicznych Politechniki Koszalińskiej*” nr 21.
- The Little Data Book on Financial Inclusion* (2018). International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Washington.
- Triki, T., Faye, I., eds. (2013). *Financial Inclusion in Africa*. African Development Bank (AfDB), Tunisia.
- Weber M. (2002). *Gospodarka i społeczeństwo*. Warszawa: PWN.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.47

The text was submitted to the editorial office: June 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.

Hanna SOMMER¹
Grzegorz ZAKRZEWSKI²

*“The world has enough
for everyone's need,
but not enough
for everyone's greed”.*
Mahatma Gandhi

ECOLOGICAL SECURITY VS. FOOD SECURITY

This article attempts to indicate the relationship between some of the most important issues concerning the global population, namely ecological factors and food security. While “exploiting” the Earth, man has violated its natural cycle and, in many respects, pushed many ecological systems to the ultimate environmental threshold. Today, due to the industrial use of the natural environment, its shaping and protection is subject of numerous discussions. If a given ecosystem has been degraded, it is the task of humankind to restore it. Bioethicists investigate how deep this interference could be when modifying the world of fauna and flora. Often, however, those simple farming methods, already known and used in medieval agriculture, are sufficient. The aim of the study is to explore the opinions of young inhabitants of Podkarpacie (also known as Subcarpathian Province) on food security assessed through the prism of ecological security issues in the context of a total ban on cod fishing in the Baltic Sea. The ban was introduced for four years from January 2020 and, while the initiative may contribute to the renewal of the cod population, it is highly restrictive and covers about 150 fishing vessels, the owners of which have no other income.

Keywords: ecological security, food security, cod fishing ban.

1. INTRODUCTION

Nature has given humankind access to food, clean waters, uncontaminated soil and photosynthesis, perfectly describing the flow of energy in ecosystems (See more: Sommer, Zakrzewski 2018). Nature generates ecosystem services for itself -services which man has started to use imprudently. Our existence depends on the continuous supply of ecosystem services in both quantitative and qualitative sense. These goods, widely available to man, have not been seen as valuable so far and being public goods, they have not been a market product, since how could one appraise the value of clean air or water. There are no problems

¹ Hanna Sommer, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Management, Rzeszów University of Technology, Al. Powstańców Warszawy 8, 35-959 Rzeszów; e-mail: hansom@prz.edu.pl (corresponding author). ORCID: 0000-0001-7208-7641.

² Grzegorz Zakrzewski, PhD, Eng., University of Security in Poznań, ul. Marynarki Polskiej 15, 80-557 Gdańsk; e-mail: grzegorz.zakrzewski@wsb.net.pl. ORCID: 0000-0002-0945-5322.

with establishing the cost of atmospheric emissions, however, or fees for the economic use of water. The consequence of such actions is the degradation of ecosystems and decreasing biodiversity. We are approaching the ultimate environmental thresholds, suffering painful consequences thereof. On the example of the Baltic Sea, in the areas where total ban on fishing the Baltic cod (*Gadus morhua callarias*), has been in force since 1 January 2020 the feelings of the selected social group regarding food security will be examined through the prism of ecological security issues.

2. BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELFARE

The global economy which governs the modern world exerts an ever-increasing influence on the functioning of ecosystems. Protection and rational, scientifically based, shaping of the environment are now recognized as the main task of decision-makers. The concept of ecosystem was introduced in 1935 by Arthur George Tansley, an English botanist as the basic functional and spatial unit, which is formed by two components remaining closely related to each other:

- inanimate one (biotope, also called habitat), which consists of soil, water and air with their physicochemical properties, as well as climate;
- animate one (biocenosis), consisting of a combination of species specific to a given biotope under certain geographical conditions (See more: Sommer, Zakrzewski, 2017a).

Throughout the era of the human civilisation which left written records, a man had a minimal impact on their environment. Local effects in the environment were so small that the environment was able to regenerate – restore its resources. The resistance of the natural environment has been exposed by man to the limits of its capabilities.

Many ecological systems have already reached the ultimate environmental threshold. Crossing this border may lead to a catastrophe, as it triggers a chain reaction leading to the irreversible destruction of this environment or its basic elements (Borsuk, 1994).

The condition of the environment and the state of its endangerment directly affect ecological security (Sałek-Imińska, 2017).

Fig. 1 presents a simplified ecosystem for the needs of the article.

The ultimate environmental thresholds (UET) are presented in Fig. 2.

Jerzy Kozłowski distinguishes four categories of UET as they allow defining the final boundaries of the location, scale, type and time of individual development actions carried out in a given area, and thus to designate an ecologically safe solutions space in which these actions must be maintained (Kozłowski, 2011).

Universal security includes many measures to the extent necessary for human survival as a result of human actions or natural forces which threaten protected values (Karwan, 2019). The contemporary man exploits the natural environment across borders not only by introducing local, continental and global air pollution. These pollutants do not respect the physical borders of countries. Earth is a planet whose surface is covered by land in only about 25%. The remaining part is covered by the global ocean. It is the largest ecosystem in the world, whose resources are used not only by the coastal states.

ECOSYSTEM	BIOCENOSIS	Group of organisms
		Mutual interaction between organisms
	BIOTOPE	Life space
		Set of abiotic factors




Fig. 1. Simplified ecosystem
Source: Own data.




Fig. 2. Method of extreme natural thresholds
Source: Own research based on (Kozłowski, 2011).

3. ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEM AND BIODIVERSITY OF THE BALTIC SEA IN THE ASPECT OF INTRODUCING FISHING QUOTAS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Scientists are divided in their establishment of what caused the catastrophe in the Baltic cod population. Some of them blame mass fishing for this situation, while others indicate climate change and the lack of substantial winter saltwater inflows from the North Sea. Everyone is convinced that the main reason may be the increase in pollution and biogenicity caused by the intensive agriculture of the countries lying in the catchment area.

The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) announced on 29 May 2019 the latest results of the study on the state of the stocks of the basic fish species exploited in the Baltic Sea and made recommendations on the size of fishing quotas in 2020 (ICES, 2019). Currently, the spawning stock biomass is one of the lowest, and the exploitable stock biomass (approximately fish ≥ 35 cm) is the lowest in the history of this stock assessment.




Chart 1. Cargo and biomass of breeding shoal (thousands of tons) East Baltic cods in years 1974–2019

Source: (MIR-PIB Gdynia, 2020).

All of the determined objectives and directions of activities and tasks are the basis for the implementation of environmental policy (Puacz-Olszewska, 2017), which defines an action plan aimed at improving the quality of ecological and food security in the Baltic Sea area. One of the most important tasks of the Republic of Poland is to ensure environmental protection (Jurgilewicz, M., Jurgilewicz, O., 2019).

ICES recommends suspension of cod fishing in 2020, based on the precautionary principle (National Marine Fisheries Research Institute, 2020). The European Commission has introduced a complete ban on cod fishing in the Baltic Sea from 1 January 2020 to 2024.

This period of time is intended to ensure the recovery of the Baltic cod stocks. The goal of restoring biodiversity is likely to be achieved. It will be possible to assess the extent of this achievement on the basis of the population study in 2024 and mid-year studies.

The introduced ban on fishing has generated associated costs, which include:

- unavailability of the Baltic cod on the market, partly replaced by the Atlantic cod;
- reduced income of the fishing industry;
- exclusion of the ship owners of sports and recreational vessels from the programme mitigating the socio-economic effects thereof.

In the ports of the Polish coast there are about 200 (out of which 150 are active) vessels which can carry from several to 20 or more anglers depending on the craft (Lis, 2019) The situation is made all the more dubiously spicy by the fact that, according to the data of the National Marine Fisheries Research Institute, their industry caught only 1–2% of the annual quota of this species allocated to mass fishing. In order to survive this difficult period, ship owners operate additional activities such as room rental and fishing equipment retail shops.

4. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS OF THE AUTHOR'S ORIGINAL RESEARCH

The research methodology is a set of rules, stating who, what and where is to be studied. The key to the reliable measurement of the phenomenon being of interest to us is in the selection of the right research method in order to measure the phenomenon under study in the best way possible. A method is a conscious and consistent course of action, which leads to the achievement of a specific research objective, which should constitute a research problem, expressed by a relevant question or a set of questions the answers to which the research undertaken ought to provide. In this study, the research problem has been formulated as follows: *What are the attitudes of the UR students majoring in such fields as biology, protection of environment and agriculture towards the issues related to food security assessed through the prism of ecological security issues?*

The research problem, as a fundamental component of any significant research, is a complex component, hence detailed questions are needed to clarify it.

- Do the actions of the European Commission imposing a total ban on cod fishing ensure the recovery of biodiversity in the Baltic Sea?
- Does ecological security have an impact on food security?
- How is the wealth of the ecosystem understood in terms of food efficiency?
- What is the attitude towards the industrial-scale fish farming (e.g. Norwegian salmon) and seafood?
- Should sports (recreational) sea fishing be prohibited?

Research hypotheses should be derived from the research problem and specific questions.

- Maintaining a healthy environment and production using ecological methods exerts the most beneficial impact on the health of both people and animals and the entire natural environment.
- A complete ban on cod fishing may considerably contribute to improving the biodiversity in the Baltic sea.
- Environmental security has an immense impact on food security.

- In the long-term perspective, maintaining well-functioning ecosystems is the most cost-effective and, in some cases, the only solution leading to the satisfaction of human needs.
- Fish and seafood production on an industrial scale gains a positive assessment.
- Sports (recreational) sea fishing should not be prohibited due to minute quantities of fish caught, while providing livelihood for around 200 ship owners and associated staff.

Most methodologists consider it necessary to formulate hypotheses in the course of the research, hence each scientific study should consist of three successive stages:

- detecting and determining the research problem,
- formulating a hypothesis, which is a hypothetical solution to the problem,
- verifying the hypothesis (Konarzewski, 2000).

In the methodology of scientific research, an important function is performed by research techniques, which is practical measure, regulated by carefully developed indications, allowing for obtaining optimally verifiable information, opinions and facts.

A survey is a technique of collecting information, consisting in the completion of special questionnaires by respondents, generally with a high degree of standardisation in the presence or more often without the presence of an interviewer. A survey is, therefore, a technique for collecting quantitative data, and to a lesser extent – qualitative data.

A questionnaire consisting of 15 questions (5 open and 10 close-ended questions) was used for the research.

The research was conducted using the CAWI method (Computer Assisted Web Interviews) at the turn of April and May 2020 among the students of the University of Rzeszów in the fields of biology, environment protection and agriculture. The questionnaire was received by 150 people, however only 118 questionnaires were qualified for the analysis due to incomplete answers.

The young people, when asked about their attitude to ecology, resulting from their knowledge and sensitivity which influence pro-ecological attitudes, responded as follows (Chart 2).

Most of the respondents have a definitely positive attitude to ecology (66%). Slightly fewer (24%) have a rather positive and 10% neutral attitude. None of the interviewees gave a rather negative or definitely negative answer. Undoubtedly, the pro-ecological attitudes of the respondents are the result of acquiring knowledge and ecological sensitivity of a conscious human being, in this case students of biology, environment protection and agriculture.

In the next question, the respondents were asked to answer how they understood environmental security. The most frequent answers were: it is a desirable ecological condition; healthy existence of the ecosystem; nature. Many of the respondents pointed out that ecological security depends on the political system.

However, with respect to the question of how they understood food security, the following answers appeared:

- ensuring the right amount of food of a certain quality;
- guaranteeing individual people, the possibility of purchasing food which satisfy their nutritional requirements;
- efficient use of food;
- food storage in compliance with food safety rules;

- ensuring that food is healthy; that it does not contain contaminants or substances harmful to humans;
- society should not allow any human being to starve;
- appropriate food distribution.




Chart 2. Survey participants' approach to ecology

Source: authors' own research.

When asked about how they understand the wealth of an ecosystem in terms of food efficiency (food production), the respondents were very willing to provide comprehensive information on this subject:

- Maintaining well-functioning ecosystems is the most cost-effective, and in some cases the only, solution to meet people's needs in the long term.
- Maintaining a healthy environment is also essential because there exists the so-called critical point, where, having reached it, the destroyed ecosystem will cease to provide services on which we depend.
- Understanding, exploring and estimating the value of ecosystem services is essential for good environmental management. It is also an obligation towards future generations.
- Global climate changes are the main threat to biodiversity.
- Agriculture conducted with eco-friendly methods has the most beneficial effect on both human and animal health as well as the entire natural environment.
- Each ecosystem creates a lot of diverse benefits, while valuation usually refers only to one or two of them. In addition, protection of the ecosystems indicates an infinite supply of their services, but not a one-off economic benefit. Therefore, in terms of long-term return on investment ecosystem services are unbeatable.

The opinion on the industrialisation of food production held by the surveyed students is illustrated in Chart 3.




Chart 3. To what extend modern agricultural and orchard production is industrial?

Source: authors' own research.

In Chart 3, the unanimity among the respondents on the subject of assessing the degree of food production on an industrial scale may be surprising. As many as 80% of the respondents claim that such production takes place to a definitely large extent, 13% to a rather large extent, and 7% were unable to take a position on this issue. Concerning the respondents' previous statements, one may conclude that they are fully aware of the fact that large-scale food production is leading to immense changes in the ecosystem.

The vast majority of the respondents (86%) are aware of the ban on cod fishing in the Baltic Sea. The issue of stating the period over which this prohibition is in force looks a little bit worse. It can be stated that few of these people can correctly specify the duration of this period. On the other hand, 14% of the respondents are not aware of the existence of such a ban. The source of their knowledge concerning the action the European Commission introducing a total ban on cod fishing in the Baltic Sea is the Internet and TV.

Are the surveyed students aware of the total ban on cod fishing in the Baltic Sea? The results of the research are presented in Chart 4.

Whether the respondents, young people living in Podkarpacie, show solidarity with the fishermen who lost their jobs due to the fishing ban, is shown in Chart 5.




Chart 4. Awareness of prohibition of cod catch on Baltic sea among survey participants
Source: authors' own research.




Chart 5. Solidarity with fishermen who lost their jobs due to catch prohibition
Source: authors' own research.

In Chart 5, the majority of the respondents (39%) are unable to take a stance with regard to solidarity with the fishermen who lost their jobs due to the ban on cod fishing in the Baltic Sea. In the remaining answers, one can draw a trendline, which indicates a certain pattern in the responses. Among the respondents, 22% show solidarity with the fishermen and 19% rather agree with it. On the other hand, 20% of respondents claim that the fishermen do not deserve the feeling of solidarity from other people in this matter, of which 7% take a definitely negative stance in this case. It can be assumed that the large distance of the respondents' place of residence from the fishermen's place of work and residence could have had an impact on the results of the study.

The respondents also expressed their opinion on sport/recreational sea fishing. It is illustrated in Chart 6.




Chart 6. Should sport sea fishing be prohibited?

Source: authors' own research.

As many as 46% of the surveyed students were unable to take a position on the subject of recreational fishing. In the other responses, a trend line may be drawn, opposite to the one which indicates the solidarity with fishermen who lost their jobs due to the ban on fishing. 24% of the respondents definitely do not oppose such fishing operations, and 19% rather support this opinion. On the other hand, 8% stated that such manner of fishing should rather be prohibited, and 3% are firmly in favour of banning sea fishing in a sports form.

Another issue which the surveyed students were asked to voice their opinions about was the EU recommendation for a total ban on cod fishing. Will the European Commission's

actions introducing a complete ban on cod fishing ensure the recovery of biodiversity in the Baltic Sea? The answers are presented in Chart 7.




Chart 7. Support of EU recommendation in terms of total prohibition of cod catch

Source: authors' own research.

As many as 37% of respondents support the ban on cod fishing, of which 7% are definitely convinced. A high percentage (24%) have no opinion on this issue and, by analogy, are not convinced about this ban, and 4% are firmly against it, claiming that a total ban on cod fishing will not ensure a restoration of biodiversity in the Baltic Sea.

The respondents were also asked about the extent to which maintaining a healthy environment leads to satisfying the existential needs of humans. Their opinions were presented in Chart 8.

Almost half of the respondents (44%) are convinced that maintaining a healthy environment leads to satisfying the existential needs of humans, and 22% are aware of this fact. 15% of respondents cannot take a position on this issue. However, some respondents believe that a healthy environment is unlikely to satisfy (10%) and definitely will not satisfy (9%) existential human needs. According to the responses to this topic, one can see a trendline depicting the growing number of indications supporting the importance of a healthy environment.

The young people participating in the survey were also asked to answer the question of whether ecological security has an impact on food security. The opinions were included in Chart 9.




Chart 8. To what extent does healthy environment maintenance allow to satisfy people's existential needs?

Source: authors' own research.




Chart 9. Does environment safety influence food safety Source: authors' own research

Source: authors' own research.

Young inhabitants of Podkarpacie believe that ecological security has a definite (49%) and considerable (30%) impact on food security. 14% of respondents have no opinion on this subject, and 7% described the degree of impact as low. None of the respondents strongly negated the occurrence of such an impact.

The graph shows a noticeable growing trendline of the respondents' replies, from the lack of a decisive impact of ecological behaviours on food security to a marked influence thereof.

Summing up the results of the conducted research in the context of verifying the hypotheses postulated, it should be concluded that the assumed hypotheses proved correct to a lesser or greater extent.

The vast majority of the respondents are convinced that maintaining a healthy environment leads to satisfying the existential needs of humans, while being simultaneously aware that the production using ecological methods has an impact on human and animal health and the entire natural environment.

Nearly 40% of respondents were in favour of the total ban on cod fishing in the Baltic Sea; 24% were unable to define their position clearly on this subject, and fewer than 30% claimed that a total ban on cod fishing would not ensure the restoration of biodiversity in the Baltic Sea.

Almost 80% of respondents stated that ecological safety has a huge impact on food security, 14% were unable to assess this dependence, and 7% considered that this impact is low.

The respondents believed that well-functioning ecosystems are the most cost-effective solution leading to satisfying human nutritional needs in the long run. According to their assessment, food production is currently taking place on an industrial scale, which is leading to huge changes in the ecosystem.

With respect to the issue of sports (recreational) sea fishing, as many as 46% of respondents did not take a position. Over 40% of respondents support this form of fishing, and only 11% are against recreational fishing. Such a large percentage of people who did not take a position on the analysed issue may stem from the poor knowledge of the topic. This form of fishing constitutes a minute fraction of the quantity of the fish caught and provides the livelihood for about two hundred owners of vessels and associated staff (e.g. hotels, specialist fishing equipment stores). Here, a warning should be given against the effect of throwing out the baby with the bathwater (See more: <https://biznes.trojmiasto.pl/Protest-rybakow-Tym-razem-podrzucano-ryby-pod-brame-Urzędu-Morskiego-n144938.html>).

5. CONCLUSIONS

Food security is one of the basic human needs, which, in simple terms, through the prism of Maslow's pyramid of needs (Sommer, Zakrzewski, 2017), boils down to the necessity of ensuring continuous access to food supplies. Therefore, it also refers to the avoidance of famine and a sense of security.

The improvement of the Baltic Sea environment is a problem to which solutions are being sought also by Poland. The restoration of the Baltic cod species, is an important issue which would ensure stable and healthy fish populations which would not only be capable of providing food for consumers and jobs in the fisheries sector but would also contribute to increasing the resilience of the Baltic Sea ecosystem to the negative effects of the

observed climate change. Environmental degradation may lead to ecological disasters on a local or global scale.

The Baltic cod has not been able to revive itself for years. The poor condition of the species or the lack of the appearance of this fish in the coastal zone is a serious problem which environmentalists have been pointing to for a considerable period of time. Limitation of fishing is expected to give the fish a chance to recover. However, for the first time in the fishing history, recreational fishermen were banned from fishing for cod. The ban on catching fish with a fishing rod from a boat was introduced for at least four years from 1 January 2020.

The initiatives regarding the maintenance of food safety, carried out at both regional and global level, testify to the increasing need for preventive and corrective actions in this area witnessing progressive degradation of the natural environment. The introduced restrictions should be carefully monitored and investigated as future solutions interfering with the natural environment of man in order to obtain a clear answer to the question of whether aquaculture will be the main solution to avoid a disaster lurking in the future to the detriment of the Earth's inhabitants - famine.

It is however still necessary to consider whether taking away jobs from the recreational fishermen who catch negligible quantities of fish will have a significant impact on improving the ecosystem of the Baltic Sea.

REFERENCES

- Borsuk, S., red. (1994). *Ochrona i kształtowanie środowiska*. Toruń–Bydgoszcz.
- Chudziński, T. (2019). *Bałtyk stał się nieprzyjazny dla dorsza. Dlaczego zaczął obowiązywać zakaz połowu tej ryby?*. „Dziennik Bałtycki” 29.11.2019 r. [Access: 05.04.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://dziennikbaltycki.pl/baltyk-stal-sie-nieprzyjazny-dla-dorsza-dlaczego-zaczal-obowiazrywac-zakaz-polowu-tej-ryby/ar/c3-14616463>.
- <https://biznes.trojmiasto.pl/Protest-rybakow-Tym-razem-podrzucono-ryby-pod-brame-Urzedu-Morskiego-n144938.html> [Access: 05.04.2020].
- <https://www.kalendarzrolnikow.pl/1954/plodozmian-czyli-rotacja-roslin-system-dwupolowy-i-system-trzypolowy> [Access: 05.04.2020].
- Jurgilewicz, M., Jurgilewicz, O. (2019). *Management of information security and its protection in criminal matters: case of Poland*. “Journal of Security and Sustainability”, Vol. 8(3), March.
- Karwan, H.M. (2019). *Bezpieczeństwo publiczne a koncepcja umowy społecznej* [w:] Gałęcki, A., red., *W trosce o bezpieczne jutro. Reminiscencje i zamierzenia*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo WSB.
- Konarzewski, K. (2000). *Jak uprawiać badania pedagogiczne? Metodologia praktyczna*. Warszawa: WSiP.
- Kozłowski, J. (2011). *Podjęcie ekologiczne w metodyce planowania. Metoda krańcowych progów przyrodniczych*, „Problemy Rozwoju Miast”, No. 1–2 [Access: 05.04.2020]. Access on the internet: <http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-84b5f76b-e42c-47d0-a740-f8591b4bc0e6>.
- Lis, M. (2019). *Popłynąłem na dorsze. To jeden z ostatnich rejsów* [Access: 07.04.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://finanse.wp.pl/poplynalem-na-dorsze-to-jeden-z-ostatnich-rejsow-6451241617205377a>.
- Morski Instytut Rybacki (MIR) *Komunikat o stanie zasobów ryb Bałtyku i zalecanych przez ICES wielkości kwot połowowych w roku 2020* [Access: 7.04.2020]. Access on the internet:

<https://mir.gdynia.pl/komunikat-o-stanie-zasobow-ryb-baltyku-i-zalecanych-przez-ices-wielkosc-kwot-polowowych-w-roku-2020/>.

Puacz-Olszewska, J., *Bezpieczeństwo i ochrona środowiska naturalnego przy gospodarowaniu odpadami komunalnymi – zasady prawne*, Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Informatyki, Zarządzania i Administracji, Rzeszów 2017, t. 15, z. 2(39).

Sałek-Imińska, A. (2017). *Ekonomiczne narzędzia zarządzania przedsiębiorstwem w zakresie bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego* [w:] Szulczewski, A., red., *Bezpieczeństwo państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w kontekście zagrożeń ekologicznych*, Słupsk: Fundacja Pro Pomerania.

Sommer, H., Zakrzewski, G. (2017). *Zastosowanie piramidy Masłowa w ekologii informacji – przyczynek do dyskusji* [w:] Materska, K., Taraszkiewicz, B., red., *Ekologia informacji a zasoby informacyjne w bibliotekach i cyberprzestrzeni*. Słupsk: Biblioteka Uczelniana Akademii Pomorskiej.

Sommer, H., Zakrzewski, G. (2017a). *Założenia dla edukacji ekologicznej czy bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego*. „*Humanities and Social Sciences*”, Vol. XXII, 24 (3/2017) [Access: 08.04.2020]. Access on the internet: <http://doi.prz.edu.pl/pl/publ/einh/344>.

Sommer, H., Zakrzewski, G. (2018). *Zarządzanie w działach związanych z obronnością państwa według opinii studentów bezpieczeństwa*. „*Humanities and Social Sciences*”, Vol. XXIII, 25 (3/2018) [Access: 8.04.2020]. Access on the internet: <http://doi.prz.edu.pl/pl/pdf/einh/424>.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.48

The text was submitted to the editorial office: June 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.

Lilia SUCHOCKA¹
Eleonora KRAJEWSKA²
Małgorzata PASEK³

THE NEED FOR SOCIAL SUPPORT AND THE FUNCTIONING OF INDIVIDUALS IN A HEALTH-LIMITING CONDITION

Introduction: Negative and difficult life experiences, and stressful situations that an individual may face, affects not only those who experience such situations but also their family and friends. In a distressing situation, such as an illness in the family, a person suffering from an illness and their closest support networks may need various types and forms of support. Difficulties in coping with demanding situations frequently result in fear, anxiety, and depression. Sufferers may feel threatened and often expect help and support from those who are close to them and from specific institutions. The issue of social support still attracts considerable interest, and is examined in this research from the perspective of various scientific disciplines.

Aim: The main aim of this study is to assess, in psychological terms, the need for social support among individuals who are in a difficult life situation because they suffer from a chronic disease.

Materials and methods: The study was conducted among chronic illness sufferers and involved 40 individuals (23 men and 17 women) hemodialyzed at St. Luke's Hospital in Tarnów. The methods used were an individual questionnaire and a survey questionnaire developed by the authors and the *Berlin Social Support Scales* (BSSS) developed by Ralf Schwarzer & Ute Schulz

Results: Research findings show that emotional support is the most important type of support for a large percentage of respondents in a difficult life situation. They also need instrumental support, which involves obtaining specific information about how to cope with their condition. In an illness situation, the respondents experience fatigue, exhaustion and general anxiety. A chronic disease and the treatment associated with it can place limitations on some aspects of life and the social functioning of people affected by it. These people find it hard to enjoy the cultural and social life or to participate in recreation.

¹ Lilia Suchocka, PhD, Faculty of Education and Psychology, Jan Kochanowski University of Kielce, ul. Krakowska 11, 25-029 Kielce; e-mail: liliasuchocka@ibnps.eu. ORCID: 0000-0003-0474-3955.

² Eleonora Krajewska, St. Luke's Provincial Hospital in Tarnów, Lwowska 178A, 33-100 Tarnów; e-mail: elakrajewska71@gmail.com. ORCID: 0000-0002-5005-7094.

³ Małgorzata Pasek, PhD, University of Applied Sciences in Tarnow, ul. Mickiewicza 8, 33-100 Tarnów; e-mail: malgorzata_pasek@wp.pl (corresponding author). ORCID: 0000-0002-5638-5582.

Conclusions: Individuals in a difficult situation, such as those facing a chronic illness, expect emotional and instrumental support. A chronic illness and its treatment limits the social activity of those who are affected by it.

Keywords: social support, difficult situation, coping.

1. INTRODUCTION

Support is commonly defined as the assistance available to an individual in a difficult situation and as specific acts of help directed towards those who face difficult life situations or experiences. The following types of support are distinguished in the literature: a) emotional, b) informational, c) instrumental, and d) material. Emotional support involves offering emotional empathy to people in difficult situations, showing them care and building a sense of security. Informational support is usually based on providing necessary information, which helps them to get a proper understanding of their difficult situation. It is primarily focused on supplying necessary information, providing advice and information about where to seek the specialist help. Instrumental support is treated as some kind of instruction that often includes guidelines on how to cope with and solve a difficult situation. Material support most often refers to specific financial or in-kind aid (Filipiak, 2010).

Negative life experiences and difficult situations that an individual goes through frequently affect not only the person who faces such conditions, but also those who are close to them. Family members or friends usually share the strong emotions, worries and fears. In a distressing situation, such as an illness in the family, a person suffering from an illness as well as those around, usually need various types and forms of support.

Individuals who find themselves in a difficult situation often feel helpless; this is why, emotional support that allows them to work off their strong emotions (e.g. fear, sadness, regret, anger, or rage) is the most appropriate form of support. Another important type of support in such situations is informational support. It allows people in need and their family to receive information from professionals about where to search for help. This kind of support is often educational in nature. If the support is given to a chronically ill person, it should be adjusted to the individual situation and the needs of this person, and it should be multidimensional. Therefore, it is important that the support in such situations should come from a variety of people: medical personnel (doctors, nurses, and psychologists), priests and social workers, and above all, from the family members and friends (Sęk, Cieślak, 2004; Ziarko, 2014).

Any chronic disease is connected with an undesirable change in a person's life. People affected with a chronic condition often feel a heavy burden, and their illness presents many new challenges that they have to cope with. A chronic illness is a critical event in the patient's life, especially for those suffering from chronic kidney failure, when it is necessary to decide on renal replacement therapy (Bauman, 2017; Lichodziejewska-Niemierko, 2016). People who are chronically ill may become passive and withdrawn, they feel frustrated, despondent or apathetic. Consequently, they may have problems in their social relations and with following medical recommendations (Bauman, 2017; Marcinkowska, Zabiegaj, Kulik, 2016). However, if they learn to cope with this difficult situation and to live with their illness, they can still live normal and full lives despite the health limitations. That is why, treatment often becomes an important element of everyday functioning.

Chronic renal failure is defined as a condition developing as a result of the progressing and irreversible impairment of kidneys' functions. It is an unpleasant and burdensome disease, and often has some negative consequences. A chronic illness frequently changes the mental functioning of a person, influencing their cognitive and emotional processes. Chronic illness sufferers may experience, among others, social consequences of their illness, which are manifested by changes in the social roles that they perform. In those critical life situations, they may run a risk of stigmatization, which often leads to mental and social alienation or isolation (Wiśniewska, Paczkowska, Białobrzaska, 2010).

2. THE PURPOSE

The main aim of the study was to assess, in psychological terms, the need for social support among individuals suffering from a chronic illness. Moreover, the study aimed at examining the specific nature of emotional states that accompany the experience of a difficult situation, and at determining to what extent a chronic illness and its treatment limit the everyday functioning.

The following research hypotheses were formulated:

H 1. Emotional support is the most expected support during a chronic illness, in the study group.

H 2. The perceived available instrumental and emotional support is rated the highest by the respondents facing a difficult situation connected with their illness.

H 3. In a difficult situation related to haemodialysis treatment, the respondents experience fatigue, exhaustion and anxiety.

H 4. A chronic illness places some limitations on how the respondents can function in different areas of their lives.

3. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The following research tools were used to conduct the research:

1. an individual questionnaire and a survey questionnaire developed by the authors,
2. the *Berlin Social Support Scales (BSSS)* developed by Ralf Schwarzer & Ute Schulz. (*Berlińska Skala Wsparcia Społecznego* – Polish version adapted by A. Łuszczżyńska, M. Kowalska, 2002)

The study was conducted among individuals suffering from a chronic illness and involved 40 respondents (including 23 men and 17 women) haemodialysed at the Dialysis Unit at St. Luke's Hospital in Tarnów. The age distribution is as follows: 8 respondents aged 41–50 (which constitutes 20% of all respondents), 22 – aged 51–60 (55%), and 9 individuals aged 71–80 (25%).

The level of respondents' education varied, with most respondents that have completed vocational education (N = 15, i.e. 37.5%) and higher education (N = 13, 32.5%), followed by those with secondary education (N = 10, i.e. 25.0%) and elementary education (N = 2, i.e. 5%)

Fig. 1 shows how long the respondents have been haemodialysed.

The majority (N = 21, i.e. 52.5%) of patients suffering from chronic kidney disease have been haemodialysed for 2–5 years. The second largest group (N = 13, i.e. 32.5%) included those who have been haemodialysed for up to one year from the moment they were diagnosed with kidney disease. Only 2 respondents (i.e. 5%) have been haemodialysed for 6–10 years, and 4 (10%) for over 10 years.




Fig. 1. Length of haemodialysis treatment

Source: Compiled by authors.

The haemodialysis treatment and disease length affect the everyday functioning, and increase the need for various types of support.


4. RESULTS

Difficult life situations, especially a chronic illness, often change the individual's mental functioning, influencing their cognitive processes and emotions they experience. People who suffer from a chronic illness may also experience the individual and social consequences of their condition, such as difficulties in performing their social roles or changes in these roles, limitations in their professional life. Moreover, an illness condition often results in withdrawal, limitations in functioning, or even social isolation or being rejected.

For the purpose of this study, the following were analysed: a) social support perceived by the respondents, b) emotions accompanying the respondents during their illness, and c) limitations of social activity and everyday functioning. All these three variables determine how an individual functions in a difficult situation and how they cope with a chronic disease, as well as how much support they need and how much support they are willing to receive – both from the family and specialists.

Fig. 2 below shows how the respondents perceive support.

The majority in the study group ($N = 30$, i.e. 75.0%) could always count on receiving help from the family. The research has shown that a small number of respondents ($N = 8$, i.e. 20%) received the help necessary in their illness condition, from time to time. Only one respondent ($N = 1$, i.e. 2.5%) stated that the family members were not interested in the problems experienced as a result of illness, and one respondent ($N = 1$, i.e. 2.5%) felt completely abandoned in their situation.




75.0% – I can always rely on them, 20.0% – I can sometimes rely on them, 2.5% – my family is not interested in my problems, 2.5% – I am lonely

Fig. 2. Support from the close ones as perceived by respondents

Source: Compiled by authors

Fig. 3 presents the results regarding the type of support that respondents expect most.



65.0% – emotional support, 15.0% – informational support, 10.0% – material support, 7.5% – spiritual support, 2.5% – instrumental support

Fig. 3. Type of support most expected

Source: Compiled by authors.

Based on the obtained results, it can be concluded that the respondents were most likely to expect and need emotional support in the difficult situation they experienced (N = 26, i.e. 65.0%). This was followed by informational support (N = 6, i.e. 15%). Four respondents

(N = 4, i.e. 10%) expected material support. Three respondents (N = 3, i.e. 7.5%) expected spiritual support and one person (N = 1, i.e. 2.5%) – instrumental support.

Table 1 below compiles mean values regarding support perception and support seeking among the respondents.

Table 1. Perceived support and support seeking based on the *Berlin Social Support Scales* (BSSS)

	Perceived available emotional support	Perceived available instrumental support	Need for support	Support seeking
Mean Value	3.37	3.46	2.98	2.95
Me	3.50	3.75	3.25	3.20
SD	0.62	0.72	0.66	0.89
Min.	1.75	1.00	1.75	1.00
Max.	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00

Source: Compiled by authors.

1) *Perceived available instrumental support* was rated the highest by the respondents suffering from a chronic illness, with the result $M = 3.46$ close to the maximum value (Min = 1.75, Max = 4.00). Thus, it can be concluded that the respondents in a difficult illness condition were most likely to need instrumental support, which mainly involved receiving specific information about how to cope with their condition and what to do.

Instrumental support was followed by 2) *emotional support*, with the result above the mean value $M = 3.37$ (Min = 1.00, Max = 4.00). Thus, it can be stated that emotional support is almost as important as instrumental support when experiencing the situation of an illness; it most often refers to the need for being cared about, feeling a sense of security and closeness.


In the study group, 3) *the need for support* $M = 2.98$, (Min = 1.75, Max = 4.00) and 4) *support seeking* $M = 2.95$, (Min = 1.00, Max = 4.00) were ranked at a level slightly above the mean value, which means that the respondents suffering from a chronic illness expressed the general need for support and support seeking at an average level.

The obtained mean results between different types of perceived and sought support did not show statistically significant differences. Therefore, the above analysis is more of a qualitative nature.

Fig. 4 below gives a graphic illustration of emotions accompanying illness.

When treated with haemodialysis, the patients under study were most likely to feel fatigue and exhaustion (N = 17, i.e. 42.5%), anxiety (N = 10, i.e. 25.0%), sadness and loneliness (N = 2, i.e. 5%), and stress and depression (N = 2, i.e. 5%). Nine respondents (N = 9, i.e. 22.5%) reported no changes in mood resulting from their illness and treatment.

The experience of an illness and the need to undergo haemodialysis treatment placed some limitations on how the respondents functioned in the family and society. Table 2 below presents data on various aspects of life that have been limited to a different extent, due to a chronic illness and its treatment.



42.5% – fatigue and exhaustion, 25.0% – anxiety, 22.5% – no change in mood, 5.0% – sadness and loneliness, 5.0% – stress, depression.

Fig. 4. Emotional states accompanying illness in the studied group

Source: Compiled by authors.

Table 2. Selected aspects of life that have been limited since the beginning of haemodialysis treatment in the study group

Variables:	Completely		To some extent		Not at all		Non applicable	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Work life	11	27.5%	12	30.0%	3	7.5%	14	35.0%
Social life	5	12.5%	18	45.0%	8	20.0%	9	22.5%
Education and development	5	12.5%	3	7.5%	9	22.5%	23	57.5%
Entertainment	5	12.5%	19	47.5%	2	5.0%	14	35.0%
Leisure travel	13	32.5%	13	32.5%	2	5.0%	12	30.0%
Interests and hobbies	3	7.5%	14	35.0%	7	17.5%	16	40.0%
Pursuing goals	4	10.0%	15	37.5%	3	7.5%	18	45.0%

Source: Compiled by authors.

Based on the obtained results given in Table 2, it can be concluded that various life areas and activities of patients were limited completely or to some extent, as a result of their chronic illness or more precisely, as a result of haemodialysis treatment.

In the group under study, 32.5% respondents (N = 13) stated that haemodialysis treatments put an end to leisure travel and 27.5% (N = 11) claimed that these completely limited their work activity. Few respondents reported limitations in their social life, education and personal development, entertainment (N = 5, i.e. 12.5%), pursuing some goal in life (N = 4, 10.0%), as well as pursuing their interests and hobbies (N = 3, i.e. 7.5%).

In the study group, haemodialysis treatments partly limited entertainment opportunities (N = 19, 47.5%), social life (N = 18, 45.0%), pursuing the goals (N = 15, 37.5%), pursuing interests (N = 14, 35.0%), leisure travel (N = 13, 32.5%), professional life (N = 12, 30.0%). Only a few patients felt that their education and development opportunities were limited (N = 3, 7.5%).

When examining the areas of life affected by an illness and its treatment, it is worth drawing attention to the data concerning those areas that the respondents believe were in no way limited as a result of their illness and treatment. 23 respondents (N = 23; 57.7%) did not feel any limitations when it came to their education and development. 18 respondents (i.e. 45%) did not feel restricted in pursuing their goals, 16 (40.0%) – in pursuing their interests, 14 respondents (30.0%) reported no limitations to their professional life and entertainment, 12 respondents (30.0%) stated that leisure travel had not been affected, while 9 respondents (22.5%) believed that their social life had not been limited.

5. DISCUSSION

There are some difficult moments and situations in human life, e.g. a chronic illness, when the individual needs the support from another person or from an institution. The chronic illness, long-term treatment and the resulting limitations in various areas of life often make it impossible for patients to stay fully independent and resourceful. Support in such life situations mainly concerns interactions and is tantamount to providing help and consequently, it involves: working, taking effort and action for the benefit of another person in order to ease the difficulties they experience (Kacperczak, 2006).

One of the major stressful situations in human life is illness. Thus, providing support in such situations is of key importance. Lack of adequate support can lead to depression, discouragement and withdrawal.

Based on the results obtained in the group under study, the following conclusions can be formulated:

1. Emotional support is the most expected type of support by those facing a difficult situation, such as a chronic disease. A large percentage of respondents put first the need for emotional support in a difficult life situation. In the group under study, family and social ties are considered to be more important than other types of support; e.g., instrumental, material or spiritual. According to Kurowska & Weselska (2015), maintaining good relationships and close emotional ties with other people enables us to build up our personal resources for coping with a difficult situation and activates additional energy and resourcefulness.
2. Perceived available instrumental and emotional support are rated the highest by the respondents suffering from a chronic illness. Based on the obtained results, it can be concluded that the respondents in a difficult illness condition were most likely to need instrumental support, which mainly involved receiving specific information about how to cope with their condition. The research conducted by Grochowska, Kurzawska, Bodys-Cupak (2016) also shows that both the patient's family and friends, as well as specialists constitute the so-called basic supporting network. Lack of support from the family and specialists strengthens the patients' feelings of helplessness, confusion and not being able to cope.
3. The difficult illness condition and haemodialysis treatment are accompanied by emotional states such as: fatigue, exhaustion, and anxiety. Studies have shown that

although patients may have partially or completely accepted their illness and taken a conscious decision to start dialysis therapy, many of them feel tired, exhausted, anxious, sad and resentful because they are forced to change their lifestyle and face new limitations due to increasing side effects of haemodialysis. Bereza (2009) states that haemodialysis is a burdensome treatment that is necessary for the rest of a patient's life, and the numerous limitations that go with it constitute a heavy mental strain for patients.

4. A difficult situation such as a chronic illness, places some limitations on how the respondents can function in their lives. Based on the research findings, it can be concluded that a chronic illness and its treatment limit the social activity of patients in some ways. Chronic dialysis patients are not likely to participate in social or cultural life and in leisure pursuits. Illness and its treatment have become the priority in their lives.

6. CONCLUSION

Based on the research findings, it can be concluded that the respondents experiencing a difficult life situation such as a chronic illness:

- were most likely to expect and need emotional and informational support;
- rated the perceived available instrumental support highest, followed by the perceived emotional support.

When undergoing treatment related to their illness, they were most likely to feel fatigue and exhaustion, anxiety, sadness and loneliness, as well as stress and depressed mood.

In the group of patients under study, treatment related to the disease:

- put an end to their leisure travel and often also to their work life;
- limited their social life and the ability to pursue goals and interests, for a few respondents;
- Some respondents believe that their treatment did not restrict their education opportunities and development, among others.

REFERENCES

- Baum, E. (2017). *Jakość życia chorych poddawanych terapii nerkozastępczej*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Medycznego im. K. Marcinkowskiego w Poznaniu.
- Bereza, B. (2009). *Doświadczenie własnej choroby przez pacjentów dializowanych*. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL.
- Filipiak, G. (2010). *Funkcja wsparcia społecznego w rodzinie*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo UAM.
- Grochowska, A., Kurzawska, M., Bodys-Cupak, I. (2016). *Wsparcie a jakość życia pacjentów dializowanych w Tarnowie*. „Polski Przegląd Nauk o Zdrowiu”, No. 2 (47).
- Kacperczyk, A. (2006). *Wsparcie społeczne w instytucjach opieki paliatywnej i hospicyjnej*. W: Kaptacz, A. De Walden-Gałaszko, K. ed., *Pielęgniarstwo opieki paliatywnej*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Lekarskie PZWL.
- Kurowska, K., Weselska, M. (2015). *Rola wsparcia a przystosowanie się do życia osób dializowanych*. „Nefrologia i Dializoterapia Polska”, No. 19.
- Lichodziejewska-Niemierko, M. (2016). *Jakość życia u chorych na nerki*. „Dializa i Ty”, No. 1(27).

Marcinkowska, U., Zabiegaj, U., Kulik, H. (2018). *Interakcje społeczne i wsparcie społeczne u chorych leczonych nerkozastępczo metodą hemodializy*. „Nefrologia i Dializoterapia Polska”, No. 22.

Sęk, H., Cieślak, B. (ed.) (2004). *Wsparcie społeczne, stres i zdrowie*. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

Wiśniewska, L., Paczkowska, B., Białobrzaska, B. (2010). *Zapotrzebowanie na wsparcie emocjonalne wśród pacjentów leczonych nerkozastępczo*. „Forum Nefrologiczne”, No. 3(1).

Ziarko, M. (2014). *Zmaganie się ze stresem choroby przewlekłej*. Poznań: UAM Poznań.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.49

The text was submitted to the editorial office: November 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.

Krzysztof SUROWIEC¹

REPUBLIC OF CHINA ARMED FORCES AND THEIR MODERNIZATION IN THE YEARS 2017–2020 IN THE BACKGROUND OF THE GEOPOLITICAL CRISIS IN RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

This paper examines the development of the military potential of Taiwan (ROC) in 2017–2020 against the background of threats resulting from the aspirations of the People's Republic of China. Taiwan is one of the fastest developing countries in the world. This paper presents the latest trends in terms of the scale and scope of modernization of the Taiwanese armed forces, with particular regard to land forces in 2017–2020, and the factors that had a direct impact on the process, such as its geopolitical location and power, and the ever-increasing threat from China. Both of these countries strive to maximize their power and preserve their interests in joint relations. Realism as a doctrine of international relations is well known and implemented in the PRC, and factors such as nationalism only strengthen it. Taiwan is still considered part of its former "homeland," and Taipei's proclamation of independence could lead to war, even if the Chinese economy were to suffer. On the other hand, Taipei's *raison d'être* is to ensure its own security through the development of its military and economic potential and faith in external help. Mutual fears between Taipei and Beijing and other countries in the region are exacerbated by the so-called security dilemma, which means that any actions aimed at ensuring greater military potential by China will be poorly received in Tokyo, Seoul, Hanoi, Taipei, and especially in Washington, and will cause even greater armament on their part, which may lead to war.

Keywords: Taiwan, military, Republic of China Armed Forces, Taiwan Army's equipment modernization, geopolitics, military security.

1. INTRODUCTION

Taiwan (Republic of China – ROC) is located in East Asia between the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea. It includes the island of Taiwan itself (with an area of 35.8 thousand km²) and 21 offshore islands and the Pescadora archipelago. The Cairo Conference in 1943 decided on the return of Taiwan to Chinese rule after the liberation from Japanese rule which took place in 1945. In 1949 the authorities of the Republic of China and the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's army were evacuated to the

¹ Krzysztof Surowiec, PhD, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Management, Ignacy Łukasiewicz Rzeszów University of Technology, ul. Podkarpacka 1, 35-082 Rzeszów; e-mail: ks@prz.edu.pl. ORCID: 0000-0002-6298-2260.

island, pushed out of mainland China by the communists, and with them about 2 million refugees. As of January 1, 2002, the Republic of China belongs to the WTO under the name of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. In March 2005, the People's Republic of China (PRC) threatened Taiwan with a direct military attack if it declared formal independence and adopted an anti-secession law as the legal basis for an attack on the island. According to Ye Zicheng, the PRC will only achieve the status of a real superpower if Taiwan joins (Ye Zicheng, 2011). Taiwan is formally a province of China, but in fact it remains independent of the PRC government. In January 2020, the elections in Taiwan were won for the second time in a row by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and President Cai Ing-wen officially rejected proposals to unite with China, offering in return a constructive, peace-based dialogue. Currently, Taiwan maintains official diplomatic relations with only a dozen of the 193 countries that belong to the United Nations.

The ROC of China has a special political and military relationship with the United States. The US became the guarantor of Taiwan's independence, responding to any flare-up of the situation in the Taiwan Strait. In December 1954, the Mutual Defense Treaty was concluded between the USA and Taiwan. In January 1955, the US Congress adopted The Formosa Resolution under which President Dwight Eisenhower was granted the right to defend Taiwan by Congress (Bush, 2015). As a result of these agreements several thousand American soldiers were stationed in Taiwan during the Cold War. In March 1979, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act under which the US continues to sell arms to Taiwan. In view of the increased intensity of rivalry between the US and the PRC (Góralczyk, 2019), Washington's relations with Taipei have gained new significance in recent years. Successive US presidents, from George W. Bush Jr., through Barack Obama and Donald Trump, expanded diplomatic and economic relations, also providing modern weapons. Maintaining strong relations with Taiwan is also a prime concern of the US, in line with its pursuit of further peace and stability in Asia and the maintenance of its influence in the region. The last American document strengthening relations with Taiwan was the "TAIPEI" Act signed on March 26, 2020 by President Trump. Its purpose was to expand the US relationship with Taiwan and to encourage other nations and international organizations to strengthen official and unofficial ties with the island.

According to the Global Firepower analyses, which were presented in 2020, Taiwan was 26th in the world in terms of the military strength index (Ching-Tse, 2020). Despite such a high position, Taiwan's ranking dropped four positions compared to the previous year. The study took into account the potential of 136 countries. Global Firepower took several individual factors into account, including each country's ability to wage war by land, sea and air, giving Taiwan a "PowerIndex" score of 0.4008 (for an ideal score of 0.0000). The United States once again took first place, followed by Russia, China, India and Japan.

Purpose of the paper and research methodology

The purpose of the paper was to present the latest trends in terms of the scale and scope of the modernization of the Taiwanese armed forces with particular regard to land forces in 2017–2020, and the factors that had a direct impact on the described process in the current conditions, resulting from the geopolitical location and power, and the ever-increasing threat from the People's Republic of China. The research problem is summarised in the question of how significantly ROC's military potential has increased in recent years to such an extent that it is possible to maintain political independence from the People's Republic

of China, which is becoming a hegemon in this region and is fighting with the United States of America for the position of a superpower. The subject of the research was the Taiwan armed forces and their modernization in 2017–2020. In the paper the following methods of science on security have been applied: qualitative (the facts are obtained through deductions and induction of the studied subject and extended exegesis of the subject literature); quantitative (the facts cited can be presented synthetically by means of numbers); empirical (obtaining facts through own experience) and the historical method (leading to the establishment of a historical fact).

2. DEMOGRAPHIC POTENTIAL AND ECONOMY POWER AND ITS IMPACT ON MILITARY EXPENDITURE

In 1905, the population of Taiwan was approximately 3 million; by 1940 the population rose to 5.87 million, and by the end of World War II in 1946 it was 6.09 million (Mitchell, 2003). The years after the Second World War were a period of accelerated population growth, whose peak, according to experts' calculations, would fall in the first years of the third decade of the 21st century. This is confirmed by calculations according to which the population of Taiwan is aging very quickly, which also affects the potential of the country's armed forces. In 2010, population growth in Taiwan was less than 0.2% and the fertility rate was only 0.9. It was the lowest rate ever recorded in the country. Taiwan's population is projected to peak at around 23.7 million in 2024 and then decline (The Republic of China Yearbook, 2014). Between 1956 and 1982, Taiwan's population doubled from 9 million to over 18 million. In 2017, the ROC population of the Republic of China was 23.508.428 million (The Military Balance, 2018), in 2018 23.545.963 million (The Military Balance, 2019), in 2019 23.577.456 million (The Military Balance, 2020), and now the estimated population of Taiwan is 23.816.775 million (Taiwan Demographics, Worldometer).

Taking into consideration economy, Taiwan belongs to the so-called “Asian tigers”, i.e. countries rapidly developing their economy based on the free market and the development of modern technologies, especially in electronics. With the economic miracle, Taiwan's defense spending also increased in the face of the constant threat from the PRC. In 2017, Taiwan's GDP was \$ 571 billion in current prices, in 2018, \$ 603 billion, in 2019, \$ 586 billion (The Military Balance, 2018, 2019, 2020). At the end of 2020, economists estimate that Taiwan's GDP, despite the Covid-19 epidemic, will be close to the values of 2019².

Taipei's military expenditures in the analyzed period classified Taipei in the world's 30, at a similar level as Poland, Egypt, Pakistan and Singapore. In 2017, Taiwan's defense budget was estimated at USD 10.4 billion, in 2018 at USD 11 billion, in 2019 at USD 10.9 billion (The Military Balance, 2018, 2019, 2020), and in 2020 the President of Taiwan proposed a defense budget of over \$ 13 billion. In 2019, overall South and East Asia spending increased by 3.4% to 2018. special funds for the modernization of the armed forces, most of which will be allocated to the import of weapons from the US. In 2021, this increase would even exceed 10% to USD 15.42 billion (Bartkiewicz, 2020). The defense budget of the PRC in 2020 is expected to amount to approximately USD 178 billion, and in 2019 it was at the level of USD 261 billion (Szopa, 2020). According to the Globalfirepower military portal, Taiwan's military expenditure in 2020 will amount to approximately USD

² According to sources from Tradingeconomics and Eurostat.in the second quarter of 2020, Taiwan's GDP fell by only 0.58% due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

10.75 billion, which will allow the country to be 27th out of 138 countries surveyed in terms of defense spending from the state budget (Globalfirepower, 2020)³.

The currently developing quantitative methods in research on international relations on the basis of selected models also show a specific place of a given country in the international balance of power in terms of its economic (general), military and geopolitical power. The Polish model presenting these three types of power is that of prof. Sulka. According to this model and power measurements, a new bipolar system was developed in 2017 in terms of economic potential, but based on military power, the world remained unipolar. On the basis of geopolitical power, a “weak” bipolar system (with a large US advantage) emerged. China has become a world power according to the power-metric measurements. The methodology of Sułek's model (Sułek, 2013) and the division of powers into three types require appropriate units of measurement. The mire is usually taken as the basic unit. The studied power of states is a fraction of this size (if we assume that our unit will be millimire (mm), i.e. a thousandth of a world power – it is equal to 1000). The power of states is inherently relative, so we measure it in relation to the power of the world as a fixed point of reference.

Based on the Sułek's model and the calculations made according to it for 2017, Taiwan and China rank in the ranking of world powers as follows. According to the measurements of the economic (general) power, in 2017 China took the first position in the world, ahead of the USA with 152.113 mm, while Taiwan took the 33rd position with the power of 4.691 mm. Taking into account the military power, China took the second position with 100.224 mm, more than twice less than the USA, while Taiwan was the 26th with the power of 5.888 mm. The distribution of geopolitical power in the world according to Sułek's model shows that China came in second with a power of 117,520 mm. Taiwan ranked 28th in this hierarchy with a geopolitical power of 5.489 mM out of 1000 – the power of the whole world (Sułek, Białoskurski, Kiczma, 2019).

According to the latest power-metric ranking for 2018 (Sułek, Kiczma, 2020), taking into account the economic power of countries calculated on the basis of Professor Sułek's model, China was in the first place in the world, gaining 156.804 mm (world 1000), slightly increasing the advantage over the USA. Taiwan moved up one position in this ranking (32), gaining 4.561 mm. China's military power in 2018 was 103.334 mm, which gave it the second place in the ranking. On the other hand, Taiwan fell one position (27) with a power of 5.859 mm. In the classification of geopolitical powers, China came second (121,157), and Taiwan moved up one position compared to 2017 (27th place) with a power of 5.426 (Sułek, Kiczma, 2020).

³ The Swedish SIPRI institute (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) reported that global spending on weapons in 2019 increased quite significantly. Spending on armaments amounted to the equivalent of USD 1.917 trillion, which meant an increase by 3.6% compared to the previous year. There were included: the USA (USD 732 billion, increase by 5.3%), China (USD 261 billion increase by 5.1%) and India (USD 71.1 billion increase by 6.8%). Russia came fourth (USD 65.1 billion, up 4.5%) and Saudi Arabia fifth (USD 61.9 billion, down from the USD \$ 67.6 billion). It was followed by France (USD 50.1 billion), Germany (USD 49.3 billion), Great Britain (USD 48.7 billion), Japan (USD 47.6 billion), South Korea (USD 43.9 billion). SIPRI authors say 2019 was the peak year for military spending, with COVID-19 on the downward trend from 2020. An epidemic may shift funds to fight it, and the widespread decline in GDP also forces a reduction in military spending. On the other hand, the epidemic may cause international tensions, which will stimulate further spending. See SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <https://sipri.org/databases/milex> (2020, 09, 27).

3. THE LAND FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THEIR MODERNIZATION IN 2017–2020

Taiwan, despite the fact that it is a small country, both in terms of territory and population, has quite significant armed forces compared to most other countries in the world's top thirty armies. In 2017, Taiwan had 215.000 active soldiers, including 130,000 in the army, 40.000 in the fleet, 40.000 in the air force, and 11.445 in the paramilitary forces. The strategic reserves amounted to 1.657.000 soldiers in that year (The Military Balance, 2018). A year later, according to the Military Balance data, the number of the Taiwan armed forces decreased, which was influenced by the professionalization of the army and the internal policy. A decline in the combat readiness of the Taiwanese army was the result of these reforms. According to Maciej Szopa, in 2018 only 81% of uniformed jobs could actually be filled (Szopa, 2020). The condition of the Taiwanese army in 2018 was 163.000, of which 88.000 served land, 40.000 in the fleet, 35.000 in aviation, and over 11.000 paramilitary troops. (The Military Balance, 2019). The size of the reserves remained at the same level as a year earlier, at least according to the Taiwanese MND. In 2019, the numbers of each type of Taiwan's armed forces remained at the same level (The Military Balance, 2020). In 2020, according to the calculations of the Globalfirepower website, the Taiwanese army is expected to amount to 165.000 soldiers, while the state of the Chinese army will be about 2.183.000 without reserves (Globalfirepower, 2020).

Despite the modern equipment of the Taiwanese army, the threat that the military of this country is talking about, may be the lack of an adequate number of trained recruits to operate it in the future. The professionalization of the army contributed to the decline in the size of the army, but also to the reduction of the time of service in the army. In Taiwan, conscripts spend 12 or 4 months in the army, depending on their age. Neither in either case it is possible to train a fully professional soldier. In addition to the abovementioned conscripts, the so-called "Professionals" whose service time is 4 years. All of this is worrying Taipei staffers about the future.

According to the latest complete data for 2019, Taiwan's land forces + following commands: 3 corps HQ and 5 defense commands HQ; forces manoeuvre: 4 – armored brigades, 3 – mechanized infantry brigades, 6 – light infantry brigades and in reserve 21 – light infantry brigades. In addition to the above-mentioned units, the army had a combat support: 3 artillery groups, 3 engineer groups, 3 CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive) groups, and 3 signals groups. Apart from them, there were also coastal defense forces in the form of 1 anti-ship missile battalion.

Changes in Taiwanese-Chinese relations in recent years have intensified especially with the election of the president Cai Ing-wen in January 2016. The policy pursued by the new president has increased Beijing's political and military pressure on Taiwan. Manifestations of Chinese authoritarian behavior towards Hong Kong residents or its own citizens, as well as large expenditure on armaments in that country, led to increased Taiwanese opposition to unification with Beijing and led to military reforms. China, led by President Xi Jinping, increased its claims against the countries of the region including in particular Taiwan. The Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan (MND) said in its Quadrennial Defense Review 2017 (QDR) that there had been a marked improvement in Chinese operational capabilities in recent years, as well as the construction of advanced weapons and their conversion which, as the Ministry believes, could lead to a possible blockade of Taiwan by Chinese troops.

Beijing also has, according to MND, the ability to quickly capture the offshore islands of Taiwan. All of this greatly complicates Taiwan's security environment. This strategic environment led to the adoption by MND of the doctrine of strong defense and multi-dimensional deterrence. This goal is to be served by cooperation and the purchase of weapons from the USA. Washington in June 2017 finalized the Taipei agreement, thanks to which Taiwan gained: surface-to-air Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) Block IIIA, Mk. 54 Lightweight Torpedo conversion kits, the MK48 Mod 6 Advanced Technology Heavyweight Torpedo, the AGM-154C JSOW (Joint Standoff Weapon) air-to-ground missile and upgrades the AGM-88B HARM (High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile). Taiwan is also developing, independently or in cooperation with the US, automated coastal defense systems (the "Tan An" Coastal Defense Rocket System and the XTR-102 System) (The Military Balance, 2018).

Due to the geostrategic threat, the challenge for Taiwan has become to forge strong ties with Japan, which also has territorial disputes with the PRC and fears that Beijing will gain too much advantage in the Pacific. However, they did not bring large official results.

The Ministry of Defense of Taiwan started stronger efforts from 2016 to recruit specialists in defense matters so far related to the civil sectors. In 2017, the cost of maintaining military personnel accounted for 46% of the total defense budget, military investments (including purchases) accounted for approximately 30%, and the remainder for over 20% was spent on operating, maintaining and maintaining military equipment. The administration of the new president has also made efforts to develop indigenous arms manufacturers, especially for the land forces. One speaks about the Ordinance Readiness Development Center (ORDC), which produces various armored vehicles; and the semi-private NCSIST, which produces missiles, UAVs and other platforms. ORDC manufactures primarily the CM-32 Yunpao armored vehicle, the CM-21 armoured personnel carrier (an indigenous design based on the US M113 armored personnel carrier) and self-propelled howitzers. Of great importance in the defense industry of Taiwan is primarily the Taoyuan-based NCSIST, which produces the Tien Kung (I, II and III) air-defense system, the Tien Chien (I, II) air-to-air missile, the Antelope air defence system, Hsiung Feng (I, II and III) anti-ship cruise missiles, the Hsiung Feng IIE landattack cruise missile, the Wan Chien stand-off airto-ground cruise missile, the Ray-Ting 2000 artillery multiple-launch rocket system, UAVs and various automated coastal-defense systems.

In 2018, the US administration of Donald Trump supported Taiwan's defense efforts, which also involved the sale of modern equipment. In September, another agreement decided that Taipei would purchase spare parts for the aviation industry and obtain logistical support from Washington. Demographic pressure in 2017 and 2018 influenced the introduction of plans to reduce the armed forces and the reduction of conscription.

The deepened modernization and expansion of China's armed forces accelerated the efforts of the USA, Japan and Taiwan in 2019 to find ways to greater military balance in the Taiwan Strait, which meant a reduction in Chinese advantage in this region (Werner, 2019). This year, the USA strengthened its presence in the Far East by carrying out nine patrols in the Taiwan Strait (Mierzejewski, Chatys, Ciborek, 2020). The most recent report by the Taiwan Ministry of Defense: National Defense Report, issued in September 2019, which is published every two years, stressed Taiwan's support for the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, which also highlighted cooperation with the US allies in the region, especially in

the areas of security and new technologies (National Defense Report, 2019). The report also details the agreed US arms sales: including M1A2T Abrams main battle tanks⁴ (Surdacki, 2020), BGM-71 TOW⁵ and FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles, and FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles. The acquisition of the M1A2T Abrams in particular will greatly increase the strength of the ground forces of the Republic of China, initiating the introduction of a new generation of tanks to the army. The Abrams (Reuters, 2019) will replace the long-serving tanks of the M48/M60 family, which until now were the main type of equipment in Taiwan's armored component. From a strategic point of view, it was very important to conclude a contract of sale of August 2019 between Taiwan and the USA for the sale of 66 F 16C / D Block 70 combat aircraft. These orders strengthened Taiwan's position vis-à-vis China, having a deterrent effect, but also confirmed Taipei's good relationship and alliance with Washington.

The efforts of the ROC to introduce into service CM-34 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles from the Yunpao family (Cloud Leopard) were a great success. The first order for 32 copies was delivered by the end of 2019. In August 2020, 21 more vehicles were ordered for the Taiwanese gendarmerie. Overall, it is planned to produce 284 CM-34 (Chen Chun-hua, Ko Lin, 2020).

As far as artillery is concerned, the armed forces of the Republic of China applied for the purchase of M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers from the United States. The number of planned orders is undisclosed, but the media estimates this number at around 100 M109A6 artillery pieces. As of 2019, the current ROC Army artillery consists of fairly outdated M109A2 and M109A5 systems, 8-inch M110A2 self-propelled howitzers and towed 155mm M114 howitzers.

As in previous years, relations with the PRC and the maintenance of the development of military potential dominated Taipei's security policy. There were also further efforts to make the army fully professional based on volunteers rather than recruit recruits, largely influenced by demographic pressure. Due to the lack of potential suppliers of equipment from abroad, Taiwan is modernizing its current industrial centers and developing defense

⁴ As Surdacki R. writes, "According to the agreement of July 2019, Taiwan will acquire two Abrams tank battalions. As part of the package, in 2023-2026, the Taiwanese armed forces will receive a total of 108 M1A2T Abrams MBTs, 14 M88A2 Hercules technical support vehicles and 16 M1070A1 HET heavy technology transporters. In addition, the ordered package includes full armament (including 7.62 mm universal machine guns or 12.7 mm large-caliber machine guns), ammunition (various types) and spare parts and auxiliary equipment. The agreement also covers the armor technology in export version, AGT-1500 tank engines, X-110 tank gears, as well as »Hunter-Killer« system technology, including remotely controlled weapons modules CROWS-LP and the independent commander's thermal imager (CITV) and other parts spare parts and auxiliary equipment". See more broadly (Surdacki, 2020).

⁵ In 2018, Taiwan bought a batch of 460 TOW 2B Aero missiles for over \$ 130 million from Raytheon in the US. Further purchase negotiations were also conducted for 2019, which were to include the delivery of missiles and launchers of the aforementioned TOW 2B Aero for approximately USD 375.3 million. The deliveries are planned until 2028. In total, approximately 1240-1700 TOW 2B missiles, 57 launchers and vehicles are to be delivered. See more broadly, Taiwan is building an anti-tank shield, Defense 24 (2020), <https://www.defence24.pl/tajwan-buduje-paniempancerna-tarcze>.

production there. In 2019, the government initiated a new defense and industrial policy to further strengthen the independent production of military equipment⁶.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The ROC, wishing to maintain independence and scare away its main potential aggressor, i.e. the PRC, must constantly modernize and expand its armed forces, including the land army. The PRC has enormous population, economic and military advantages over Taiwan, and has also accelerated the modernization of its armed forces, but despite this, Taiwan tries to reduce it in the geopolitical game in East and South Asia. Taipei owns and develops modern armed forces, both land and others, producing them locally (the Hsiung Feng III missile) or, more often, importing them from the USA. One means in particular the M1A2T Abrams or BGM-71 TOW tanks. Limiting the number of soldiers in the Taiwanese army for the sake of even greater professionalism and specialization does not necessarily mean a deterioration in the quality of training or combat capability. On the contrary, a professional army with modern equipment in today's world is able to ensure the security of each country in a more coordinated way. Another advantage of Taiwan is having a developed economy and information technology so important in the design of modern weapons. Taipei is also increasing its military budget as seen in the announcements for 2021 (Reuters, 2020). Taiwan's independence is not possible without having allies. The main such country for Taipei is the United States, and then countries that feel threatened by mainland China or share similar democratic and political values, i.e. Japan, South Korea and India.

The issue that Taiwan must pay attention to is the growing importance of the PRC in the last decade. Beijing feels stronger in the Pacific due to the economic crisis in the US of 2008 and the following years. However, currently China has lost much of its support worldwide as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, which makes it less involved in international conflicts in the Pacific, especially when it comes to the use of hard force. More and more likely is the so-called the American pivot to the Pacific (Bartosiak, 2016), which is feared by China. As a result of this and the detonators occurring in this region, a conflict may arise over a new balance of power between the US and the PRC (Allison, 2018). Taiwan's declaration of independence in the wake of US support could also lead to war. In particular, the US is afraid of the PRC's exit to the open Pacific, should Taiwan be unified or conquered. Geopolitical contradictions, i.e. misunderstandings between interests or traditional spheres of influence, may exacerbate tensions between Taiwan and the US and the PRC.

The process of modernization of the Taiwanese army in 2017–2020 was stable, accelerating in some periods. Taiwan's defense budget expenditure throughout the analyzed period was at a similar level, but increased despite the epidemiological crisis in 2020 and with the growth in the potential threat from the PRC. Despite having modern components in the army, some of them are already obsolete (artillery), which strengthens Beijing's advantage in the event of an invasion of Taiwan.

As a result of the military reforms undertaken and the continuous modernization of, inter alia, land forces, Taiwan may become a very strong fortress to be conquered if Beijing

⁶ The Taiwanese have high hopes for the Hsiung Feng III supersonic missile being implemented for domestic production, which is guided by radar and has a range of 1.5 to even 2 thousand. km.

decided to do so. Especially today, when China's economy and reputation have been severely undermined by Covid-19 pandemic. In addition, Taipei's position is strengthened by the alliance with the US, which may offer not only the transfer of modern technologies, but also political support following the armaments contracts.

REFERENCES

- Allison, G. (2018). *Skazani na wojnę? Czy Ameryka i Chiny unikną pułapki Tukidydesa?* Bielsko-Biała.
- Bartkiewicz, A. (2020). *Tajwan zwiększa wydatki na obronność o ponad 10 proc.* [Access: 24.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.rp.pl/Chiny/200819793-Tajwan-zwieksza-wydatki-na-obronnosc-o-ponad-10-proc.html>.
- Bartosiak, J. (2016). *Pacyfik i Eurazja. O wojnie.* Warszawa.
- Bush, R. (2015). *At cross purposes: US-Taiwan relations since 1942.* Routledge.
- Chen Chun-hua, Ko Lin (2020). *Military police to get CM-34 armored vehicles* [Access: 30.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202008250020>.
- Ching-Tse, Ch. (2020). *Taiwan ranks 26th in global military strength index* [Access: 24.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3945511>.
- Globalfirepower (2020). [Access: 27.09.2020]. Access on the internet: https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=taiwan.
- Góralczyk, B. (2019). *Powrót Chin do centrum światowej sceny.* „Rocznik Strategiczny”, Vol. 24, 2018/19. Warszawa.
- Mierzejewski, D., Chatys, M., Ciborek, P. (2020). *Globalny i regionalny wymiar polityki zagranicznej Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej.* „Rocznik Strategiczny”, Vol. 25, 2019/20. Warszawa.
- Mitchell, B.R. (2003). *International historical statistics: Africa, Asia & Oceania, 1750–2000.*
- National Defense Report (2019). [Access: 1.10.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Taiwan-National-Defense-Report-2019.pdf>.
- Reuters (2019). [Access: 4.10.2020]. Access on the internet: U.S. State Department approves possible \$2.2 billion arms sale to Taiwan. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan/u-s-state-department-approves-possible-2-2-billion-arms-sale-to-taiwan-idUSKCN1U32HT>.
- Reuters (2020). *Taiwan proposes 10% increase in defense spending for 2021* [Access: 5.10.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3986450>.
- SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2020) [Access: 27.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://sipri.org/databases/milex>.
- Sułek, M. (2013). *Potęga państw: modele i zastosowania.* Warszawa.
- Sułek, M., Białoskurski, R., Kiczma, Ł. (2019). *Potęga państw. Rankingi potęgometryczne* [Access: 1.10.2020]. Access on the internet: <http://prnet.org.pl/img/pub/pot%C4%99ga-pa%C5%84stw-2019-rankingi-pot%C4%99gometryczne.pdf>.
- Sułek, M., Kiczma, Ł. (2020). *Potęga państw. Rankingi potęgometryczne.* Warszawa.
- Surdacki, R.(2020). *Tajwan przygotowuje się do przyjęcia Abramsów* (2020) [Access: 30.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.defence24.pl/tajwan-przygotowuje-sie-do-przyjecia-abramsow>.

- Szopa, M. (2020). Defence 24. *Rekordowy wzrost wydatków na zbrojenia. To już koniec?* [Access: 27.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.defence24.pl/rekordowy-wzrost-wydatkow-na-zbrojenia-to-juz-koniec-komentarz>.
- Szopa, M. (2020). Defence 24. *Tajwan: armii brakuje rezerw. Powodem „rofesjonalizacja”* [Access: 28.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.defence24.pl/tajwan-armii-brakuje-rezerw-powod-profesjonalizacja-komentarz>.
- Taiwan Demographics (2020). [Access: 27.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/taiwan-demographics/#pop>.
- Tajwan buduje przeciwpancerną tarczę. Defence 24* (2020) [Access: 30.09.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://www.defence24.pl/tajwan-buduje-przeciwpancerna-tarcze>.
- The Military Balance 2017*. International Institute for Strategic Studies-Routledge. London 2017.
- The Military Balance 2018*. International Institute for Strategic Studies-Routledge. London 2018.
- The Military Balance 2019*. International Institute for Strategic Studies-Routledge. London 2019.
- The Military Balance 2020*. International Institute for Strategic Studies-Routledge. London 2020.
- The Republic of China Yearbook* (2014). Executive Yuan, R.O.C.
- Werner, B. (2019). *China's Newest Aircraft Carrier Transits Taiwan Strait* [Access: 5.10.2020]. Access on the internet: <https://news.usni.org/2019/12/26/chinas-newest-aircraft-carrier-transits-taiwan-strait>.
- Ye Zicheng (2011). *Inside China's Grnad Strategy. The Perspective from The People's Republic*. Lexington.

DOI: 10.7862/rz.2020.hss.50

The text was submitted to the editorial office: October 2020.

The text was accepted for publication: December 2020.


Justyna STECKO¹

**REVIEW OF THE BOOK BY
W. JULIAN KORAB-KARPOWICZ, *SOCIAL HARMONY
OR PRINCIPLES OF A HAPPY SOCIETY
(HARMONIA SPOŁECZNA CZYLI ZASADY
SZCZĘŚLIWEGO SPOŁECZEŃSTWA).*
PUBLISHER: PIW, WARSAW 2017,
P. 233, ISBN 978-83-06-03415-8**

W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz is a philosopher and political thinker, professor of the University of Opole. He has also taught at many universities abroad, among others, the State University of Texas in San Marcos and the Zayed University in Dubai. He is a prolific writer, who has published several books.

His notable achievement is *Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus: New Directions for the Future Development of Humankind* (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017a). This work like Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is written in numbered paragraphs. In order to make his *Tractatus* more accessible to general reader, Professor Korab-Karpowicz has then published the monograph entitled *Harmonia Społeczna* (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017b). It was printed by PIW, one of the leading publishers in Poland. Like *Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus*, *Social Harmony* is a work of normative political theory. It presents a vision of the good state and a happy society.

As the author writes, the monograph is a desire to confirm that "cooperation is an integral part of human nature, and when we properly recognize our human nature and organize our environment according to the principle of cooperation, we can arrive at



¹ Justyna Stecko, PhD, Rzeszów University of Technology, Faculty of Management, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences; e-mail: jstecko@prz.edu.pl. ORCID: 0000-0001-9968-7946.

a world of social harmony” (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017b) And as the author claims, this harmony “brings about a happy society” (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017b).

The book is characterized by a well thoughtful, and at the same time extremely functional division of the content. It consists of four parts, a valuable introduction and the ending that organizes the vision. These are successively: part one “A man, culture, civilization”, part two – “Principles of a happy society”, part three “A happy society and a good state”, and part four “Human evolution and quantum theory.”

In the first part, which consists of seven chapters, the author introduces the following topics: “The concept of civilization,” “Who is the human,” “Cooperation as the first principle of humanity,” “Diversity and social classes”, “Today's conflicts and their solution”, “Reality and happiness” and he concludes this part with a reflection on a “Harmonious and happy community.” The second part consists of the “Introduction – What is Politics?” and of seven chapters that describe the principles of a happy society. These are “Collaboration,” “Justice and social balance,” “Leaders’ wisdom and citizens’ virtues,” “A proper education,” “The right laws,” “Political knowledge” and “The continuity of generations”. The third part of the book, in which the idea of a good state is discussed, consists of six chapters, which constitute a coherent whole. These are: “Organic and artificial state,” “The State: definition and characteristics,” “The Good state and its criteria,” “The Good state and its political system,” “The real and outward democracy,” “The Good state and a happy society.” The fourth part presents a vision of “Human evolution” and “A new world picture”. The book is concluded by a proposal of “The new politics”. One important concept is that of evolutionity. Like in his *Tractatus*, Professor Korab-Karpowicz postulates that we need to transit from the largely conflicting postmodern times to a new evolutionary age, in which humans would engage in a conscious transformation toward moral and intellectual improvement (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017b).

The author refers to ancient ideas such as the golden mean, political community, happiness as values, and at the same time the purpose of existence and rationality of an action and puts them into a contemporary context. These ideas are not only beautiful but also timeless. Contemporary eudaimonia, according to the author, may be based on the principle that “everyone has an opportunity for self-realization, while respecting the self-realization of others” (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017a). And although self-realization should be expressed most fully in “moral and intellectual perfection” (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017a), which is an evolutionary goal, there should be no social consent to impose the path of such development on anyone. Members of the community work together on the basis of respect and mutual understanding. The aim of *Social Harmony* is to make the reader aware that harmonious relationships, based on the idea of cooperation, is a sine qua non condition for the good life of each of us.

The human being as a rational, moral and free being has evolutionary capacities. We are not finished beings yet. Since civilization is ultimately based on our abilities to recognize moral values, according to the author, “the proof of human moral development is the gradual moral improvement of humans, which is expressed in social life” (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017b). And while we seem to have made a huge leap in the development of the idea of freedom and our intellectual capacities that are paralleled by scientific and technological achievements, some ethicists may have doubts about our progress on the moral ground. Hence, as we develop our civilizations, without being fully aware about our evolutionary capacities, we may move forward or we may fall. It is true that the tools we use every day

will change, but breaking the moral rules is as tempting now as it was a thousand years ago, and the words of Ovid seem to be invariably relevant.

Prof. Korab-Karpowicz appears to rely largely on some Aristotelian ideas, such as *eudaimonia* (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017b). He stresses the importance of virtue and emphasizes that politics cannot be separated from ethics. In a happy society, political leaders should represent wisdom and the highest moral values. It seems that this thought should especially guide all those who see themselves in the political life of societies.

The enormous optimism that characterizes the author's vision that virtue can still be achieved in contemporary politics is a rare and noteworthy phenomenon today. However, this is not an uncritical optimism. He indicates the possibility of human growth and decline. He stresses the importance of human potential for development and proposes the principles that a happy society of the future should strive for. As he writes, this vision of a better world is not revolutionary but evolutionary. While appreciating the value of tradition and religion which are to constitute a solid foundation, we need to engage in a conscious evolution and in an improvement of our life conditions.

Perhaps in the opinion of some readers, this publication presents a social utopia, but for me it is a beautiful normative vision that respects the otherness of others and can inspire us. In my opinion the only missing things are references to the animal world. Animals, although we have long entered the 21st century, are still treated more as things in communities than as sentient beings. Perhaps, this will be another part of the study that the author is preparing for his readers.

It seems obvious that W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz's book entitled *Social Harmony* will find a wide audience, not only among philosophers, politicians and social researchers, but also among the so-called ordinary, socially sensitive and engaged readers. The book has now been translated to Arabic and published in UAE. It deserves to be widely known and studied.

REFERENCES

Korab-Karpowicz, W.J. (2017a). *Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus: New Directions for the Future Development of Humankind*. Oxford: Routledge.

Korab-Karpowicz, W.J. (2017b). *Social harmony or principles of a happy society (Harmonia społeczna czyli zasady szczęśliwego społeczeństwa)*. Warsaw: PIW.

THE LIST OF REVIEWERS COOPERATING
WITH THE JOURNAL OF
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN 2020

Andrejovska Alena (Slovakia)	Matušíková Daniela (Slovakia)
Bakushevych Ivanna (Ukraine)	Mirzoieva Tetiana (Ukraine)
Buckles Brian (The USA)	Misiuk Andrzej (Poland)
Chaplinska Oksana (Ukraine)	Nagy Henrietta (Hungary)
Czubocha Krzysztof (Poland)	Nakoneczny Andriy (Ukraine)
Delekta Anna (Poland)	Nechiporenko Oleksandra (Ukraine)
Gerasymchuk Andrii (Ukraine)	Nechyporenko Oleksandr (Ukraine)
Gherman Laurian (Romania)	Paczkowski Jurij (Ukraine)
Grata Paweł (Poland)	Pantea Maria-Carmen (Romania)
Hachkevych Andriy (Ukraine)	Pavel Popyk (Ukraine)
Huusko Perttu (Finland)	Pawlikowicz Leszek (Poland)
Jankovycz Tetyana (Ukraine)	Petrecka Beata (Poland)
Janowicz-Lomott Marietta (Poland)	Pisarenko Volodymyr (Ukraine)
Jaworski Krzysztof (Poland)	Prusak Anna (Poland)
Kaducakova Helena (Slovakia)	Radyewa Marina (Ukraine)
Kardis Kamil (Slovakia)	Rekun Ivan (Ukraine)
Karpiuk Mirosław (Poland)	Sheiko Sergii (Ukraine)
Kubejko Ewa (Poland)	Shtuler Iryna (Ukraine)
Kucharek Daniel (Poland)	Sokolovskii Oleh (Ukraine)
Kuczur Tomasz (Poland)	Sribna Nataliia (Ukraine)
Kvitka Sergiy (Ukraine)	Stashko Halyna (Ukraine)
Lipińska Justyna (Poland)	Šliwa Zdzisław (Estonia)
Lisovyi Andrii (Ukraine)	Vorkut Tetiana (Ukraine)
Maciejewski Jan (Poland)	Wojewodzic Tomasz (Poland)
Malec Norbert (Poland)	Zhivo Petrov (Bulgaria)
Mateichyk Vasyl (Ukraine)	

The names of the cooperating reviewers is quoted once a year – in the last issue of the Journal of *Humanities and Social Sciences* no. 27 (4/2020) and published on the website:
<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zeszyty-naukowe/humanities-and-social-sciences/>

THE LIST OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN THE JOURNAL
OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN 2020

1/2020

Anna Curzytek: Carnival as a time of celebration: Rituals in kindergarten

Henryk Cwiąg: A new dimension in the security of Poland

Justyna Lipińska: Social dialogue as the essence of virtual organizations

Anna Nizioł, Norbert Życzyński: An increase of the region's competitiveness through effective tourist product management: an example using the thematic trail

Marcin Nowak: Nomothetic and idiographic approach in management sciences

Krzysztof Rejman, Grzegorz Błażejewski: Social rehabilitation of individuals with physical disabilities

Grzegorz Roslan: Psychological actions in the armed conflict

Serhii Sheiko, Olena Kolodii: Development of entrepreneurship in the context of civilizational dynamics

Oleh Sokolovskyi, Oksana Chaplinska: Christological discourse in the modern theology of catholicism

Dariusz Zajac, Magdalena D. Suraj: Economic activity of residents in border districts of Poland: A study of non-agricultural business enterprises

Krzysztof Załęski, Zdzisław Śliwa: Hybrid warfare as a strategic tool for shaping policy of the Russian Federation

2/2020

Anna Barwińska-Małajowicz, Bogusław Ślusarczyk: Conditions and barriers to the development of entrepreneurship in Poland at the local level

Fryderyk Czekaj: Climate changes and their impact on current and future threats to the Podkarpackie Province

Krzysztof Czubochoa, Krzysztof Rejman: Social and political consequences of the eastern EU enlargement: the perspective of a critical sociological approach

Anna Delekta, Justyna Stecko: Family tourism and its influence on students' behaviours as tourists

Paweł Dobrzański, Mirosław Śmieszek, Magdalena Dobrzańska: Bicycle transport within selected Polish and European Union cities

Alexander Gugin, Grzegorz Ostasz, Yuliya Lisnevskaya: Castro II. Raúl – ideological leadership in the antilles

Hubert Kotarski: Higher education as part of the modernization of contemporary Poland

Elżbieta Kurzępa, Katarzyna Kurzępa-Dedo: Consequences of the liquidation of the bank enforcement title and social expectations

Piotr Makowski: Issues of brand capital loss risk analysis

Adam Metelski: Physical activity as a predictor of career success

Eugeniusz Moczuk, Bogusław Płoszajczak: Artificial Intelligence – benefits and threats for society

Arkadiusz Pietluch: Leveraging academic and vocational performance through self-efficacy

Anna Walczyna, Anna Arent: Relationship between psychosocial working conditions and the entrepreneurial intentions of students

3/2020

Anna Barwińska-Małajowicz, Kamila Tęcza: Regional labour market and depopulation – an assessment of the situation in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship

Viacheslav Blikhar, Mariia Blikhar, Mykola Kozlovets: The importance of legal convergence in the actions of the state regarding relations with the church: a comparative approach

Tamiliia Dotsevych, Tamara Tkach, Viktoriia Slabouz: Phenomenon of “communicative act”: A psycholinguistics perspective

Ewelina Kaczmarska: The functioning of *feminativum* in the Polish linguistic reality. A case study

Tomasz Kuczur: Political crime in Polish systemic conditions in the 20th century

Nuria Muñoz Vila, Jacek Strojny: Analysis of the management skills required of leaders of project teams using the analytic hierarchy process method (AHP)

Bartosz Pasterski: Organization of the oil industry in south-eastern Poland in the years 1944–1989

Małgorzata Polinceusz: Dissolving assemblies to guarantee security

Małgorzata Polkowska: Space diplomacy – future perspective

Serhii Sheiko, Olena Kolodii: Possibilities of resolving the dilemma ‘power–knowledge’ in the process of the civil society formation in Ukraine

Magdalena Szydełko: The key limiting factors for the establishment of a benchmarking partnership in cluster enterprises

Ewa Trojanowska: Material and living conditions of the Jewish people in ghettos in the Rzeszów powiat during German occupation

Alicja Żukowska: The energy sector in the process of achieving superpetrostate status in the light of strategic documents of the Russian Federation

Grzegorz Ostasz: Book review: *The Mańkowski Chronicles*, Andrzej Emeryk Mańkowski, “ASPRA” Publishing House, Warsaw 2017, 920 pages

4/2020

Katarzyna Coombs-Hoar: Effect of cultural differences on the principle of authority introduced by Robert Cialdini

Tetiana Hlushko, Mykola Kozlovets: Strategies of economic nationalism as an alternative to neoliberal ideology

Joanna Jaroszyk: Spain as the State of Autonomies. Principles behind the territorial organization between 1978 and 1983

Paweł Kępa: The issue of road visibility and road traffic safety

Grzegorz Kozłowski: Us-Japan burden-sharing during the presidency of Donald Trump

Ireneusz Piotr Maj, Joanna Maj: Senator Stanisław Siedlecki. Youth and the beginnings of political activity (1877–1918). Contribution to a biography

Krzysztof Predecki: Safety of the public at football facilities

Sabina Rokita: The influence of the COVID-19 pandemic on management actions and the financial performance of enterprises in Poland during the first half of 2020

Malwina Siewier: Polish-German struggle for influence in Upper Silesia during the sanitation period (1926–1939)

Mirosław Sołtysiak: Financial exclusion in Poland from the male point of view in the light of empirical research

Hanna Sommer, Grzegorz Zakrzewski: Ecological security vs. food security

Lilia Suchocka, Eleonora Krajewska, Małgorzata Pasek: The need for social support and the functioning of individuals in a health-limiting condition

Krzysztof Surowiec: Republic of China armed forces and their modernization in the years 2017–2020 in the background of the geopolitical crisis in relations with the people's Republic of China (PRC)

Justyna Stecko: Review of the book by W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, *Social Harmony or Principles of a Happy Society (Harmonia społeczna czyli zasady szczęśliwego społeczeństwa)*. Publisher: PIW, Warsaw 2017, p. 233, ISBN 978-83-06-03415-8

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The Journal annually publishes a list of reviewers: in the last issue of the quarterly - no. 4/2020 and on the website:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zeszyty-naukowe/humanities-and-social-sciences/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/recenzenci-wspolpracujacy/>

Previous name of the Journal: *Ekonomia i Nauki Humanistyczne*, ISSN 1234-3684

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zeszyty-naukowe/ekonomia-inh/>

<http://eih.prz.edu.pl/>

The journal uses for reviewing, as described on its website:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zasady-recenzowania/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/podstawowe-informacje/standardy-recenzowania/>

Information for authors available at:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/informacje-dla-autorow/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/podstawowe-informacje/informacje-dla-autorow/>

Review's form available at:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zeszyty-naukowe/humanities-and-social-sciences/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/podstawowe-informacje/formularz-recenzji/>

Instruction for Authors

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/instrukcja-dla-autorow/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/podstawowe-informacje/instrukcja-redakcyjna/>

Contact details to Editorial Office available at:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zeszyty-naukowe/humanities-and-social-sciences/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/komitet-redakcyjny/>

Electronic version of the published articles available at:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zeszyty-naukowe/humanities-and-social-sciences/>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/pl/wersja-elektroniczna/>

Reviewing standards, information for authors, the review form, instruction for authors and contact details to HSS Editors and to Publishing House are also published in the fourth number of *Humanities and Social Sciences*, vol. XXIV, 27(4/2020).

**The review principles of scientific articles
in the Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences**

1. To evaluate each article editors appoint two independent reviewers outside of the author's institution. At least one of the reviewers is affiliated with a foreign institution other than the author's nationality.
2. Editors choose the best-qualified reviewers in the field.
3. Between the reviewers and authors of the article there is no conflict of interest.
4. Reviewing procedure is done confidentially (double-blind peer review).
5. Each review shall be in writing and ends with a request for approval or rejection of the article for publication.
6. Reviews that do not meet the substantive and procedural requirements are not accepted.
7. Pre-qualified by the editor-in-chief paper is sent to reviewers who comment on its acceptance or rejection. Reviewers are entitled to re-examine the revised text.
8. Reviewers' remarks are transmitted to the author whose duty is to correct the text.
9. The final decision to qualify or reject the article belongs to the editor-in-chief in consultation with the members of the Editorial Board.
10. Review form is available under the following link: <http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/pl/zeszyty-naukowe/humanities-and-social-sciences/>
Eligibility or rejection criteria are included in the review form.
11. The names of the cooperative reviewers will be quoted once a year – In the last issue of the Papers, and published on the website.
12. Detailed information on reviewing articles and works proceedings of the papers and the Publishing House are described in the guidelines for authors of scientific papers.
13. Each reviewer and reviewer submits the reviewer's declaration of no conflict of interest. The reviewer is obliged to inform the editorial office of the journal about the occurrence of a conflict of interest.

Ethical standards in the Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences

To prevent misconduct in science (**ghostwriting, guest authorship**), the editorial staff of Journals of the Rzeszow University of Technology has introduced appropriate procedures specific to the disciplines represented and has taken the following measures:

1. The editors will require the contributions from the authors in the creation of the article (with their affiliation and the following information: who the author of the concept is, objectives, research, etc.); the primary responsibility will be borne by the person submitting the article.
2. The editors will explain the concept of **ghostwriting** and **guest authorship** to the authors, which are a manifestation of scientific misconduct, and any detected cases of this type of action on the part of the authors will be revealed, including the notification of the appropriate bodies.
3. The editors will obtain information about the sources of publications funding, contribution to research institutions and other bodies (**financial disclosure**).
4. The editors will document all forms of scientific misconduct, especially breaking the rules of conduct obligatory in science.

Conflict of interest

There must be no conflict of interest between reviewers and article authors. Conflict of interest is considered to be the direct personal relationship between the reviewer and the author (in particular, relationship to the second degree and marriage), professional dependency relations or direct scientific cooperation during the last two years preceding the year of the review preparation. Each reviewer and reviewer submits the reviewer's declaration of no conflict of interest. The reviewer is obliged to inform the editorial office of the journal about the occurrence of a conflict of interest.

Review Sheet
Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences

Title:

A Please respond to the following questions

1. Does the title of the paper reflect the content sufficiently? Yes No
2. Are the discussed issues up-to-date? Yes No
3. Paper originality Max. 20 points
4. Goals realization formulated in the paper objective Max. 20 points
5. Language and style correctness Max. 20 points
6. Proper selection of literature and sources Max. 20 points
7. Correctness on drawing conclusions and its relevance resulted
from the paper content Max. 20 points

Total no. of points:

8. Is the paper suitable for publication?

- Yes
- Yes, but after the remarks specified in point 9 are corrected
- No, because



B Confidential
Name and Surname
Address

.....
Signature of the Reviewer

Instrukcja dla autorów artykułów naukowych publikowanych w Oficynie Wydawniczej Politechniki Rzeszowskiej

Jan KOWALSKI¹ (czcionka 10 pkt, pogrubiona, wyrównanie do lewej)

TYTUŁ ARTYKUŁU (CZCIONKA 14 PKT, WERSALIKAMI, WYŚRODKOWANY, POGRUBIONY, ODSTĘP PRZED AKAPITEM 42 PKT, PO 18 PKT)

Streszczenie tekstu 1 akapit zawierający **100-150 słów**. Czcionka 9 pkt, wcięcia obustronne 0,5 pkt, wcięcie pierwszego wiersza 0,5 pkt, tekst wyjustowany.

1. WPROWADZENIE (czcionka 10 pkt, wersalikami, pogrubiony, wysunięcie pierwszego wiersza 0,5cm, numerowany, odstęp przed akapitem 12 pkt, po akapicie 3 pkt)

2. TYTUŁ ROZDZIAŁU (czcionka 10 pkt, wersalikami, pogrubiony, wysunięcie pierwszego wiersza 0,5cm, numerowany, odstęp przed akapitem 12 pkt, po akapicie 3 pkt)

Tekst referatu - przyjmowane są teksty jedynie w j. angielskim: czcionka 10 pkt, wcięcie pierwszego wiersza akapitu 0,5 cm, tekst wyjustowany, odstęp pojedynczy, odstępy przed i po akapicie 0 pkt. Prosimy nie stosować dodatkowych linii odstępu między akapitami.

1.1. Tytuł podrozdziału (czcionka 10 pkt, pogrubiony, wysunięcie pierwszego wiersza 0,75 cm, odstęp przed akapitem 6 pkt, po akapicie 3 pkt)



Rys. 1. Przykład rysunku i jego opisu (opis rysunku umieszczony pod rysunkiem, czcionka 9 pkt, wyjustowany, obustronne wcięcia 0,5 cm, wysunięcie pierwszego wiersza 1 cm, odstęp przed akapitem 6 pkt, po akapicie 3 pkt)

¹ Informacje o autorze: tytuł (stopień), imię i nazwisko, jednostka organizacyjna, uczelnia, miejscowość, adres uczelni, mail. Informacje w przypisie proszę podać zarówno w języku polskim, jak i angielskim. W przypadku kilku autorów artykułu proszę wskazać, kto jest autorem korespondencyjnym. Każdy z autorów jest zobowiązany do podania numeru ORCID. Instrukcja dla nieposiadających: https://www.ifj.edu.pl/library/open-access/materials/Instrukcja_ORCID.pdf

Tabela 1. Przykład tabeli i jej opisu (czcionka 9 pkt, wyjustowany, wysunięcie pierwszego wiersza 1 cm, odstęp przed akapitem 6 pkt, po akapicie 3 pkt)

	Po tabeli należy zostawić odstęp 6 pkt
--	--

Przykład zapisu wzoru:

$$A_2^1 = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{b_i \cdot \cos^2 \alpha}{2 \cdot a \cdot c} \quad (1)$$

Wzór należy wyśrodkować, odstęp przed i po akapicie 3 pkt, numeracja wyrównana do prawej strony marginesu.

Przykłady cytowania – styl APA:

- Nazwisko autora wpisywane jest w nawiasie okrągłym oraz rok ukazania się publikacji, numery stron podawane są w przypadku dosłownego cytowania tekstu. Zgodnie z Standardem APA nazwiska, rok oraz numery stron oddzielone są przecinkiem: **(Kowalski, 1999)**.
- Jeżeli publikacja posiada 2 autorów podajemy ich nazwiska oddzielone są przecinkiem: **(Nowak, Kowalski, 2018)**
- Gdy publikacja posiada trzech, czterech lub pięciu autorów, w pierwszym cytowaniu wymieniamy wszystkich: **(Nowak, Kowalski, Wiśniewska, Wójcik, Kowalczyk 2018)** a przy następnych jedynie pierwszego zastępując pozostałych skrótem „i in.”: **(Nowak i in., 2018)**
- Cytowanie jednocześnie dwóch lub więcej publikacji różnych autorów: Autorów wymieniamy w kolejności alfabetycznej, oddzielając odniesienia do ich publikacji średnikiem. **(Buczak, 1999; Kowalski, 2018; Wiśniewski, 2013)**
- Cytowanie więcej niż jednej publikacji autora: Po nazwisku autora wpisujemy chronologicznie lata ukazania się publikacji **(Nowak, 2013; Nowak, 2018)**
- Jeżeli obie publikacje zostały wydane w tym samym roku, po jego podaniu wpisuje się litery alfabetu. Socjolog jest to osoba, która potrafi wyzwolić się ze swoich bezpośrednich uwarunkowań i zobaczyć rzeczy w szerszym kontekście. **(Nowak, 2013a; Nowak, 2013b)**.
- Gdy autorzy noszą to samo nazwisko: Publikacje rozróżnia się stawiając pierwszą literę imienia przed nazwiskiem autora. **(J. Nowak, 2018; Z. Nowak, 2016)**
- Gdy powołanie się na publikację ma pośredni charakter, należy podać dane źródła pierwotnego, następnie wyrażenie „za”, a na końcu dane źródła wtórnego, w którym podane zostało źródło pierwotne. **(Nowak, 2013, za Kowalski 2015)**.
- Powołując się na pracę zbiorową, należy podać nazwisko redaktora ze stosownym dopiskiem (red., red nauk.) ale w nawiasie kwadratowym, (Nowak, Kowalski [red. nauk.] 2013)
- Akty prawne: wskazujemy początek tytułu np. ustawy, rozporządzenia (w bibliografii pojawia się pełny tytuł), autor może wskazać konkretny paragraf lub artykuł,

który pojawia się jako strona (**Ustawa, 2005, art. 35 ust. 1**). Jeżeli autor wykorzystuje dwa lub więcej aktów prawnych z tego samego roku, wówczas podajemy pierwsze wyrazy tytułu aktu prawnego (**Ustawa o Straży..., 2001, art. 1. par.4**).

- W źródłach internetowych należy wskazać autora lub nazwę strony oraz datę opublikowania tekstu (**MNiSW, 2018**)
- Cytowanie dosłowne: Gdy przytaczany fragment ma ponad 40 słów, należy umieścić go w osobnym akapicie z wcięciem (5 spacji), bez cudzysłowu oraz tekst powinien być poprzedzony i zakończony wolnym wierszem. Gdy przytaczany fragment jest krótszy niż 40 słów, należy umieścić go w linii właściwego tekstu, w cudzysłowu.

Wszystkie publikacje, na które autor się powołuje lub które przywołuje powinny znaleźć się w bibliografii na końcu pracy w stylu APA

LITERATURA zestawiona alfabetycznie (czcionka 10 pkt, wersalikami, pogrubiona, odstęp przed akapitem 12 pkt, po akapicie 3 pkt).

Przykłady bibliografii:

- Nazwisko autora, Inicjał imienia. (rok wydania). *Tytuł książki*. Miejsce wydania: Wydawnictwo.

Nowak, J. (2016). *Współczesne problemy aksjologiczne*. Warszawa: PWN.

- Jeśli nazwisko autora odnosi się do kilku pozycji literatury, należy umieścić je w kolejności wydania, w miejsce nazwiska wpisując sześć łączników (—), np.:

Kowalski, A. (2016). *Etyka życia codziennego*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

— (2018). *Wartości codzienne*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

- W przypadku powoływania się w tekście na pracę zbiorową pierwsze w opisie bibliograficznym jest wtedy nazwisko redaktora:

Nowak, A., Kowalski M., red. (2012). *Współczesne problemy etyczne*. Warszawa: PWN.

- Opis bibliograficzny rozdziału w pracy zbiorowej przyjmuje taką oto formę:

Nowak, H. (2018). *Etyka życia społecznego* [w:] Kowalski E., red., *Etyka*. Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, s. 13-25

- Z kolei opis bibliograficzny artykułu w czasopiśmie przybiera następującą formę:

Nowak, S. (2015). *Płaszczyzna aksjonormatywna*. "Studia etyczne" Nr 4.

- Akty prawne :

Ustawa z 2.10.2005 o podatku dochodowy. Dz.U. 2005, nr 20, poz. 456, z późn. zm.

- Opis dokumentu elektronicznego musi zawierać datę dostępu, źródło dokumentu, typ nośnika, wersję, np.:

Staśkiewicz T. (2016). *Co by się stało gdybyśmy wszyscy zostali wegetarianami? Naukowiec z Oxfordu szokuje prognoząmi* [dostęp: 18.02.2018]. Dostęp w internecie: <https://innpoland.pl/125943,co-by-sie-stalo-gdybysmy-wszyscy-zostali-wegetarianami-naukowiec-z-oxfordu-szokuje-prognozami>

- Jeśli artykuł ma numer DOI (Digital Object Identifier), należy podać go na końcu zapisu bibliograficznego.

ZASADY PRZYGOTOWANIA REFERATU

- Treść artykułu prosimy napisać w edytorze Word, czcionką Times New Roman, zachowując dla wszystkich akapitów pojedynczy odstęp między wierszami.
- Preferowana objętość: 20 000-30 000 znaków (ze spacjami).
- Układ referatu powinien być opracowany zgodnie ze schematem i według instrukcji.
- Referaty powinny być napisane w formacie A4, przy czym należy zastosować następujące marginesy: **górny i dolny – 5,3 cm, lewy i prawy – 4,1 cm**. Nie należy wprowadzać numeracji stron.
- Wszystkie rysunki, wykresy i tabele powinny być umieszczone bezpośrednio w tekście lub wypełniać całe strony (**nie mogą przekraczać marginesów**). Rysunki należy zgrupować.
- Numery i tytuły rysunków, wykresów oraz tabel należy umieścić nad nimi (wyrównanie do lewej), a wskazanie źródła pod nimi (również wyrównanie do lewej).
- Dla całego tekstu pracy należy stosować **przypisy styl APA**.

dotychczasowa nazwa (do 2012 r.)
*Zeszyty Naukowe Politechniki Rzeszowskiej,
Ekonomia i Nauki Humanistyczne*
(p-ISSN 1234-3684)

zmiana nazwy (od 2013 r.) na:
Humanities and Social Sciences, HSS
(p-ISSN 2300-5327), (e-ISSN 2300-9918)

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-Chief

Grzegorz OSTASZ

Deputy of Editor-in-Chief

Justyna STECKO

Editorial assistant

Elżbieta KURZĘPA

Associate Editors

Eugeniusz MOCZUK, Tadeusz OLEJARZ, Marta POMYKAŁA,
Grzegorz ROSŁAN, Beata ZATWARNICKA-MADURA, Dominik ZIMON,

Scientific Board

Alla ARISTOVA (Ukraine), Heinrich BADURA (Austria)
Guido BALDI (Germany), Aleksander BOBKO (Poland)
Zbigniew BOCHNIARZ (The USA), Viktor CHEPURKO (Ukraine)
Zuzana HAJDUOVÁ (Slovakia), Wilem J.M. HEIJMAN (The Netherlands)
Tamara HOVORUN (Ukraine), Paweł GRATA (Poland)
Beatriz Urbano LOPEZ DE MENESES (Spain)
Aleksandr MEREZHKO (Ukraine), Nellya NYCHKALO (Ukraine)
Waldemar PARUCH (Poland), Krzysztof REJMAN (Poland)
Annely ROTHKEGEL (Germany), Josef SABLİK (Slovakia)
Mykoła STADNIK (Ukraine), Anatoliy TKACH (Ukraine)
Michael WARD (Ireland), Natalia ZHYHAYLO (Ukraine)

Statistical editor

Tomasz PISULA

Language editors

E-CORRECTOR

Magdalena REJMAN-ZIENTEK, Piotr CYREK

Afiliacja Komitetu Redakcyjnego:

Politechnika Rzeszowska, Wydział Zarządzania, Polska

Informacje dla autorów:

<http://oficyna.prz.edu.pl/zeszyty-naukowe/humanities-and-social-sciences>

<http://hss.prz.edu.pl/>

Dane kontaktowe do wydawcy:

Kierownik Oficyny Wydawniczej

mgr inż. Joanna Bieniasz

Politechnika Rzeszowska

al. Powstańców Warszawy 12

35-959 Rzeszów

e-mail: jbie@prz.edu.pl

tel: +48 17 865 1195